LIBRARY 

OF   THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


GIFT  OF 

' 


2.      V 


'vS- 


SHERMAN'S  HISTORICAL  RAID. 


THE  MEMOIRS 


IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  THE  RECORD. 


A  REVIEW  BASED  UPON  COMPILATIONS  FROM 
THE  FILES  OF  THE  WAR  OFFICE. 


H.  V.  BOYNTON, 

WASHINGTON  CORRESPONDENT  OP  THE   CINCINNATI  GAZETTE. 


CINCINNATI: 

WILSTACH,    BALDWIN   &   CO., 
1875. 


ENTERED  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1875,  by 

WILSTACH,  BALDWIN  &  CO., 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


PEEFACE. 


GENERAL  SHERMAN  in  the  introduction  to  his  Memoirs, 
says: 

"  What  is  now  offered  is  not  designed  as  a  history  of  the  war,  or  even  as  a 
complete  account  of  all  the  incidents  in  which  the  writer  bore  a  part ;  but  merely 
as  his  recollection  of  events,  corrected  by  a  reference  to  his  own  memoranda, 
which  may  assist  the  future  historian  when  he  comes  to  describe  the  whole, 
and  account  for  the  motives  and  reasons  which  influenced  some  of  the  actors 
in  the  grand  drama  of  the  war." 

The  object  of  the  present  compilation,  chiefly  from  the  offi 
cial  records,  is  to  show  wherein  the  Memoirs  of  General  Sher 
man  fall  far  short  of  presenting  the  correct  history  of  many 
great  events  of  which  they  treat;  how  much  they  lack  of 
giving  a  complete  account  of  incidents  which  they  relate ;  how 
far  the  author's  recollection,  even  when  corrected  by  his  own 
memoranda,  is  at  fault;  and  to  furnish  the  future  historian 
with  facts  which  will  guard  him  against  perpetuating  the  error 
and  the  injustice  which  pervade  both  volumes  of  the  work. 

This  book  is  a  criticism  upon  Sherman  as  a  general,  only  so 
far  as  the  official  records  presented  furnish  such  criticism. 
There  is  no  attempt  to  contradict  his  statements,  except  as  the 
records  contradict  them.  Wherever  these  show  that  he  has 
done  grave  injustice  both  to  the  living  and  to  the  dead,  they 
are  produced  with  as  little  comment  as  is  needed  to  set  them 
in  connected  order,  and  point  out  the  refutations  which  they 
contain.  While  by  this  method  of  review,  his  mistakes  only 

(3) 


4  PEEFACE. 

are  presented,  there  has  been  no  intention  to  underrate  the 
great  and  brilliant  services  which  he  performed. 

If  these  pages  serve  in  any  degree  to  correct  error  and  do 
justice,  where  error  uncorrected,  and  injustice  done,  affect  the 
reputations  of  men  or  officers,  who,  either  in  humble  position 
or  exalted  station,  freely  periled  their  lives,  or  laid  them  down 
for  the  country,  the  object  for  which  they  have  been  written 
will  be  accomplished. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAP.  PAGE 

I. — INTRODUCTORY 7 

H— FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON— THE  CREDIT  WHICH  SHER 
MAN  DENIES  GRANT .        .10 

III. — SHILOH — THE  QUESTION  OF  SURPRISE — UNFAIR  TREATMENT 

OF   BUELL   AND   HIS   ARMY 25 

IV. — IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH — GENERAL  KOSECRANS  MISREP 
RESENTED     .        .        . 44 

V. — CHICKASAW  BAYOU — PLUNGING  AN  ARMY  THROUGH  SWAMPS 

AND  AGAINST  IMPREGNABLE  BLUFFS        ...        .54 

VI. — CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA — INJUSTICE  TO  KOSECRANS, 

THOMAS,  AND  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND     .        .    65 

VII. — THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN — UNJUST  ARRAIGNMENT  OF  GEN 
ERAL  W.  SOOY  SMITH         .        .        .        .        .        .        .89 

VIII. — E-ESACA — THE  FAILURE  THERE  ATTRIBUTED  TO  MCPHERSON    96 

IX. — KENESAW — UNGENEROUS   TREATMENT  OF  THOMAS;  INACCU 
RATE  STATEMENTS 107 

X. — THE  BATTLE  OF  ATLANTA  AND  ITS  POLITICAL  GENERALS    .119 

XI. — THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA — DID  GRANT  OR   SHERMAN   PLAN 

IT?        .        . 128 

XII. — HARDEE'S  ESCAPE   FROM   SAVANNAH 162 

XIII. — AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE  CRITICISED  FROM  SAVANNAH        .  173 

(5) 


6  CONTENTS. 

CHAP.  ,  PAGE 

XIV. — THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE — THE  HISTORY  OF  HIS 

CONTEMPLATED  KEMOVAL  .        .        .        ...        .  183 

XV. — THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH — CHARACTER,  OF  THE 
ATTACK  ON  SECRETARY  STANTON;  THE  JEFF.  DAVIS 
GOLD 198 

XVI. — BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE — THE  CARELESS  ADVANCE  OF  AN 

ARMY 208 

XVII. — THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON — FIRST  DRAFT  MADE  BY  A 
CONFEDERATE  CABINET  OFFICER — F AC- SIMILE  OF  THE 
ORIGINAL 219 

XVIII. — OPINIONS   OF  JEFF.   DAVIS'  CABINET  OFFICERS  ON   SHER 
MAN'S  TERMS 244 

XIX. — SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF — THE  CONTROVERSY  WITH  THE  WAR 

DEPARTMENT  OVER  THE  CONTROL  OF  THE  STAFF  CORPS  259 

XX. — CONCLUSION — THE  CASE  AGAINST  THE  MEMOIRS  SUMMED  UP  272 


CHAPTER    I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN  is  one  of  the  most  popular  heroes  of 
the  late  war.  He  has  published  his  book  after  ten  years  of 
reflection  upon  events  in  which  he  bore  most  conspicuous  and 
honorable  part.  During  these  years  he  has  had  uninterrupted 
access  to  the  official  records,  including  their  most  confidential 
papers;  and  in  view  of  his  high  position,  his  opportunities 
for  intimate  knowledge  and  his  popularity,  what  he  has  now 
written  will,  in  spite  of  himself,  be  accepted  as  history  by 
most  readers  who  have  not  the  means  of  testing  his  story  by 
the  records.  It  is  believed  that  the  extracts  from  these,  pre 
sented  in  this  volume,  will  prove  sufficient  to  thoroughly 
fortify  General  Sherman  in  the  claim  that  his  book  is  not 
history,  and  so  in  part  prevent  the  injustice  which  will  be 
done  to  many  distinguished  officers  and  brave  armies,  if  what 
he  has  written  be  received  as  accurate.  No  criticisms  of  the 
strategy  or  the  tactics  of  General  Sherman  will  be  found  in 
these  pages,  except  such  as  are  plainly  called  forth  by  the 
records  produced. 

High  as  is  the  position  which  he  occupies,  great  as  is  the 
authority  with  which  he  speaks,  there  is  nothing  in  either 
which  should  afford  him  the  least  protection  in  the  eyes  of  his 
countrymen,  if  he  be  found  detracting  from  the  merit  or  the 
fame  which  belongs  to  his  associates. 

It  might  be  pardoned  in  one  who  accomplished  so  much  if 
he  had  contented  himself  with  moderately  magnifying  his  own 
achievements,  but  when  he  goes  beyond  this,  and  claims  the 

(7) 


8  INTRODUCTORY. 

merit  which  belongs  to  others,  and  steps  still  beyond  and 
attempts  to  belittle  the  deeds  of  men  in  no  respect  his 
inferiors  as  generals  or  soldiers,  and  does  cruel  injustice  to 
whole  armies,  the  harmless  vanity  of  the  successful  general 
becomes  the  gigantic  wrong  of  the  false  historian. 

In  a  broad  and  high  sense,  the  merit  of  every  man  who 
bore  a  musket  faithfully,  and  slept  finally  in  the  grave  of  the 
"unknown/7  is  as  great  as  his.  His  Memoirs  arraign  the 
dead  as  well  as  the  living.  The  files  of  the  War  Department 
afford  an  answer  for  both.  These  orders,  letters,  telegrams, 
and  reports,  written  either  before,  at  the  time,  or  immediately 
after  the  occurrence  of  the  events  ordered,  in  progress,  or 
accomplished,  photographed  the  truth,  and  in  these  the  living 
and  the  dead  find  just  defense.  Here  Thomas,  McPherson, 
Stanton,  and  their  companions,  speak  for  themselves,  and 
vindicate  themselves  from  unjust  aspersions.  Here,  in  short, 
truth  is  made  manifest,  and  exact  justice  done. 

The  position  which  General  Sherman  occupies  now,  and 
that  which  he  held  during  the  war,  will  naturally,  and  of  nec 
essity,  give  the  force  of  history  to  what  he  has  written,  in 
spite  of  any  disclaimer  he  may  make,  and  this  historical 
character  will  attach  to  these  Memoirs  so  long  as  they  remain 
uncorrected  by  the  official  record. 

For  the  benefit  of  comrades  living,  who  can  not  conveni 
ently  consult  these  records,  and  especially  in  vindication  of 
such  as  are  dead,  it  should  be  esteemed  a  duty  by  all  who  can 
reach  the  files,  to  search  them  carefully,  with  a  view  to  over 
throw  error  and  establish  truth.  So  far  as  General  Sherman's 
book  conforms  to  official  papers,  their  production  can  only 
strengthen  him;  so  far  as  it  fails  to  agree  with  these,  it  not 
only  deserves  to  be  condemned,  but  its  condemnation  should 
be  measured  by  the  prominence  of  the  author  and  his  abund 
ant  facilities  for  obtaining  accurate  information. 

Judged  by  the  official  record,  the  verdict  must  be  that  the 
work  is  intensely  egotistical,  unreliable,  and  cruelly  unjust  to 
nearly  all  his  distinguished  associates.  Our  erratic  General 


INTRODUCTORY.  9 

thrusts  his  pen  recklessly  through  reputations  which  are  as 
dear  to  the  country  as  his  own.  He  detracts  from  what  right 
fully  belongs  to  Grant;  misrepresents  and  belittles  Thomas ; 
withholds  justice  from  Buell,  repeatedly  loads  failures  for 
which  he  was  responsible,  now  upon  Thomas,  now  upon 
Schofield,  now  upon  McPhcrson,  and  again  upon  the  three 
jointly;  is  unjust  in  the  extreme  to  Kosecrans;  sneers  at 
Logan  and  Blair;  insults  Hooker,  and  slanders  Stanton. 

The  salient  points  of  the  long  story  are  readily  found  by 
those  who  either  followed,  or  made  themselves  familiar  by 
study  with  his  campaigns.  The  reader  turns  naturally  for 
explanations  of  the  surprise  and  attending  disgrace  at  Shiloh ; 
the  ill-judged  and  fatal  assault  at  Chickasaw  Bayou ;  the 
protest  against  the  move  by  which  Vicksburg  was  captured; 
his  failure  to  carry  the  point  assigned  him  at  the  battle  of 
Chattanooga;  the  escape  of  Johnston  from  Dalton  and  Eesaca; 
the  terrible  mistake  of  the  assault  on  Kenesaw;  the  plunging 
of  his  army,  marching  by  the  flank,  into  Hood's  line  of  battle 
under  the  supposition  that  Atlanta  was  evacuated;  the  escape 
of  the  rebel  army  from  Savannah ;  the  careless  and  inexcus 
able  periling  and  narrow  escape  of  his  own  army  at  Benton- 
ville ;  and  lastly,  the  political  surrender  to  Johnston  at 
Raleigh:  these  are  points  upon  which  every  reader  desires 
light.  But  instead  of  gaining  it,  he  finds  that  for  most,  the 
chief  aim  of  the  author  seems  to  be  to  make  the  darkness 
more  impenetrable. 

The  succeeding  chapters  will  treat,  in  their  order,  of  the 
prominent  movements  and  battles  which  General  Sherman 
passes  in  review  in  his  Memoirs,  and  in  each  of  these  the  ver 
sion  of  his  book  will  be  compared  with  the  facts  as  disclosed 
by  the  records  now  on  file  in  the  War  Department. 


CHAPTER  II. 

FORTS    HENRY   AND    DONELSON — THE    CREDIT   WHICH    SHER 
MAN   DENIES   TO   GRANT. 

OF  the  many  remarkable  things  in  General  Sherman's  book 
few  will  excite  more  comment  than  the  deliberate  attempt  to 
take  from  General  Grant  the  credit  which  belongs  to  him 
for  several  very  important  movements,,  and  either  assign  it  to 
others,  as  in  the  case  of  the  move  against  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  or  appropriate  it  for  himself,  as  is  done  in  claiming 
that  he  planned  the  "March  to  the  Sea."  No  one  general 
officer  of  his  rank  was  under  greater  obligations  to  another 
throughout  the  war  than  Sherman  to  Grant,  and  on  this 
account  any  unjust  treatment  of  the  latter  deserves  severer 
condemnation. 

General  Sherman  wrote  his  book  while  in  Washington.  A 
staff  officer  at  his  headquarters  copied  the  rough  manuscript 
daily.  All  the  records  of  the  War  Department,  including  re 
ports,  field  telegrams,  and  all  other  species  of  official  corres 
pondence  pertaining  to  every  movement  of  which  he  wrote, 
and  arranged  for  ready  reference,  were  at  his  disposal.  He 
had  only  to  ask  for  them,  or  to  send  an  orderly  after  them.  And 
yet,  incredible  as  it  may  seem,  he  scarcely  availed  himself  of 
this  collection  of  records,  but  wrote  from  memory  and  from  some 
portions  of  these  which  happened  to  be  in  his  own  possession. 

In  reviewing  the  campaign  up  the  Cumberland  and  Tennes 
see  Rivers,  Sherman  thus  gives  the  credit  to  Halleck — or  to 
"Cullum  or  I"— on  page  219  of  Vol.  I: 

"  Though  it  was  midwinter,  General  Halleck  was  pushing  his  preparations 
most  vigorously,  and  surely  he  brought  order  out  of  chaos  in  St.  Louis  with 

(10) 


FORTS  HENRY  AND   DONELSOX.  11 

commendable  energy.  I  remember  one  night  sitting  in  his  room,  on  the  sec 
ond  floor  of  the  Planters'  House,  with  him  and  General  Cullum,  his  chief  of 
staff,  talking  of  things  generally,  and  the  subject  then  was  of  the.  much-talked- 
of  'advance,'  as  soon  as  the  season  would  permit.  Most  people  urged  the 
movement  down  the  Mississippi  River ;  but  Generals  Polk  and  Pillow  had  a 
large  rebel  force  with  heavy  guns  in  a  very  strong  position  at  Columbus,  Ky., 
about  eighteen  miles  below  Cairo  |  Commodore  Foote  had  his  gun-boat  fleet  at 
Cairo  ;  and  General  U.  S.  Grant,  who  commanded  the  district,  was  collecting 
a  large  force  at  Paducah,  Cairo,  and  Bird's  Point.  General  Halleck  had  a 
map  on  his  table,  with  a  large  pencil  in  his  hand,  and  asked,  *  Where  is  the 
rebel  line  ? '  Cullum  drew  the  pencil  through  Bowling  Green,  Forts  Donelson 
and  Henry,  and  Columbus,  Ky.  '  That  is  their  line,'  said  Halleck ;  '  now  where 
is  the  proper  place  to  break  it?'  And  either  Cullum  or  I  said,  'Naturally  the 
center.'  Halleck  drew  a  line  perpendicular  to  the  other,  near  its  middle, 
and  it  coincided  nearly  with  the  general  course  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and 
he  said, '  That's  the  true  line  of  operations,' 

"  This  occurred  more  than  a  month  before  General  Grant  began  the  move 
ment,  and  as  he  was  subject  to  General  Halleck's  orders,  I  have  always  given 
General  Halleck  the  full  credit  for  that  movement,  which  was  skillful,  suc 
cessful,  and  extremely  rich  in  military  results ;  indeed  it  was  the  first  real 
success  on  our  side  in  the  civil  war.  The  movement  up  the  Tennessee  began 
about  the  1st  of  February,  and  Fort  Henry  was  captured  by  the  joint  action 
of  the  navy  under  Commodore  Foote,  and  the  land  forces  under  General 
Grant,  on  the  6th  of  February,  1862.  About  the  same  time  General  S.  R. 
Curtis  had  moved  forward  from  Rolla,  and  on  the  8th  of  March,  defeated  the 
rebels  under  McCulloch,  Van  Dorn  and  Price  at  Pea  Ridge. 

"As  soon  as  Fort  Henry  fell,  General  Grant  marched  straight  across  to 
Fort  Donelson,  on  the  Cumberland  River,  invested  the  place,  and,  as  soon  as 
the  gun-boats  had  come  round  from  the  Tennessee,  and  had  bombarded  the 
water  front,  he  assaulted;  whereupon  Buckner  surrendered  the  garrison  of 
twelve  thousand  men,  Pillow  and  ex-Secretary  of  War  General  Floyd  having 
personally  escaped  across  the  river  at  night,  occasioning  a  good  deal  of  fun 
and  criticism  at  their  expense." 

If  General  Sherman  had  taken  the  trouble  to  send  for  Gen 
eral  Halleck's  letter-book  for  the  time  he  mentions  above,  he 
would  have  found  a  letter  to  General  McClellan,  then  General- 
in-Chief  of  the  army,  showing  that  he  (Halleck)  had  no  settled 
plans  for  a  movement  up  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee, 
and  only  general  ideas  of  it  at  most,  and  that  he  did  not  ex 
pect  such  a  movement  could  take  place  till  long  after  the  time 
General  Grant  actually  captured  both  Forts  Henry  and  Donel 
son,  and  effectually  opened  these  rivers. 


12  FORTS   HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 

This  letter,  lying  at  General  Sherman's  very  elbow,  is  dated 
at  Headquarters  Department  of  the  Missouri,  St.  Louis,  Jan 
uary  20,  1862.  The  following  extracts  are  sufficient  to  settle 
the  question  at  issue  : 

I  have  received  no  information  in  respect  to  the  general  plan  of  campaign, 
and  therefore  feel  much  hesitation  in  recommending  any  line  of  operations  for 
these  and  other  troops  which  I  may  be  able  to  withdraw  from  Missouri.  Of 
course  this  line  must  be  subordinate  to  some  general  plan.  I  take  it  for 
granted  General,  that  what  has  heretofore  been  done  has  been  the  result  of 
political  policy  rather  than  military  strategy,  and  that  the  want  of  success  on 
our  part  is  attributable  to  the  politicians  rather  than  to  the  generals.  *  * 

I  am  aware  General,  that  you  are  in  no  way  responsible  for  this ;  these 
movements  have  been  governed  by  political  expediency,  and  in  many  cases 
directed  by  politicians  in  order  to  subserve  party  interest.  *  *  *  But 
is  it  not  possible,  with  the  new  Searetary  of  War,  to  introduce  a  different  pol 
icy,  and  make  our  future  movements  in  accordance  with  military  principles. 
On  this  supposition  I  venture  to  make  a  few  suggestions  in  regard  to  opera 
tions  in  the  West. 

The  idea  of  moving  down  the  Mississippi  by  steam,  is  in  my  opinion  im 
practicable,  or  at  least  premature.  It  is  not  the  proper  line  of  operations,  at 
least  now.  A  much  more  feasible  plan  is  to  move  up  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee,  making  Nashville  the  present  objective  point.  This  would  threaten 
Columbus,  and  force  the  abandonment  of  Bowling  Green.  *  *  *  * 

This  line  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee  is  the  great  central  line  of 
the  Western  theater  of  war,  with  the  Ohio  below  the  mouth  of  Green  River 
as  the  base,  and  two  great  navigable  rivers  extending  far  into  the  theater  of  op 
erations.  But  the  plan  should  not  be  attempted  without  a  large  force — not  less 
than  sixty  thousand  effective  men.  *  *  *  The  main  central  line  will  also 
require  the  withdrawal  of  all  available  troops  from  this  State,  also  those  in 
Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Wisconsin,  and  Ohio,  which  are  armed,  or  still  to  be 
armed,  and  also  the  transfer  to  that  route,  or  near  it,  of  all  the  Kentucky 
troops  not  required  to  secure  the  line  of  Green  River. 

The  force  at  Cairo  and  on  the  Ohio  River  below  the  mouth  of  Green  River 
is  now  about  fifteen  thousand.  Seven  regiments  have  just  been  ordered  there 
from  Missouri. 

By  the  middle  or  last  of  February  I  hope  to  send  fifteen  thousand  more. 
If  thirty  thousand  or  forty  thousand  can  be  added  from  the  sources  indicated, 
these  will  be  sufficient  for  holding  Cairo,  Fort  Holt,  and  Paducah,  and  form 
the  column  proposed.  *  *  *  * 

These  suggestions  are  hastily  written  out,  but  they  are  the  result  of  much  anx 
ious  inquiry  and  mature  deliberation.  I  am  confident  that  the  plan,  if  properly 
carried  out,  will  produce  important  results.  I  also  believe  it  to  be  feasible. 

I  have  not  designated  any  particular  line  or  lines  of  movement ;  that  must 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  13 

be  a  matter  for  further  study,  if  the  general  idea  should  be  approved.  Per 
haps  the  main  column  should  move  from  Smithland,  between  the  rivers,  by 
Dover,  etc.  Perhaps  the  line  east  of  the  Cumberland,  or  that  west  of  the 
Tennessee,  would  be  preferable.  These  questions,  however,  are  matters  easily 
determined. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Majw-General. 

As  General  Grant  formally  proposed,  on  January  28th,  to 
General  Halleck  to  take  Fort  Henry,  captured  it  on  the  6th 
of  February,  moved  on  Fort  Donelson  the  next  day,  and  took 
it  on  the  16th  of  February,  it  will  be  seen  from  the  above 
letter,  that  General  Halleck,  at  the  time  Grant  had  accom 
plished  this  work  and  opened  both  rivers,  did  not  expect 
to  have  men  enough  by  thirty  or  forty  thousand  to  begin  the 
vague  movement  he  had  in  his  mind. 

But  if  General  Sherman  had  searched  the  records  with  the 
least  care  he  would  have  found  that  even  these  identical  ideas 
of  Halleck,  about  a  move  on  a  line  perpendicular  to  one  join 
ing  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus  were  suggested  by  General 
Buell. 

For  the  records  show  that  as  early  as  November  of  the  pre 
ceding  year,  Buell  had  proposed  to  General  McClellan  to  move 
around  the  right  flank  of  the  rebels  at  Bowling  Green,  and 
advance  on  Nashville,  while  supplies  and  troops  from  Halleck 
should  move  up  the  Cumberland,  guarded  by  the  fleet.  General 
McClellan  urged  cooperation  on  Halleck,  who  delayed  answer 
ing  dispatches  for  some  time.  Finally,  on  January  3d,  at  the 
request  of  President  Lincoln,  General  Buell  wrote  General 
Halleck,  setting  forth  most  of  the  ideas  that  Halleck  afterward 
submitted  as  his  own  to  McClellan,  and  which  are  given  above 
in  the  letter  dated  January  20th. 

The  records  give  a  connected  history  of  the  discussion  at 
this  time  between  the  authorities  at  Washington,  and  Generals 
Buell  and  Halleck. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  31,  18R1. 
General  BUELL,  Louisville,  Ky. 

General  McClellan  is  sick.  Are  General  Halleck  and  yourself  in  concert? 
When  you  move  on  Bowling  Green,  what  hinders  it  being  reenforced  from 
Columbus?  Answer.  A.  LINCOLN. 


14  FORTS  HENRY  AND   DONELSON. 

LOUISVILLE,  KY..  January  1,  1862. 
To  A.  LINCOLN,  President. 

There  is  no  arrangement  between  General  Ilalleck  and  myself.  I  have 
been  informed  by  General  McClellan  that  he  would  make  suitable  disposition 
for  concerted  action. 

There  is  nothing  to  prevent  Bowling  Green  being  reenforced  from  Colum 
bus,  if  a  military  force  is  not  brought  to  bear  on  the  latter  place. 

D.  C.  BUELL,  Brigadier- General. 

LOUISVILLE,  11  P.  M.,  January  1,  1862. 
To  President  LINCOLN, 

I  have  already  telegraphed  General  Halleck  with  a  view  to  arranging  a 
concert  of  action  between  us,  and  am  momentarily  expecting  his  answer. 

D.  C.  BUELL,  Brigadier  General. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  31,  1861. 
General  HALLECK,  St.  Louis. 

General  McClellan  is  sick.  Are  General  Buell  and  yourself  in  concert? 
When  he  moves  on  Bowling  Green,  what  hinders  it  being  reenforced  from 
Columbus?  A  simultaneous  move  by  you  on  Columbus  might  prevent  it. 
Answer.  A.  LINCOLN. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI, 
ST.  Louis,  January  1,  1862. 

A.  LINCOLN,  President  U.  S.  A.,  Washington. 

I  have  never  received  a  word  from  General  Buell.  I  am  not  ready  to  co 
operate  with  him ;  hope  to  do  so  in  a  few  weeks.  Have  written  fully  on  this 
subject  to  General  McClellan.  Too  much  haste  will  ruin  everything  here. 

II.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General. 

LOUISVILLE,  KY.,  January  1,  1862. 
Major-General  HALLECK,  St.  Louis. 

I  understand  General  McClellan  is  sick.  Has  any  concerted  action  been 
arranged  for  us  ?  If  not,  can  any  be  arranged  between  us  ?  If  possible,  it  is 
desirable  it  should  be  done  speedily. 

D.  C.  BUELL,  Brigadier- General  commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI,  ) 
ST.  Louis,  January  2,  1862.      j 
Brigadier- General  BUELL,  Louisville. 

I  have  had  no  instructions  respecting  cooperation.  All  my  available  troops 
are  in  the  field,  except  those  at  Cairo  and  Paducah,  which  are  barely  sufficient 
to  threaten  Columbus,  etc.  A  few  weeks  hence  I  hope  to  be  able  to  render 
you  very  material  assistance,  but  now  a  withdrawal  of  my  troops  from  this 
State  is  almost  impossible.  Write  me  fully. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  15 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  OHIO,  ) 
LOUISVILLE,  January  3,  1862.      j 

General  W.  H.  HALLECK,  Commanding  Department  of  the  Missouri. 

GENERAL:  I  received  your  dispatch,  and,  with  more  delay  than  I  meant, 
proceed  to  the  subject  of  it,  in  compliance  with  your  request,  and  I  may  add 
also,  at  the  wish  of  the  President. 

I  do  not  underrate  the  difficulties  in  Missouri,  but  I  think  it  is  not  extrava 
gant  to  say  that  the  great  power  of  the  rebellion  in  the  West  is  arranged  on 
a  front,  the  flanks  of  which  are  Columbus  and  Bowling  Green,  and  the  center 
about  where  the  railroad  between  those  points  crosses  the  Tennessee  and 
Cumberland  Rivers,  including  Nashville  and  the  fortified  points  below,  It 
is,  I  have  no  doubt,  within  bounds  to  estimate  their  force  on  that  line  at 
eighty  thousand  men,  including  a  column  about  Somerset,  Ky.  In  rear  of 
their  right  flank  it  is  more. 

Of  their  force,  forty  thousand  may  be  set  down  as  at  Bowling  Green,  twenty 
thousand  at  Columbus — though  you,  doubtless,  have  more  information  on 
that  point  than  I  have — and  twenty  thousand  at  the  center.  Considering  the 
railroad  facilities,  which  enable  the  enemy  to  concentrate  in  a  few  hours  on 
any  single  point  of  this  front,  you  will  at  once  see  the  importance  of  a  com 
bined  attack  on  its  center  and  flanks,  or  at  least  of  demonstrations  which 
may  be  converted  into  real  attacks,  and  fully  occupy  the  enemy  on  the  whole 
front.  It  is  probable  that  you  may  have  given  the  subject,  as  far  as  Columbus 
and  the  center  are  concerned,  more  attention  than  I  have.  With  reference  to 
the  former,  at  least,  I  can  make  no  more  than  the  general  suggestion  already 
expressed,  that  it  should  be  fully  occupied. 

The  attack  upon  the  center  should  be  made  by  two  gun-boat  expeditions, 
with,  I  should  say,  twenty  thousand  men  on  the  two  rivers.  They  should,  of 
course,  be  organized  with  reference  to  the  depth  of  water  in  the  rivers;  and 
whether  they  should  be  of  equal  or  unequal  strength,  would  depend  upon 
that  and  other  considerations,  and  can  hardly  be  determined  until  the  moment 
of  departure.  The  mode  of  attack  must  depend  on  the  strength  of  the  enemy 
at  the  several  points  and  the  features  of  the  localities.  It  will  be  of  the  first 
importance  to  break  the  railroad  communication,  and,  if  possible,  that  should 
be  done  by  columns  moving  rapidly  to  the  bridges  over  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee.  The  former  probably  would  not  be  reached  at  first,  being  some 
thirty-one  miles  above  the  first  principal  battery  that  I  know  of  at  Dover. 
The  other  is  eighteen  miles  above  Fort  Henry — the  first  I  know  of  on  the 
Tennessee.  If  the  expeditions  should  not  be  strong  enough  to  do  the  work 
alone,  they  should  establish  themselves  firmly  at  the  nearest  possible  point, 
and  remain  at  least  until  they  ascertained  that  reinforcements  from  my  col 
umns,  or  some  other  source,  would  not  reach  them.  By  uniting,  they  could 
establish  themselves  permanently  under  the  protection  of  the  gun-boats. 

I  say  this  much  rather  to  lay  the  subject  before  you  than  to  propose  any 
definite  plan  for  your  side.  Whatever  is  done  should  be  done  speedily,  within 


16  FORTS  HENRY  AND   DONELSON. 

a  few  days.     The  work  will  become  more  difficult  every  day.     Please  let  me 
hear  from  you  at  once.         Very  truly  yours,  t 

D.  C.  BUELL,  Brigadier-  General  commanding. 

Four  days  later  General  Buell  telegraphed  as  follows : 

LOUISVILLE,  January  7,  1862. 
General  HALLECK,  St.  Louis. 

I  am  telegraphed  by  the  President.    Can  you  fix  a  day  for  concerted  action  ? 

D.  C.  BUELL,  Brigadier- General. 

To  which  Halleek  replied: 

ST.  Louis,  January  7,  1862. 
General  BUELL,  Louisvitte. 

Designate  a  day  for  a  demonstration.    I  can  do  nothing  more.    See  my  letter 
of  yesterday.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General. 


The  letter  thus  referred  to  was  as  follows : 

APARTMENT 

ST.  Louis,  January  6,  1862 


HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  MISSOURI,  ) 


Brigadier- General  D.  C.  BUELL,  Louisville,  Ky. 

GENERAL  :  I  have  delayed  writing  to  you  for  several  days  in  hopes  of  get 
ting  some  favorable  news  from  the  South-west.  The  news  received  to-day, 
however,  is  unfavorable,  it  being  stated  that  Price  is  making  a  stand  near 
Springfield,  and  that  all  our  available  forces  will  be  required  to  dislodge  and 
drive  him  out. 

My  last  advices  from  Columbus  represent  that  the  enemy  has  about  twenty- 
two  thousand  men  there.  I  have  only  about  fifteen  thousand  at  Cairo,  Fort 
Holt,  and  Paducah,  and  after  leaving  guards  at  these  places  I  could  not  send 
into  the  field  over  ten  or  eleven  thousand.  Moreover,  many  of  these  are  very 
imperfectly  armed. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  would  be  madness  for  me  to  attempt  any 
serious  operation  against  Camp  Beauregard  or  Columbus.  Prooably,  in  the 
course  of  a  few  weeks,  I  will  be  able  to  send  additional  troops  to  Cairo  and 
Paducah  to  cooperate  with  you,  but  at  present  it  is  impossible;  and  it  seem? 
to  me  that,  if  you  deem  such  cooperation  necessary  to  your  success,  your 
movement  on  Bowling  Green  should  be  delayed.  I  know  nothing  of  the  plan 
of  campaign,  never  having  received  any  information  on  the  subject;  but  it 
strikes  me  that  to  operate  from  Louisville  and  Paducah,  or  Cairo,  against  an 
enemy  at  Bowling  Green,  is  a  plain  case  of  exterior  lines,  like  that  of 
McDowell  and  Patterson,  which,  unless  each  of  the  exterior  columns  is 
superior  to  the  enemy,  leads  to  disaster  ninety-nine  times  in  a  hundred. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND   DONELSON.  17 

On  the  6th  of  January  McClellan  wrote  to  Buell  as  follows : 
"Halleck,  from  his  own  accounts,  will  not  soon  be  in  condi 
tion  to  support  properly  a  movement  up  the  Cumberland." 
And  again  on  the  13th :  "  Halleck  is  not  yet  in  condition  to 
afford  you  the  support  you  need  when  you  undertake  the 
movement  on  Bowling  Green." 

On  the  10th  of  January  Halleck  telegraphed  Buell: 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  MISSOURI,  ) 
ST.  Louis,  January  10,  1862.      J 
General  BUELL,  Louisville. 

Troops  at  Cairo  and  Paducah  are  ready  for  a  demonstration  on  Mayfield, 
Murray,  and  Dover.  Six  additional  regiments  will  be  there  next  week.  Fix 
the  day  when  you  wish  a  demonstration ;  but  put  it  off  as  long  as  possible,  in 
order  that  I  may  increase  the  strength  of  the  force. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General. 

On  the  same  day  Halleck  telegraphed  Grant :  "  Reinforce 
ments  are  receiving  arms.  Delay  your  movements  until  I 
telegraph.  Let  me  know  when  the  channel  is  clear." 

And  on  the  next  day :  "  I  can  hear  nothing  from  Buell,  so 
fix  your  own  time  for  the  advance.  Three  regiments  will 
come  down  Monday." 

Subsequently  the  following  passed  between  Halleck  and 
Buell: 

ST.  Louis,  February  2,  1862. 
Brigadier- General  BUELL,  Louisville,  Ky. 

GENERAL  :    Yours  of  the  30th  ultimo  is  received.    At  present  it  is  only 
proposed  to  take  and  occupy  Fort  Henry  and  Dover,  and,  if  possible,  cut 
the  railroad  from  Columbus  to  Bowling  Green.       *       *       *       But  it  will 
take  some  time  to  get  troops  ready  to  advance  far  south  of  Fort  Henry. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major  General. 

ST.  LOUIS,  February  7,  1862. 

To  General  BUELL,  Louisville. 

You  say  you  regret  that  we  could  not  have  consulted  on  this  matter  earlier. 
So  do  I  most  sincerely.  I  had  no  idea  of  commencing  the  movement  before 
the  15th  or  20th  inst.,  until  I  received  General  McClellan's  telegram  about 
the  reinforcements  sent  to  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  by  Beauregard.  Although 


18  FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 

not  ready,  I  deemed  it  important  to  move  instantly.     I  believe  I  was  right. 
Fort  Henry  must  be  held  at  all  hazards. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General. 

From  all  of  which  it  will  appear  that  General  Halleck  had 
not  originated,  up  to  the  time  General  Grant  was  ready  to 
execute  it,  any  such  move  as  the  latter  was  anxious  and 
waiting  to  make,  and  General  McClellan  did  not  even  con 
sider  Halleck  as  prepared  to  afford  a  support. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  General  Grant  began  preparations  for 
the  move  he  had  in  contemplation  the  latter  part  of  Decem 
ber,  and  consequently  before  the  date  of  the  correspond 
ence  between  President  Lincoln  and  Generals  Buell  and 
Halleck.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  in  the  records  to  indicate 
that  General  McClellan,  the  President,  or  General  Buell  com 
municated  with  General  Grant  upon  the  subject  of  a  move  up 
the  Tennessee  or  Cumberland.  In  fact,  as  he  was  subordinate 
to  General  Halleck,  they  would  not  have  written  him  directly. 

On  the  6th  of  January,  1862,  General  Grant,  then  in  com 
mand  at  Cairo,  telegraphed  to  General  Halleck  for  permission 
to  visit  St.  Louis,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  authority  from 
General  Halleck  to  move  against  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson. 
At  first,  leave  to  visit  headquarters  was  refused ;  but  on  the 
22d  of  January  it  was  granted,  and  on  the  23d  Grant  started 
for  St.  Louis,  called  on  Halleck,  and  suggested  a  move  on 
Fort  Henry.  According  to  Badeau,  who  wrote  by  authority, 
when  Grant  "  attempted  to  broach  the  subject,  Halleck 
silenced  him  so  quickly  and  sharply  that  Grant  said  no  more 
on  the  matter,  and  went  back  to  Cairo  with  the  idea  that  his 
commander  thought  him  guilty  of  proposing  a  great  military 
blunder." 

Grant,  however,  had  been  quietly  engaged  for  three  weeks 
in  preparing  for  this  move,  had  studied  it  carefully,  and  quite 
set  his  heart  upon  it.  He  was  the  more  convinced  of  its  fea 
sibility,  from  a  report  of  a  partial  reconnoissance  of  Fort 
Henry,  made  by  General  C.  F.  Smith,  and  forwarded  to  Gen 
eral  Halleck  on  January  24th. 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  19 

Upon  reaching  Cairo  he  telegraphed  Halleck : 

CAIRO,  January  28,  1862. 
Major-  General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

With  permission  I  will  take  Fort  Henry  on  the  Tennessee,  and  establish 
and  hold  a  large  camp  there.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Brigadier-General. 

On  the  same  day  Commodore  Foote,  then  in  command  of 
the  gun-boats  in  that  section,  and  in  full  accord  with  General 
Grant,  also  telegraphed  Halleck  as  follows : 

CAIRO,  January  28,  1862. 
Major- General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Commanding  General  Grant  and  myself  are  of  opinion  that  Fort  Henry, 
on  the  Tennessee  River,  can  be  carried  with  four  iron-clad  gun-boats  and 
troops  to  permanently  occupy.  Have  we  your  authority  to  move  for  that 
purpose  when  ready  ?  A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag  Officer 


On  the  29th  General  Grant  wrote  Halleck  as  follows : 

^RTERS  DISTRICT  OP  CAI 
CAIRO,  January  29,  1862 


HRAPQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  CAIRO,  ) 


Major-  General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  St.  Louis  Mo. 

In  view  of  the  large  force  now  concentrating  in  this  district,  and  the  present 
feasibility  of  the  plan,  I  would  respectfully  suggest  the  propriety  of  subduing 
Fort  Henry,  near  the  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  line,  and  holding  the  position. 
If  this  is  not  done  soon,  there  is  but  little  doubt  but  that  the  defenses  on  both 
the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers  will  be  materially  strengthened. 
From  Fort  Henry  it  will  be  easy  to  operate,  either  on  the  Cumberland,  only 
twelve  miles  distant,  Memphis,  or  Columbus.  It  will,  besides,  have  a  moral 
effect  upon  our  troops  to  advance  them  toward  the  rebel  States.  The  advan 
tages  of  this  move  are  as  perceptible  to  the  General  commanding  as  to 
myself,  therefore,  further  statements  are  unnecessary.. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Brigadier- General. 

To  these  dispatches  of  Grant  and  Commodore  Foote,  Hal 
leck  replied : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  MISSOURI,) 
ST.  Louis,  January  29,  1862.      J 
Brigadier-General  GRANT,  Cairo. 

Make  your  preparations  to  take  and  hold  Fort  Henry.  I  will  send  yon 
written  instructions  by  mail.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General. 


20  FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI,  ] 
ST.  Louis,  January  29,  1862.       } 

Commodore  FOOTE,  Cairo. 

I  am  waiting  for  General  Smith's  report  on  the  road  from  Smithland  to 
Fort  Henry.  As  soon  as  that  is  received  will  give  orders.  In  the  meantime 
have  every  tiling  ready.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General 

On  the  1st  of  February  permission  to  make  the  movement 
arrived  from  Halleck,  and  on  Che  2d  Grant  began  the  cam 
paign  with  seventeen  thousand  men,  less  than  one-third  the 
force  Halleck  had  in  mind  for  the  operations  he  thought 
might  be  carried  on  along  this  general  line.  On  the  6th  of 
February  Fort  Henry  'was  taken,  and  on  the  8th  Grant  tele 
graphed  Halleck  that  he  should  immediately  take  Fort  Don- 
elson  and  return  to  Fort  Henry. 

On  the  16th  he  had  accomplished  the  work,  and  the  cam 
paign  for  which  Halleck  wanted  "not  less  than  sixty  thousand 
effective  men/'  thirty  thousand  of  which  he  hoped  to  have 
"  by  the  middle  or  last  of  February,"  had  been  made  a  suc 
cess  by  Grant  with  a  force  of  seventeen  thousand  men  and 
four  gun-boats. 

General  Sherman  closes  the  chapter  in  which  he  treats  of 
the  movements  on  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  as  follows : 

"  From  the  time  I  had  left  Kentucky  General  Buell  had  really  made  no 
substantial  progress;  though  strongly  reenforced,  beyond  even  what  I  had 
asked  for,  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  had  remained  at  Bowling  Green 
until  his  line  was  broken  at  Henry  and  Donelson,  when  he  let  go  Bowling 
Green  and  fell  back  hastily  to  Nashville ,  and  on  Buell's  approach  he  did 
not  even  tarry  there,  but  continued  his  retreat  southward." 

Three  chapters  previous  to  the  one  containing  this  unkind 
allusion  to  General  Buell,  General  Sherman,  writing  of  his 
selection  as  Superintendent  of  the  Louisiana  Military  College, 
says :  "  For  this  honorable  position  I  was  indebted  to  Major 
D.  C.  Buell  and  General  G.  Mason  Graham,  to  whom  I  have 
made  full  and  due  acknowledgment." 

While  the  General  of  the  army  should  have  felt  himself,  by 
virtue  of  his  position  and  opportunities  for  obtaining  exact 


FORTS   HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  21 

information,  under  strong  obligations  to  correctly  present  all 
matters  of  which  he  wrote,  he  was  thus  peculiarly  bound  to 
treat  General  Buell  with  common  fairness.  But  in  the  above 
extract  he  wholly  ignores  the  fact  that  after  he  left  Ken 
tucky,  General  Buell  had  organized  and  made  efficient  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  which,  from  that  time  forward,  under 
Buell,  Rosecrans,  and  Thomas,  held  high  rank  among  the 
armies  of  the  Union.  A  portion  of  it  under  General  Buell's 
directions  and  the  immediate  command  of  General  Thomas, 
had  broken  the  Confederate  right  at  Mill  Springs,  killed  the 
commander  of  its  army,  captured  its  fortified  camp,  with  all 
its  artillery,  several  thousand  stand  of  small  arms,  transporta 
tion,  and  stores,  and  there  achieved  a  victory  which  at  the 
time  was  regarded  by  the  nation  as  a  most  important  one. 
It  was  the  Western  Ball  Run  for  the  Confederacy.  General 
Thomas,  in  his  report  upon  the  battle,  thus  speaks  of  the 
captures : 

"  On  reaching  the  intrenchments  we  found  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned 
every  thing  and  retired  during  the  night.  Twelve  pieces  of  artillery,  with 
their  caissons  packed  with  ammunition,  one  battery  wagon  and  two  forges,  a 
large  amount  of  small  arms,  mostly  the  old  flint-lock  muskets,  and  ammuni 
tion  for  the  same,  one  hundred  and  fifty  or  sixty  wagons,  and  upward  of  one 
thousand  of  horses  and  mules,  a  large  amount  of  commissary  stores,  intrench 
ing  tools,  and  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  fell  into  our  hands.  A  correct 
list  of  all  the  captured  property  will  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  it  can  be  made 
up  and  the  property  secured. 

"  The  steam  and  ferry-boats  having  been  burned  by  the  enemy  on  their  re 
treat,  it  was  found  impossible  to  cross  the  river  and  pursue  them ;  besides, 
their  command  was  completely  demoralized,  and  retreated  with  great  haste 
and  in  all  directions,  making  their  capture  in  any  numbers  quite  doubtful  if 
pursued." 

Besides  this,  General  Buell  had  contributed  a  considerable 
force  to  aid  General  Grant  in  the  movement  on  Fort  Donel- 
son,  and  Bowling  Green  was  evacuted  in  the  face  of  an 
advance  upon  it  by  General  Buell,  and  before  Fort  Donelson 
had  fallen. 

But  whether  any  "substantial  progress"  had  been  made  by 


22  FORTS   HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 

General  Buell  after  General  Sherman  left  Kentucky,  will  best 
appear  from  portions  of  three  letters  written  by  General  Sher 
man  while  in  Kentucky,  the  first  two  bearing  date  about  ten 
days  before  he  relieved  General  Kobert  Anderson  in  com 
mand,  and  the  third  about  a  wreek  before  he  was  in  turn 
relieved  by  General  Buell.  Muldraugh's  Hill  is  about  forty 
miles  south  of  Louisville,  on  the  railroad  to  Nashville,  and 
was  one  of  the  first  points  of  consequence  occupied  on  that 
line  by  the  Union  forces.  General  Sherman  gives  the  follow 
ing  account  of  the  movement  upon  it,  and  the  condition  of 
affairs  after  his  troops  were  established  there : 

HEADQUARTERS  MULDRAUGH'S  HILL,  ") 
September  27,   1861.      j 

Captain  OLIVER  D.  GREEN,  Adjutant- General. 

SIR:  When  I  left  Louisville  on  the  cars  in  charge  of  the  Home  Guards, 
followed  by  Rosseau's  brigade,  I  understood  my  orders  to  be  to  station  parties 
along  the  road  at  all  the  bridges,  secure  the  road  and  occupy  Muldraugh's 
Hill.  *  *  *  * 

This  is  not  an  isolated  hill,  but  a  range  separating  the  waters  of  the  Rolling 
Fork  of  Salt  Creek  and  Green  River,  the  ascent  from  the  north  being  very 
abrupt,  and  the  descent  to  the  south  being  very  gradual. 

Our  position  is  far  from  being  a  strong  one  when  held  against  a  superior 
force.  Roads  will  enable  the  enemy  with  cavalry  to  pass  round  us  and  cut 
off  our  communications  and  starve  us  out.  I  have  no  safe  line  of  retreat,  but 
must  stand  our  ground  let  what  will  happen. 

Our  opponents,  led  by  General  Buckner,  who  is  familiar  with  the  ground, 
are  now  supposed  to  be  along  the  railroad  from  Green  River  to  Bowling 
Green.  Their  forces  are  variously  estimated  from  seven  thousand  to  twenty 
thousand  men ;  and,  I  doubt  not,  they  have  fifteen  thousand,  some  well  and 
some  poorly  armed,  but  all  actuated  by  the  one  purpose  to  destroy  us.  I  am 
fully  alive  to  the  danger  of  our  position  and  to  all  its  disadvantages,  especially 
that  of  supplies.  Our  provisions  have  been  hauled  up  the  rugged  valley  of 
Clear  Creek  by  hired  wagons,  and  by  some  which  were  brought  along  by  the 
Thirty-ninth  Indiana.  We  can  barely  supply  our  wants,  and  are  liable  at 
any  moment  to  have  these  wagons  seized.  The  reason  I  came  to  Muldraugh's 
Hill  was  for  effect.  Had  it  fallen  into  the  hands  of  our  enemy  the  cause 
would  have  been  lost,  and  even  with  it  in  our  possession  for  a  week  nobody 
has  rallied  to  our  support.  I  expected,  as  we  had  reason  to,  that  the  people 
of  Kentucky  would  rally  to  our  support,  but,  on  the  contrary,  none  have 
joined  us,  while  hundreds,  we  are  told,  are  going  to  Bowling  Green.  The 
railroad  from  Bowling  Green  toward  us  is  broken  at  Nolin,  ten  miles  off,  and 
and  at  another  trestle  beyond  some  seven  miles.  I  doubt  if  this  was  done  by 


FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON.  23 

Buckner's  orders,  but  rather  by  the  small  parties  of  guards  left  to  protect 
them  and  who  are  scared  at  our  approach.  I  have  from  time  to  time  given 
you  telegraphic  notice  of  these  events,  and  must  now  await  the  develop 
ments 

We  should  have  here  at  least  twenty  thousand  men,  but  that  has  been  an 
imposibility.  Truly  yours, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Brigadier-General. 

From  this  first  letter  it  appears  how  "  the  cause  would  have 
been  lost"  if  the  enemy  had  gained  Muldraugh's  Hill.  The 
second  one  shows  how  the  conduct  of  the  Union  troops  after 
securing  the  Hill,  was  about  to  "  ruin  our  cause." 

HEADQUARTERS  MULDRAUGH'S  HILL,  ) 
September  29,  1861.      j 

General  ROBERT  ANDERSON,  Louisville,  Ky. 

DEAR  GENERAL:  I  am  sorry  to  report  that  in  spite  of  my  orders  and 
entreaties,  our  troops  are  committing  depredations  that  will  ruin  our  cause. 
Horses  and  wagons  have  been  seized,  cattle,  sheep,  hogs,  chickens,  taken  by 
our  men,  some  of  whom  wander  for  miles  around.  I  am  doing  and  have 
done  all  in  my  power  to  stop  this,  but  the  men  are  badly  disciplined  and  give 
little  heed  to  my  orders  or  those  of  their  own  regimental  officers.  We  have 
received  no  accessions  from  the  country,  and  I  have  only  a  few  weak,  scattered 
camps,  such  as  Curran  Pope's  at  New  Haven,  and  General  Ward's  at  Green- 
burg.  Of  course,  the  chief  design  of  our  occupying  Muldraugh's  Hill  was  to 
afford  an  opportunity  for  the  people  to  organize  and  arm,  but  I  can  not  learn 
that  such  is  the  case. 

A  great  many  people  come  into  our  camps,  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and 
go  away.  I  have  no  doubt  spies  could  enter  our  camp  and  we  can  not  con 
ceal  the  strength  of  our  command.  Although  Buckner  is  not  at  Green  River 
he  has  many  locomotives  and  cars  there,  and  can  march  from  there  in  a  day 
or  a  day  and  a  half,  and  I  feel  uneasy  about  our  communications.  The 
Home  Guards  have  all  returned,  leaving  us  whom  they  deem  outsiders  alone, 
and  the  whole  country  would  raise  round  about  us,  leaving  us  with  an 
ambush  all  the  way.  To  be  effective,  a  force  here  should  be  very  large,  too 
large  to  be  attacked  in  position.  As  to  us  we  could  make  a  good  fight,  but 
would  soon  be  starved  out.  I  know  how  you  are  situated  and  will  do  my 
best,  and  only  want  you  not  to  draw  too  strong  inferences  from  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Green  River  bridges.  This  was,  no  doubt,  intended  as  an  obstruc 
tion  to  our  advance,  until  other  designs  of  their's  were  completed,  but  as  soon 
as  Buckner  is  ready,  he  will  surely  advance  on  Elizabethtown  where  he  lives. 
I  hear  nothing  of  Thomas'  moves  or  those  at  Paducah.  Our  lines  are  broken 
and  I  have  sent  down  to  examine.  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 


24  FORTS  HENRY  AND  DONELSON. 

The  third  letter  was  written  a  few  days  before  he  was 
relieved  by  General  Buell : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  ) 
LOUISVILLE,  November  6,  1861.      J 
General  L.  THOMAS,  Adjutant- General. 

SIR,  :  General  McClellan  telegraphs  me  to  report  to  him  daily  the  situation 
of  affairs  here.  *  *  *  *  We  should  have  here  a  very  large  force, 
sufficient  to  give  confidence  to  the  Union  men  of  the  ability  to  do  what  should 
be  done — possess  ourselves  of  all  the  State.  But  all  see  and  feel  we  are 
brought  to  a  stand  still,  and  this  produces  doubt  and  alarm.  With  our 
present  force  it  would  be  simple  madness  to  cross  Green  River,  and  yet 
hesitation  may  be  as  fatal.  In  like  manner  the  other  columns  are  in  peril, 
not  so  much  in  front  as  rear ;  the  railroads  over  which  our  stores  must  pass 
being  much  exposed.  I  have  the  Nashville  Railroad  guarded  by  three  regi 
ments,  yet  it  is  far  from  being  safe,  and  the  moment  actual  hostilities  com 
mence  these  roads  will  be  interrupted  and  we  will  be  in  a  dilemma.  To 
meet  this  in  part,  I  have  put  a  cargo  of  provisions  at  the  mouth  of  Salt  River 
guarded  by  two  regiments.  All  these  detachments  weaken  the  main  force 
and  endanger  the  whole.  Do  not  conclude,  as  before,  that  I  exaggerate  the 
facts.  They  are  as  stated,  and  the  future  looks  as  dark  as  possible.  It  would 
be  better  if  some  man  of  sanguine  mind  were  here,  for  I  am  forced  to  order 
according  to  my  convictions.  Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Brigadier- General  commanding. 

In  the  light  of  these  letters  it  would  seem  as  if  there  had 
really  been  most  "substantial  progress"  under  General  Buell 
after  General  Sherman  left  Kentucky. 


CHAPTER    III. 

SHILOH— THE    QUESTION    OF   SUKPRISE;    UNFAIR    TREATMENT 
OF   BUELL   AND    HIS   ARMY. 

AFTER  the  extended  discussions  over  the  events  preceding 
and  attending  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  in  some  of  which  contro 
versies  General  Sherman  himself  participated,  and  all  of  which 
have  called  out  extracts  from  the  official  records,  that,  taken 
together,  effectually  settle  some  of  the  earlier  questions  in 
dispute,  it  must  surprise  all  readers  of  the  Memoirs  to  find 
their  author  ignoring  these  records,  and  at  this  late  day  pre 
senting  many  inaccurate  statements  in  regard  to  the  operations 
about  Pittsburgh  Landing. 

The  main  questions  at  issue  have  always  been  whether  the 
Union  army  was  surprised  at  Shiloh;  if  it  was,  who  was 
mainly  responsible,  and  how  far  Buell's  army  can  lay  claim 
to  having  made  the  victory  possible? 

General  Sherman  labors  ingeniously,  but  inaccurately,  as 
the  official  records  show,  to  relieve  himself  from  responsi 
bility  for  it,  and  even  attempts  to  create  the  impression  that 
there  was  no  general  surprise.  Ever  since  this  battle,  most 
who  believed  that  the  Union  army  was  unexpectedly  attacked 
on  that  occasion,  have  kid  the  chief  load  of  responsibility 
upon  General  Grant,  and  he  through  all  these  years  has  made 
no  effort  to  shift  the  burden.  But  now  it  will  appear  through 
the  records  which  these  Memoirs  have  called  out,  that  General 
Sherman  was  mainly  responsible,  since  he  was  encamped  in 
advance;  his  division,  as  he  wrote  to  the  United  States  Service 
Magazine  in  1865,  " forming  as  it  were  the  outlying  picket," 
so  that  he  was  in  charge  of  the  picket  front  looking  toward 

(25) 


26  SHILOH. 

the  roads  over  which  an  enemy  must  approach;  and  while  not 
technically  in  command  of  the  entire  camp,  in  the  absence  of 
General  Grant,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Savannah,  some 
twelve  miles  distant,  he  was  constantly  treated,  trusted,  and 
consulted  by  General  Grant,  as  if  he  were  the  senior  officer  at 
the  front.  General  Sherman,  holding  steadily  till  the  last, 
and  against  all  evidence,  to  the  belief  that  no  immediate  attack 
was  probable,  by  impressing  his  convictions  upon  General 
Grant,  misled  the  latter  as  to  the  real  condition  of  affairs 
along  the  front,  and  thus  did  the  author  of  the  Memoirs 
become  primarily  responsible  for  the  surprise. 

The  records  disclose  both  the  blindness  which  prevailed  as 
to  the  real  situation,  and  where  the  responsibility  for  it  mainly 
rested,  and  some  comparison  of  these,  with  the  statements  of 
the  Memoirs,  will  set  the  case  in  a  clear  light. 

On  the  14th  of  March  General  C.  F.  Smith,  then  in  com 
mand  at  Savannah  previous  to  the  arrival  of  General  Grant, 
"instructed  me" — writes  General  Sherman — "to  disembark 
my  own  division  and  that  of  General  Hurlbut  at  Pittsburgh 
Landing;  to  take  positions  well  back,  and  to  leave  room  for 
his  whole  army;  telling  me  that  he  would  soon  come  up  in 
person,  and  move  out  in  force  to  make  the  lodgment  on  the 
railroad  contemplated  by  General  Halleck's  orders." 

"  On  the  16th  we  disembarked  and  marched  out  about  ten  miles  toward 
Corinth  to  a  place  called  Monterey  or  Pea  Ridge,  where  the  rebels  had  a  cav 
alry  regiment,  which,  of  course,  decamped  on  our  approach,  but  from  the 
people  we  learned  that  trains  were  bringing  large  masses  of  men  from  every 
direction  into  Corinth."-Page  228,  Vol.  I. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  such  knowledge  would  have 
made  General  Sherman  very  watchful  when  he  afterward 
encamped  at  Shiloh.  And  yet  with  this  important  fact  ascer 
tained,  when  he  took  position  there,  instead  of  camping  in 
line  of  battle,  he  stationed  three  of  his  brigades  a  mile  and  a 
half  from  Hurlbut's  division,  and  the  fourth  over  two  miles 
from  the  rest.  Other  divisions,  as  they  arrived,  selected 


SHILOH.  27 

camps  to  suit  themselves.  There  was  no  line  of  battle  deter 
mined,  no  rifle  pits  dug,  none  of  the  simplest  forms  of  obstruc 
tions  provided,  and  no  sufficient  picketing,  as  the  result 
proved.  And  Sherman  was  the  senior  officer  on  the  main 
front. 

"  On  the  18th  Hurlbut  disembarked  his  division  and  took  post  about  a  mile 
and  a  half  out,  near  where  the  roads  branched — one  leading  to  Corinth,  the 
other  toward  Hamburgh.  On  the  19th  I  disembarked  my  division  and  took 
post  about  three  miles  back;  three  of  the  brigades  covering  the  roads  to 
Purdy  and  Corinth,  and  the  other  brigade,  Stuart's,  temporarily  at  a  place  on 
the  Hamburgh  road.  *  *  *  Within  a  few  days  Prentiss'  division 
arrived  and  camped  on  my  left,  and  afterward  McClernand's  and  W.  H. 
L.  Wallace's  divisions  were  formed  in  a  line  to  our  rear.  *  *  * 
General  C.  F.  Smith  remained  back  at  Savannah  in  chief  command,  and  I 
was  only  responsible  for  my  own  division.  I  kept  pickets  well  out  on  the 
roads,  and  made  myself  familiar  with  all  the  ground  inside  and  outside  my 
lines." 

Of  the  events  immediately  preceding  the  battle,  General 
Sherman  writes  as  follows: 

"  I  always  acted  on  the  supposition  that  we  were  an  invading  army ;  that 
our  purpose  was  to  move  forward  in  force,  make  a  lodgment  on  the  Memphis 
&  Charleston  Road,  and  thus  repeat  the  grand  tactics  of  Fort  Donelson,  by 
separating  the  rebels  in  the  interior  from  those  at  Memphis  and  on  the  Mis 
sissippi  River.  We  did  not  fortify  our  camps  against  an  attack,  because  we 
had  no  orders  to  do  so,  and  because  such  a  course  would  have  made  our  raw 
men  timid.  The  position  was  naturally  strong,  with  Snake  Creek  on  our 
right,  a  deep,  bold  stream,  with  a  confluent  (Owl  Creek)  to  our  right  front, 
and  Lick  Creek,  with  a  similar  confluent  on  our  left,  thus  narrowing  the  space 
over  which  we  could  be  attacked  to  about  a  mile  and  a  half  or  two  miles. 

"At  a  later  period  of  the  war  we  could  have  rendered  this  position  impreg 
nable  in  one  night,  but  at  this  time  we  did  not  do  it,  and  it  may  be  it  is  well 
we  did  not.  From  about  the  1st  of  April  we  were  conscious  that  the  rebel 
cavalry  in  our  front  were  getting  bolder  and  more  saucy;  and  on  Friday,  the 
4th  of  April,  it  dashed  down  and  carried  off  one  of  our  picket  guards,  com 
posed  of  an  officer  and  seven  men,  posted  a  couple  of  miles  out  on  the  Corinth 
road.  Colonel  Buckland  sent  a  company  to  its  relief,  then  followed  himself 
with  a  regiment,  and,  fearing  lest  he  might  be  worsted,  I  called  out  his  whole 
brigade,  and  followed  some  four  or  five  miles,  when  the  cavalry  in  advance 
encountered  artillery.  I  then,  after  dark,  drew  back  to  our  lines  and  reported 
the  fact  by  letter  to  General  Grant  at  Savannah ;  but  thus  far  (night  of  the 
4th)  we  had  not  positively  detected  the  presence  of  infantry,  for  cavalry  regi- 


28  SHILOH. 

ments  generally  had  a  couple  of  guns  along,  and  I  supposed  the  guns  that 
opened  on  us  on  the  evening  of  Friday,  April  4th,  belonged  to  the  cavalry 
that  was  hovering  along  our  whole  front. 

"  Saturday  passed  in  our  camps  without  any  unusual  event,  the  weather 
being  wet  and  mild,  and  the  roads  back  to  the  steamboat  landing  being  heavy 
with  mud ;  but,  on  Sunday  morning,  the  6th,  early,  there  was  a  good  deal  of 
picket-firing,  and  I  got  breakfast,  rode  out  along  my  lines,  and,  about  four 
hundred  yards  to  the  front  of  Appier's  regiment,  received  from  some  bushes 
in  a  ravine  to  the  left  front,  a  volley,  which  killed  my  orderly,  Holliday. 
About  the  same  time  I  saw  the  rebel  lines  of  battle  in  front  coming  down  on 
us  as  far  as  the  eye  could  reach.  All  my  troops  were  in  line  of  battle  ready, 
and  the  ground  was  favorable  to  us.  I  gave  the  necessary  orders  to  the  bat 
tery  (Waterhouse's  )  attached  to  Hildebrand's  brigade,  and  cautioned  the  men 
to  reserve  their  fire  till  the  rebels  had  crossed  the  ravine  of  Owl  Creek,  and 
had  begun  the  ascent;  also  sent  staff  officers  to  notify  Generals  McClernand 
and  Prentiss  of  the  coming  blow.  Indeed,  McClernand  had  already  sent  three 
regiments  to  the  support  of  my  left  flank,  and  they  were  in  position  when  the 
onset  came. 

"  In  a  few  minutes  the  battle  of  '  Shiloh '  began  with  extreme  fury  and  lasted 
two  days."— Pages  229-230,  Vol.  I. 

In  August  following  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  when  its  events 
were  fresh  in  his  mind,  General  Sherman  was  sworn  as  a  wit 
ness  in  the  trial  of  Colonel  Thos.  Worthington,  Forty-sixth 
Ohio  Volunteers,  who  had  severely  criticized  the  management 
of  the  former  previous  to  the  battle.  The  following  extracts 
from  the  official  report  of  that  testimony  bear  upon  the  ques 
tions  under  consideration;  and  some  of  them  flatly  contra 
dict  the  statements  of  the  book.  This  is  notably  the  case  upon 
the  very  important  point  whether  Sherman  had  reason  to  know 
as  early  as  Friday  before  the  fight,  that  the  enemy  was  in  force 
in  his  immediate  front. 

General  W.  T.  Sherman,  sworn  and  examined : 

"  He  (Colonel  Worthington)  says  '  a  slight  abattis  might  have  prevented  an 
attack.'  What  business  was  it  of  his  whether  his  superior  officer  invited  an 
attack  or  not  ?  The  Army  Regulations  will  show  him  that  no  fortification 
can  be  made  except  under  order  of  the  commanding  general.  To  have 
erected  fortifications  would  have  been  an  evidence  of  weakness,  and  would 
have  invited  an  attack.  *  *  *  And  here  I  mention,  for  future 
history,  that  our  right  flank  was  well  guarded  by  Owl  and  Snake  Creeks,  our 
left  by  Lick  Creek,  leaving  us  simply  to  guard  our  front.  No  stronger  posi- 


OF  THE 

{    UNIVERSITY 

\     -      °F         X; 
SHILOH.  29 

tion  was  ever  held  by  an  army.  Therefore,  on  Friday,  two  days  before  the 
battle,  when  Colonel  Worthington  was  so  apprehensive,  I  knew  there  was 
no  hostile  party  within  six  miles,  though  there  was  reason  to  expect  an 
attack.  I  suppose  Colonel  McDowell,  like  myself,  had  become  tired  of  his 
constant  prognostications,  and  paid  no  attention  to  him,  especially  when  we 
were  positively  informed  by  men  like  Buckland,  Kilby  Smith,  and  Major 
Ricker,  who  went  to  the  front  to  look  for  enemies,  instead  of  going  to  the 
landing;  and  here  I  will  state  that  Pittsburgh  Landing  was  not  chosen  by 
General  Grant,  but  by  Major-General  Smith.  I  received  orders  from  Gen- 
ers.l  Smith,  and  took  post  accordingly ;  so  did  General  Hurlbut ;  so  did  his 
own  division.  The  lines  of  McClernand  and  Prentiss  were  selected  by 
Colonel  McPherson.  I  will  not  insult  General  Smith's  memory  by  criti 
cizing  his  selection  of  a  field.  It  was  not  looked  to  so  much  for  defense  as 
for  ground  on  which  our  army  could  be  organized  for  offense.  We  did 
not  occupy  too  much  ground.  General  Buell's  forces  had  been  expected 
rightfully  for  two  weeks,  and  a  place  was  left  for  his  forces,  although  Gen 
eral  Grant  afterward  had  determined  to  send  Buellto  Hamburgh  as  a  separate 
command. 

"  But  even  as  we  were  on  the  6th  of  April,  you  might  search  the  world  over 
and  not  find  a  more  advantageous  field  of  battle — flanks  well  protected,  and 
never  threatened,  troops  in  easy  support ;  timber  and  broken  ground  giving 
good  points  to  rally,  and  the  proof  is  that  forty-three  thousand  men,  of  whom 
at  least  ten  thousand  ran  away,  held  their  ground  against  sixty  thousand 
chosen  troops  of  the  South  with  their  best  leaders.  On  Friday,  the  4th,  nor 
officer,  nor  soldier,  not  even  Colonel  Worthington  looked  for  an  attack,  as  I 
can  prove. 

"  On  Friday,  April  4th,  our  pickets  were  disposed  as  follows :  McDowell's 
brigade,  embracing  Worthington's  regiment,  looked  to  Owl  Creek  Bridge,  and 
had  nothing  to  do  with  any  other  road.  Buckland  and  Hildebrand  covered 
our  line  to  the  main  Corinth  road.  Pickets,  one  company  to  a  regiment, 
were  thrown  forward  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  front,  videttes  a  mile  further, 
making  a  chain  of  sentinels.  About  noon  of  that  day,  Buckland's  adjutant 
came  to  my  tent  and  reported  that  a  lieutenant  and  seven  men  of  his  guard 
had  left  their  posts  and  were  missing — probably  picked  up  by  a  small  cavalry 
force  which  had  hovered  around  for  some  days,  and  which  I  had  failed  to 
bag.  I  immediately  dispatched  Major  Ricker  with  all  my  cavalry  in  a  tre 
mendous  rain  to  the  front.  Soon  after  I  heard  distant  musketry,  and  finally 
three  cannon  shots,  which  I  knew  must  be  the  enemy,  as  we  had  none  there. 
This  was  the  first  positive  information  any  intelligent  mind  on  that  field  had 
of  any  approaching  force.  Before  that,  no  scout,  no  officer,  no  responsible 
man,  had  seen  an  infantry  or  artillery  soldier  nearer  than  Monterey,  five 
miles  out.  For  weeks  and  months  we  had  heard  all  sorts  of  reports,  just  as 
we  do  now.  For  weeks  old  women  had  reported  that  Beauregard  was  coming, 
sometimes  with  one  hundred  thousand ;  sometimes  with  three  hundred  thou 
sand  ;  when,  in  fact,  he  did  not  leave  Corinth  until  after  even  Colonel  Worth- 


30  SHILOH. 

ington  had  been  alarmed  for  safety.  As  soon  as  I  heard  the  cannon,  I  and 
my  staff  were  in  the  saddle  and  off  to  the  front.  We  overtook  a  party  of 
Buckland's  and  Hildebrand's  brigades  going  forward  to  the  relief  of  the 
pickets.  On  reaching  a  position  in  advance  of  the  guard-house,  a  mile  and  a 
half  from  Shiloh,  they  deployed  into  line  of  battle  and  I  awaited  the  return 
of  my  cavalry  and  infantry,  still  to  our  front. 

"  Colonel  Buckland  and  Major  Kicker  soon  returned  and  reported  encoun 
tering  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry  near  the  fallen  timbers  six  miles  in 
front  of  our  camp.  We  then  knew  that  we  had  the  elements  of  an  army  in 
our  front,  but  did  not  know  its  strength  or  destination.  The  guard  was 
strengthened,  and,  as  night  came  on  we  returned  to  camp,  and  not  a  man  in 
camp  but  knew  we  had  an  enemy  to  the  front  before  we  slept  that  night. 
But  even  I  had  to  guess  its  purpose.  No  general  could  have  detected  or 
reported  the  approach  of  an  enemy  more  promptly  than  was  done." 

The  positive  contradiction  between  these  statements,  and 
those  of  the  book  which  deny  that  infantry  and  artillery 
had  been  discovered  as  early  as  Friday  afternoon,  will  be 
observed. 

On  that  very  afternoon,  however,  General  Sherman  had 
written  to  General  Grant,  giving  the  result  of  the  cavalry 
reconnoissance.  That  this  did  not  agree  with  the  present 
statement,  that  up  to  the  night  of  the  4th,  "we  had  not 
positively  detected  the  presence  of  infantry,"  the  following 
report  by  General  Grant  will  show : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  WEST  TENNESSEE,  ) 
SAVANNAH,  April  5,  1862.      j 

General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Commanding  Department  of  Missouri,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

GENERAL:  Just  as  my  letter  of  yesterday  to  Captain  McLean,  Assistant- 
Adjutant-General,  was  finished,  notices  from  Generals  McClernand's  and  Sher 
man's  Assistant-Adjutant-Generals  were  received,  stating  that  our  outposts 
had  been  attacked  by  the  enemy  apparently  in  strong  force.  I  immediately 
went  up,  but  found  all  quiet  The  enemy  took  two  officers  and  four  or  five 
of  our  men  prisoners,  and  killed  four.  We  took  eight  prisoners,  and  killed 
several;  number  of  the  enemy  wounded  not  known.  They  had  with  them 
three  pieces  of  artillery,  and  cavalry  and  infantry.  How  much  can  not,  of 
course,  be  estimated. 

I  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  being  made  upon  us  (general 
one),  but  will  be  prepared  should  such  a  thing  take  place.  General  Nelson's 
division  has  arrived.  The  other  two  of  General  Buell's  column  will  arrive 
to-morrow  or  next  day.  It  is  my  present  intention  to  send  them  to  Hamburg, 


SHILOII.  31 

some  four  or  five  miles  above  Pittsburgh,  when  they  all  get  here.  From  that 
point  to  Corinth  the  road  is  good,  and  a  junction  can  be  formed  with  the 
troops  from  Pittsburgh  at  almost  any  point.  *  *  *  * 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

Immediately  after  the  battle,  General  Sherman  appears  to 
have  been  won  over  to  the  idea  that  an  abattis  might  be  valu 
able  as  a  protection  to  his  camp,  for  in  a  compilation  of  his 
orders,  made  under  his  own  direction,  the  very  first  of  them 
which  appears  after  the  engagement,  contains  the  following 
paragraph : 

"Each  brigade  commander  will  examine  carefully  his  immediate  front;  fell 
trees  to  afford  his  men  a  barricade,  and  clear  away  all  underbrush  for  two 
hundred  yards  in  front,  so  as  to  uncover  an  approaching  enemy;  with  these 
precautions,  we  can  hold  our  camp  against  any  amount  of  force  that  can  be 
brought  against  us." 

There  is  no  indication  that  General  Sherman  considered 
this  order  either  an  evidence  of  weakness,  or  an  invitation  to 
attack,  or  as  calculated  to  make  his  "  raw  men  timid." 

That  General  Halleck  supposed  the  officers  in  charge  of 
the  camp  had  taken  means  to  strengthen  their  position,  is 
shown  by  the  following  telegram : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI,  ") 
ST.  Louis,  April  8,  1862.      j 
Hon.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

The  enemy  attacked  our  works  at  Pittsburgh,  Tennessee,  yesterday,  but  was 
repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  No  details  given. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General. 

General  Buckland  and  Major  Ricker  have  both  written  an 
account  of  the  reconnoissance  on  the  4th.  Starting  at  2  p.  M., 
General  Buckland  had  come  up  with  the  enemy's  cavalry 
about  two  miles  in  front  of  the  camp.  Of  what  happened, 
what  was  seen,  and  what  reported  to  General  Sherman,  Gen 
eral  Buckland  thus  writes: 

"We  pursued  about  a  mile,  when  the  enemy  commenced  firing  artillery 


32  SHILOH. 

at  us.  We  discovered  that  he  had  a  large  force  of  infantry  and  artillery. 
We  therefore  concluded  to  march  back  to  camp  with  as  little  delay  as 
possible. 

"When  we  reached  the  picket  lines,  General  Sherman  was  there  with  several 
regiments  in  line  of  battle.  As  I  rode  up  to  General  Sherman  at  the  head 
of  my  column,  with  about  fifteen  prisoners  close  behind  me,  the  General 
asked  me  what  I  had  been  doing.  His  manner  indicated  that  he  was  not 
pleased.  I  replied  that  I  had  accidentally  got  into  a  little  fight,  and  there 
were  some  of  the  fruits  of  it,  pointing  to  the  prisoners.  He  answered  that 
I  might  have  drawn  the  whole  army  into  a  fight  before  they  were  ready,  and 
ordered  me  to  take  my  men  to  camp.  Soon  after  reaching  camp,  one  of 
General  Sherman's  aids  came  and  said  the  General  desired  me  to  send  him  a 
written  statement  of  what  I  had  done  and  seen  that  day,  which  I  did  the  same 
evening.  General  Sherman  afterward  informed  me  that  he  sent  the  state 
ment  to  General  Grant  the  same  night. 

"  The  next  day,  Saturday  April  5th,  I  visited  the  picket  line  several  times, 
and  found  that  the  woods  were  swarming  with  rebel  cavalry  along  the  entire 
front  of  my  line,  and  the  pickets  claimed  to  have  discovered  infantry  and 
artillery.  Several  times  during  the  day  I  reported  these  facts  to  General 
Sherman.  Colonel  Hilderbrand,  of  the  Third  Brigade,  and  other  officers, 
visited  the  picket  line  with  me  during  the  day.  It  was  well  understood  all 
that  day  and  night  throughout  Sherman's  division,  that  there  was  a  large 
rebel  force  immediately  in  our  front.  I  consulted  with  Colonels  Cockrell  and 
Sullivan  as  to  the  proper  measures  to  prevent  a  surprise.  The  pickets  were 
strengthened,  and  Colonel  Cockrell  sent  two  companies  of  the  Seventieth  Ohio 
to  take  a  position  where  they  could  best  support  the  pickets  in  case  of  an 
attack.  I  also  established  a  line  of  sentinels  from  my  camp  to  the  reserve  of 
the  pickets.  Every  officer  in  my  brigade  was  fully  aware  of  the  danger,  and 
such  precautions  were  taken  that  a  surprise  was  impossible."  *  *  * 

Concerning  the  same  reconnoissance,  Major  Kicker  wrote  as 
follows : 

*  *  *  "When  we  got  back  to  the  picket  lines  we  found  General  Sher 
man  there  with  infantry  and  artillery  in  line  of  battle,  caused  by  the  heavy 
firing  of  the  enemy  on  us.  General  Sherman  asked  me  what  was  up.  I  told 
him  I  had  met  and  fought  the  advance  of  Beauregard's  army,  that  he  was 
advancing  on  us.  General  Sherman  said  it  could  not  be  possible,  Beauregard 
was  not  such  a  fool  as  to  leave  his  base  of  operations  and  attack  us  in  ours — 
mere  reconnoissance  in  force." 

General  Bragg's  official  report  shows  that  this  reconnoitering 
party  was  really  pushed  up  to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  three 


SHILOH.  33 

corps   of   the    Confederate   army.     Of   the    movement   from 
Monterey  to  the  battle-field,  Bragg  says : 

"Moving  from  there,  the  command  bivouacked  for  the  night  near  the 
Meckey  House,  immediately  in  rear  of  Major- General  Hardee's  corps,  Major- 
General  Folk's  being  just  in  our  rear  *  *  *  A  reconnoissance  in 
some  force  from  the  enemy  made  its  appearance  during  the  evening  in  front 
of  General  Hardee's  corps,  and  was  promptly  driven  back." 

The  following  extracts  from  various  official  reports  of  the 
battle,  bear  pointedly  upon  the  question  of  a  surprise.  General 
John  McArthur,  commanding  Second  Division,  says: 

"  We  had  been  in  line  but  a  few  moments  when  the  enemy  made  their  ap 
pearance  and  attacked  my  left  wing." 

Colonel  R.  P.  Buckland,  Fourth  Brigade,  Sherman's  divis 
ion,  says: 

"  Between  six  and  seven  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  I  was  informed  that 
our  pickets  were  fired  upon.  I  immediately  gave  orders  for  forming  the 
brigade  on  the  color  line,  which  was  promptly  done.  About  this  time  I  was 
informed  that  the  pickets  were  being  driven  in.  I  ordered  the  Forty-eighth 
Regiment,  Colonel  Sullivan,  to  advance  in  support  of  the  pickets,  which  he 
did,  but  discovered  that  the  enemy  had  advanced  in  force  to  the  creek,  about 
eighty  to  one  hundred  rods  in  front.  I  immediately  ordered  the  brigade  to 
advance  in  line  of  battle.  We  had  marched  about  thirty  to  forty  rods,  when 
we  discovered  the  enemy  and  opened  fire  upon  him  along  the  whole  line, 
which  checked  his  advance  and  caused  him  to  fall  back." 

Colonel  J.  R.  Cockerell,  commanding  Seventieth  Ohio,  says : 

"On  Sunday  morning,  April  6,  1862,  an  alarm  was  made  in  the  front  of 
this  brigade,  and  I  called  my  regiment  from  breakfast  and  formed  it  in  line 
of  battle  on  the  color  line.  I  then  heard  heavy  firing  on  the  left  and  in  front 
of  our  line,  and  advanced  my  regiment  about  two  hundred  paces  in  the 
woods,  and  formed  line  of  battle  in  pursuance  of  your  order.  I  ordered  my 
regiment  to  open  fire,  with  the  left  thrown  back,  and  did  great  execution 
among  the  enemy,  who  retired  into  the  hollow." 

Colonel  Hilderbrand,  commanding  Third  Brigade,  Sher 
man's  division,  says: 

"Early  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  6th  inst.,  our  pickets  were  fired  on,  and 
3 


34  SHILOH. 

shortly  after  seven  o'clock  the  enemy  appeared  in  force,  presenting  himself  in 
columns  of  regiments  at  least  four  deep.  He  opened  upon  our  camp  a  heavy 
fire  from  infantry,  which  was  immediately  followed  by  shell.  Having  formed 
my  brigade  in  line  of  battle,  I  ordered  an  advance.  The  Seventy -seventh  and 
Fifty-seven tli  Regiments  were  thrown  forward  to  occupy  a  certain  position, 
but  encountered  the  enemy  in  force  within  three  hundred  yards  of  oui 
camp." 

Captain  Samuel  E.  Barrett,  commanding  First  Regiment 
Illinois  Artillery,  says : 

"We  were  stationed  near  the  outposts,  and  on  the  alarm  being  given,  at 
about  half  past  seven  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  the  battery  was  promptly 
got  in  readiness,  and  in  ten  minutes  thereafter  commenced  firing  on  the  right 
of  the  log  church,  some  one  hundred  yards  in  front  of  General  Sherman's 
headquarters,  where  the  attack  was  made  by  the  enemy  in  great  force." 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Parlin,  commanding  Forty-eighth  Ohio 
Infantry,  says : 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  6th  our  regiment  met  the  enemy  about  two  hun 
dred  yards  in  front  of  our  color  line ;  they  came  upon  us  so  suddenly  that  for 
a  short  time  our  men  wavered,  but  soon  rallied  again,  when  we  kept  him 
back  for  two  hours  and  until  General  Sherman  ordered  us  to  fall  back  to  the 
Purdy  road." 

As  to  the  distances  of  the  picket  from  his  front,  and  the 
limits  reached  by  his  reconnoissance,  it  is  notable  that  General 
Sherman  fixes  them  much  further  from  camp  than  all  the 
other  officers  who  have  given  testimony  or  made  statements 
upon  these  points. 

An  officer  of  General  Beauregard's  staff,  who  was  helping 
direct  the  rebel  advance,  wrote  thus  of  the  matter: 

"The  total  absence  of  cavalry  pickets  from  General  Grant's  army  was  a  mat 
ter  of  perfect  amazement.  There  were  absolutely  none  on  Grant's  left,  where 
Breck  in  ridge's  division  was  meeting  him,  so  that  we  were  able  to  come  up 
within  hearing  of  their  drums  entirely  unperceived.  The  Southern  generals 
always  kept  cavalry  pickets  out  for  miles,  even  when  no  enemy  was  supposed 
to  be  within  a  day's  march  of  them  The  infantry  pickets  of  Grant's  forces 
were  not  above  three-fourths  of  a  mile  from  his  advance  camps,  and  they  were 
too  few  to  make  any  resistance." 

The  officers  of  General  Thomas'  army,  who  had  charge  of 


SHILOH.  35 

the  pickets  a  few  days  after  the  battle,  rode  over  the  line  from 
which  the  rebels  moved  to  the  attack.  Every  where  were  signs 
of  the  deliberation  with  which  the  enemy  formed  his  forces. 
The  routes  by  which  each  corps  and  division  of  the  first  line 
was  to  march  to  its  position  in  the  woods,  were  blazed  upon 
the  trees,  and  the  entire  force  of  the  enemy  went  into  line  for 
the  attack  wholly  undisturbed,  and  with  as  much  order  and 
precision,  as  if  forming  upon  markers  for  a  grand  review. 
And  the  time  that  the  enemy  was  thus  forming  his  lines, 
scarcely  out  of  rifled  cannon  range,  "  passed  in  our  camps," 
says  General  Sherman,  "  without  any  unusual  event." 

Enough  has  been  presented  to  show  upon  how  slight  a 
foundation  that  position  of  the  book  is  built,  by  which  General 
Sherman  seeks  to  controvert  the  idea  that  "  our  army  was 
taken  completely  by  surprise"  at  Shiloh. 

Two  brief  extracts  from  his  own  official  report  of  the  battle, 
dated  on  the  field,  April  10th,  will  show  on  what  day  and  at 
what  hour  he,  the  trusted  officer  on  the  field,  became  satisfied 
that  the  rebels  intended  to  attack: 

"  On  Saturday  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  again  very  bold,  coming  well  down 
to  our  front,  yet  I  did  not  believe  they  designed  anything  but  a  strong  demon 
stration.  *  *  *  * 

"About  8  A.  M.  (Sunday)  I  saw  the  glistening  bayonets  of  heavy  masses  of 
infantry  to  our  left  front  in  the  woods  beyond  the  small  stream  alluded  to, 
and  became  satisfied  for  the  first  time  that  the  enemy  designed  a  determined 
attack  on  our  whole  camp." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  do  more  than  call  attention  to  some 
most  absurd  points  made  by  General  Sherman. 

No  rifle  pits  were  dug  or  abattis  laid  down,  because  the  army 
regulations  stood  in  the  way. 

The  line  did  not  occupy  too  much  ground,  although  space 
enough  had  been  left  for  BuelPs  forces. 

Although  all  the  elements  of  an  army  were  known  to  be  in 
the  front  on  Friday,  yet  no  one  knew  its  destination,  and  even 
General  Sherman  had  to  guess  its  purpose. 

And  for  all  this  bungling,  blundering,  and  criminal  careless- 


36  SHILOH. 

ness,  General  Sherman  some  years  later  had  this  excuse,  in  a 
letter  to  the  United  States  Service  Magazine  : 

"  It  was  necessary  that  a  combat,  fierce  and  bitter,  to  test  the  manhood  of  the 
two  armies,  should  come  oft",  and  that  was  as  good  a  place  as  any.  It  was  not 
then  a  question  of  miltary  skill  and  strategy,  but  of  courage  and  pluck,  and 
I  am  convinced  that  every  life  lost  that  day  to  us  was  necessary,  for  otherwise, 
at  Corinth,  at  Memphis,  at  Vicksburg,  we  would  have  found  harder  resistance, 
had  we  not  shown  our  enemies,  that  rude  and  untutored  as  we  then  were,  we 
could  fight  as  well  as  they." 

A  well  ordered  line  of  battle,  some  rifle  pits,  and  a  vigilant 
watch  for  an  approaching  enemy,  followed  by  such  fighting 
as  these  precautions  would  have  insured,  might  have  made 
even  a  better  impression  upon  the  rebels  with  a  great  saving 
of  life. 

At  Shiloh,  for  the  first  time  since  General  Buell  had  obtained 
an  "  honorable  position"  for  General  Sherman  in  Louisiana, 
these  two  officers  met  on  the  battle-field.  This  time  General 
Buell  came  when  sorely  needed,  to  aid  Sherman  and  his  asso 
ciates  in  securing  honorable  victory.  All  would  suppose  that 
when  the  author  of  the  Memoirs  sat  down  to  write  his  version 
of  Shiloh  he  would  at  least  have  done  bare  justice  to  General 
Buell  and  his  army,  but  the  reader  will  look  for  it  in  vain. 
Whatever  his  impressions  at  the  time  may  have  been,  the  pub 
lic  discussions  which  have  since  taken  place,  and  the  whole 
official  history  of  the  movements,  which  was  at  his  disposal, 
afforded  every  means  of  correcting  previous  errors.  Although, 
toward  the  close  of  that  first  disastrous  day,  Grant's  whole 
army  was  praying  for  "  night  or  Buell/'  and  Grant  about  noon 
was  urging  Buell  on  as  follows : — "  If  you  will  get  upon  the 
field,  leaving  all  your  baggage  over  the  river,  it  will  be  a 
move  to  our  advantage,  and  possibly  save  the  day  to  us," — 
General  Sherman  finds  little  to  recognize  or  praise  in  the 
gallantry  and  efficient  aid  rendered  in  time  of  need  by 
his  former  friend,  and  has  cold  words  of  disparagement 
instead. 

The  closing  portion  of  his  chapter  on  Shiloh,  is  chiefly  de- 


SHILOH.  37 

voted  to  matters  connected  with  General  Buell  and  his  forces, 
and  is  as  follows : 

*  *  *  "General  Grant  did  not  make  an  official  report  of  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  but  all  its  incidents  and  events  were  covered  by  the  reports  of  division 
commanders  and  subordinates.  Probably  no  single  battle  of  the  war  gave 
rise  to  such  wild  and  damaging  reports.  It  was  publicly  asserted  at  the  North 
that  our  army  was  taken  completely  by  surprise;  that  the  rebels  caught  us  in 
our  tents;  bayoneted  the  men  in  their  beds;  that  General  Grant  was  drunk; 
that  Buell's  opportune  arrival  saved  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  from  utter 
annihilation,  etc.  These  reports  were  in  a  measure  sustained  by  the  published 
opinions  of  Generals  Buell,  Nelson,  and  others,  who  had  reached  the  steam 
boat  landing  from  the  east  just  before  night-fall  of  the  6th,  when  there  was 
a  large  crowd  of  frightened,  stampeded  men,  who  clamored  and  declared  that 
our  army  was  all  destroyed  and  beaten.  Personally  I  saw  General  Grant, 
who  with  his  staff  visited  me  about  10  A.  M.  of  the  6th,  when  we  were  des 
perately  engaged.  But  we  had  checked  the  headlong  assault  of  our  enemy, 
and  then  held  our  ground.  This  gave  him  great  satisfaction,  and  he  told  me 
that  things  did  not  look  as  well  over  on  the  left.  He  also  told  me  that  on 
his  way  up  from  Savannah  that  morning,  he  had  stopped  at  Crump's  Landing, 
and  had  ordered  Lew.  Wallace's  division  to  cross  over  Lick  Creek,  so  as  to  come 
up  on  my  right,  telling  me  to  look  out  for  him.  He  again  came  to  me  just 
before  dark,  and  described  the  last  assault  made  by  the  rebels  at  the  ravine, 
near  the  steamboat  landing,  which  he  had  repelled  by  a  heavy  battery  collected 
under  Colonel  J.  D.  Webster  and  other  officers,  and  he  was  convinced  that  the 
battle  was  over  for  that  day.  He  ordered  me  to  be  ready  to  assume  the  offen 
sive  in  the  morning,  saying  that,  as  he  had  observed  at  Fort  Donelson  at 
the  crisis  of  the  battle,  boih  sides  seemed  defeated  and  whoever  assumed  the 
offensive  was  sure  to  win.  General  Grant  also  explained  to  me  that  General 
Buell  had  reached  the  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River  opposite  Pittsburgh  Land 
ing,  and  was  in  the  act  of  ferrying  his  troops  across  at  the  time  he  was 
speaking  to  me. 

"About  half  an  hour  afterward  General  Buell  himself  rode  up  to  where  I 
was,  accompanied  by  Colonels  Fry,  Michler,  and  others  of  his  staff.  I  was 
dismounted  at  the  time,  and  General  Buell  made  of  me  a  good  many  signifi 
cant  inquiries  about  matters  and  things  generally.  By  the  aid  of  a  manu 
script  map  made  by  myself,  I  pointed  out  to  him  our  positions  as  they  had 
been  in  the  morning,  and  our  then  positions ;  I  also  explained  to  him  that 
my  right  then  covered  the  bridge  over  Lick  Creek,  by  which  we  had  all  day 
been  expecting  Lew.  Wallace;  that  McClernand  was  on  my  left,  Hurlbut  on 
his  left,  and  so  on.  But  Buell  said  he  had  come  up  from  the  landing,  and 
had  not  seen  our  men — of  whose  existence,  in  fact,  he  seemed  to  doubt.  I 
insisted  that  I  had  five  thousand  good  men  still  left  in  line,  and  thought  that 
McClernand  had  as  many  more,  and  that  with  what  was  left  of  Hurlbut's, 
W.  H.  L.  Wallace's,  and  Prentiss'  divisions,  we  ought  to  have  eighteen 


38  SHILOH. 

thousand  men  fit  for  battle.  I  reckoned  that  ten  thousand  of  our  men  were 
dead,  wounded,  or  prisoners,  and  that  the  enemy's  loss  could  not  be  much 
less.  Buell  said  that  Nelson's,  McCook's,  and  Crittenden's  divisions  of  his 
army,  containing  eighteen  thousand  men,  had  arrived,  and  could  cross  over 
in  the  night  and  be  ready  for  the  next  day's  battle.  I  argued  that,  with  these 
reinforcements,  we  could  sweep  the  field.  Buell  seemed  to  mistrust  us,  and 
repeatedly  said  that  he  did  not  like  the  looks  of  things,  especially  about  the 
boat  landing,  and  I  really  feared  he  would  not  cross  over  his  army  that  night, 
lest  he  should  become  involved  in  our  general  disaster.  He  did  not,  of  course, 
understand  the  shape  of  the  ground,  and  asked  me  for  the  use  of  my  map, 
which  I  lent  him  on  the  promise  that  he  would  return  it.  He  handed  it  to 
Major  Michler  to  have  it  copied,  and  the  original  returned  to  me,  which 
Michler  did  two  or  three  days  after  the  battle.  Buell  did  cross  over  that 
night,  and  the  next  day  we  assumed  the  offensive  and  swept  the  field,  thus 
gaining  the  battle  decisively.  Nevertheless,  the  controversy  was  started  and 
kept  up,  mostly  to  the  personal  prejudice  of  General  Grant,  who,  as  usual, 
maintained  an  imperturbable  silence. 

"  After  the  battle,  a  constant  stream  of  civilian  surgeons,  and  sanitary  com 
mission  agents,  men  and  women,  came  up  the  Tennessee  to  bring  relief  to  the 
thousands  of  maimed  and  wounded  soldiers  for  whom  we  had  imperfect  means 
of  shelter  and  care.  These  people  caught  up  the  camp  stories,  which,  on  their 
return  home,  they  retailed  through  their  local  papers,  usually  elevating  their 
own  neighbors  into  heroes,  but  decrying  all  others.  Among  them  was  Lieu- 
ten  ant-Governor  Stanton,  of  Ohio,  who  published  in  Bellefontaine,  Ohio,  a 
most  abusive  article  about  General  Grant  and  his  subordinate  generals.  As 
General  Grant  did  not,  and  wouid  not,  take  up  the  cudgels,  I  did  so.  My 
letter  in  reply  to  Stanton,  dated  June  10,  1862,  was  published  in  the  Cincin 
nati  Commercial  soon  after  its  date.  To  this  Lieuten ant-Governor  Stanton 
replied,  and  I  further  rejoined  in  a  letter  dated  July  12,  1862.  These  letters 
are  too  personal  to  be  revived.  By  this  time  the  good  people  of  the  North 
had  begun  to  have  their  eyes  opened,  and  to  give  us  in  the  field  more  faith 
and  support.  Stanton  was  never  again  elected  to  any  public  office,  and  was 
commonly  spoken  of  as  'the  late  Mr.  Stanton.'  He  is  now  dead,  and  I  doubt 
not  in  life  he  often  regretted  his  mistake  in  attempting  to  gain  popular  fame 
by  abusing  the  army  leaders,  then,  as  now,  an  easy  and  favorite  mode  of 
gaining  notoriety,  if  not  popularity.  Of  course,  subsequent  events  gave 
General  Grant  and  most  of  the  other  actors  in  that  battle  their  appropriate 
place  in  history,  but  the  danger  of  sudden  popular  clamor  is  well  illustrated 
by  this  case. 

"  The  battle  of  Shiloh,  or  Pittsburgh  Landing,  was  one  of  the  most  fiercely 
contested  of  the  war.  On  the  morning  of  April  6,  1862,  the  five  divisions  of 
McClernand,  Prentiss,  Hurlbut,  W.  H.  L.  Wallace,  and  Sherman  aggregated 
about  thirty-two  thousand  men.  We  had  no  intrenchments  of  any  sort,  on 
the  theory  that,  as  soon  as  Buell  arrived,  we  would  march  to  Corinth  to  attack 
the  enemy.  The  rebel  army,  commanded  by  General  Albert  Sidney  John- 


SHILOH.  39 

Bton,  was,  according  to  their  own  reports  and  admissions,  forty-five  thousand 
strong,  had  the  momentum  of  attack,  and  beyond  all  question  fought  skill 
fully  from  early  morning  till  about  2  P.  M.,  when  their  commander-in-chief 
was  killed  by  a  Minie-ball  in  the  calf  of  his  leg,  which  penetrated  the  boot 
and  severed  the  main  artery.  There  was  then  a  perceptible  lull  for  a  couple  of 
hours,  when  the  attack  was  renewed,  but  with  much  less  vehemence,  and  con 
tinued  up  to  dark.  Early  at  night  the  division  of  Lew.  Wallace  arrived  from 
the  other  side  of  Snake  Creek,  not  having  fired  a  shot.  A  very  small  part 
of  General  Buell's  army  was  on  our  side  of  the  Tennessee  River  that  evening, 
and  their  loss  was  trivial. 

"  During  that  night  the  three  divisions  of  McCook,  Nelson,  and  Crittenden 
were  ferried  across  the  Tennessee,  and  fought  Avith  us  the  next  day  (7th.) 
During  that  night,  also,  the  two  wooden  gun-boats,  Tyler,  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Gwin,  and  Lexington,  Lieutenant  Shirk,  both  of  the  regular 
navy,  caused  shells  to  be  thrown  toward  that  part  of  the  field  of  battle  known 
to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Beauregard  afterward  reported  his  entire  loss 
as  ten  thousand  six  hundred  and  ninety-nine.  Our  aggregate  loss,  made  up 
from  official  statements,  shows  seventeen  hundred  killed,  seven  thousand  four 
hundred  and  ninety-five  wounded,  and  three  thousand  and  twenty-two  pris 
oners;  aggregate,  twelve  thousand  two  hundred  and  seventeen,  of  which 
twenty-one  hundred  and  sixty-seven  were  in  Buell's  army,  leaving  for  that  of 
Grant  ten  thousand  and  fifty.  This  result  is  a  fair  measure  of  the  amount 
of  fighting  done  by  each  army." 

And  this  of  an  army  that  occupied  three-fourths  of  the  line 
of  battle  on  the  second  day,  and  carried  it  steadily  forward 
till  victory  was  attained!  Instead  of  this  last  unworthy  sen 
tence,  General  Sherman  might  have  had  the  fairness  to  say 
that,  as  Grant's  force  for  the  first  day's  fight  consisted  of  five 
divisions,  aggregating  about  thirty-two  thousand  men,  and  as 
Lew.  Wallace's  division,  about  six  thousand  strong,  came  up 
for  the  second  day's  fight — while  Buell  had  only  one  brigade 
in  action  after  5  o'clock  the  first  day,  and  only  three  divisions 
of  eighteen  thousand  men  the  second  day — the  losses  of  each 
army  were  about  in  proportion  to  their  respective  numbers, 
and  the  time  each  was  engaged.  But  it  has  never  heretofore 
answered  General  Sherman's  purpose  to  state  the  facts  about 
Buell's  army  at  Shiloh,  and  now  he  is  attempting  to  perpetu 
ate  exploded  errors. 

The  statement  that  General  Grant  made  no  official  report 
of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  careless 


40  SHILOH. 

manner  in  which  General  Sherman  has  prepared  his  book. 
Not'  only  did  Grant  make  such  a  report,  but  it  was  written 
before  the  reports  of  any  of  the  division  commanders  had 
been  handed  in,  as  is  shown  by  their  respective  dates,  so  that 
it  is  valuable  as  containing  General  Grant's  own  understand 
ing  of  the  events  of  the  battle.  It  has  long  been  in  the 
regular  files,  with  the  reports  of  one  hundred  and  sixteen 
other  officers,  upon  the  part  taken  by  their  commands  in  this 
battle.  It  was  printed  in  the  Rebellion  Record  for  1862. 

And,  as  General  Sherman,  since  the  publication  of  his 
Memoirs,  still  maintains  that  General  Grant  made  no  official 
report  of  Shiloh,  it  is  proper  to  present  its  forma)  official 
marks.  It  opens  and  closes  as  follows : 

HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  WEST  TENNESSEE,  ) 
PITTSBURGH,  April  9th,  1862.     j 

Captain  N.  H.  McLEAN,  A.  A.  Gen.  Dept.  of  the  Mississippi,  St.  Louis,  Mo 

CAPTAIN  :    It  becomes  my  duty  again   to  report  another  battle  fought 
between  two  great  armies — one  contending  for  the  maintenance  of  the  best 
government  ever  devised,  the  other  for  its  destruction.     It  is  pleasant  t<> 
record  the  success  of  the  army  contending  for  the  former  principle. 
(Then  follows  the  body  of  the  report.) 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-  General  commanding. 

The  document  was  forwarded  to  the  War  Department  from 
General  Halleck's  headquarters  at  St.  Louis,  thus  officially 
certified : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
ST.  Louis,  April  14th,  1862.      } 
Official  copy. 

J.  C.  KELTON,  Assistant  Adjutant-  General. 

On  account  of  some  delay,  it  was  not  transmitted  to  the 
Senate  when  that  body  called  for  all  the  reports  of  the  battle. 
Those  forwarded  in  obedience  to  the  call,  were  not  described 
by  Mr.  Stanton  in  his  letter  accompanying  them,  as  all  the 
reports,  but  as  aall  the  reports  (one  hundred  and  sixteen  in 
number)  which  have  yet  been  received  by  this  Department." 


SHILOH.  41 

It  now  occupies  its  proper  place  in  the  files  with  the  other 
reports  of  that  battle. 

A  paragraph  from  this  report  sets  forth  the  part  taken  by 
General  BuelPs  forces  in  repelling  the  assault  near  the  steam 
boat  landing,  about  the  close  of  the  first  day's  action,  which 
is  wholly  ignored  in  General  Sherman's  account  of  Shiloh. 
Says  General  Grant: 

"At  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  a  desperate  effort  was  made  by  the  enemy 
to  turn  our  left  and  get  possession  of  the  landing,  transports,  etc.  This  point 
was  guarded  by  the  gun-boats  Tyler  and  Lexington,  Captains  Gwinn  and 
Shirk,  U.  S.  N.,  commanding,  four  20-pounder  Parrott  guns  and  a  battery  of 
rifled  guns.  As  there  is  a  deep  and  impassable  ravine  for  artillery  or  cav 
alry,  and  very  difficult  for  infantry  at  this  point,  no  troops  were  stationed 
here  except  the  necessary  artillerists  and  a  small  infantry  force  for  their  sup 
port.  Just  at  this  moment  the  advance  of  Major-General  Buell's  colupin  (a 
part  of  the  division  under  General  Nelson)  arrived,  the  two  Generals  named 
both  being  present.  An  advance  was  immediately  made  upon  the  point  of 
attack,  and  the  enemy  soon  driven  back." 

It  is,  to  say  the  least,  quite  improbable  that  when  General 
Grant  was  detailing  to  Sherman  the  desperate  attack  at  the 
ravine  spoken  of  in  his  report,  and  had  seen  BuelPs  troops, 
with  Buell  and  Nelson  both  present,  advance  and  push  back 
the  enemy  with  the  assistance  of  the  gun-boats  and  the  heavy 
artillery,  he  not  only  forgot  to  mention  to  Sherman  the  fact 
that  Buell  and  part  of  his  troops  were  across  and  had  been 
engaged  at  the  ravine,  but  should  tell  him  that  Buell  was 
actually  on  the  other  side  of  the  river. 

General  BuelPs  official  report  agrees  exactly  with  that  of 
General  Grant,  in  regard  to  the  attack  at  the  landing.  In 
speaking  of  his  arrival,  which  was  at  1  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  of  the  6th,  General  Buell  says : 

"Finding  General  Grant  at  the  landing,  I  requested  him  to  send  steamers 
to  Savannah  to  bring  up  General  Crittenden's  division,  which  had  arrived 
during  the  morning,  and  then  went  ashore  with  him.  *  *  *  In  the 
meantime  the  enemy  had  made  such  progress  against  our  troops  that  his 
artillery  and  musketry  began  to  play  into  the  vital  spot  of  the  position,  and 
some  persons  were  killed  on  the  bank  at  the  very  landing.  General  Nelson 


42  SHILOH. 

arrived  with  Colonel  Ammen's  brigade  at  this  opportune  moment.  It  was 
immediately  posted  to  meet  the  attack  at  that  point,  and  with  a  battery  of 
artillery,  which  happened  to  be  on  the  ground,  and  was  brought  into  action, 
opened  fire  on  the  enemy  and  repulsed  him.  The  action  of  the  gun-boats  also 
contributed  very  much  to  that  result.  The  attack  at  that  point  was  not 
renewed,  night  having  come  on,  and  the  firing  ceased  on  both  sides." 

Concerning  the  actors  in  the  battle,  General  Grant  says  : 

"Of  the  part  taken  by  each  separate  command  I  can  not  take  special 
notice  in  this  report,  but  will  do  so  more  fully  when  reports  of  division  com 
manders  are  handed  in. 

"  General  Buell  coming  on  the  field  with  a  distinct  army  long  under  his 
command,  and  which  did  such  efficient  service,  commanded  by  himself  in 
person  on  the  field,  will  be  much  better  able  to  notice  those  of  his  command, 
who  particularly  distinguished  themselves,  than  I  possibly  can." 

Ill  this  report  General  Grant  says  nothing  of  himself,  and 
all  that  he  could  of  good  about  others.  There  was  no  attempt 
here,  nor  has  he  ever  attempted  since  to  evade  his  full  respon 
sibility  for  Shiloh,  but  has  trusted  to  time  for  a  proper  distri 
bution  of  both  honor  and  blame. 

General  Halleck's  congratulatory  order  issued  a  week  after 
the  battle  thus  recognized  the  presence  and  the  action  of 
BuelPs  troops  on  the  first  day : 

"  1.  The  Major-General  commanding  this  department  thanks  Major-General 
Grant  and  Major-General  Buell,  and  the  officers  and  men  of  their  respective 
commands,  for  the  bravery  and  endurance  with  which  they  sustained  the  gen 
eral  attacks  of  the  enemy  on  the  6th,  and  for  the  heroic  manner  in  which  on 
the  7th  instant  they  defeated  and  routed  the  entire  rebel  army.  The  soldiers 
of  the  Great  West  have  added  new  laurels  to  those  which  they  had  already 
won  on  numerous  fields." 

The  report  made  to  General  Halleck  by  General  Grant  on 
the  evening  of  the  5th,  that  one  of  BuelPs  divisions  had  then 
arrived,  and  two  others  would  arrive  the  next  day,  renders 
unnecessary  the  further  discussion  of  a  question  indirectly 
presented  by  General  Sherman.  In  previous  controversies,  it 
has  been  strenuously  maintained  by  him,  that  General  Grant 
ordered  an  advance  for  the  second  day  without  regard  to  the 


SHILOH.  43 

arrival  of  Buell's  troops.  The  report  to  Halleck  shows  that 
this  was  impossible. 

The  connection  sought  to  be  established  between  the  letters 
of  Lieuteriant-Governor  Stanton  upon  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
and  his  non-election  to  public  office  after  writing  them,  is  cer 
tainly  a  curious  conceit  to  indulge  over  the  grave  of  such  a 
man. 

This  treatment  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  is  a  fair  sample  of 
the  entire  work.  The  two  volumes,  as  will  be  shown  by  the 
records,  teem  with  inaccuracies  and  instances  of  great  injus 
tice  done  to  associate  generals  and  cooperating  armies. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

IUKA   AND   SECOND   CORINTH — GENERAL   ROSECRANS   MIS 
REPRESENTED. 

HOSTILE  criticism  of  Generals  Buell,  Rosecrans,  and 
Thomas,  the  successive  commanders  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
forms  one  of  the  salient  features  of  the  Memoirs.  General 
Rosecrans  particularly  distinguished  himself  in  the  battles  of 
luka  and  Corinth,  in  the  autumn  following  the  first  occupa 
tion  of  the  latter  place.  From  General  Sherman's  account, 
however,  the  reader  would  suppose  that  General  Rosecrans 
had  behaved  badly  in  both  these  actions.  Of  the  battle  at 
luka,  he  says : 

"In  the  early  part  of  September  the  enemy  in  our  front  manifested  great 
activity,  feeling  with  cavalry  at  all  points,  and  on  the  13th  General  Van 
Dorn  threatened  Corinth,  while  General  Price  seized  the  town  of  luka,  which 
was  promptly  abandoned  by  a  small  garrison  under  Colonel  Murphy.  Price's 
force  was  about  eight  thousand  men,  and  the  general  impression  was  that  he  was 
en  route  for  Eastport,  with  the  purpose  to  cross  the  Tennessee  River  in  the 
direction  of  Nashville,  in  aid  of  General  Bragg,  then  in  full  career  for  Ken 
tucky. 

"General  Grant  determined  to  attack  him  in  force,  prepared  to  regain 
Corinth  before  Van  Dorn  could  reach  it.  He  had  drawn  Ord  to  Corinth,  and 
moved  him  by  Burnsville  on  luka,  by  the  main  road  twenty-six  miles.  Gen 
eral  Grant  accompanied  this  column  as  far  as  Burnsville.  At  the  same  time 
he  had  dispatched  Bosecrans  by  roads  to  the  south,  via  Jacinto,  with  orders  to 
approach  luka  by  the  two  main  roads  coming  into  luka  from  the  south,  viz., 
the  Jacinto  and  Fulton  roads. 

"On  the  18th  General  Ord  encountered  the  enemy  about  four  miles  out  of 
luka.  His  orders  contemplated  that  he  should  not  make  a  serious  attack 
until  Bosecrans  had  gained  his  position  on  the  south ;  but,  as  usual,  Bose 
crans  had  encountered  difficulties  in  the  confusion  of  roads.  His  head 
of  column  did  not  reach  the  vicinity  of  luka  till  4  P.  M.  of  the  19th,  and  then 
(44) 


IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH.  45 

his  troops  were  long  drawn  out  on  the  single  Jacinto  road,  leaving  the  Fulton 
road  clear  for  Price's  use.  Price  perceived  his  advantage,  and  attacked  with 
vehemence  the  head  of  Rosecrans'  column,  Hamilton's  division,  beating  it 
back,  capturing  a  battery,  and  killing  and  disabling  seven  hundred  and 
thirty-six  men,  so  that  when  night  closed  in  Rosecrans  was  driven  to  the 
defensive,  and  Price,  perceiving  his  danger,  deliberately  withdrew  by  the  Ful 
ton  road,  and  the  next  morning  was  gone.  Although  General  Ord  must  have 
been  within  four  or  six  miles  of  this  battle,  he  did  not  hear  a  sound,  and  he 
or  General  Grant  did  not  know  of  it  till  advised  the  next  morning  by  a  cour 
ier  who  had  made  a  wide  circuit  to  reach  them.  General  Grant  was  much 
offended  with  General  Rosecrans  because  of  this  affair;  but  in  my  experience 
these  concerted  movements  generally  fail,  unless  with  the  very  best  kind  of 
troops,  and  then  in  a  country  on  whose  roads  some  reliance  can  be  placed, 
which  is  not  the  case  in  northern  Mississippi.  If  Price  was  aiming  for  Ten 
nessee  he  failed,  and  was  therefore  beaten.  He  made  a  wide  circuit  by  the 
south  and  again  joined  Van  Dorn."  *  *  *  * 

To  what  extent  this  action  was  a  reverse  for  General  Rose 
crans,  and  in  what  degree  General  Grant  was  offended,  the 
reports  of  the  last-named  officer  will  show: 

IUKA,  Miss.,  September  20,  1862. 
To  Major-General  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

General  Rosecrans,  with  Stanley  and  Hamilton's  divisions  of  Missouri  cav 
alry,  attacked  General  Price  south  of  this  village  about  two  hours  before 
dark  yesterday,  and  had  a  sharp  fight  until  night  closed  in. 

General  Ord  was  to  the  north  with  an  armed  -force  of  about  five  thousand 
men,  and  had  some  skirmishing  with  rebel  pickets.  This  morning  the  fight 
was  resumed  by  General  Rosecrans,  who  was  nearest  to  the  town,  but  it  waa 
found  that  the  enemy  had  been  evacuating  during  the  night,  going  south. 
Hamilton  and  Stanley,  with  the  cavalry,  are  in  full  pursuit. 

This  will,  no  doubt,  break  up  the  enemy,  and  possibly  force  them  to  aban 
don  much  of  their  artillery.  The  loss  on  either  side  in  killed  and  wounded 
is  from  four  to  five  hundred. 

The  enemy's  loss  in  arms,  tents,  etc.,  will  be  large.  We  have  about  two 
hundred  and  fifty  prisoners.  I  have  reliable  information  that  it  was  Price's 
intention  to  move  over  east  of  Tennessee.  In  this  he  has  been  thwarted. 
Among  the  enemy's  loss  are  General  Little,  killed,  and  General  Whitfield, 
wounded.  I  can  not  speak  too  highly  of  the  energy  and  skill  displayed  by 
General  Rosecrans  in  the  attack,  and  of  the  endurance  of  the  troops  under 
him.  General  Ord's  command  showed  untiring  zeal,  but  the  direction  taken 
by  the  enemy  prevented  them  taking  the  active  part  they  desired.  Price's 
force  was  about  fifteen  thousand.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Maj&r-General 


46  IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH. 

Subsequently,  General  Grant  made  an  extended  report  of 
this  battle,  which  bears  date  October  22d.  The  chief  ex 
pression  in  it  which  can  be  construed  into  dissatisfaction 
with  General  Kosecrans7  movements,  is  where  he  says,  speak 
ing  of  the  delay  of  his  column  through  the  fault  of  a  guide, 
"this  caused  some  disappointment  and  made  a  change  of  plans 
necessary,"  and  before  closing  his  report  he  calls  attention  to 
the  fact  that  this  delay  was  "  the  fault  of  a  guide." 

This  report  sums  up  the  movement  and  its  results  as 
follows : 

On  the  16th  of  September  we  commenced  to  collect  our  strength  to  move 
upon  Price  at  luka,  in  two  columns ;  the  one  to  the  right  of  the  railroad, 
commanded  by  Brigadier-General  (now  Major-General)  W.  S.  Rosecrans; 
the  one  to  the  left,  commanded  by  Major-General  O.  E.  C.  Ord.  On  the 
night  of  the  18th  the  latter  was  in  position  to  bring  on  an  engagement  in  one 
hour's  march.  Thejormer,  from  having  a  greater  distance  to  march,  and 
through  the  fault  of  a  guide,  was  twenty  miles  back.  On  the  19th,  by  making 
a  rapid  march,  hardy,  well  disciplined,  and  tried  troops  arrived  within  two 
miles  of  the  place  to  be  attacked.  Unexpectedly,  the  enemy  took  the  initia 
tive  and  became  the  attacking  party.  The  ground  chosen  was  such  that  a 
large  force  on  our  side  could  not  be  brought  into  action ;  but  the  bravery  and 
endurance  of  those  brought  in  was  such  that,  with  the  skill  and  presence  of 
mind  of  the  officer  commanding,  they  were  able  to  hold  their  ground  till 
night  closed  the  conflict.  During  the  night  the  enemy  fled,  leaving  our 
troops  in  possession  of  the  field,  with  their  dead  to  bury  and  wounded  to  care 
for.  If  it  was  the  object  of  the  enemy  to  make  their  way  into  Kentucky, 
they  were  defeated  in  that ;  if  to  hold  their  position  until  Van  Dorn  could 
come  up  on  the  south-west  of  Corinth  and  make  a  simultaneous  attack,  they 
were  defeated  in  that.  Our  only  defeat  was  in  not  capturing  the  entire  army, 
or  in  destroying  it,  as  I  had  hoped  to  do. 

It  was  a  part  of  General  Hamilton's  command  that  did  the  fighting, 
directed  entirely  by  that  cool  and  deserving  officer. 

I  commend  him  to  the  President  for  acknowledgment  for  his  services. 

*  *  *  *  I  can  not  close  this  report  without  paying  a  tribute  to  all 
the  officers  and  soldiers  comprising  this  command.  Their  conduct  on  the 
march  was  exemplary  and  all  were  eager  to  meet  the  enemy.  The  possibility 
of  defeat  I  do  not  think  entered  the  mind  of  a  single  individual,  and  I  believe 
this  same  feeling  now  pervades  the  entire  army  which  I  have  the  honor  to 
command.  *  *  *  *  U.  S.  GBANT,  Major- General. 

In  his  account  of  the  battle  of  Corinth,  which  took  place 


IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH.  47 

about  two  weeks  after  the  action  at  luka,  General  Sherman  is 
still  more  unjust  to  General  Kosecrans.  The  battle  was  a 
brilliant  and  most  decisive  one,  and  General  Rosecrans'  con 
duct  throughout,  such  as  merited  and  secured  the  highest 
praise,  and  a  few  days  after  his  return  from  a  long  pursuit 
of  the  enemy,  he  was  relieved  and  promoted  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  in  place  of  General 
Buell. 

In  regard  to  the  affair  at  Corinth  the  Memoirs  say : 

"Still  by  the  1st  of  October,  General  Grant  was  satisfied  that  the  enemy 
was  meditating  an  attack  in  force  on  Boliver  or  Corinth;  and  on  the  2d 
Van  Dorn  made  his  appearance  near  Corinth,  with  his  entire  army.  On  the 
3d  he  moved  down  on  that  place  from  the  north  and  north-west. 

"  General  Rosecrans  went  out  some  four  miles  to  meet  him,  but  was  worsted 
and  compelled  to  fall  back  within  the  line  of  his  forts.  These  had  been 
begun  under  General  Halleck,  but  were  much  strengthened  by  General  Grant, 
and  consisted  of  several  detached  redoubts  bearing  on  each  other,  and  inclos 
ing  the  town  and  the  depots  of  stores  at  the  intersection  of  the  two  railroads. 
Van  Dorn  closed  down  on  the  forts  by  the  evening  of  the  3d,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  4th  assaulted  with  great  vehemence. 

"Our  men,  covered  by  good  parapets,  fought  gallantly,  and  defended  their 
posts  well,  inflicting  terrible  losses  on  the  enemy,  so  that  by  noon  the  rebels 
were  repulsed  at  all  points  and  drew  off,  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  in 
our  hands.  *  *  *  * 

"Meantime,  General  Grant  at  Jackson,  had  dispatched  Brigadier -General 
McPherson  with  a  brigade  directly  for  Corinth,  which  reached  General 
Rosecrans  after  the  battle ;  and  in  anticipation  of  his  victory,  had  ordered 
him  to  pursue  instantly,  notifying  him  that  he  had  ordered  Ord's  and 
Hurlbut's  divisions  rapidly  across  to  Pocahontas,  so  as  to  strike  the  rebels 
in  flank.  On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  General  Ord  reached  Hatchie  River 
at  Davis'  bridge,  with  four  thousand  men;  crossed  over  and  encountered  the 
retreating  army,  captured  a  battery  and  several  hundred  prisoners,  dispersing 
the  rebel  advance  and  forcing  the  main  column  to  make  a  wide  circuit  by 
the  south  in  order  to  cross  the  Hatchie  River. 

"  Had  General  Rosecrans  pursued  promptly  and  been  on  the  heels  of  this 
mass  of  confused  and  routed  men,  Van  Dora's  army  would  surely  have  been 
utterly  ruined;  as  it  was,  Van  Dorn  regained  Holly  Springs  somewhat 
demoralized. 

"General  Rosecrans  did  not  begin  his  pursuit  till  the  next  morning,  the 
5th,  and  it  was  then  too  late. 

"General  Grant  was  again  displeased  with  him,  and  never  became  fully 
reconciled.  General  Rosecrans  was  soon  after  relieved,  and  transferred  to 


48  IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH. 

the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  Tennessee,  of  which  he  afterward  obtained 
the  command  in  place  of  General  Buell,  who  was  removed. 

"The  effect  of  the  battle  of  Corinth  was  very  great.  It  was,  indeed,  a 
decisive  blow  to  the  Confederate  cause  in  our  quarter,  and  changed  the  whole 
aspect  of  affairs  in  West  Tennessee.  From  the  timid  defensive,  we  were  at 
once  enabled  to  assume  the  bold  offensive.  In  Memphis  I  could  see  its  effects 
upon  the  citizens,  and  they  openly  admitted  that  their  cause  had  sustained 
a  death-blow." 

The  several  insinuations  against  General  Rosecrans  (who 
had  struck  this  death-blow),  which  the  above  extracts  contain, 
are  placed  in  their  true  light,  through  the  telegrams  sent  by 
General  Grant  at  the  time  of  the  movement,  and  his  full 
report  made  later: 

JACKSON,    October  5,  1862. 
General  H.  W.  HALLECK,   Washington,  D.  C. 

Yesterday  the  rebels  under  Van  Dorn,  Price,  and  Lovell  were  repulsed 
from  their  attack  on  Corinth  with  great  slaughter.  The  enemy  are  in  full 
retreat,  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field.  Rosecrans  telegraphs 
that  the  loss  is  serious  on  our  side,  particularly  in  officers,  but  bears  no  com 
parison  with  that  of  the  enemy.  General  Hackleman  fell  while  gallantly 
leading  his  brigade.  General  Oglesby  is  dangerously  wounded.  McPherson 
reached  Corinth  with  his  command  yesterday.  Rosecrans  pursued  the  retreat 
ing  enemy  this  morning,  and  should  he  attempt  to  move  toward  Boliver, 
will  follow  him  to  that  place.  Hurlbut  is  at  the  Hatchie  with  five  or  six 
thousand  men,  and  is  no  doubt,  now  with  the  pursuing  column.  From  seven 
hundred  to  a  thousand  prisoners,  beside  wounded,  are  left  on  our  hands. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-General, 

JACKSON,  October  5,  1862. 
General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

General  Ord,  who  followed  Hurlbut  and  took  command,  met  the  enemy 
to  day  on  the  south  side  of  the  Hatchie,  as  I  understand  from  a  dispatch,  and 
drove  them  across  the  stream  and  got  possession  of  the  heights  with  our 
troops.  Ord  took  two  batteries  and  about  two  hundred  prisoners.  A  large 
portion  of  Rosecrans'  forces  were  at  Chewalla.  At  this  distance  every  thing 
looks  most  favorable,  and  I  can  not  see  how  the  enemy  are  to  escape  without 
losing  every  thing  but  their  small  arms.  I  have  strained  every  thing  to  take 
into  the  fight  an  adequate  force,  and  to  get  them  to  the  right  place. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-  General 

JACKSON,  October  6,  1862. 

General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Generals  Ord  and  Hurlbut  came  on  the  enemy's  rear  yesterday,  Hurlbut 


IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH.  49 

having  driven  in  small  bodies  the  day  before.  After  several  hours  hard  fight 
ing  they  drove  the  enemy  five  miles  back  across  the  Hatchie  toward  Corinth, 
capturing  two  batteries,  about  three  hundred  prisoners,  and  many  small 
arms.  I  immediately  apprised  General  Eosecrans  of  these  facts,  and  directed 
him  to  urge  on  the  good  work.  The  following  dispatch  just  received : 

CHEWALLA,  October  6,  1862. 
"  To  Major-General  GRANT. 

"The  enemy  are  totally  routed,  throwing  every  thing  away.     We  are  fol 
lowing  sharply.  W.  S.  EOSECRANS." 

Under  previous  instructions,  Hurlbut  is  also  following.     McPherson  is  in 
the  lead  of  Kosecrans'  column.     Eebel  General  Martin  said  to  be  killed. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 


JACKSON,  October  8,  1862. 
General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Eosecrans  has  followed  rebels  to  Eipley.  Troops  from  Bolivar  will  occupy 
Grand  Juction  to-morrow.  With  reinforcements  rapidly  sent  in  from  the 
new  lines,  I  can  take  any  thing  on  the  Mississippi  Central  road.  I  ordered 
Eosecrans  back  last  night,  but  he  is  so  adverse  to  returning  that  I  have 
directed  him  to  remain  still,  until  you  can  be  heard  from. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General 

General  Rosecrans'  protest  against  giving  up  the  pursuit, 
thus  referred  to  by  General  Grant,  was  as  follows: 

HEADQUARTERS,  JONESBORO,  Miss.,  ) 
October  7,  1862,  midnight.      j 
Major- General  GRANT,  Jackson,  Tenn. 

Yours,  8:30  P.  M.,  received.  I  most  deeply  dissent  from  your  views  as  to 
the  policy  of  pursuit.  We  have  defeated,  routed,  and  demoralized  the  army 
which  held  the  Lower  Mississippi  Valley.  We  have  the  two  railroads  lead 
ing  south  to  the  Gulf,  through  the  most  populous  parts  of  this  State,  into 
which  we  can  now  pursue  them  by  the  Mississippi  Central  or  Mobile  &  Ohio 
Eoad.  The  effect  of  returning  to  our  old  position  will  be  to  give  them  up 
the  only  corn  they  have  in  the  country  west  of  Alabama,  including  Tuscum- 
bia  Valley,  and  to  permit  them  to  recruit  their  forces,  advance,  and  reoccupy 
their  old  ground,  reducing  us  to  the  occupation  of  a  defensive  position,  bar 
ren  and  worthless,  on  a  long  front,  of  which  they  can  harass  us  until  bad 
weather  precludes  any  effectual  advance,  except  along  the  railroads,  where 
time,  fortifications,  and  rolling  stock  will  render  them  superior  to  us. 

Our   force,  including  what   can    be   spared  with   Hurlbut,  will    garrison 

Corinth  and  Jackson,  and  enable  us  to  push  them.     Our  advance  will  cover 

even  Holly  Springs,  which  will  be  ours  when  we  want  it.    All  that  is  needful 

is  to  combine,  push,  and  whip  them.     We  have  whipped,  and  should  now 

4 


50  IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH. 

push  to  the  wall,  all  the  forces  in  Mississippi,  and  capture  the  rolling  stock 
of  the  railroads  west  of  the  Alabama  &  Mobile.  Bragg's  army  alone  could 
repair  the  damage  we  have  it  in  our  power  to  do  them.  But  I  beseech  you 
to  bend  every  thing  to  push  them  while  they  are  broken,  weary,  hungry,  and 
ill  supplied.  Draw  every  thing  from  Memphis  to  help  move  on  Holly 
Springs.  Let  us  concentrate,  and  appeal  to  the  governors  of  the  States  to 
rush  down  some  twenty  or  thirty  new  regiments  to  hold  in  our  rear,  and  we 
can  make  a  triumph  of  our  start.  Respectfully  and  truly, 

W.  S.  ROSECRANS,  Major-  General. 

In  reply  to  this  he  received  an  order  from  the  general  com 
manding,  directing  him  to  desist  from  pursuit,  and  return  with 
his  command  cautiously,  but  promptly,  to  Corinth. 

WASHINGTON,  10  A   M.,  October  8,  1862. 
Major-General  U.  S.  GRANT. 

Why  order  a  return  of  your  troops  ?  Why  not  reenforce  Rosecrans,  and 
pursue  the  enemy  into  Mississippi,  supporting  your  army  on  the  country  ? 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

JACKSON,  October  8,  1862. 
General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

An  army  can  not  subsist  itself  on  the  country  except  in  forage.  They  did 
not  start  out  to  follow  but  a  few  days,  and  are  much  worn  out ;  and  I  have 
information,  not  only  that  the  enemy  have  reserves  that  are  on  their  way  t  > 
join  the  retreating  column,  "but  that  they  have  fortifications  to  retreat  to  in 
case  of  need.  The  Mobile  road  is  also  open  to  the  enemy  to  near  Rienzi,  and 
Corinth  would  be  exposed  by  the  advance.  Although  partial  success  might 
result  from  further  pursuit,  disaster  would  follow  in  the  end.  If  you  say  so, 
however,  it  is  not  too  late  yet  to  go  on,  and  I  will  join  the  moving  column  and 
go  to  the  farthest  extent  possible.  Rosecrans  has  been  reenforced  with  every 
thing  on  hand,  even  at  the  risk  of  this  road  against  raids. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-General. 

It  was  decided,  however,  to  order  General  Rosecrans  back, 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  not  strong  enough,  or  sufficiently 
prepared,  for  such  a  pursuit  as  he  designed  to  make. 

The  following  extract  from  orders  issued  by  General  Grant 
at  Jackson,  October  7th,  shows  that  he  then  thought  General 
Rosecrans  had  accomplished  all  possible  for  him  to  do  in  the 
place  assigned  him. 


IUKA  AND  SECOND  CORINTH.  51 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  WEST  TENNESSEE,  ) 
JACKSOK,  TENN.,  October  7.     J 

[General  Order  No.  88.] 

It  is  with  heartfelt  gratitude  the  General  commanding  congratulates  the 
Armies  of  the  West  for  another  victory,  won  by  them  on  the  3d,  4th,  and  5th 
inst.,  over  the  combined  armies  of  Van  Dorn,  Price,  and  Lovell.  *  *  * 
While  one  division  of  the  army,  under  Major-General  Kosecrans,  was 
resisting  and  repelling  the  onslaught  of  the  rebel  hosts  at  Corinth,  another 
from  Bolivar,  under  Major-General  Hurlbut,  was  marching  upon  the  enemy's 
rear,  driving  in  their  pickets  and  cavalry,  and  attracting  the  attention  of  a 
large  force  of  infantry  and  artillery.  *  *  *"  * 

To  these  two  divisions  of  the  army  all  praise  is  due,  and  will  be  awarded 
by  a  grateful  country. 

Between  them  there  should  be,  and  I  trust  is,  the  warmest  bonds  of  brother 
hood.  Each  was  risking  life  in  the  same  cause,  and  on  this  occasion  risking 
it  also  to  save  and  assist  the  other.  No  troops  could  do  more  than  these 
separated  armies.  Each  did  all  possible  for  it  to  do  in  the  place  assigned 
it.  *  *  *  * 

By  command  of  Major-  General  GRANT, 

JOHN  A.  KAWLINS,  A.  A.  G. 

General  Grant  closed  his  formal  report  of  this  battle  as 
follows : 

As  shown  by  the  reports,  the  enemy  was  repulsed  at  Corinth,  at  11  A.  M.  on 
the  4th,  and  not  followed  until  next  morning. 

Two  days'  hard  fighting  without  rest,  probably,  had  so  fatigued  the  troops  as 
to  make  earlier  pursuit  impracticable.  I  regretted  this  as  the  enemy  would 
have  been  compelled  to  abandon  most  of  his  artillery  and  transportation  in  the 
difficult  roads  of  the  Hatchie  crossing  had  the  pursuit  commenced  then. 

The  victory  was  most  triumphant  as  it  was  however,  and  all  praise  is  due 
officers  and  men  for  their  undaunted  courage  and  obstinate  resistance  against 
an  enemy  outnumbering  them  as  three  to  two. 

When  it  became  evident  that  an  attack  would  be  made,  I  drew  off*  from  the 
guard  along  the  line  of  the  railroad  all  the  troops  that  could  possibly  be 
spared  (six  regiments)  to  reenforce  Corinth  and  Bolivar,  as  before  stated; 
four  of  these  were  sent  under  General  McPherson  to  the  former  place  and 
formed  the  advance  in  the  pursuit.  Two  were  sent  to  Bolivar,  and  gave  that 
much  additional  force  to  be  spared  to  operate  on  the  enemy's  rear. 

When  I  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  succeeded  in  crossing  the  Hatchie, 
I  ordered  a  discontinuance  of  the  pursuit.  Before  this  order  reached  them, 
the  advance  infantry  force  had  reached  Ripley,  and  the  cavalry  had  gone 
beyond  possibly  twenty  miles.  This  I  regarded,  and  yet  regard,  as  absolutely 
necessary  to  the  safety  of  our  army.  They  could  not  have  possibly  caught 


52  IUKA  AND   SECOND  CORINTH. 

the  enemy  before  reaching  his  fortifications  at  Holly  Springs,  and  where  a  gar 
rison  of  several  thousand  troops  was  left  that  were  not  engaged  in  the  battle 
of  Corinth.  Our  own  troops  would  have  suffered  for  food,  and  suffered  greatly 
from  fatigue.  Finding  that  the  pursuit  had  followed  so  far,  and  that  our 
forces  were  very  much  scattered,  I  immediately  ordered  an  advance  from  Boli 
var  to  be  made,  to  cover  the  return  of  the  Corinth  forces.  They  went  as  far 
south  as  Davis'  Mills,  about  seven  miles  south  of  Grand  Junction,  drove  a 
small  rebel  garrison  from  there,  and  entirely  destroyed  the  railroad  bridges  at 
that  place. 

The  accompanying  reports  show  fully  all  the  casualties  and  other  results 
of  these  battles. 

I  am,  Colonel,  very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General  commanding. 

The  following  is  the  close  of  General  Rosecrans'  report  of 
this  battle : 

Thus  by  noon  ended  the  battle  of  the  4th  of  October. 

After  waiting  for  the  enemy's  return  a  short  time,  our  skirmishers  began  to 
advance,  and  found  that  their  skirmishers  were  gone  from  the  field,  leaving 
their  dead  and  wounded.  Having  ridden  over  it  and  satisfied  myself  of  the 
fact,  I  rode  all  over  our  lines,  announcing  the  result  of  the  fight  in  person ;  and 
notified  our  victorious  troops  that  after  two  days  of  fighting,  two  almost 
sleepless  nights  of  preparation,  movement,  and  march,  I  wished  them  to  re 
plenish  their  cartridge  boxes,  haversacks,  and  stomachs,  take  an  early  sleep 
and  start  in  pursuit  by  daylight.  Returning  from  this  I  found  the  gallant 
McPherson  with  a  fresh  brigade  on  the  public  square,  and  gave  him  the  same 
notice  with  orders  to  take  the  advance. 

The  results  of  the  battle  briefly  stated  are :  We  fought  the  combined  rebel 
forces  of  Mississippi,  commanded  by  Van  Dorn,  Price,  Lovell,  Villipigue,  and 
Rust  in  person,  numbering,  according  to  their  own  authorities,  thirty-eight 
thousand  men. 

We  signally  defeated  them  with  little  more  than  half  their  numbers,  and 
they  fled  leaving  their  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field.  The  enemy's  loss  in 
killed  was  fourteen  hundred  and  twenty-three  officers  and  men ;  their  loss  in 
wounded,  taking  the  general  average,  amounts  to  fifty-six  hundred  and  ninety- 
two. 

We  took  twenty-two  hundred  and  forty-eight  prisoners,  among  whom  are 
one  hundred  and  thirty-seven  field  officers,  captains,  and  subalterns,  represent 
ing  fifty-three  regiments  of  infantry,  sixteen  regiments  of  cavalry,  thirteen 
batteries  of  artillery,  and  seven  battalions,  making  sixty-nine  regiments,  seven 
battalions,  and  thirteen  batteries  besides  separate  companies. 

We  took,  also,  fourteen  stands  of  colors,  two  pieces  of  artillery,  thirty-three 
hundred  stands  of  small  arms,  forty-five  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  a 
large  lot  of  accouterments. 


IUKA  AND   SECOND  CORINTH.  53 

The  enemy  blew  up  several  ammunition  wagons  between  Corinth  and 
Chewalla,  and  beyond  Chewalla  many  ammunition  wagons  and  carriages  were 
destroyed,  and  the  ground  was  strewn  with  tents,  officers'  mess  chests,  and  small 
arms. 

We  pursued  them  forty  miles  in  force  and  sixty  miles  with  cavalry.  Our 
loss  was  only  three  hundred  and  fifteen  killed,  and  eighteen  hundred  and 
twelve  wounded,  and  two  hundred  and  thirty-two  prisoners  and  missing. 

It  is  said  the  enemy  was  so  demoralized  and  alarmed  at  our  advance  they 
set  fire  to  the  stores  at  Tupello,  but  finding  we  were  not  close  upon  them  they 
extinguished  the  fire  and  removed  the  public  stores,  except  two  car  loads  of 
bacon  which  they  destroyed.  *  *  *  * 

\V.  S.  ROSECRANS,  Major- General. 

Another  report  of  General  Rosecrans  shows  that  General 
McPherson  with  his  fresh  troops,  reached  him  just  before  sun 
set  after  the  battle,  and  together  with  the  whole  command 
began  the  pursuit  at  daylight  the  next  morning. 

Rosecrans'  force  in  the  battle  of  Corinth  was  fifteen  thou 
sand  seven  hundred  infantry,  and  two  thousand  five  hundred 
cavalry,  an  aggregate  of  eighteen  thousand  two  hundred 
against  an  enemy  of  thirty-eight  thousand. 

General  Sherman  admits  that  "beyond  doubt  the  rebel  army 
lost  at  Corinth  fully  six  thousand  men." 

The  records  set  forth  with  sufficient  clearness  the  brilliant 
character  of  the  battle,  the  energy  of  the  pursuit,  and  the  satis 
faction  felt  by  General  Grant  at  the  results.  So  far  as  the 
differences  which  arose  between  Generals  Grant  and  Rosecrans 
about  this  time,  grew  out  of  these  movements,  they  ap 
pear  to  have  had  their  origin  chiefly  in  General  Rosecrans' 
insisting  upon  pursuing  the  enemy  beyond  where  General 
Grant  considered  it  prudent  to  do  so,  and  persisting  in  express 
ing  his  opinions  against  those  of  his  commanding  officer. 
But  whatever  the  causes  of  difference  were,  General  Grant's 
report,  setting  forth  that  an  earlier  pursuif  than  the  one 
made  was  probably  impracticable,  is  a  full  answer  to  General 
Sherman's  version  of  the  cause  of  trouble. 


CHAPTER    Y. 

CHICKASAW    BAYOU — PLUNGING    AN    ARMY    THROUGH    DEEP 
SWAMPS    AGAINST   IMPREGNABLE    BLUFFS. 

THE  attack  upon  Yicksburg  from  the  Yazoo  River  and 
Chickasaw  Bayou  in  December,  1862,  was  under  the  sole 
direction  of  General  Sherman. 

The  movement  had  been  proposed  by  General  Grant  on  the 
4th  of  December,  and  the  approval  of  the  plan  telegraphed 
by  Halleck  on  the  5th.  On  the  8th  Grant  telegraphed  that 
Sherman  would  be  in  command  of  the  river  expedition.  To 
this  Halleck  replied: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1862.      j 
Major-General  GBANT,  Oxfwd,  Miss. 

#  #      *       #       The  President  may  insist  upon  designating  a  separate 
commander,  if  not,  assign  such  officers  as  you  may  deem  best.     Sherman 
would  be  my  choice  as  the  chief,  under  you. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-4n- Chief. 

After  General  Sherman  left  Memphis  and  before  his  ex 
pedition  failed,  the  President  had  acted  as  General  Halleck 
surmised.  The  following  telegram  upon  that  point  will  also 
show  from  its  date,  that  the  subsequent  removal  of  General 
Sherman  had  no  connection  with  his  failure : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
WASHINGTON,  December  18,  1862.      j 
Major-General  GRANT,  Oxford,  Miss. 

*  *      *       #      It  is  the  wish  of  the  President  that  General  McClernand's 
corps  shall  constitute  a  part  of  the  river  expedition,  and  that  he  shall  have 
the  immediate  command,  under  your  direction. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

This  campaign  was  the  first  after  Shiloh,  where  General 
Sherman  was  entrusted  with  great  responsibilities.  General 

(54^ 


CHICKASAW  BAYOU.  55 

Grant's  order  assigning  him  to  the  command,  left  both  the 
details  of  the  preparations  and  the  plans  of  the  movement 
entirely  in  his  hands,  as  will  appear  from  the  first  paragraph 
of  that  order: 

HEADQUARTERS  THIRTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS,  ) 
DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  TENNESSEE,  OXFORD,  Miss.,  December  8,  1862.      j 

Major-Gen.  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  commanding  Right  Wing  Army  in  the  Field,  present. 

GENERAL  :  You  will  proceed  with  as  little  delay  as  practicable  to  Memphis, 
Tennessee,  taking  with  you  one  division  of  your  present  command.  On  your 
arrival  at  Memphis  you  will  assume  command  of  all  the  troops  there,  and 
that  portion  of  General  Curtis'  forces  at  present  east  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
and  organize  them  into  brigades  and  divisions  in  your  own  way. 

As  soon  as  possible  move  with  them  down  the  river  to  the  vicinity  of 
Vicksburg,  and  with  the  cooperation  of  the  gun-boat  fleet  under  command 
of  Flag-Officer  Porter,  proceed  to  the  reduction  of  that  place  in  such  manner 
as  circumstances  and  your  own  judgment  may  dictate.  *  *  *  * 

TJ.  S.  GRANT,  Mayor-GeneraL 

On  the  same  day  Grant  telegraphed  to  Halleck:  "  General 
Sherman  will  command  the  expedition  down  the  Mississippi. 
He  will  have  a  force  of  about  forty  thousand  men." 

On  the  22d  of  December  this  army  rendezvoused  at  Friar's 
Point,  ready  to  move  up  the  Yazoo  River  to  the  rear  of 
Vicksburg.  On  the  27th,  the  four  divisions,  Steel  e's,  M.  L. 
Smith's,  Morgan's,  and  A.  J.  Smith's,  aggregating  over  forty- 
two  thousand  men,  were  landed  in  front  of  the  bluffs  over 
looking  the  swamps  through  which  ran  Chickasaw  Bayou. 
To  flounder  through  this  boggy  low  land,  cross  the  bayou, 
and  storm  the  heights  beyond,  was  the  task  Sherman  laid  out 
for  his  army.  It  was  his  first  attempt  to  command  more  than 
a  division  in  action,  and  he  had  not  before  directed  a  battle. 
Though  the  rebels  had  been  reenforced  in  consequence  of  the 
failure  of  Grant's  cooperative  movement  from  Holly  Springs, 
they  were  still  far  inferior  in  numbers  to  Sherman's  army. 
Their  position,  however,  was  impregnable.  The  high  bluffs 
were  strengthened  from  base  to  summit  with  rifle-pits  and 
heavier  parapets,  and  to  assault  seemed  madness  then  to  many 
of  the  officers,  and  appears  so  still  when  all  the  facts  can  be 


56  CHICKASAW  BAYOU. 

coolly  considered.  But  Sherman  decided  upon  this  manner 
of  attack,  and  forty  thousand  men  were  moved  through  bogs 
and  bayous  to  assault  a  position  of  which  he  now  says  in  his 
Memoirs : 

"The  men  of  the  Sixth  Missouri  actually  scooped  out  with  their  hands 
caves  in  the  bank,  which  sheltered  them  against  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  who, 
right  over  their  heads,  held  their  muskets  outside  the  parapet  vertically  and 
fired  down." 

Extracts  from  General  Sherman's  own  account  show  the 
nature  and  difficulties  of  the  ground,  and  the  character  of  the 
whole  attack : 

"  The  place  of  our  disembarkation  was,  in  fact,  an  island,  separated  from 
the  high  bluff  known  as  Walnut  Hills,  on  which  the  town  of  Yicksburg 
stands,  by  a  broad  and  shallow  bayou — evidently  an  old  channel  of  the 
Yazoo.  On  our  right  was  another  wide  bayou  known  as  Old  River,  and  on 
the  left  still  another,  much  narrower,  but  too  deep  to  be  forded,  known  as 
Chickasaw  Bayou.  All  the  island  was  densely  wooded,  except  Johnson's 
plantation,  immediately  on  the  bank  of  the  Yazoo,  and  a  series  of  old  cotton- 
fields  along  Chickasaw  Bayou.  There  was  a  road  from  Johnson's  plantation 
directly  to  Vicksburg,  but  it  crossed  numerous  bayous  and  deep  swamps  by 
bridges,  which  had  been  destroyed;  and  this  road  debouched  on  level  ground 
at  the  foot  of  the  Vicksburg  bluff',  opposite  strong  forts  well  prepared 
and  defended  by  heavy  artillery.  On  this  road  I  directed  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  division,  not  so  much  by  way  of  a  direct  attack  as  a  diversion  and 
threat. 

"Morgan  was  to  move  to  his  left  to  reach  Chickasaw  Bayou,  and  to  follow 
it  toward  the  bluff,  about  four  miles  above  A.  J.  Smith.  Steele  was  on 
Morgan's  left  across  Chickasaw  Bayou,  and  M.  L.  Smith  on  Morgan's  right. 
We  met  light  resistance  at  all  points,  but  skirmished  on  the  27th  up  to  the 
main  bayou  that  separated  our  position  from  the  bluffs  of  Vicksburg,  which 
were  found  to  be  strong  by  nature  and  by  art,  and  seemingly  well  defended. 
On  reconnoitering  the  front  in  person,  during  the  27th  and  28th,  I  became 
satisfied  that  General  A.  J.  Smith  could  not  cross  the  intervening  obstacles 
under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  forts  immediately  in  his  front,  and  that  the  main 
bayou  was  impassable,  except  at  two  points — one  near  the  head  of  Chickasaw 
Bayou,  in  front  of  Morgan,  and  the  other  about  a  mile  lower  down,  in  front 
of  M.  L.  Smith's  division. 

"During  the  general  reconnoissance  of  the  28th,  General  Morgan  L.  Smith 
received  a  severe  and  dangerous  wound  in  his  hip,  which  completely  disabled 
him  and  compelled  him  to  go  to  his  steamboat,  leaving  the  command  of  his 
division  to  Brigadier-General  D.  Stuart;  but  I  drew  a  part  of  General  A.  J. 


CHICKASAW  BAYOU.  57 

Smith's  division,  and  that  General  himself,  to  the  point  selected  for  passing 
the  bayou,  and  committed  that  special  task  to  his  management. 

"General  Steele  reported  that  it  was  physically  impossible  to  reach  the 
bluffs  from  his  position,  so  I  ordered  him  to  leave  but  a  show  of  force  there, 
and  to  return  to  the  west  side  of  Chickasaw  Bayou  in  support  of  General 
Morgan's  left.  He  had  to  countermarch  and  use  the  steamboats  in  the  Yazoo 
to  get  on  the  firm  ground  on  our  side  of  the  Chickasaw. 

"On  the  morning  of  December  29th  all  the  troops  were  ready  and  in 
position.  The  first  step  was  to  make  a  lodgment  on  the  foot-hills  and  bluff* 
abreast  of  our  position,  while  diversions  were  made  by  the  navy  toward 
Haines'  Bluff,  and  by  the  first  division  directly  toward  Vicksburg.  I 
estimated  the  enemy's  forces,  then  strung  from  Vickburg  to  Haines'  Bluff, 
at  fifteen  thousand  men,  commanded  by  the  rebel  Generals  Martin  Luther 
Smith  and  Stephen  D.  Lee.  Aiming  to  reach  firm  ground  beyond  this  bayou, 
and  to  leave  as  little  time  for  our  enemy  to  reenforce  as  possible,  I  determined 
to  make  a  show  of  attack  along  the  whole  front,  but  to  break  across  the 
bayou  at  the  two  points  named,  and  gave  general  orders  accordingly.  I 
pointed  out  to  General  Morgan  the  place  where  he  could  pass  the  bayou,  and 
he  answered,  'General,  in  ten  minutes  after  you  give  the  signal  I'll  be  on 
those  hills.'  He  was  to  lead  his  division  in  person,  and  was  to  be  supported 
by  Steele's  division.  The  front  was  very  narrow,  and  immediately  opposite, 
at  the  base  of  the  hills,  about  three  hundred  yards  from  the  bayou,  was  a 
rebel  battery,  supported  by  an  infantry  force  posted  on  the  spurs  of  the  hill 
behind.  To  draw  attention  from  this,  the  real  point  of  attack,  I  gave  instruc 
tions  to  commence  the  attack  at  the  flanks. 

"I  went  in  person  about  a  mile  to  the  right-rear  of  Morgan's  position,  at  a 
place  convenient  to  receive  reports  from  all  other  parts  of  the  line,  and  about 
noon  of  December  29th  gave  the  orders  and  signal  for  the  main  attack.  A 
heavy  artillery  fire  opened  along  our  whole  line,  and  was  replied  to  by  the 
rebel  batteries,  and  soon  the  infantry  fire  opened  heavily,  especially  on  A.  J. 
Smith's  front  and  in  front  of  General  George  W.  Morgan.  One  brigade 
(DeCourcey's)  of  Morgan's  troops  crossed  the  bayou  safely,  but  took  to  cover 
behind  the  bank,  and  could  not  be  moved  forward.  Frank  Blair's  brigade, 
of  Steele's  division,  in  support,  also  crossed  the  bayou,  passed  over  the  space 
of  level  ground  to  the  foot  of  the  hills ;  but,  being  unsupported  by  Morgan, 
and  meeting  a  very  severe  cross-fire  of  artillery,  was  staggered,  and  gradually 
fell  back,  leaving  about  five  hundred  men  behind  wounded  and  prisoners, 
among  them  Colonel  Thomas  Fletcher,  afterward  Governor  of  Missouri. 
Thayer's  brigade,  of  Steele's  division,  took  a  wrong  direction,  and  did  not 
cross  the  bayou  at  all,  nor  did  General  Morgan  cross  in  person.  This  attack 
failed,  and  I  have  always  felt  that  it  was  due  to  the  failure  of  General  G.  W. 
Morgan  to  obey  his  orders,  or  to  fulfill  his  promise  made  in  person.  Had  he 
used  with  skill  and  boldness  one  of  his  brigades,  in  addition  to  that  of  Blair's, 
he  could  have  made  a  lodgment  on  the  bluff,  which  would  have  opened  the 
door  for  our  whole  force  to  follow.  Meantime  the  Sixth  Missouri  Infantry, 


58  CHICKASAW  BAYOU. 

at  heavy  loss,  had  also  crossed  the  bayou  at  the  narrow  passage  lower  down, 
but  could  not  ascend  the  steep  bank ;  right  over  their  heads  was  a  rebel  bat 
tery,  whose  fire  was  in  a  measure  kept  down  by  our  sharp-shooters  (Thirteenth 
United  States  Infantry),  posted  behind  logs,  stumps,  and  trees,  on  our  side  of 
the  bayou. 

"  The  men  of  the  Sixth  Missouri  actually  scooped  out  with  their  hands 
caves  in  the  bank,  which  sheltered  them  against  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  who, 
right  over  their  heads,  held  their  muskets  outside  the  parapet  vertically  and 
fired  down.  So  critical  was  the  position  that  we  could  not  recall  the  men  till 
after  dark,  and  then  one  at  a  time.  Our  loss  had  been  pretty  heavy,  and  we 
had  accomplished  nothing,  and  had  inflicted  little  loss  on  our  enemy.  At 
first  I  intended  to  renew  the  assault,  but  soon  became  satisfied  that,  the 
enemy's  attention  having  been  drawn  to  the  only  two  practicable  points,  it 
would  prove  too  costly,  and  accordingly  resolved  to  look  elsewhere  for  a  point 
below  Haines'  Bluff,  or  Blake's  plantation."  *  *  *  * 

Two  succeeding  efforts  to  secure  a  new  position  from  which 
to  attack  failed,  and  two  days  afterward,  as  Pemberton  was 
moving  reinforcements  into  Vicksburg  and  out  to  Sherman's 
front,  the  expedition  was  abandoned,  with  a  total  loss  of  about 
two  thousand  men  in  killed  and  wounded.  On  returning  to 
the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  Sherman  found  McClernand  there 
with  orders  to  relieve  him. 

He  thus  concludes  his  account : 

"  Still  my  relief,  on  the  heels  of  a  failure,  raised  the  usual  cry  at  the  North 
of  '  repulse,  failure,  and  bungling.'  There  was  no  bungling  on  my  part,  for  I 
never  worked  harder,  or  with  more  intensity  of  purpose  in  my  life;  and 
General  Grant,  long  after,  in  his  report  of  the  operations  of  the  siege  of 
Vicksburg,  gave  us  all  full  credit  for  the  skill  of  the  movement,  and  described 
the  almost  impregnable  nature  of  the  ground;  and  although  in  all  my  official 
reports  I  assumed  the  whole  responsibility,  I  have  ever  felt  that,  had  General 
Morgan  promptly  and  skillfully  sustained  the  lead  of  Frank  Blair's  brigade 
on  that  day,  we  should  have  broken  the  rebel  line,  and  effected  a  lodgment  on 
the  hills  behind  Vicksburg.  General  Frank  Blair  was  outspoken  and  indig 
nant  against  Generals  Morgan  and  DeCourcey  at  the  time,  and  always  abused 
me  for  assuming  the  whole  blame.  But  had  we  succeeded,  we  might  have 
found  ourselves  in  a  worse  trap,  when  General  Pemberton  was  at  full  liberty 
to  turn  his  whole  force  against  us." 

And  so,  according  to  General  Sherman  himself,  bad  as 
the  assault  at  Chickasaw  Bayou  turned  out  to  be,  success 


CHICKASAW  BAYOU.  59 

might  have  proved  still  worse.  But  had  an  army  of  forty-two 
thousand  men  gained  a  position  in  rear  of  Vicksburg,  it  might, 
with  the  cooperation  of  the  gun-boats,  have  held  its  own  against 
Pemberton  and  all  the  forces  he  then  could  bring. 

No  amount  of  blame  distributed  among  division  command 
ers  can  conceal  the  recklessness  with  which  an  army  was  pushed 
through  swamps  and  bayous  against  inaccessible  bluffs,  and  the 
best  answers  to  all  Sherman's  unjust  attacks  upon  officers  who 
fought  with  him  there,  are  found  in  his  own  report  of  the 
action : 

HEADQUARTERS  RIGHT  WING  THIRTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS,  ) 
CAMP,  MILLIKEN'S  BEND,  LA.,  January  3,  1863.      j 

Colonel  J.  H.  KAWLINS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General  to  Major- General  GKANT, 

Oxford,  Miss.,  at  last  reliable  accounts. 

SIR  :  *  *  *  *  As  soon  as  we  reached  the  point  of  debarkation 
DeCourcey's,  Stuart's,  and  Blair's  brigades  were  sent  forward  in  the  direction 
of  Vicksburg  about  three  miles,  and  on  the  27th  the  whole  army  was  disem 
barked  and  moved  out  in  four  columns:  Steele's  above  the  mouth  of  Chicka- 
saw  Bayou ;  Morgan,  with  Blair's  brigade  of  Steele's  division,  below  the  same 
bayou ;  Morgan  L.  Smith  on  the  main  road  from  Johnson's  plantation  to 
Vicksburg,  with  orders  to  bear  to  his  left,  so  as  to  strike  the  bayou  about  a 
mile  south  of  where  Morgan  was  ordered  to  cross  it ;  and  A.  J.  Smith's  divis 
ion  keeping  on  the  main  road.  All  the  heads  of  columns  met  the  enemy's 
pickets  and  drove  them  toward  Vicksburg.  During  the  night  of  the  27th  the 
ground  was  reconnoitered  as  well  as  possible,  and  it  was  found  as  difficult  as 
it  could  possibly  be  from  nature  and  art.  Immediately  in  our  front  was  a 
bayou,  passable  only  at  two  points,  on  a  narrow  levee,  or  a  sand  bar,  which 
was  perfectly  commanded  by  the  enemy's  sharp-shooters  that  lined  the  levee, 
or  parapet,  on  its  opposite  bank. 

Behind  this  was  an  irregular  strip  of  bench,  or  table-land,  on  which  were 
constructed  a  series  of  rifle  pits  and  batteries,  and  behind  that  a  high,  abrupt 
range  of  hills,  whose  scarred  sides  were  marked  all  the  way  up  with  rifle 
trenches,  and  the  crowns  of  the  principal  hills  presented  heavy  batteries. 

The  county  road,  leading  from  Vicksburg  to  Yazoo  City,  runs  along  the 
foot  of  these  hills,  and  answered  an  admirable  purpose  to  the  enemy  as  a  cov 
ered  way,  along  which  he  moved  his  artillery  and  infantry  promptly  to  meet 
us  at  any  point  at  which  we  attempted  to  pass  this  difficult  bayou.  Never 
theless  that  bayou,  with  its  levee  parapets,  backed  by  the  lines  of  rifle  pits, 
batteries,  and  frowning  hills,  had  to  be  passed  before  we  could  reach  terra 
firma,  and  meet  our  enemy  on  any  thing  like  fair  terms. 

Steele,  in  his  progress,  followed  substantially  an  old  levee  back  from  the 
Yazoo  to  the  foot  of  the  hills  north  of  Thompson's  Lake,  but  found  that,  in 


60  CHICK  AS  AW  BAYOU. 

order  to  reach  the  hard  land,  he  would  have  to  cross  a  long  corduroy  cause 
way,  with  a  battery  enfilading  it,  others  cross-firing  it,  with  a  similar  line  of 
rifle  pits  and  trenches  before  decribed.  He  skirmished  with  the  enemy  on  the 
morning  of  the  28th,  whilst  the  other  columns  were  similarly  engaged,  bat  on 
close  and  critical  examination  of  the  swamp  and  causeway  in  front,  with  the 
batteries  and  rifle  pits  well  manned,  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  reach  the  county  road  without  a  fearful  sacrifice.  As 
soon  as  he  reported  this  to  me  officially,  and  that  he  could  not  cross  over  from 
his  position  to  the  one  occupied  by  our  center,  I  ordered  him  to  retrace  his 
steps  and  cross  back  in  steamboats  to  the  south-west  side  of  Chickasaw  Bayou, 
and  to  support  General  Morgan,  which  he  accomplished  during  the  night 
of  the  28th,  arriving  in  time  to  support  him  and  take  part  in  the  assault  of 
the  29th. 

General  Morgan's  division  was  evidently  on  the  best  of  all  existing  roads 
from  Yazoo  River  to  the  firm  land.  He  had  attached  to  his  train  the  pon 
toons  with  which  to  make  a  bridge,  in  addition  to  the  ford,  or  crossing,  which 
I  knew  was  in  his  front,  the  same  by  which  the  enemy's  pickets  had  retreated. 
This  pontoon  bridge  was,  during  the  night,  placed  across  a  bayou  supposed  to 
be  the  main  bayou,  but  which  turned  out  to  be  an  inferior  one,  and  it  was, 
therefore,  useless ;  but  the  natural  crossing  remained,  and  I  ordered  him  to 
cross  over  with  his  division,  and  carry  the  line  of  works  to  the  summit  of  the 
hill  by  a  determined  assault.  On  the  28th  a  heavy  fog,  during  the  early  part 
of  the  day,  enveloped  the  whole  country,  but  General  Morgan  advanced 
DeCourcey's  brigade  and  engaged  the  enemy.  Heavy  firing  of  artillery  and 
infantry  were  sustained,  and  his  column  moved  on  until  he  encountered  the 
real  bayou.  This  again  checked  his  progress,  and  was  not  passed  until  the 
next  day. 

At  the  point  where  Morgan  L.  Smith's  division  reached  the  bayou  was  a 
narrow  sand  spit,  with  abattis  thrown  down  by  the  enemy  on  our  side,  with  the 
same  deep  and  boggy  bayou,  with  its  levee  parapet,  and  system  of  cross  bat 
teries  and  rifle  pits  on  the  other  side.  To  pass  it  by  the  flank  would  have 
been  utter  destruction,  for  the  head  of  column  would  have  been  swept  away 
as  fast  as  it  presented  itself  above  the  steep  bank.  General  M.  L.  Smith, 
whilst  reconnoitering  it  early  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  was,  during  the 
heavy  fog,  shot  in  the  hip  by  a  chance  rifle  bullet,  which  disabled  him,  and 
lost  to  me  one  of  my  best  and  most  daring  leaders,  and  to  the  Unites  States 
the  services  of  a  practical  soldier  and  enthusiastic  patriot.  I  can  not  exag 
gerate  the  loss  to  me  personally  and  officially  of  General  Morgan  L.  Smith  at 
that  critical  moment.  His  wound  in  the  hip  disabled  him,  and  he  was  sent  to 
the  boat.  General  D.  Stuart  succeeded  to  his  place  and  to  the  execution  of 
his  orders.  General  Stuart  studied  the  nature  of  the  ground  in  his  front  and 
saw  all  its  difficulties,  but  made  the  best  possible  disposition  to  pass  over  his 
division,  the  Second,  whenever  he  heard  General  Morgan  engaged. 

To  his  right,  General  A.  J.  Smith  had  placed  Burbridge's  brigade  of  his 
division  next  to  Stuart,  with  orders  to  make  rafts  and  cross  over  a  portion  of 


CHICKASAW  BAYOU.  61 

his  men ;  to  dispose  his  artillery  so  as  to  fire  at  the  enemy  across  the  bayou, 
and  produce  the  effect  of  a  diversion.  His  other  brigade,  Landrum's,  occupied 
a  key  position  on  the  main  road,  with  pickets  and  supports  pushed  well  for 
ward  into  the  tangled  abattis,  within  three-fourths  of  a  mile  of  the  enemy's 
forts,  and  in  plain  view  of  the  city  of  Vicksburg. 

Our  boats  still  lay  at  our  place  of  debarkation,  covered  by  the  gun-boats 
and  by  four  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  each  division.  Such  was  the  dispo 
sition  of  our  forces  during  the  night  of  the  28th. 

The  enemy's  right  was  a  series  of  batteries  or  forts,  seven  miles  above  us  on 
the  Yazoo,  at  the  first  bluff,  near  Snyder's  house,  called  Drumgould's  Bluff; 
his  left,  the  fortified  city  of  Vicksburg;  and  his  line  connecting  these  was  near 
fourteen  miles  in  extent,  and  was  a  natural  fortification,  strengthened  by  a 
year's  labor  of  thousands  of  negroes,  directed  by  educated  and  skilled  officers. 

My  plan  was  by  a  prompt  and  concentrated  movement  to  break  the  center, 
near  Chickasaw  Creek,  at  the  head  of  a  bayou  of  the  same  name;  and  once  in 
position  to  turn  to  the  right  (Vicksburg),  or  left  (Drumgould's  Bluff),  according 
to  information  then  obtained.  I  supposed  their  organized  forces  to  amount  to 
about  fifteen  thousand,  which  could  be  reenforced  at  the  rate  of  about  four 
thousand  a  day,  provided  General  Grant  did  not  occupy  all  the  attention  of 
Pemberton's  forces  at  Grenada,  or  Rosecrans  those  of  Bragg  in  Tennessee. 
Not  one  word  could  I  hear  from  General  Grant,  who  was  supposed  to  be 
pushing  south,  or  of  General  Banks,  supposed  to  be  ascending  the  Missis 
sippi. 

Time  being  every  thing  to  us,  I  determined  to  assault  the  hills  in  front  of 
Morgan  on  the  morning  of  the  29th ;  Morgan's  division  to  carry  the  position 
of  the  hills,  Steele's  division  to  support  him  and  hold  the  county  road.  I 
had  placed  General  A.  J.  Smith  in  command  of  his  own  division  (First)  and 
that  of  M.  L.  Smith  (Second),  with  orders  to  cross  on  the  sand  spit,  under 
mine  the  steep  bank  of  the  bayou  on  the  further  side,  and  carry  at  all  events 
the  levee  parapets  and  first  line  of  rifle  pits  to  prevent  a  concentration  on 
Morgan. 

It  was  near  twelve  o'clock  (noon)  when  Morgan  was  ready,  by  which  time 
Blair's  and  Thayer's  brigades  of  Steele's  division  were  up  with  him  and  took 
part  in  the  assault,  and  Hovey's  brigade  was  close  at  hand.  All  the  troops 
were  massed  as  close  as  possible,  and  all  our  supports  were  well  in  hand. 

The  assault  was  made  and  a  lodgment  effected  on  the  hard  table-land  near 
the  county  road,  and  the  heads  of  the  assaulting  columns  reached  different 
points  of  the  enemy's  works,  but  then  met  so  withering  a  fire  from  the  rifle 
pits  and  cross-fire  of  grape  and  canister  from  the  batteries,  that  the  columns 
faltered  and  finally  fell  back  to  the  point  of  starting,  leaving  many  dead, 
wounded,  and  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  enemy. 

For  a  more  perfect  understanding  of  this  short  and  desperate  struggle  I 
refer  to  the  reports  of  Generals  Morgan,  Blair,  Steele,  and  others  inclosed. 

General  Morgan's  first  report  to  me  was  that  the  troops  were  not  discour 
aged  at  all,  though  the  losses  in  Blair's  and  DeCourcey's  brigades  were  heavy, 


62  CHICKASAW  BAYOU. 

and  he  would  renew  the  assault  in  half  an  hour;  but  the  assault  was  not 
again  attempted. 

I  urged  General  A.  J.  Smith  to  push  his  attack,  though  it  had  to  be  made 
across  a  narrow  sand  bar,  and  up  a  narrow  path  in  the  nature  of  a  "breach," 
as  a  diversion  in  favor  of  Morgan,  or  real  attack,  according  to  its  success. 

During  Morgan's  progress  he  passed  over  the  Sixth  Missouri  under  circum 
stances  that  called  for  all  the  individual  courage  for  which  that  admirable 
regiment  is  justly  famous.  Its  crossing  was  covered  by  the  United  States 
regulars  deployed  as  skirmishers  up  to  the  near  bank  of  the  bayou,  covered 
as  well  as  possible  by  fallen  trees,  and  firing  at  any  of  the  enemy's  sharp 
shooters  that  showed  a  mark  above  the  levee. 

Before  this  crossing  all  the  ground  opposite  was  completely  swept  by  our  artil 
lery,  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  Major  Taylor,  Chief  of  Artillery. 

The  Sixth  Missouri  crossed  over  rapidly  by  companies,  and  lay  under  the 
bank  of  the  bayou,  with  the  enemy's  sharp-shooters  over  their  heads  within  a 
few  feet,  so  near  that  these  sharp-shooters  held  out  their  muskets  and  fired 
down  vertically  upon  our  men. 

The  orders  were  to  undermine  this  bank  and  make  a  road  up  it,  but  it  was 
impossible;  and  after  the  repulse  of  Morgan's  assault  I  ordered  General  A.  J. 
Smith  to  retire  this  regiment  under  cover  of  darkness,  which  was  successfully 
done.  Their  loss  was  heavy,  but  I  leave  to  the  brigade  and  division  com 
manders  to  give  names  and  exact  figures. 

Whilst  this  was  going  on  Burbridge  was  skirmishing  across  the  bayou  at 
his  front,  and  Landrum  pushed  his  advance  through  the  close  abattis  or 
entanglement  of  fallen  timber  close  up  to  Vicksburg. 

When  the  night  of  the  29th  closed  in  we  stood  upon  our  original  ground, 
and  had  suffered  a  repulse.  The  effort  was  necessary  to  a  successful  accom 
plishment  of  my  orders,  and  the  combinations  were  the  best  possible  under 
the  circumstances. 

I  assume  all  the  responsibility  and  attach  fault  to  no  one,  and  am  gener 
ally  satisfied  with  the  high  spirit  manifested  by  all  *  *  *  * 

The  naval  squadron,  Admiral  Porter,  now  holds  command  of  the  Missis 
sippi  to  Vicksburg  and  the  Yazoo  up  to  Drumgould's  Bluff,  both  of  which 
points  must  in  time  be  reduced  to  our  possession,  but  it  is  for  other  minds 
than  mine  to  devise  the  way. 

The  officers  and  men  comprising  my  command  are  in  good  spirits,  disap 
pointed  of  course  at  our  want  of  success,  but  by  no  means  discouraged.  We 
reembarked  our  whole  command  in  the  sight  of  the  enemy's  batteries  and 
army  unopposed,  remaining  in  full  view  a  whole  day,  and  then  deliberately 
moved  to  Milliken's  Bend. 

I  attribute  our  failure  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  position,  both  natural 
and  artificial,  and  not  to  his  superior  fighting ;  but,  as  we  must  all  in  the 
future  have  ample  opportunities  to  test  this  quality,  it  is  foolish  to  dis 
cuss  it. 

I  will  transmit  with  this  detailed  reports  of  division  and  brigade  com- 


CHICKASAW   BAYOU.  63 

raanders,  with  statements  of  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  and  names  as  far 
as  can  be  obtained. 

The  only  real  fighting  was  during  the  assault  by  Morgan's  and  Steele's 
divisions,  and  at  the  time  of  crossing  the  Sixth  Missouri,  during  the  afternoon 
of  December  29th,  by  the  Second  Division. 

Picket  skirmishing  and  rifle  practice  across  Chickasaw  Bayou  was  constant 
for  four  days.  This  cost  us  the  lives  of  several  valuable  officers  and  men,  and 
many  wounded.  I  have  the  honor  to  be, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  commanding. 

Accompanying   this   report   is  a  list  of  casualties,  which 
shows  the  following  losses  of  each  division: 

Killed.  Wounded.  Missing. 

A.  J.  Smith's 1  1  

M.  L.  Smith's 26                         103  6 

George  W.  Morgan's 62                          447  386 

F.  Steele's 102                         431  364 


Total 191  982  756 

An  aggregate  of  nineteen  hundred  and  twenty-nine,  con 
cerning  which  General  Sherman  made  the  following  indorse 
ment  : 

"  My  belief  is  that,  of  the  missing,  four  hundred  were  taken  prisoners  after 
reaching  the  enemy's  trenches,  and  the  remainder  will  turn  up  on  boats  not 
their  own." 

From  this  report  of  General  Sherman's  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  very  divisions  to  which  he  now  attributes  his  failure,  and 
upon  whose  commanders  he  visits  severe  censure,  were  the 
identical  troops  and  officers  he  reported  at  the  time  as  having 
done  his  hardest  fighting,  and  accomplished  every  thing  it 
was  possible  to  perform. 

The  reports  of  these  division  commanders,  whom  he  then 
commended,  in  turn  relieve  the  brigade  officers  he  now  abuses 
from  the  blame  he  attempts  to  fix  upon  them,  and  show  that, 
the  conduct  of  Generals  Morgan,  DeCourcey,  and  Thayer,  and 
the  fighting  of  their  troops  were  such  as  should  have  com 
manded  high  praise,  even  from  General  Sherman. 


64  CHICKASAW   BAYOU. 

Immediately  after  this  action  General  George  Morgan  was 
assigned  to  an  equal  command  with  General  Sherman,  namely, 
that  of  the  First  Corps,  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  Sherman 
taking  the  Second  Corps,  while  General  McClernand  succeeded 
him  in  command  of  the  army. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  material  for  more  severe  criti 
cisms  of  the  statements  made  in  the  Memoirs,  concerning  the 
failure  at  Chickasaw  Bayou,  than  is  contained  in  this  report 
of  Sherman's,  written  when  the  facts  were  vividly  present  to 
his  mind. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

CHATTANOOGA   AND   CHICKAMAUGA — INJUSTICE   TO   ROSE- 
CRANS,  THOMAS,  AND  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND. 

IN  a  previous  chapter  it  has  been  seen  how  coldly,  unjustly, 
and  almost  contemptuously  General  Sherman's  book  treats  of 
Buell  and  his  army  at  Shiloh — a  general  and  an  army  that, 
beyond  all  room  for  question,  brought  salvation  to  Grant's 
forces,  to  which  sore  disaster  had  come  through  a  dis 
graceful  surprise,  for  which  Sherman  was  in  person  largely 
responsible. 

Following  him  in  his  book  through  his  excuses  for  bloody 
failure  at  Chickasaw  Bayou,  his  protest  against  Grant's 
plan  for  capturing  Vicksburg  from  the  rear,  and  his  assertion 
that  it  might  have  been  taken  six  months  earlier  by  another 
route,  we  find  him  again  misrepresenting  and  sneering  at  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  under  its  successive  commanders,  Rose- 
crans  and  Thomas,  then  operating  about  Chattanooga  under 
its  new  title,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

With  the  records  of  the  war  at  his  control,  and  at  his  very 
elbow,  this  is  the  version  of  Rosecrans'  movement  on,  and 
capture  of  Chattanooga,  which  General  Sherman  puts  forth : 

"  While  we  were  thus  lying  idle  in  camp  on  the  Big  Black,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  under  General  Rosecrans,  was  moving  against  Bragg  at 
Chattanooga;  and  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  General  Burnside,  was  marching 
toward  East  Tennessee. 

"  General  Rosecrans  was  so  confident  of  success  that  he  somewhat  scattered 
his  command,  seemingly  to  surround  and  capture  Bragg  in  Chattanooga ;  but 
the  latter,  reenforced  from  Virginia,  drew  out  of  Chattanooga,  concentrated 
his  army  at  Lafayette,  and  at  Chickamauga  fell  on  «Roseerans,  defeated  him 
and  drove  him  into  Chattanooga. 

5  (65) 


66  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CH1CKAMAUGA. 

"  The  whole  country  seemed  paralyzed  by  this  unhappy  event ;  and  the 
authorities  in  Washington  were  thoroughly  stampeded.  From  the  East  the 
Eleventh  Corps  (Slocum)  and  the  Twelfth  Corps  (Howard)  were  sent  by  rail 
to  Nashville,  and  forward  under  command  of  General  Hooker.  Orders  were 
also  sent  to  General  Grant  by  Halleck  to  send  what  reinforcements  he  could 
spare  immediately  toward  Chattanooga. 

"  Bragg  had  completely  driven  Rosecrans'  army  into  Chattanooga.  The 
latter  was  in  actual  danger  of  starvation,  and  the  railroad  in  his  rear  seemed 
inadequate  to  his  supply.  The  first  intimation  which  I  got  of  this  disaster 
was  on  the  22d  of  September,  by  an  order  from  General  Grant  to  dispatch 
one  of  my  divisions  immediately  into  Vicksburg  to  go  toward  Chattanooga, 
and  I  designated  the  First,  General  Osterhaus' — Steele,  meantime,  having 
been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  Arkansas,  and  had 
gone  to  Little  Rock.  General  Osterhaus  marched  the  same  day,  and  on  the 
23d  I  was  summoned  to  Vicksburg  in  person,  where  General  Grant  showed 
me  the  alarming  dispatches  from  General  Halleck,  which  had  been  sent  from 
Memphis  by  General  Hurlbut,  and  said,  on  further  thought,  that  he  would 
send  me  and  my  whole  corps.  But,  inasmuch  as  one  division  of  McPherson'a 
corps  (John  E.  Smith's)  had  already  started,  he  instructed  me  to  leave  one  of 
my  divisions  on  the  Big  Black,  and  to  get*  the  other  two  ready  to  follow  at 
once.  I  designated  the  Second,  then  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Giles 
A.  Smith,  and  the  Fourth,  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  Corse." — Page 
346,  Vol.  I. 

Before  considering  General  Sherman's  story  further,  a  state 
ment  of  General  Rosecrans'  operations,  which  is  sustained  by 
the  record,  may  properly  be  considered: 

General  Rosecrans,  with  his  magnificent  army,  had,  by  his 
brilliant  strategy,  driven  Bragg  without  serious  battle  out  of 
Murfreesboro,  out  of  Tullahoma,  out  of  Wartrace,  and  finally 
across  the  Tennessee,  here  a  deep  and  wide  river,  where  he 
took  post  in  the  fortified  city  of  Chattanooga. 

The  ojective  point  of  Rosecrans7  next  campaign  was  the 
latter  city.  Two  plans  were  open  to  him.  He  could  cross 
the  river  above,  in  the  face  of  Bragg's  army,  and  assault  the 
place.  Had  he  done  this,  and  at  the  cost  of  never  so  bloody 
a  battle  wrested  that  stronghold  from  Bragg,  the  whole  nation 
would  have  applauded,  and  the  movement  been  so  plain  that 
even  General  Sherman  might  have  been  compelled  to  write 
it  correctly,  notwithstanding  his  prejudices  against  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  67 

The  other  course  open  to  Rosecrans  was  the  one  he  adopted, 
namely,  to  cross  the  Tennessee  far  below  the  city,  and  the 
three  intervening  mountain  ranges,  come  down  in  the  rear  of 
Chattanooga,  and  force  Bragg  to  evacuate  it. 

Long  before  the  single  line  of  railroad  could  bring  him  the 
needed  supplies  for  such  a  campaign,  Halleck,  who  knew 
nothing  of  the  ground  and  its  great  difficulties,  was  telegraph 
ing  from  Washington  peremptory  orders  to  move.  But,  wait 
ing  till  he  had  twenty-five  days'  scant  supplies,  Rosecrans  cut 
loose  from  his  base  and  crossed  the  Tennessee  under  great 
disadvantages,  one  of  his  largest  divisions  actually  crossing  in 
canoes  and  upon  rafts  constructed  by  the  men,  many  of  the 
soldiers  piling  their  clothes,  guns,  and  cartridge-boxes  on  two 
or  three  rails,  and  pushing  the  whole  over  before  them  as  they 
swam  the  half  mile  of  deep  water.  The  three  ranges  were  all 
difficult  in  the  extreme ;  but  finally  the  main  part  of  the  army 
came  down  from  Lookout  Mountain  into  McLemore's  Cove, 
in  rear  of  Chattanooga,  and  Bragg,  giving  up  the  city  without 
a  blow,  being  unable  to  hold  it  and  at  the  same  time  confront 
Rosecrans  with  any  portion  of  his  force,  evacuated  it  and 
retreated  to  Lafayette,  behind  Pigeon  Mountains.  Here, 
he  was  virtually  reenforced  by  Longstreet  from  Virginia, 
although  the  forces  of  the  latter  were  still  only  within  sup 
porting  distance,  and  not,  as  General  Sherman  writes,  before 
he  evacuated  Chattanooga.  And  because  he  was  thus  reen 
forced  he  set  out  to  re-occupy  the  city  he  had  abandoned,  and 
which  he  knew  to  be  Rosecrans'  objective  point.  "  Then 
occurred  the  widely  misunderstood  and  misrepresented  battle 
of  Chickamauga. 

Bragg,  strengthened  by  Longstreet,  started  to  interpose 
between  Rosecrans  and  the  stronghold  he  had  lately  evacu 
ated.  Rosecrans  was  also  marching  to  occupy  it  as  the 
objective  point  of  his  campaign.  Thus  marching,  the  heads 
of  the  two  armies  met  where  their  respective  roads  to  Chatta 
nooga  intersected,  about  six  miles  from  the  city,  and  facing 
toward  each  other  and  closing  together  like  the  blades  of  a 


68  CHATTANOOGA   AND   CHICKAMAUGA. 

pair  of  shears,  these  armies  fought  two  days  for  Chatta 
nooga. 

The  key  positions  of  the  whole  movement  were  the  passes 
in  Missionary  Ridge,  which  controlled  the  roads  to  Chatta 
nooga,  and  these  lay  less  than  two  miles  from  the  field,  and 
directly  on  the  roads  both  armies  were  pushing  over  toward 
the  city. 

The  history  of  the  fighting  is  well  known.  The  breaking 
of  the  right  on  the  second  day  has  been  widely  treated  as  if  it 
were  the  rout  of  the  Union  forces.  But  Thomas,  who 
remained  with  the  largest  part  of  the  army  intact,  fought 
through  to  the  close  of  the  battle  with  his  lines  unbroken. 
The  last  divisions  of  our  line  to  leave  the  field  were  in  undis 
turbed  possession  of  their  ground,  and  withdrew  quietly  and 
unmolested.  Thomas  left  the  field  mainly  because  the  passes 
which  controlled  Chattanooga — the  objective  point  of  the 
campaign — were  in  his  rear,  and  if  he  did  not  occupy  them 
that  night  the  chances  were  that  the  rebels  would  do  so,  and 
thus  make  successful  their  plan  of  battle,  which  was  to  turn 
the  Union  left  and  interpose  between  Rosecrans  and  Chatta 
nooga. 

The  rebels  did  not  follow  till  noon  of  the  next  day,  and 
finding  our  army  in  the  passes  did  not  attack  it.  The  follow 
ing  day  Rosecrans'  army  marched  undisturbed  into  Chatta 
nooga,  and  Union  troops  held  it  till  the  close  of  the  war. 

Chickamauga,  then,  was  the  battle  for  Chattanooga;  and 
at  the  end  of  a  campaign  which,  when  impartial  history  is 
written,  will  assuredly  rank  among  the  most  brilliant  for  its 
strategy,  the  prize  for  which  Rosecrans  contended  was  won. 
The  troops  which  fought  longest  and  suffered  most  never 
looked  upon  the  battle  as  a  defeat,  and  were  fully  satisfied 
with  the  part  they  had  played.  To  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  it  was  but  the  battle  for,  and  the  winning  of  Chattanooga. 
And  this,  though  Sherman's  readers  would  not  dream  of  it,  is 
how  it  came  to  pass  that  "  Bragg  had  completely  driven  Rose 
crans' army  into  Chattanooga." 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  69 

General  Rosecrans'  movements  winch  secured  Chattanooga 
resembled  in  many  of  their  main  features  those  by  which 
Sherman  captured  Atlanta.  Rosecrans  had  successively 
flanked  Bragg  out  of  all  positions  from  Murfreesboro  to 
Chattanooga,  and  instead  of  assaulting  this  he  moved  to  the 
rear,  compelled  its  evacuation,  fought  for  it  in  the  open  field, 
and  occupied  it.  Sherman,  chiefly  by  flanking  Johnston, 
drove  him  back  upon  Atlanta.  After  many  assaults,  against 
the  earnest  advice  of  Thomas  and  others  who  wished  him  to 
go  the  rear  and  compel  an  evacuation,  he  finally  yielded  and 
marched  to  Lovejoy's  and  Jonesboro,  leaving  Slocum  to  watch 
for  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta,  as  Crittenden  had  watched  for 
Rosecrans  at  Chattanooga. 

The  movement  drew  Hood  out  of  Atlanta,  and  Slocum 
marched  in,  as  Crittenden  had  passed  into  Chattanooga  when 
Rosecrans'  army  flanked  Bragg  out  of  it.  Sherman's  army, 
at  the  moment  of  occupation,  was  quite  as  much  scattered 
below  Atlanta,  as  Rosecrans'  had  been  south  of  Chattanooga. 
Suppose  some  story-teller  of  the  war  had  then  written: 
"Hood  had  completely  driven  Sherman's  army  into  At 
lanta  !"  If  it  be  answered  that  Sherman  marched  back  to 
his  objective  point  without  a  fight,  the  scales  may  still  settle 
even,  for  Sherman  did  not  start  to  flank  till  after  serious 
battle,  while  Rosecrans  avoided  assaulting  a  stronghold  in  the 
outset. 

After  these  misrepresentations  of  the  movement  by  which 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  won  this  rebel  stronghold  on 
the  Tennessee,  the  reader  will  be  better  prepared  for  the  mis- 
statements  written  in  regard  to  the  same  army  when  it  passed 
under  the  command  of  General  Thomas,  and  took  part  in  the 
battles  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge.  That 
army  had  well  nigh  starved  in  carrying  out  its  purpose  to 
hold  the  city  it  had  taken.  Thousands  of  horses  and  mules 
had  died  for  want  of  food.  There  were  brigade  headquarters 
where  the  officers  lived  chiefly  on  parched  corn  ;  there  were 
regimental  headquarters  where  the  daily  food  was  mush  or 


70  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

gruel;  there  were  officers  of  high  rank,  who  lived  for  days  on 
sour  pork  and  wormy  and  moldy  bread.  But  the  lofty  spirit 
of  these  men  was  unbroken,  and  no  army  stood  any  where 
during  the  rebellion  whose  faith  in  final  victory  was  stronger 
than  the  faith  of  these  soldiers  under  George  H.  Thomas;  and 
yet  at  this  late  day,  and  in  the  light  of  the  immortal  charge 
they,  as  an  army,  made  up  the  heights  of  Missionary  Ridge, 
the  General  of  the  armies  affirms  that  General  Grant  doubted 
whether  they  would  come  out  of  their  trenches  for  a  fight. 

But  let  General  Sherman  speak  for  himself  as  he  does  on 
page  361  of  his  first  volume.  Before  perusing  it  let  the 
reader  bear  in  mind  that  the  line  of  supplies  of  Thomas'  army 
had  been  fully  opened  before  Sherman  arrived,  through  the 
cooperation  of  Generals  Howard  and  Slocum,  and  without 
any  help  from  him,  and  that  the  suffering  for  food  was  entirely 
at  an  end  and  not  a  present  thing,  as  his  words  imply ;  that 
Chattanooga  was  no  longer  besieged,  except  as  a  rebel  army 
was  in  front  of  it,  while  the  communications  to  the  rear, 
though  not  all  that  could  be  wished,  were  still  ample  to  enable 
General  Thomas  to  hold  the  place. 

Says  General  Sherman,  speaking  of  his  arrival : 

"  Of  course  I  was  heartily  welcomed  by  Generals  Grant,  Thomas,  and  all, 
who  realized  the  extraordinary  efforts  we  had  made  to  come  to  their  relief. 

"  The  next  morning  we  walked  out  to  Fort  Wood,  a  prominent  salient  of 
the  defenses  of  the  place,  and  from  its  parapet  we  had  a  magnificent  view  of 
the  panorama.  Lookout  Mountain,  with  its  rebel  flags  and  batteries,  stood 
out  boldly,  and  an  occasional  shot  fired  toward  Wauhatchee  or  Moccasin 
Point  gave  life  to  the  scene.  These  shots  could  barely  reach  Chattanooga, 
and  I  was  told  that  one  or  more  shot  had  struck  a  hospital  inside  the  lines. 
All  along  Missionary  Kidge  were  the  tents  of  the  rebel  beleaguering  force ; 
the  lines  of  trench  from  Lookout  up  toward  the  Chickamauga  were  plainly 
visible,  and  rebel  sentinels  in  a  continuous  chain  were  walking  their  posts  in 
plain  view,  not  one  thousand  yards  off.  'Why,'  said  I,  'General  Grant, 
you  are  besieged ;'  and  he  said,  '  it  is  too  true.'  Up  to  that  moment  I  had 
no  idea  that  things  were  so  bad.  The  rebel  lines  actually  extended  from  the 
river  below  the  town  to  the  river  above,  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  closely  held  to  the  town  and  its  immediate  defenses.  General  Grant 
pointed  out  to  me  a  house  on  Missionary  Ridge  where  General  Bragg's  head 
quarters  were  known  to  be.  He  also  explained  the  situation  of  affairs  gen- 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  71 

erally;  that  the  mules  and  horses  of  Thomas'  army  were  so  starved  that 
they  could  not  haul  his  guns ;  that  forage,  corn,  and  provisions  were  so  scarce 
that  the  men  in  hunger  stole  the  few  grains  of  corn  that  were  given  to  favor 
ite  horses;  that  the  men  of  Thomas'  army  had  been  so  demoralized  by  the 
battle  of  Chickamagua  that  he  feared  they  could  not  be  got  out  of  their 
trendies  to  assume  the  offensive ;  that  Bragg  had  detached  Longstreet  with  a 
considerable  force  up  into  East  Tennessee  to  defeat  and  capture  Burnside ; 
that  Burnside  was  in  danger,  etc.;  and  that  he  (Grant)  was  extremely  anxious 
to  attack  Bragg  in  position,  to  defeat  him,  or  at  least  to  force  him  to  recall 
Longstreet.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  so  long  been  in  the  trenches 
that  lie  wanted  my  troops  to  hurry  up  to  take  the  offensive/^/  after  which, 
he  had  no  doubt  the  Cumberland  Army  would  fight  well.  Meantime  the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Corps,  under  General  Hooker,  had  been  advanced  from 
Bridgeport  along  the  railroad  to  Wauhatchee,  but  could  not  as  yet  pass 
Lookout  Mountain.  A  pontoon  bridge  had  been  thrown  across  the  Ten 
nessee  Kiver  at  Brown's  Ferry,  by  which  supplies  were  hauled  into  Chat 
tanooga  from  Kelly's  and  Wauhatchee." 

And  this  from  a  General  whose  own  army  alone,  of  the 
three  engaged,  failed  in  this  very  battle  of  Chattanooga  to 
execute  what  was  expected  of  it,  and  what  it  was  ordered  to 
do.  It  fought  splendidly  and  persistently,  but  failed  to  gain 
a  foothold  on  the  main  ridge  upon  Bragg's  extreme  right. 
Hooker  carried  Lookout,  Thomas  advancing  and  supporting 
his  left  as  it  swept  around  the  mountain  and  reached  down 
ward  toward  the  city.  Thomas7  men  needed  no  example  from 
Sherman;  had  not  seen  his  army,  saw  none  of  his  fighting, 
and  knew  very  little  of  his  movements,  rose  early  from  their 
bivouacks  the  day  after  Lookout,  swung  round  over  the  plains 
and  woods  which  the  rebels  had  occupied,  to  make  sure  of 
their  retreat  to  Missionarv  Rido;e,  then  faced  the  ridjre  for 

*/  O      /  O 

two  miles,  formed  that  grand  storming  party,  and,  in  the  face 
of  an  army  with  sixty  cannon  in  position,  climbed  those 
rugged  heights  and  drove  Bragg  into  sudden,  unexpected, 
and  rapid  retreat.  It  was  more  than  two  hours  after  the  battle 
was  thus  ended,  by  these  men,  who,  forsooth,  it  was  feared 
would  not  come  out  of  their  trenches  to  fight  till  Sherman 
had  set  them  an  example,  before  Sherman  himself  heard  that 
the  victory  had  been  gained.  And  ten  years  after  he  assumes 


72  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUaA. 

to  sneer  at  the  men  who  formed  Thomas'  storming  army  at 
Missionary  Ridge.  Let  the  official  record  answer  him !  Gen 
eral  Grant,  without  waiting  till  Thomas'  men  could  see  Sher 
man  fight  and  take  courage,  ordered  an  assault  on  the  ridge. 
And,  on  this  point,  the  records  afford  the  means  of  correcting 
a  common  error  in  regard  to  this  movement.  The.  matter 
will  be  briefly  presented  here,  although  not  mentioned  in  the 
Memoirs. 

It  has  been  frequently  said  that,  after  all,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  carried  the  ridge  only  by  chance,  and  that  no 
orders  were  given  for  going  beyond  the  line  of  rifle  pits  at 
its  base,  but  that  the  forward  movement  from  that  point  was 
caused  by  a  portion  of  the  line  starting  on  without  orders, 
and  thus  leading  the  whole  toward  the  summit. 

General  Grant,  however,  in  his  report  states  the  character 
of  the  orders  he  gave  General  Thomas,  and  shows  that  the 
storming  of  the  ridge  was  intended  from  the  first : 

"His  (Hooker's)  approach  was  intended  as  the  signal  for  storming  the 
ridge  in  the  center  with  strong  columns,  but  the  time  necessarily  consumed 
in  the  construction  of  the  bridge  near  Chattanooga  Creek  detained  him  to  a 
later  hour  than  was  expected.  *  *  *  *  Thomas  was  accordingly 
directed  to  move  forward  his  troops,  *  *  *  *  with  a  double  line  of 
skirmishers  thrown  out,  followed  in  easy  supporting  distance  by  the  whole 
force,  and  carry  the  rifle  pits  at  the  foot  of  Missionary  Kldge,  and  when 
carried  to  reform  his  lines  in  the  rifle  pits,  with  a  view  of  carrying  the  top  of 
the  ridge." 

The  form  in  which  General  Thomas  communicated  this 
order  to  his  own  troops,  is  shown  by  a  paragraph  from  the 
report  of  General  Baird  who  commanded  his  left  division : 

"  I  had  just  completed  the  establishment  of  my  line,  and  was  upon  the  left 
of  it,  when  a  staff  officer  from  Major-General  Thomas  brought  me  verbal 
orders  to  move  forward  to  the  edge  of  the  open  ground  which  bordered  the 
foot  of  Mission  Bldge,  within  striking  distance  of  the  rebel  rifle  pits  at  its 
base,  so  as  to  be  ready  at  a  signal,  which  would  be  the  firing  of  six  guns  from 
Orchard  Knob,  to  dash  forward  and  take  those  pits.  He  added  this  was 
preparatory  to  a  general  assault  on  the  mountain ;  that  it  was  doubtless 
designed  by  the  Major-General  commanding  that  I  should  take  part  in  this 
movement;  so  that  I  would  be  following  his  wishes  were  I  to  push  on  to  the 
summit." 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  73 

"General  Rosecrans  was  so  confident  of  success  that  he 
somewhat  scattered  his  command,"  say  the  Memoirs.  There 
was  another  thing  of  which  General  Rosecrans  was  confident, 
and  which  a  just  or  accurate  writer  should  have  mentioned  when 
dealing  out  severe  criticism.  He  had  been  notified  from  Wash 
ington,  early  in  August,  that  Burnside  would  move  through 
East  Tennessee  with  an  effective  force  of  twelve  thousand 
men  upon  his  left,  and  was  informed  almost  daily,  before 
and  after  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  that  he  would  be  on  the 
ground  for  cooperative  movements.  The  record  history  of 
this  failure  on  the  part  of  Burnside,  is  necessary  to  any  fair 
review  of  Rosecrans'  campaign  against  Chattanooga,  and 
enough  to  show  its  real  bearing  will  now  be  presented. 

The  dispatches  which  follow  are  from  General  Halleck 
at  Washington,  to  Burnside  on  the  march  and  in  East  Ten 
nessee  : 

"August  5th. — You  will  immediately  move  with  a  column  of  twelve  thousand 
men  by  the  most  practicable  route  on  East  Tennessee,  making  Knoxville  or 
its  vicinity  your  objective  point.  *  *  *  *  You  will  report  by 
telegraph  all  the  movements  of  your  troops.  As  soon  as  you  reach  East 
Tennessee  you  will  endeavor  to  connect  with  the  forces  of  General  Rosecrans, 
who  has  peremptory  orders  to  move  forward.  The  Secretary  of  War  repeats 
his  orders,  that  you  move  your  headquarters  from  Cincinnati  to  the  field,  and 
take  command  of  the  troops  in  person." 

"September  5th. — Nothing  from  you  since  August  31st.  Keep  General 
Rosecrans  advised  of  your  movements,  and  arrange  with  him  for  coop 
eration." 

"September  llth. — Connect  with  General  Rosecrans  at  least  with  your 
cavalry.  *  *  *  *  General  Rosecrans  will  occupy  Dalton  or  some 
point  upon  the  railroad,  to  close  all  access  from  Atlanta,  also  the  mountain 
passes  on  the  west.  This  being  done  it  will  be  determined  whether  the 
moveable  forces  shall  move  into  Georgia  and  Alabama,  or  into  the  Valley 
of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina." 

"September  13th. — It  is  important  that  all  the  available  forces  of  your 
command  be  pushed  forward  into  East  Tennessee.  All  your  scattered  forces 
should  be  centered  there.  As  long  as  we  hold  Tennessee,  Kentucky  is  per 
fectly  safe.  Move  down  as  rapidly  as  possible  toward  Chattanooga  to  connect 
with  Rosecrans.  Bragg  may  hold  the  passes  in  the  mountain  to  cover  At 
lanta,  and  move  his  main  army  through  Northern  Alabama  to  reach  the 
Tennessee  River,  and  turn  Rosecrans'  right  and  cut  off  his  supplies.  In  that 
case  he  will  turn  Chattanooga  over  to  you,  and  move  to  intercept  Bragg." 


74  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

"September  14th. — There  are  reasons  why  you  should  reenforce  General 
Eosecrans  with  all  possible  dispatch.  It  is  believed  that  the  enemy  will 
concentrate  to  give  him  battle.  You  must  be  there  to  help  him." 

"September  15th. — From  information  received  here  to-day  it  is  very  prob 
able  that  three  divisions  of  Lee's  army  have  been  sent  to  reenforce  Bragg. 
It  is  important  that  all  the  troops  in  your  department  be  brought  to  the 
front  with  all  possible  dispatch,  so  as  to  help  General  Rosecrans." 

September  18th. —  *  *  *  *  A  part,  at  least,  of  Longstreet's  corps 
is  going  to  Atlanta.  It  is  believed  that  Bragg,  Johnston,  and  Hardee,  with 
the  exchanged  prisoners  from  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  are  concentrating 
against  Rosecrans.  You  must  give  him  all  the  aid  in  your  power." 

"  September  9th. 
"  Major- General  BURNSIDE,  Knoxvilk. 

"  General  Rosecrans  is  on  the  Chickamauga  River,  twenty  miles  south  of 
Chattanooga,  He  is  expecting  a  battle,  and  wants  you  to  sustain  his  left. 
Every  possible  effort  must  be  made  to  assist  him." 

"September  19th. — General  Meade  is  very  confident  that  another  part  of 
Ewell's  corps  has  gone  to  East  Tennessee.  The  forces  said  to  be  collecting  at 
Jonesboro  are  probably  those  that  were  at  Wytheville,  Newbern,  etc.,  under 
Sam.  Jones  and  Jackson." 

"September  20th. — General  Rosecrans  had  a  severe  battle  yesterday,  and 
expects  another  to-day.  It  is  of  vital  importance  that  you  move  to  his  left 
flank." 

"  September  21st. — General  Rosecrans  telegraphed,  at  9  o'clock  this  morning, 
that,  if  your  troops  do  not  join  him  immediately,  they  will  be  obliged  to  move 
down  the  north  side  of  the  Tennesse  River.  As  the  enemy  has  driven  General 
Rosecrans  back  to  near  Chattanooga,  Bragg  may  throw  a  force  off  into  East 
Tennessee  between  you  and  General  Rosecrans.  The  extent  of  the  defeat  and 
loss  is  not  known  here. 

"  General  Rosecrans  will  require  all  the  assistance  you  can  give  him  to 
hold  Chattanooga." 

"  September  22d. — Yours  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  must  again  urge  you  to 
move  immediately  to  Rosecrans'  relief.  I  fear  your  delay  has  already 
prompted  Bragg  to  prevent  your  communication.  Do  not  allow  your  troops 
to  be  caught  by  the  enemy  south  of  the  Tennessee  River.  To  all  appearances 
your  only  safety  is  to  move  down  on  the  north  side.  Sam.  Jones  is  not  likely 
to  move  from  Danville  unless  reenforced.  If  the  enemy  should  cross  the 
Tennessee  above  Chattanooga  you  will  be  separated  from  Rosecrans,  who 
may  not  be  able  to  hold  out  on  the  south  side." 

"  WASHINGTON,  September  27<A,  j 
HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY.      J 

"  Your  orders  before  leaving  Kentucky,  and  frequently  repeated  telegrams 
after,  were  to  connect  your  left  on  General  Rosecrans'  right,  so  that,  if  the 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  75 

enemy  concentrated  on  one,  the  other  would  be  able  to  assist.  General  Rose- 
crans  was  attacked  on  Chickamauga  Creek  and  driven  back  to  Chattanooga, 
which  he  holds,  waiting  for  your  assistance.  Telegram  after  telegram  has 
been  sent  to  you  to  go  to  his  assistance  with  all  available  force,  you  being  the 
judge  of  what  troops  it  was  necessary,  under  the  circumstances,  to  leave  in 
East  Tennessee.  The  route  by  which  you  were  to  reach  General  Rosecrans 
was  also  left  to  your  discretion.  When  he  was  forced  to  fall  back  on  Chatta 
nooga  you  were  advised,  not  ordered,  to  move  on  the  north  side  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River,  lest  you  might  be  cut  up  by  the  enemy  on  the  south  side.  The 
danger  of  the  latter  movement  being  pointed  out  to  you,  you  were  left  to  de 
cide  for  yourself.  The  substance  of  all  telegrams  from  the  President  and  from 
me  was :  you  must  go  to  General  Rosecrans'  assistance  with  all  your  available 
forces,  by  such  route  as,  under  the  advice  given  you  from  us,  and  such  infor 
mation  as  you  can  get,  you  might  deem  most  practicable.  The  orders  are 
very  plain,  and  you  can  not  mistake  their  purport.  It  only  remains  for  you 
to  execute  them.  General  Rosecrans  is  holding  Chattanooga,  and  awaiting 
reinforcements  from  you.  East  Tennessee  must  be  held  at  all  hazards,  if 
possible. 

"  The  President  has  just  signed  his  telegram,  which  is  added,  in  which  I 
fully  concur." 

"October  1st. — Yours  of  yesterday  is  received,  the  purport  of  all  your  in 
structions  have  been  that  you  should  hold  some  point  near  the  upper  end  of 
the  valley,  and  with  all  the  remainder  of  your  available  force,  march  to  the 
assistance  of  General  Rosecrans.  The  route  of  march  and  all  details  were 
left  to  your  own  judgment.  Since  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  and  the  retreat 
of  our  forces  to  Chattanooga,  you  have  been  repeatedly  informed  that  it  would 
be  dangerous  to  attempt  to  form  a  connection  on  the  south  side  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River,  and  consequently  that  you  ought  to  march  on  the  northern  side. 
General  Rosecrans  has  now  telegraphed  to  you  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  join 
him  at  Chattanooga,  but  only  to  move  down  to  such  a  position  that  you  can 
come  to  his  assistance  if  he  should  require  it.  You  are  in  direct  communica 
tion  with  him,  and  can  learn  his  condition,  and  needs,  sooner  than  I  can. 

"Distant  expeditions  into  Georgia  are  not  now  contemplated.  The  object 
is  to  hold  East  Tennessee  by  forcing  the  enemy  south  of  the  mountains  and 
barring  the  passes  against  his  return." 

"  October  3d. — General  Rosecrans  reports  that  enemy's  cavalry  have 
crossed  the  river  below  Kingston,  for  a  raid  upon  his  connections.  I  can  only 
repeat  what  I  have  so  often  urged,  the  importance  of  your  communicating 
with  General  Rosecrans'  army  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  so  far  as  to 
command  the  crossing." 

"October  5th, — I  can  only  repeat  former  instructions,  to  leave  sufficient  force 
in  the  upper  end  of  the  valley  to  hold  Jones  in  check,  and  with  the  remainder 
to  march  down  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  guarding  the  fords, 
and  connecting  with  General  Rosecrans.  I  can  not  make  them  plainer." 

"October  14th. — I  have  received  no  dispatch  from  you  since  the  7th  until  this 


76  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

morning,  and  have  no  information  of  the  condition  of  affairs  and  the  position 
of  your  troops.  When  you  were  urged  to  move  down  the  river  to  General 
Kosecrans'  assistance,  that  operation  was  deemed  safe  and  of  great  importance. 
The  condition  of  affairs  may  now  be  different.  You  certainly  should  hold 
Kingston,  and  as  far  below  as  may  seem  prudent. 

"  Hood  will  probably  send  a  part  of  his  army  to  the  south-west.  Whether 
to  Bragg  or  by  Abingdon  is  uncertain.  I  think  your  available  force  at  Kings 
ton  and  above  should  be  held  in  readiness  to  move  up  the  valley,  should  the 
enemy  appear  in  force  in  south-west  Virginia.  A  copy  of  this  is  sent  to  Gen 
eral  Grant." 

"October  ~L8th. — General  Kosecrans  still  calls  for  your  cooperation  with  him 
at  Chattanooga,  and  again  suggests  that  Kingston  should  be  made  your  main 
point  of  defense.  In  this  I  agree  with  him.  If  he  can  not  hold  Chattanooga, 
you  can  not  hold  East  Tennessee,  as  that  place  threatens  the  gateway  from 
Georgia.  Why  is  it  that  you  make  no  report  of  your  position  and  move 
ments  ?  We  are  left  entirely  in  the  dark  in  regard  to  your  army." 

"October  24th. — It  now  appears  pretty  certain  that  Ewell's  corps  has  gone  tc 
Tennessee,  and  its  probable  object  is  Abingdon.  His  force  is  estimated  at  from 
twenty  to  twenty-five  thousand.  It  is  reported  that  he  left  Lee's  army  on 
Monday  last,  but  'did  not  pass  through  Richmond.  It  is  therefore  most  proba 
ble  that  he  passed  through  Lynchburg  taking  the  road  to  Abingdon." 

The  following  telegrams  were  sent  by  Mr.  Lincoln  to  Gen 
eral  Burnside : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  September  2\ftt.,  2  A.  M. 
To  General  BURNSIDE,  Knoxmlle : 
Go  to  Rosecrans  with  your  full  force  without  a  moment's  delay. 

A.  LINCOLN. 

September  2lst. — If  you  are  to  do  any  good  to  Kosecrans,  it  will  not  do  tc 
waste  time  with  Jonesboro.  It  is  already  too  late  to  do  the  most  good  that 
might  have  been  done,  but  I  hope  it  will  still  do  some  good.  Please  do  not 
wait  a  moment.  A.  LINCOLN. 

September  27. 

To  BURNSIDE,  at  Knoxvitte. 

Your  dispatch  just  received.  My  orders  to  you  meant  simply  that  you 
should  save  Kosecrans  from  being  crushed  out,  believing  if  he  lost  his  posi 
tion  you  could  not  hold  East  Tennessee  in  any  event,  and  that  if  he  held  his 
position  East  Tennessee  was  substantially  safe  in  any  event. 

This  dispatch  is  in  no  sense  an  order.  General  Halleck  will  answer  you 
fully. 

September  27. 

To  General  BURNSIDE,  Knoxvitte. 

It  was  suggested  to  you,  not  ordered,  that  you  move  to  Kosecrans  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river,  because  it  was  believed  that  the  enemy  would  not 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  77 

permit  you  to  join  him  if  you  should  move  on  the  south  side.  Hold  your 
present  position,  send  Rosecrans  what  you  can  spare  in  the  quickest  and  safest 
way;  in  the  meantime  hold  the  remainder  as  nearly  in  readiness  to  go  to 
him  as  you  can  consistently  with  the  duty  it  is  to  perform  while  it  remains. 

East  Tennessee  can  be  no  more  than  temporarily  lost  so  long  as  Chatta 
nooga  is  firmly  held.  A.  LINCOLN. 

It  would  be  unjust  to  General  Burnside  to  present  these 
dispatches  from  the  record  without  his  excuses  for  never  aid 
ing  Rosecrans.  September  6th  he  telegraphed  Halleck  from 
Knoxville: 

"  We  are  making  some  movements  to  aid  Rosecrans.  A  bearer  of  dispatches 
leaves  here  this  evening  or  to-morrow  with  papers." 

September  17th  he  telegraphed  concerning  a  force  which  he 
had  at  Athens  communicating  with  Rosecrans. 
On  the  19th: 

"Am  now  sending  on  men  that  can  be  spared  to  aid  Rosecrans.  I  shall 
go  on  to-day  to  Jonesboro.  As  soon  as  I  learn  the  result  of  our  movement 
to  the  east  will  go  down  by  railroad  and  direct  the  movement  of  the  reen- 
forcements  for  Rosecrans.  I  have  directed  every  available  man  in  Kentucky 
to  be  sent  down." 

On  the  20th,  from  Knoxville : 

"  Dispatch  of  18th  received.  You  may  be  sure  that  I  will  do  all  I  can  for 
Rosecrans.  Arrived  here  last  night,  and  am  hurrying  troops  in  his  direction. 
I  go  up  the  road  to-night  for  a  day." 

September  21st  he  telegraphed  General  Halleck  from  Mor- 
ristown  : 

"  Before  I  knew  of  the  necessity  of  sending  immediate  assistance  to  Rose 
crans  I  had  sent  a  considerable  portion  of  my  force  to  capture  or  drive  out  a 
large  force  of  the  enemy  under  General  Sam.  Jones,  stationed  on  the  road 
from  Bristol  to  Jonesboro,  *  *  *  when  the  urgent  dispatches 

from  Rosecrans  and  yourself  caused  me  to  send  back  Brigadier-General 
Whick's  division  and  Colonel  Woolford's  brigade  of  cavalry,  with  orders  to 
move  as  rapidly  as  possible  until  they  joined  Rosecran's  left  flank.  *  *  * 
When  you  remember  the  size  of  our  forces,  and  amount  of  work  we  had  to 
do,  and  the  length  of  line  occupied,  you  will  not  be  surprised  that  I  have  not 
helped  General  Rosecrans,  more  particularly  as  I  was  so  far  impressed  with 


78  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

the  truth  of  the  statement  that  Bragg  was  in  full  retreat.  It  has  not  seemed 
possible  for  me  to  successfully  withdraw  my  forces  from  the  presence  of  Jones, 
if  he  should  be  beaten  back  or  captured.  Yet,  upon  the  receipt  of  your 
dispatch,  if  it  were  possible  to  get  our  force  from  there  down  to  General 
Kosecrans  within  three  or  four  days  I  should  make  the  attempt,  and  shall,  at 
the  risk  of  being  too  late,  order  every  available  man  in  that  direction.  I  am 
sure  that  I  am  disposed  to  give  him  every  possible  assistance.  I  sincerely 
hope  that  he  will  be  able  at  least  to  check  the  enemy  for  seven  or  eight  days, 
within  which  time  I  shall  be  able  to  make  considerable  diversion  in  his  favor. 
I  hope  that  my  action  will  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  Department." 

Thus  it  was  that  Burnside  failed  Rosecrans. 

These  dispatches  throw  a  new  light  upon  the  difficulties 
with  which  General  Rosecrans  contended;  and  as  this  record 
was  open  to  General  Sherman,  it  would  have  been  just  to 
make  it  prominent  in  connection  with  his  severe  strictures. 
But  there  is  another  part  of  the  record,  with  which  even  his 
memory  must  have  been  charged,  that,  had  he  written  with 
fairness,  would  have  been  produced.  Though  no  reader  of 
the  Memoirs  would  suspect  it,  General  Sherman  himself,  when 
ordered  from  Yicksburg  to  Rosecrans'  relief,  was  more  than 
a  month  late  with  his  troops.  In  fact,  according  to  the 
notification  sent  Rosecrans  by  Halleck  of  the  time  named 
at  Memphis  for  Sherman's  arrival  at  Chattanooga,  he  was 
seven  weeks  behind,  his  command  having  reached  only  Mem 
phis  from  Yicksburg  at  that  date.  At  this  point  General 
Sherman  in  person  was  delayed  by  severe  family  affliction, 
but  this  did  not  retard  the  forward  movement  of  his  troops. 
While  his  book  does  not  indicate  that  he  was  behind  time, 
much  stress  is  laid  upon  the  statement  that  he  was  ordered  to 
repair  the  railroad  as  he  advanced,  and  no  prominence  is 
given  to  the  fact  that  a  most  rapid  advance,  as  well  as  a 
repair  of  the  railroads,  was  repeatedly  insisted  upon.  But  it 
was  not  until  General  Grant  himself  had  reached  Chattanooga, 
and  sent  back  word  to  Sherman  to  adrop  all  work  on  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad,  cross  the  Tennessee,  and 
hurry  eastward  with  all  possible  dispatch  till  you  meet  further 
orders  from  me,"  that  any  signs  of  haste  were  developed  in 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  79 

his  movements.  General  Grant  had  taken  command,  and 
relieved  Rosecrans,  and  from  that  time  forward  General  Sher 
man  used  almost  superhuman  efforts  to  reach  Chattanooga. 

The  dispatches  which  set  forth  this  most  unfortunate  delay 
are  as  follows: 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARAIY,  ) 
WASHINGTON,  B.  C.,  September  13,  1863.      j 

Major-General  GRANT  or  1  •—  ,, 
Major- General  SHERMAN,  J  v 

It  is  quite  possible  that  Bragg  and  Johnston  will  move  through  Northern 
Alabama  to  the  Tennessee  River  to  turn  General  Rosecrans'  right  and  cut 
off  his  communication.  All  of  General  Grant's  available  forces  should  be 
sent  to  Memphis,  thence  to  Corinth  and  Tuscumbia,  to  cooperate  with  Rose 
crans,  should  the  rebels  attempt  that  movement. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  September  14,  1863. 
Major- General  HURLBUT,  Memphis. 

There  are  good  reasons  why  troops  should  be  sent  to  assist  General  Rose- 
crans'  right  wing  with  all  possible  dispatch.  Communicate  with  Sherman  to 
assist  you,  and  hurry  forward  reinforcements  as  previously  directed. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-  Chief. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  September  15,  1863. 
Major- General  HURLBUT,  Memphis. 

All  troops  that  can  possibly  be  spared  in  Western  Tennessee  and  on  the 
Mississippi  River  should  be  sent  without  delay  to  assist  General  Rosecrans 
on  the  Tennessee  River.  Urge  General  Sherman  to  act  with  all  possible 
promptness.  If  you  have  boats  send  them  down  to  bring  up  his  troops. 
Information  just  received  indicates  that  a  part  of  Lee's  army  has  been  sent 
to  reenforce  Bragg.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  September  19,  1863. 
Major-General  ROSECRANS,  Chattanooga. 

*  *  *  On  the  15th  Hurlbut  says  lie  is  moving  forward  toward 
Decatur.  I  hear  nothing  of  Sherman's  troops  ordered  from  Vicksburg.  * 
*  *  *  •  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  September  19,  1863. 
Major- General  HURLBUT,  Memphis. 

Give  me  definite  information  of  the  number  of  troops  sent  toward  Decatur, 
and  where  they  are.  Also  what  other  troops  are  to  follow,  and  when.  Hag 
nothing  been  heard  from  the  troops  ordered  from  Vicksburg?  No  effort 
must  be  spared  to  support  Rosecrans'  right  and  guard  the  crossings  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 


80  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

CAIRO,  ILL.,  September  21,  12  M.,  1863. 
Major- General  HALLECK. 

GENERAL-IN-CHIEF  :  I  received  your  telegram  of  the  16th  on  the  18th,  and 
forwarded  it  immediately  to  Sherman.  I  have  sent  twelve  boats,  and  more 
will  be  sent  to  bring  up  his  corps.  The  water  is  so  low  in  the  Ohio  and  Ten 
nessee  rivers  that  I  think  they  must  march  from  Corinth.  I  have  ordered 
one  million  rations,  and  plenty  of  spare  wagons  to  Corinth  ready  as  they 
come  up.  *  *  *  *  I  hold  the  cavalry  of  my  corps  to  cover  Sher 
man's  movements.  *  *  *  *  I  have  an  abundance  of  rolling  stock 
to  Corinth,  and  from  thence  to  Chattanooga  should  not  take  more  than  eight 
days  of  hard  marching;  *  *  *  *  with  the  best  possible  speed  it  will 
not  be  possible  for  Sherman  to  get  into  communication  with  General  Eose- 
crans  in  less  than  fourteen  days  from  this  date  at  the  best,  and  probably 
twenty  days.  *  *  *  *  S.  E.  HURLBUT,  Major- General 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  September  28,  1863. 
Major- General  KOSECRANS,  Chattanooga. 

Grant's  forces  were  ordered  to  move  by  Memphis,  Corinth,  and  Tuscumbia 
to  Decatur,  and  thence  as  might  be  found  necessary  to  cooperate  with  you. 
*-  *-.  -*-  #  ipjjg  or(jer  wag  received  on  the  18th,  and  steamers  sent  to  Vicks- 
burg  to  bring  up  the  troops.  They  calculated  to  be  able  to  communicate  with 
you  in  fourteen  days  from  that  time.  Since  then  nothing  has  been  heard  of 
them,  there  being  no  telegraph  line.  The  troops  from  here  will  probably 
reach  you  first.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  September  29,  1863. 
Major-  General  GRANT,  Vicksburg. 

The  enemy  seems  to  have  concentrated  upon  General  Rosecrans  all  his 
available  forces  from  every  direction.  To  meet  him  it  is  necessary  that  all 
the  forces  that  can  be  spared  in  your  department  be  sent  to  General  Rose- 
crans'  assistance.  He  wishes  them  sent  by  Tuscumbia,  Decatur,  and  Athens. 
As  this  requires  the  opening  and  running  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Eailroad  east  of  Corinth,  an  able  commander  like  Sherman  or  'McPherson 
should  be  selected.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General. 

On  the  29th  of  September  Hooker  reported  the  head  of  his 
column  passing  from  Cincinnati  to  Louisville,  and  on  the  2d 
of  October  he  telegraphed  Mr.  Stanton  from  Nashville:  "The 
last  of  the  infantry  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  reached  their  des 
tination  yesterday.  The  Twelfth  are  now  passing  through 
this  city." 

WASHINGTON,  September  30,  1863. 
Major- General  HURLBUT,  Memphis. 
*     *     -»-     *    ^AJI  available  forces  must  be  pushed  on  toward  General  Kose- 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICK  AM  AUGA.  81 

crans  as  fast  as  possible.    Your  attention  must  be  directed  particularly  to  the 
repairing  of  the  railroad  and  the  transportation  of  supplies  toward  Decatur. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

October  2d,  Hurlbut  telegraphed  Halleck : 

"A  supply  train  of  four  hundred  wagons  is  ready  at  Corinth,  and  thirty 
days'  rations  for  twenty  thousand  men." 

WAK  DEPARTMENT,  October  4,  1863. 
Major-  General  HURLBUT,  Memphis. 

As  fast  as  troops  arrive  they  should  be  pushed  forward,  first  to  Corinth  and 
then  to  Tuscumbia,  repairing  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad.  *  * 
*  *  From  there  you  will  move  by  Florence  on  Athens  or  Decatur,  on 
the  north  side  of  the  river,  or  directly  to  Decatur,  repairing  the  railroad 
according  as  it  may  be  found  most  practicable  or  expeditious.  Time  is  all 
important.'  The  railroad  must  be  kept  up  and  guarded  in  order  to  secure  the 
supplies  of  your  army.  *  *  *  *  Should  General  Sherman  be 
assigned  by  General  Grant  to  the  command,  you  will  furnish  him  with  this 
and  all  other  orders.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General. 

On  the  10th  of  October  Sherman,  then  near  Corinth,  re 
ported  the  situation  to  Halleck,  and  asked :  "  whether  I  shall 
give  preference  to  securing  this  railroad  or  reaching  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Athens  with  expedition.  The  latter  I  can  surely 
accomplish,  the  former  is  problematical." 

The  troops  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  having  commu 
nicated  with  General  Rosecrans  by  way  of  Bridgeport,  Gen 
eral  Sherman  was  instructed  on  the  14th,  by  Halleck  in  reply, 
to  take  care  of  his  railroad. 

General  Grant,  during  all  this  time,  had  been  absent  in 
New  Orleans.  He  reached  Memphis  on  his  return  October 
5th,  proceeded  to  Cairo,  and  thence  to  Louisville  to  receive 
orders,  where  he  was  directed  to  take  command  at  Chatta 
nooga,  relieving  Rosecrans  by  Thomas.  He  started  at  once 
for  the  front,  and  shortly  after  his  arrival,  ordered  Sherman  to 
drop  every  thing  on  the  railroad,  and  come  on  with  dispatch. 

He  thus  reported  his  action  to  Halleck : 

CHATTAXOOOA,  October  26,  2  P.  M. 
Majoj- General  HALLECK. 

GENERAL-IN-CHIEF:  I  have  sent  orders  to  General  Sherman  to  move  east 
6 


82  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

toward  Stevenson,  leaving  every  thing  unguarded,  except  by  way  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  east  oi  Bear  Creek.  The  possibility  of  the  enemy  break 
ing  through  our  lines  east  of  this,  and  the  present  inability  to  follow  him 
from  here  if  he  should,  is  the  cause  of  this  order.  Sherman's  forces  are  the 
only  troops  I  could  throw  in  to  head  such  a  move. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

From  these  most  urgent  dispatches  it  is  evident  that  a 
prompt  movement  of  Sherman's  relieving  column,  as  well  as 
the  repair  of  the  railroad,  was  expected  by  the  authorities  at 
Washington. 

The  railroad  was  in  fair  condition  from  the  start  as  far  as 
Corinth,  as  General  Sherman  says,  and  one  of  his  divisions 
had  reached  that  point  on  the  2d  of  October,  as  he  also 
relates.  On  the  27th  of  that  month  he  was  at  Bear  Creek, 
only  thirty  miles  east  of  Corinth,  where  he  was  "  still  busy  in 
pushing  forward  the  repairs  to  the  railroad  bridge,"  and 
"patching  up  the  many  breaks  between  it  and  Tuscumbia/' 
when  he  received  the  dispatch  from  General  Grant  at  Chat 
tanooga,  by  way  of  Huntsville,  to  drop  railroad  work  and 
hurry  to  Chattanooga  with  all  possible  speed. 

All  this  time  Rosecrans'  army  had  been  suffering  for  sup 
plies — a  suffering  which  Sherman,  by  prompt  movement, 
might  in  great  degree  have  prevented.  But  instead,  before 
he  could  move  his  small  command  from  Corinth,  two  corps 
had  been  sent  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and,  as  Halleck 
surmised,  had  reached  and  relieved  Rosecrans  first;  in  fact 
had  done  so  before  Sherman  began  to  exhibit  any  special 
activity  in  his  advance.  Thus  Sherman  failed  Rosecrans. 
How  much  that  was  unfortunate  in  the  situation,  which  he  now 
treats  as  if  it  were  altogether  the  fault  of  Rosecrans,  might 
have  been  avoided  had  he  then  moved  with  due  haste  to  his 
assistance ! 

Returning  to  Rosecrans'  movement,  and  following  him  for 
a  time,  it  will  be  seen  that,  with  twenty -five  days'  supplies  and 
ammunition  for  two  great  battles  he  had  crossed  the  Tennes 
see,  passed  over  three  difficult  mountain  ranges,  and  coming 
down  into  the  valley  south  of  Chattanooga,  compelled  Bragg 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAGUA.  83 

to  evacuate  the  place.  Crittenden's  corps  was  left  to  observe 
the  movements  of  Bragg,  and  pass  round  the  point  of  Lookout 
into  the  city  in  case  the  enemy  left  it. 

This,  however,  was  in  no  sense  a  military  occupation  of  the 
place,  and  Crittenden  marched  through  to  join  Rosecrans 
below,  where  he  was  concentrating  his  flanking  force  to  inter 
pose  it  between  the  enemy  and  Chattanooga,  and  so  occupy 
this  city,  which  was  the  objective  point  of  his  campaign.  The 
fact  of  one  corps  of  his  army  having  passed  through  Chatta 
nooga,  led  to  the  general  belief  at  the  time  that  Rosecrans' 
army  had  taken  the  place,  marched  out  to  attack  Bragg  at 
Chickamauga,  been  defeated,  and  driven  back  into  the  city. 
This  view  was  entertained  at  the  time  in  Washington,  although 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  with  the  exception  of  Critten- 
den's  forces,  never  saw  Chattanooga  till  two  days  after  the 
battle  of  Chickamauga. 

Upon  receiving  the  news  that  Crittenden's  corps  had 
entered  Chattanooga,  General  Halleck  telegraphed : 

WASHINGTON,  September  11,  1863. 
Major- General  ROSECRANS,  Chattanooga. 

After  holding  the  mountain  passes  in  the  west,  and  Dalton  or  some  other 
point  on  the  railroad  to  prevent  the  return  of  Bragg's  army,  it  will  be 
decided  whether  your  army  shall  move  further  south  into  Georgia  and 
Alabama.  *  *  *  *  H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

This  exploded  view  of  the  real  situation  General  Sherman 
now  revives. 

In  his  next  statement  that  Bragg  reenforced  from  Virginia, 
drew  out  of  Chattanooga,  fell  on  Rosecrans  at  that  place, 
defeated  him  and  drove  him  into  the  city,  the  records  are 
once  more  against  him. 

Bragg  evacuated  Chattanooga  September  7th,  and  retreated 
to  Lafayette.  The  reinforcements  from  Virginia  were  so  near 
that  point  on  the  loth  it  was  resolved  to  march  back  toward 
Chattanooga  and  attack  Rosecrans  wherever  found.  A  part 
of  Longstreet's  Virginia  troops  under  Hood  arrived  at  Dalton 
on  the  18th;  and  participated  in  the  first  day's  fight  at  Chicka- 


84  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

mauga,  but  Longstreet  himself,  with  the  rest  of  his  command, 
did  not  arrive  till  midnight  after  the  first  day's  battle.  A 
brief  extract  from  his  official  report  is  pertinent : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  NEAR  CHATTANOOGA,  ) 
"October,  1863.      j 

"  Our  train  reached  Catoosa  platform,  near  Ringgold,  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  19th  of  September.  As  soon  as  our  horses  came  up, 
about  four  o'clock,  I  started  with  Colonel  Sorrel  and  Colonel  Manning  of  my 
staff  to  find  the  headquarters  of  the  Commanding  General.  We  missed  our 
way  and  did  not  report  until  near  eleven  o'clock  at  night.  *  *  *  * 
As  soon  as  the  day  of  the  20th  had  dawned,  I  rode  to  the  front  to  find  my 
troops.  The  line  was  arranged  from  right  to  left  as  follows:  Stewart's, 
Johnson's,  Hinman's,  and  Preston's  divisions,  Hood's  division  (of  which  only 
three  brigades  were  up),  was  in  rear  of  Jackson,  Kenshaw's  and  Humphries' 
brigades.  McLaws'  division  was  ordered  forward  from  Ringgold  the  night 
before,  but  did  not  get  up.  General  McLaws  had  not  arrived  from  Rich 
mond." 

The  impression  sought  to  be  created  that  Rosecrans'  army 
was  driven  off  the  field  is  erroneous.  Soon  after  four  o'clock 
of  the  second  day,  General  Thomas  having  received  notice 
from  General  Rosecrans  that  rations  and  ammunition  would 
be  sent  to  meet  him  at  Rossville,  determined  to  hold  the  field 
until  night  and  then  withdraw  and  take  possession  of  the  passes 
there.  At  half  after  five  he  began  the  movement,  and  the 
divisions  which  commenced  to  withdraw  at  that  time  were 
attacked  at  the  moment,  but  retired  without  confusion  or 
serious  losses.  The  last  of  the  line  maintained  its  position 
until  after  nightfall,  and  retired  after  the  fighting  for  the  day 
had  ended. 

Of  the  close  of  the  battle  and  its  results  General  Rosecrans 
in  his  official  report,  says: 

"At  nightfall  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed  along  the  whole  line,  and  sunk 
into  quietude,  without  attempting  to  renew  the  combat.  General  Thorn  33 
considering  the  excessive  labors  of  the  troops,  the  scarcity  of  ammunition, 
food,  and  water,  and  having  orders  from  the  General  commanding  to  use  his 
discretion,  determined  to  retire  on  Rossville,  where  they  arrived  in  good 
order,  took  post  before  morning,  receiving  supplies  from  Chattanooga,  and 
offering  the  enemy  battle  during  all  the  next  day,  and  repulsing  his  recon- 


CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA.  85 

noissance.  On  the  night  of  the  21st  we  withdrew  from  Rossville,  took  firm 
possession  of  the  objective  point  of  our  campaign — Chattanooga — and  pre 
pared  to  hold  it." 

Coming  down  to  the  time  when  Rosecrans  had  been  relieved, 
and  General  Thomas  was  in  command  in  Chattanooga,  General 
Sherman,  in  writing  of  his  own  arrival  there  on  November 
14th,  and  a  conversation  with  General  Grant  the  next  day, 
represents  the  latter  as  informing  him  that  forage  and  provis 
ions  were  then  extremely  scarce,  and  that  he  feared  Thomas' 
troops  could  not  be  drawn  out  of  the  trenches  for  a  fight. 

That  General  Grant  could  not  have  made  such  a  statement 
about  supplies  is  evident  from  the  following  dispatches  sent 
more  than  two  weeks  before  Sherman's  arrival : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
CHATTAXOOGA,    October  26,  1863.      j 

Major- General  HALLECK,   Washington. 

*  General  Thomas  had  also  set  on  foot,  before  mj  arrival, 
a  plan  for  getting  possession  of  the  river  from  a  point  below  Lookout 
Mountain  to  Bridgeport.  If  successful,  and  I  think  it  will  be,  the  question 
of  supplies  will  be  fully  settled.  *  *  *  * 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

CHATTANOOGA,   October  28,  1863. 
Major- General  HALLECK,   Washington. 

General  Thomas'  plan  for  securing  the  river  and  Southside  road  hence  to 
Bridgeport  has  proved  eminently  successful.  The  question  of  supplies  may 
now  be  regarded  as  settled.  If  the  rebels  give  us  one  week  more  time  I  think 
all  danger  of  losing  territory  now  held  by  us  will  have  passed  away,  and  prep 
arations  may  commence  for  offensive  operations. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

That  General  Grant  had  no  doubt  of  the  capacity  of  Gen 
eral  Thomas'  troops  to  fight,  is  proved  by  the  following 
telegram  dated  a  week  before  Sherman  arrived  in  person,  and 
a  fortnight  before  his  troops  came  up : 

CHATTANOOGA,  November  7,  1863,  1:30  P.  M. 
To  General  HALLECK,   Washington. 

I  have  ordered  Thomas  to  attack  the  enemy  at  the  north 
end  of  Missionary  Kidge,  and  when  that  is  carried,  to  threaten  or  attack  the 


86  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

enemy's  line  of  communication  between  Cleveland  and  Dalton.  This  move 
will  be  made  on  Monday  morning.  I  expect  Sherman  will  reach  Huntsville 
to-day.  I  have  repeated  orders  to  him  to  hurry  forward  with  the  Fifteenth 
Array  Corps.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  point  of  attack  thus  assigned  to 
General  Thomas,  before  the  arrival  of  Sherman,  was  that 
afterward  committed  to  Sherman's  troops,  and  which  in  spite 
of  splendid  fighting  they  failed  to  carry.  Thus  General  Grant 
not  only  believed  Thomas'  men  fully  competent  to  do  what 
was  afterward  assigned  to  Sherman,  but  felt  so  certain  of  their 
success  that  he  ordered  the  movement  before  Sherman  was 
even  within  supporting  distance. 

General  Grant  subsequently  explained  to  Halleck  why  the 
attack  ordered  was  not  made : 

CHATTANOOGA,  November  21,  1863. 
To  General  HALLECK,   Washington. 

I  ordered  an  attack  here  two  weeks  ago,  but  it  was  impossible  to  move 
artillery.  Now  Thomas'  chief  of  artillery  says  he  has  to  borrow  teams  from 
Sherman  to  move  a  part  of  his  artillery  to  where  it  is  to  be  used.  Sherman 
has  used  almost  superhuman  efforts  to  get  up  even  at  this  time,  and  his  force 
is  really  the  only  one  that  I  can  move.  Thomas  can  take  about  one  gun  to 
each  battery,  and  can  go  as  far  with  his  infantry  as  his  men  can  carry  rations 
to  keep  them  and  bring  them  back.  I  have  never  felt  such  restlessness 
before  as  I  have  at  the  fixed  and  immovable  condition  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland.  The  Quartermaster-General  states  that  the  loss  of  animals 
here  will  exceed  ten  thousand.  Those  left  are  scarcely  able  to  carry  them 
selves.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

And  in  his  formal  report  of  these  operations  he  thus  refers 
to  the  same  matter : 

"  After  a  thorouglx  reconnoitering  of  the  ground  however,  it  was  deemed 
utterly  impracticable  to  make  the  movement  until  Sherman  could  get  up, 
because  of  the  inadequacy  of  our  force  and  the  condition  of  the  animals  then 
at  Chattanooga ;  and  I  was  forced  to  leave  Burnside  for  the  present  to  con 
tend  against  superior  forces  of  the  enemy,  until  the  arrival  of  Sherman  with 
his  men  and  means  of  transportation." 

Sherman's  troops  were  delayed  by  the  heavy  roads  and 
broken  bridges,  so  that  the  orders  for  a  general  attack,  first 


CHATTANOOGA.  AND  CHICK  AM  AUGA.        87 

issued  for  the  21st,  were  suspended,  also  the  subsequent  orders 
for  an  attack  on  the  23d,  as  appears  from  the  following  letter 
to  General  Thomas: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  j  ' 
CHATTANOOGA,  November  22,  1863.      j 

GENERAL:  The  bridge  at  Brown's  Ferry  being  down  to-day,  and  the 
excessively  bad  roads  since  the  last  rain,  will  render  it  impossible  for 
Sherman  to  get  up  either  of  his  two  remaining  divisions  in  time  for  an 
attack  to-morrow  morning.  With  one  of  them  up,  and  which  would  have 
been  there  now  but  for  the  accident  to  the  bridge,  I  would  still  make  the 
attack  in  the  morning,  regarding  a  day  gained  as  of  superior  advantage  to  a 
single  division  of  troops.  You  can  make  your  arrangements  for  this  delay. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

Upon  receiving  this,  General  Thomas  so  far  from  consider 
ing  the  presence  of  Sherman's  troops  necessary  to  opening 
the  battle,  went  to  Grant,  and  urged  that  the  attack  on 
Lookout  Mountain  should  begin  at  once.  General  Thomas 
gives  this  account  of  the  matter  in  his  official  report: 

"  Feeling  as  I  did  the  necessity  of  avoiding  delay,  for  fear  the  enemy  should 
become  advised  of  our  plans,  immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  the  above  letter 
I  went  to  General  Grant,  and  advised  against  any  further  postponement  of 
our  movement,  and  suggested  that,  if  needed,  the  Eleventh  Corps,  then 
between  the  two  bridges,  could  be  sent  to  General  Sherman  to  take  the 
place  of  the  troops  that  could  not  join  him,  whilst  these  last,  together  with 
the  troops  already  in  Lookout  Valley,  would  form  a  column  to  attack  the 
enemy  on  Lookout  Mountain,  or  at  least  divert  his  attention  from  Sherman's 
crossing  above.  This  met  the  approbation  of  the  Commanding  General,  and 
on  it  was  based  my  order  of  the  23d  to  General  Hooker,  to  demonstrate  on 
Lookout,  and  if  practicable  to  carry  the  position." 

General  Grant  himself  not  only  agreed  to  this  attack  on 
Lookout  before  Sherman  came  up,  but  on  the  next  day, 
Sherman  being  still  behind,  ordered  an  attack  by  Thomas  on 
the  left  in  front  of  Missionary  Ilidge.  This  was  made  the 
day  before  Sherman  got  into  position,  and  General  Grant 
telegraphed  the  following  report  of  it : 

CHATTANOOGA,  November  23,  1863. 
To  General  HALL.ECK,   Washington. 

General  Thomas'  troops  attacked  the  enemy's  left  at  2  p.  M.  to-day,  carried 


88  CHATTANOOGA  AND  CHICKAMAUGA. 

the  first  line  of  rifle  pits  running  over  the  knoll  twelve  hundred  yards  in 
front,  taking  about  two  hundred  prisoners,  besides  killed  and  wounded.  Our 
loss  small.  The  troops  moved  under  fire  with  all  the  precision  of  veterans  on 
parade. 

Thomas'  troops  will  entrench  themselves  and  hold  their  position  until  day 
light,  when  Sherman  will  join  in  the  attack  from  the  mouth  of  Chickamauga, 
and  a  decisive  battle  will  be  fought.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

General  Grant  in  his  formal  report  of  the  battle  of  Chatta 
nooga,  has  this  to  say  upon  the  point  under  consideration : 

'*  Thomas  having  done  on  the  23d,  with  his  troops  in  Chattanooga,  what 
was  intended  for  the  24th,  bettered  and  strengthened  his  advanced  positions 
during  the  day,  and  pushed  the  Eleventh  Corps  forward  along  the  south 
bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  across  Citico  Creek,  one  brigade  of  which,  with 
Howard  in  person,  reached  Sherman  just  as  he  had  completed  the  crossing  of 
the  river." 

General  Sherman  must  have  thought  all  this  rather  lively 
work  for  troops  that  could  not  be  induced  to  leave  their 
trenches  till  they  had  been  persuaded  by  the  inspiring 
spectacle  of  his  men  making  a  breakfast  of  the  enemy. 

The  next  day  (24th)  Hooker,  acting  under  the  orders  of 
General  Thomas,  attacked  and  carried  Lookout;  Sherman 
attacked,  but  failed  to  carry  the  point  he  was  ordered  to 
occupy  on  the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge.  The  day 
following  this  Sherman  still  struggled  unsuccessfully  to  carry 
his  objective  point.  Thomas'  army,  that  up  to  this  time  had 
not  even  seen  Sherman's  troops,  stormed  Missionary  Ridge, 
and  "it  was  not  till  night  closed  in,"  as  Sherman  writes  in 
his  official  report,  "that  I  knew  that  the  troops  in  Chatta 
nooga  had  swept  across  Missionary  Ridge  and  broken  the 
enemy's  center.  Of  course  the  victory  was  won,  and  pursuit 
was  the  next  step." 

The  records  which  this  chapter  contains  were  accessible  to 
General  Sherman  when  he  penned  the  statements  which  they 
so  effectually  refute. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

THE    MERIDIAN   CAMPAIGN — UNJUST  ARRAIGNMENT   OF    GEN 
ERAL   W.  SOOY   SMITH. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN  relates  that  in  the  Winter  following 
the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  he  conceived  the  idea  of  a  move 
ment  eastward  from  the  line  of  the  Mississippi  to  penetrate 
the  interior,  and  so  break  up  railroads,  and  paralyze  the  rebel 
forces  in  that  section,  as  to  release  a  large  body  of  troops  for 
the  coming  campaign  from  Chattanooga. 

Marching  from  Vicksburg  February  3d,  1864,  his  columns 
reached  Meridian  on  the  14th,  remained  there  till  the  20th, 
causing  much  destruction  of  roads,  rolling-stock,  stores,  and 
manufacturing  establishments  of  value  to  the  enemy,  and  arrived 
at  Canton,  near  Vicksburg,  on  his  return,  February  26th : 

Much  more  had  been  expected  at  the  North  from  the  prep 
arations  made  for  the  movement,  and  the  statements  circulated 
as  to  its  object.  It  was  the  general  belief  that  the  expedition 
was  to  penetrate  as  far  east  as  Selma,  one  of  the  interior  points 
of  greatest  value  to  the  enemy,  and  also  turn  upon  Mobile. 
This  impression  was  current  at  General  Grant's  headquarters 
and  at  Washington,  and  General  Grant  himself  had  written  to 
Halleck,  under  date  of  January  15th,  1864,  in  the  same  letter 
which  unfolded  his  plan  for  the  general  Spring  campaign  as 
follows : 

"  I  shall  direct  Sherman,  therefore,  to  move  out  to  Meridian  with  his  spare 
force — the  cavalry  going  from  Corinth,  and  destroy  the  railroads  east  and 
south  of  there  so  effectually  that  the  enemy  will  not  attempt  to  rebuild  them 
during  the  rebellion.  He  will  then  return,  unless  the  opportunity  of  going 
into  Mobile  with  the  force  he  has,  appears  perfectly  plain." 

(89) 


90  THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

And  writing  on  the  same  subject  to  Thomas  at  Chattanooga, 
on  the  19th  of  January,  he  said: 

"  He  (Sherman)  will  proceed  eastward  as  far  as  Meridian  at  least,  and  will 
thoroughly  destroy  the  roads  east  and  south  from  there,  and,  if  possible,  will 
throw  troops  as  far  east  as  Selma;  or,  if  he  finds  Mobile  so  far  unguarded  as 
to  make  his  force  sufficient  for  the  enterprise,  will  go  there.  To  cooperate 
with  this  movement  you  want  to  keep  up  appearances  of  preparation  of  an 
advance  from  Chattanooga.  It  may  be  necessary  even  to  move  a  column  as 
far  as  Lafayette. 

This,  it  will  be  observed,  was  written  by  the  General  who 
ordered  the  Meridian  expedition  to  an  officer  whom  he  desired 
to  cooperate  with  it. 

So,  while  General  Sherman  insists  that  he  had  no  intention 
of  going  through  to  Mobile,  and  that  he  wanted  Banks  to  keep 
up  a  show  of  attack  in  that  direction,  it  is  evident  that  Grant 
had  such  a  move  in  mind  for  him  when  the  orders  for  the 
expedition  were  given. 

The  general  verdict  of  failure  which  met  Sherman  on  his 
return,  called  for  prompt  excuse,  and  the  best  at  hand  was 
found  in  the  fact  that  the  cavalry  force  from  Memphis, 
under  General  Sooy  Smith,  had  not  reached  Meridian  as  was 
intended. 

The  Memoirs  give  this  version  of  General  Smith's  operations : 

"  At  Memphis  I  found  Brigadier-General  W.  Sooy  Smith  with  a  force  of 
about  twenty-five  hundred  cavalry,  which  he  had,  by  General  Grant's 
orderSj  brought  across  from  Middle  Tennessee,  to  assist  in  our  general  pur 
pose  as  well  as  to  punish  the  rebel  General  Forrest,  who  had  been  most  active 
in  harassing  our  garrisons  in  West  Tennessee  and  Mississippi.  *  *  * 
*  *  *  A  chief  part  of  the  enterprise  was  to  destroy  the  rebel  cavalry 
commanded  by  General  Forrest,  who  were  a  constant  threat  to  our  railway 
communications  in  Middle  Tennessee,  and  I  committed  this  task  to  Brigadier- 
General  W.  Sooy  Smith.  General  Hurlbut  had  in  his  command  about  seven 
thousand  five  hundred  cavalry,  scattered  from  Columbus,  Kentucky,  to 
Corinth,  Mississippi,  and  we  proposed  to  make  up  an  aggregate  cavalry  force 
of  about  seven  thousand  '  effective '  out  of  these  and  the  twenty-five  hundred 
which  General  Smith  had  brought  with  him  from  Middle  Tennessee.  With 
this  force  General  Smith  was  ordered  to  move  from  Memphis  straight  for 
Meridian,  Mississippi,  and  to  start  by  February  1st.  I  explained  to  him 
personally  the  nature  of  Forrest  as  a  man,  and  of  his  peculiar  force;  told 


THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  91 

him  that  in  his  route  he  was  sure  to  encounter  Forrest,  who  always  attacked 
with  a  vehemence  for  which  he  must  be  prepared,  and  that,  after  lie  had 
repelled  the  first  attack,  he  must,  in  turn,  assume  the  most  determined  offen 
sive,  overwhelm  him,  and  utterly  destroy  his  whole  force.  I  knew  that  For 
rest  could  not  have  more  than  four  thousand  cavalry,  and  my  own  movement 
would  give  employment  to  every  other  man  of  the  rebel  army  not  imme 
diately  present  with  him,  so  that  he  (General  Smith)  might  safely  act  on  the 
hypothesis  I  have  stated. 

"  Having  completed  all  these  preparations  in  Memphis,  being  satisfied  that 
the  cavalry  force  would  be  ready  to  start  by  the  1st  of  February,  and  having 
seen  General  Hurlbut  with  his  two  divisions  embark  in  steamers  for  Vicks- 
burg,  I  also  reembarked  for  the  same  destination  on  the  27th  of  January. 
*  *  *  *  The  object  of  the  Meridian  expedition  was  to  strike  the 
roads  inland,  so  to  paralyze  the  rebel  forces,  that  we  could  take  from  the 
defense  of  the  Mississippi  River  the  equivalent  of  a  corps  of  twenty  thousand 
men,  to  be  used  in  the  next  Georgia  campaign ;  and  this  was  actually  done. 
At  the  same  time  I  wanted  to  destroy  General  Forrest,  who,  with  an  irregular 
force  of  cavalry,  was  constantly  threatening  Memphis  and  the  river  above, 
as  well  as  our  routes  of  supply  in  Middle  Tennessee.  In  this  we  failed 
utterly,  because  General  W.  Sooy  Smith  did  not  fulfill  his  orders,  which  were 
clear  and  specific,  as  contained  in  my  letter  of  instructions  to  him  of  January 
27th,  at  Memphis,  and  my  personal  explanations  to  him  at  the  same  time. 
Instead  of  starting  at  the  date  ordered,  February  1st,  he  did  not  leave  Mem 
phis  till  the  llth,  waiting  for  some  regiment  that  was  ice  bound  near  Co 
lumbus,  Kentucky;  and  then,  when  he  did  start,  he  allowed  General  Forrest 
to  head  him  off  and  to  defeat  him  with  an  inferior  force  near  West  Point, 
below  Okalona,  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad. 

"We  waited  at  Meridian  till  the  20th  to  hear  from  General  Smith,  but 
hearing  nothing  whatever,  and  having  utterly  destroyed  the  railroads  in  and 
around  that  junction,  I  ordered  General  McPherson  to  move  back  slowly 
toward  Canton.  With  WinsloAv's  cavalry  and  Hurlbut's  infantry  I  turned 
north  to  Marion,  and  thence  to  a  place  called  'Union,'  whence  I  dispatched 
the  cavalry  farther  north  to  Philadelphia  and  Louisville,  to  feel  as  it  were 
for  General  Smith,  and  then  turned  all  the  infantry  columns  toward  Canton, 
Mississippi. 

"On  the  26th  we  all  reached  Canton,  but  we  had  not  heard  a  word  of  Gen 
eral  Smith,  nor  was  it  until  sometime  after  (at  Vicksburg)  that  I  learned  the 
whole  truth  of  General  Smith's  movement  and  of  his  failure.  Of  course  I 
did  not,  and  could  not,  approve  of  his  conduct,  and  I  know  that  he  yet  chafes 
under  the  censure.  I  had  set  so  much  store  on  his  part  of  the  project  that  I 
was  disappointed,  and  so  reported  officially  to  General  Grant.  General 
Smith  never  regained  my  confidence  as  a  soldier,  though  I  still  regard  him  as 
a  most  accomplished  gentleman  and  a  skillful  engineer.  Since  the  close  of 
the  war  he  has  appealed  to  me  to  relieve  him  of  that  censure,  but  I  could 
not  do  it,  because  it  would  falsify  history." 


92  THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

It  would  not  have  falsified  history,  however,  if  General  Sher 
man  had  said,  that  instead  of  waiting  for  a  regiment  which  was 
ice  bound  near  Columbus,  Ky.,  General  Smith,  by  General  Sher 
man's  personal  and  positive  directions,  was  awaiting  the  arrival 
of  Warring's  entire  brigade  of  cavalry,  composed  of  the  Fourth 
Missouri,  Second  New  Jersey,  Seventh  Indiana,  Nineteenth 
Pennsylvania,  and  a  battery  of  the  Second  Illinois  Cavalry. 

Further  than  this,  General  Smith  was  distinctly  informed  by 
Sherman,  before  the  departure  of  the  latter,  that  it  would  be 
necessary  to  wait  for  this  brigade  in  order  to  make  up  the 
requisite  force  with  which  to  meet  Forrest.  General  Sherman 
also  assured  him  that  his  own  movement  on  Meridian  and 
the  contemplated  operations  there  did  not  of  necessity  depend 
upon  a  junction  with  the  cavalry  from  Memphis.  And  this  is 
shown  to  have  been  General  Sherman's  view,  when  he  himself 
reached  Meridian  four  days  after  the  date  he  had  fixed  for  his 
own  and  General  Smith's  arrival  at  that  point,  by  the  order 
he  then  issued.  This  was  dated  eight  days  after  the  time  men 
tioned  for  a  union  of  the  forces  there,  and  declares  that  all  the 
objects  of  the  expedition  had  been  fully  attained: 

[Special  Field  Orders  No.  20.] 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  TENNESSEE,  | 
MERIDIAN,  Miss.,  February  18th,  1864.      j 

1.  Having  fulfilled,  and  well,  all  the  objects  of  the  expedition,  the  troops 
will  return  to  the  Mississippi  Eiver  to  embark  in  another  equally  important 
movement. 

2.  *      *      *     *     The  march  will  begin  on  the  20th  instant,  and  the  corps 
commanders  will  not  pass  Union  and  Decatur  until  they  have  communicated 
with  each  other  by  couriers  across  at  these  points.     *       *       *       * 

4.     The  march  should  be  conducted  slow ;  about  fifteen  miles  per  day,  and 
in  good  order.       *      *       *       *      There  is  no  seeming  danger,  but  every  pre 
caution  should  be  taken  against  cavalry  dashes  at  our  trains.     *       *       *      * 
By  order  of  Major-General  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

L.  M.  DAYTON,  Aid-de-Camp. 

From  General  Smith's  report,  it  appears  that  Warring's 
brigade  did  not  reach  him  until  the  8th.  It  had  marched  two 
hundred  and  fifteen  miles,  over  a  country  covered  with  snow 
and  ice,  and  been  obliged  to  cross  rivers,  where  in  some  in- 


THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  93 

stances  it  was  necessary  to  build  boats  to  ferry  the  command, 
and  where  at  times  the  men  were  compelled  to  dismount  and 
harness  the  horses  to  the  artillery  and  the  ammunition  wagons 
in  order  to  draw  them  through.  Three  days  would  seem 
scarcely  enough  to  refit  a  brigade  after  such  a  march,  but  in 
that  time  it  again  started  under  General  Smith. 

A  vigorous  campaign  was  then  made  against  Forrest,  and 
pushed  as  far  as  was  prudent  or  possible.  The  delay  in  starting 
had  made  it  impracticable  to  reach  General  Sherman  at  Meri 
dian,  by  the  time  he  had  set  for  returning,  and  so  General  Smith 
withdrew  to  Memphis.  As  a  result  of  his  expedition,  he  re 
ported  between  one  and  two  million  bushels  of  corn  destroyed, 
two  thousand  bales  of  cotton  burned,  thirty  miles  of  railroad 
destroyed,  three  thousand  horses  and  mules,  and  fifteen  hundred 
negroes  brought  out  of  the  enemy's  country,  besides  the  forage 
and  subsistence  taken  for  his  mounted  force  of  seven  thousand. 

General  Sherman  in  his  report  of  the  Meridian  expedition, 
made  a  few  days  after  his  return  to  "Vicksburg,  maintained  that 
he  had  accomplished  all  he  undertook,  notwithstanding  the 
delay  in  General  Smith's  movements. 

This  portion  of  his  report  is  as  follows: 

"I  inclose  herewith  my  instructions  to  General  Smith,  with  a  copy  of  hia 
report,  and  must  say  it  is  unsatisfactory.  The  delay  in  his  starting  to  the 
llth  of  February,  when  his  orders  contemplated  his  being  at  Meridian  on  the 
10th,  and  when  he  knew  I  was  marching  from  Vicksburg  is  unpardonable,  and 
the  mode  and  manner  of  his  return  to  Memphis  was  not  what  I  expected 
from  an  intended  bold  cavalry  movement.  *  *  *  *  I  returned  (to 
Canton)  from  Vicksburg,  on  the  6th  inst.,  found  all  my  army  in,  and  learned 
that  General  Smith  had  not  started  from  Memphis  at  all  till  the  llth  of  Feb 
ruary,  had  only  reached  West  Point,  and  turned  back  on  the  22d,  the  march 
back  to  Memphis  being  too  rapid  for  a  good  effect. 

"  Nevertheless,  on  the  whole,  we  accomplished  all  I  undertook." 

General  Smith,  at  the  time  of  this  expedition,  was  Grant's 
chief  of  cavalry,  and  when  he  was  temporarily  placed  under 
the  orders  of  Sherman  for  the  Meridian  campaign,  he  was 
engaged,  in  conjunction  with  other  troops,  in  watching  and 
operating  against  Forrest's  command.  He  made  full  report  to 


94  THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN. 

General  Grant  of  his  operations  under  Sherman,  and  was  com 
mended  for  what  he  accomplished.  As  an  evidence  that  Gen 
eral  Sherman  himself  had  lost  no  confidence  in  him,  he  was  re 
tained  by  that  officer  as  chief-of-staff,  when  he  succeeded  Grant 
in  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  and 
was  entrusted  with  the  work  of  organizing  the  cavalry  force 
for  the  Atlanta  campaign,  continuing  active  in  the  field  during 
the  first  three  months  of  that  movement,  when  disabling  sick 
ness  compelled  him  to  leave  the  service.  And  yet  General 
Sherman  now  writes :  "  General  Smith  never  regained  my  con 
fidence  as  a  soldier." 

The  reports  on  file  in  the  War  Department  regarding  Gen 
eral  Smith's  movement  are  voluminous.  His  instructions 
contain  no  mention  of  February  1st  being  the  day  absolutely 
fixed  for  his  starting,  as  now  claimed  in  the  Memoirs,  and  the 
reasons,  both  for  the  delay,  and  the  subsequent  return  to  Mem 
phis,  are  of  such  a  character  as  to  fix  no  stain  upon  his  record. 

The  Memoirs,  in  fixing  the  force  with  which  he  was  to 
move  at  "  about  seven  thousand,"  show  that  General  Sherman 
expected  General  Smith  to  wait  for  Warring's  brigade,  since, 
without  it,  his  force  would  only  have  numbered  about  five 
thousand.  Instead  of  Forrest's  strength  being  then  estimated 
in  Memphis  at  "  not  more  than  four  thousand  cavalry,"  it  was 
believed  to  be,  and  in  fact  was,  fully  six  thousand.  Instead 
of  being  defeated  at  West  Point  "  with  an  inferior  force," 
General  Smith  was  not  defeated  there  at  all ;  and  further,  he 
moved  back  from  that  place  partly  because  the  rebel  cavalry 
force,  which  Sherman  had  not  kept  employed  in  his  own 
front,  was  moving  to  join  Forrest  against  him. 

But  aside  from  this  expected  reenforcement  of  the  enemy 
the  various  reports  disclose  abundant  reason  for  turning  back 
from  West  Point.  The  force  in  General  Smith's  front  was 
fully  equal  to  his  own,  and  was  posted  behind  a  river  which 
became  impassable  when  so  held.  The  enemy's  left  was  cov 
ered  by  a  swamp  and  river,  and  a  movement  in  that  direction 
was  impracticable,  while  his  right  was  protected  by  the  Tom- 


THE  MERIDIAN  CAMPAIGN.  95 

bigbce  River  which  General  Smith  could  not  cross.  His 
command  was  encumbered  with  a  large  body  of  negroes 
that  he  had  gathered  up  in  pursuance  of  orders  and  was  in 
honor  bound  to  protect.  A  rebel  brigade  was  moving  to  the 
rear  to  occupy  a  strong  point  in  his  line  of  retreat.  At 
this  time  General  Sherman  was  retiring  from  Meridian,, 
and  had  it  been  possible  for  General  Smith  to  advance  beyond 
West  Point  it  would  have  been  a  move  upon  Folk's  whole 
army,  resulting  in  utter  defeat. 

General  Smith  penetrated  further  into  the  enemy's  territory 
than  General  Sherman,  and,  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of 
his  command,  inflicted  heavier  losses  upon  the  enemy  than 
Sherman. 


CHAPTEK  VIII. 

RESACA THE  FAILURE  THERE  ATTRIBUTED  TO  McPHERSON. 

IT  is  ungenerous  in  General  Sherman  to  cast  imputations 
upon  General  McPherson,  the  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  since  this  General  and  his  army,  often  at  sore 
cost,  saved  Sherman  from  himself,  and  won  laurels  for  him  to 
wear. 

It  is  well  known  among  many  who  participated  in  it,  that 
the  prominent  officers  of  the  three  armies  which  began  the 
Atlanta  campaign,  considered  its  opening  moves  at  Dalton 
and  Resaca  as  grave  and  needless  failures.  The  feeling  was 
that  Sherman,  with  his  one  hundred  thousand  men,  should 
have  brought  Johnston's  forty-five  thousand  to  decisive  battle 
in  front  of  Resaca. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  book,  labors  to  show  first,  that  at 
the  outset  he  fully  intended  to  do  this;  and  second,  that  the 
failure  of  his  plan  resulted  from  McPherson's  timidity  at  a 
moment  when  this  officer  had  an  opportunity  to  insure  brill 
iant  success — such  as  does  not  occur  twice  in  a  single  life. 

As  will  be  remembered,  the  enemy  held  a  strongly  fortified 
position  in  front  of  Dalton.  The  road  from  Chattanooga 
passed  from  the  west  through  a  deep  gorge  called  Buzzard's 
Roost,  in  the  mountain  range  which  separated  the  two  armies. 
Its  sides  were  precipitous,  finally  taking  the  form  of  palisades. 
The  range  was  Rocky  Face.  The  gorge  was  partly  com 
manded  from  the  Union  side  by  Tunnel  Hill.  About  fifteen 
miles  south,  Snake  Creek  Gap,  which  had  been  almost  entirely 
neglected  by  the  enemy,  opened  through  the  ridge  midway 
upon  the  roads  leading  from  Dalton  to  Resaca. 
(96) 


RESACA.  97 

Of  the  position,  General  Sherman  writes  as  follows : 

"  The  position  was  very  strong,  and  I  know  that  such  a  general  as  was  my 
antagonist  (Joseph  Johnston),  who  had  been  there  six  months,  had  fortified  it 
to  the  maximum. 

"  Therefore,  I  had  no  intention  to  attack  the  position  seriously  in  front,  but 
depended  on  McPherson  to  capture  and  hold  the  railroad  to  its  rear,  which 
would  force  Johnston  to  detach  largely  against  him,  or  rather,  as  I  expected, 
to  evacuate  his  position  at  Dalton  altogether. 

"  My  orders  to  Generals  Thomas  and  Schofield  were  merely  to  press  strongly 
at  all  points  in  front,  ready  to  rush  in  on  the  first  appearance  of  '  let  go,'  and, 
if  possible,  to  catch  our  enemy  in  the  confusion  of  retreat." 

And  yet  against  this  front,  which  he  "  had  no  intention 
of  attacking  seriously/7  he  moved  Thomas  Avith  over  sixty 
thousand,  and  Schofield  with  over  thirteen  thousand,  while 
McPherson  with  twenty-four  thousand  was  sent  to  Johnston's 
rear  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  not  with  orders  to  remain  on 
his  line  of  communications,  but  to  break  his  railroad  and  then 
retire  to  Snake  Creek  Gap,  or  return  to  the  main  army  as  he 
should  deem  best. 

Which  was  the  diversion?  Were  Thomas  and  Schofield 
making  it  in  Buzzard  Roost  and  upon  impregnable  Rocky 
Face,  with  over  seventy-four  thousand  men,  while  McPherson 
was  marching  to  the  predetermined  battle-field,  in  the  rear  of 
Dalton,  with  twenty-four  thousand  ? 

The  attack  began  on  the  7th  of  May.  On  that  day  Thomas 
carried  Tunnel  Hill.  Of  all  the  operations  on  the  front 
during  the  8th  and  9th,  when  Thomas  and  Schofield  were 
assaulting  precipices,  the  Memoirs  have  nothing  except  the 
single  sentence  :  "All  the  movements  of  the  7th  and  8th  were 
made  exactly  as  ordered." 

The  history  then  proceeds : 

"I  had  constant  communication  with  all  parts  of  the  army,  and  on  the  9th, 
McPherson's  head  of  column  entered  and  passed  through  Snake  Creek  per 
fectly  undefended,  and  accomplished  a  complete  surprise  to  the  enemy.  At 
its  further  debouche  he  met  a  cavalry  brigade,  easily  driven,  which  retreated 
hastily  north  toward  Dalton,  and  doubtless  carried  to  Johnston  the  first 
serious  intimation  that  a  heavy  force  of  infantry  and  artillery  was  to  his 

7 


98  EESACA. 

rear,  and  within  a  few  miles  of  his  railroad.  I  got  a  short  note  from  Mc- 
Pherson  that  day  (written  at  2  P.  M.,  when  he  was  within  a  mile  and  a  hall 
of  the  railroad  above  and  near  Resaca),  and  we  all  felt  jubilant.  I  renewed 
orders  to  Thomas  and  Schofield  to  be  ready  for  the  instant  pursuit  of  what  I 
expected  to  be  a  broken  and  disordered  army,  forced  to  retreat  by  roads  to 
the  east  of  Resaca,  which  were  known  to  be  very  rough  and  impracticable. 

"  That  night  I  received  further  notice  from  McPherson  that  he  had  found 
Resaca  too  strong  for  a  surprise ;  that  in  consequence  he  had  fallen  back 
three  miles  to  the  mouth  of  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  was  there  fortified.  I 
wrote  him  next  day  the  following  letters,  copies  of  which  are  in  my  letter- 
book  ;  but  his  to  me  were  mere  notes  in  pencil,  not  retained." 

The  letters  referred  to  are  both  dated  May  llth.  The 
material  points  affecting  the  question  under  discussion,  are  as 
follows : 

"GENERAL,  :  I  received  by  courier  (in  the  night)  yours  of  5  and  6  :30  p.  M. 
of  yesterday.  You  now  have  your  twenty- three  thousand  men,  and  General 
Hooker  is  in  close  support,  so  that  you  can  hold  all  of  Jos.  Johnston's  army 
in  check  should  he  abandon  Dalton.  He  can  not  afford  to  abandon  Dalton, 
for  he  has  fixed  it  up  on  purpose  to  receive  us,  and  he  observes  that  we  are 
close  at  hand  waiting  for  him  to  quit.  He  can  not  afford  a  detachment 
strong  enough  to  fight  you,  as  his  army  will  not  admit  of  it. 

"  Strengthen  your  position ;  fight  anything  that  comes ;  and  threaten  the 
safety  of  the  railroad  all  the  time.  But,  to  tell  the  truth  I  would  rather  the 
enemy  would  stay  in  Dalton  two  more  days,  when  he  may  find  in  his  rear  a 
larger  party  than  he  expects  in  an  open  field.  At  all  events  we  can  then 
choose  our  own  ground,  and  he  will  be  forced  to  move  out  of  his  works.  I 
do  not  intend  to  put  a  column  into  Buzzard  Roost  Gap  at  present. 

"  McPherson  had  startled  Johnston  in  his  fancied  security,  but  had  not 
done  the  full  measure  of  his  work.  He  had  in  hand  twenty-three  thousand 
of  the  best  men  of  the  army,  and  could  have  walked  into  Resaca  (then  held 
only  by  a  small  brigade),  or  he  could  have  placed  his  whole  force  astride  the 
railroad  above  Resaca,  and  there  have  easily  withstood  the  attack  of  all  of 
Johnston's  army,  with  the  knowledge  that  Thomas  and  Schofield  were  on  his 
heels.  Had  he  done  so,  I  am  certain  that  Johnston  would  not  have  ventured 
to  attack  him  in  position,  but  would  have  retreated  eastward  by  Spring 
Place,  and  we  should  have  captured  half  his  army  and  all  his  artillery  and 
wagons  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  campaign. 

"  Such  an  opportunity  does  not  occur  twice  in  a  single  life,  but  at  the  criti 
cal  moment  McPherson  seems  to  have  been  a  little  timid.  Still,  he  was  per 
fectly  justified  by  his  orders,  and  fell  back  and  assumed  an  unassailable 
defensive  position  in  Sugar  Valley,  on  the  Resaca  side  of  Snake  Creek  Gap. 
As  soon  as  informed  of  this,  I  determined  to  pass  the  whole  army  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  to  move  on  Resaca  with  the  main  army." 


RESACA.  99 

That  McPherson  moved  promptly  through  Snake  Creek 
Gap  when  ordered,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  did  not  even 
wait  for  food  for  men  or  horses,  as  will  appear  from  the  fol 
lowing  extract  from  the  report  of  General  G.  M.  Dodge,  of 
the  Sixteenth  Army  Corps,  who  had  the  advance  in  the  move 
ment  on  Resaca : 

"  During  the  entire  day  the  command  acted  under  the  personal  direction 
of  Major-General  McPherson,  and  promptly  obeyed  and  executed  all  his 
orders.  My  transportation  had  not  yet  reached  me.  I  had  with  the  entire 
corps,  since  leaving  Chattanooga,  only  seventeen  wagons,  and  I  had  marched 
out  in  the  morning  without  rations,  most  of  the  command  having  been 
without  food  since  the  day  before  at  noon ;  thus  a  march  of  sixteen  miles 
was  made  by  the  command,  the  men  and  animals  whereof  had  had  nothing 
to  eat  for  a  day  and  a  half." 

A  report  of  General  Dodge  also  shows  that  a  detachment 
of  his  troops  passed  through  the  Gap,  moved  out  to  the  rail 
road  the  night  of  the  8th,  and  found  it  clear  of  the  enemy; 
that  the  next  day  his  entire  corps  carried  a  hill  close  to 
Resaca,  moved  in  force  to  the  railroad,  and  from  this  point 
was  withdrawn  to  the  mouth  of  Snake  Creek  Gap.  This  was 
in  accordance  with  the  positive  order  of  General  Sherman  to 
General  McPherson. 

After  the  slur  upon  McPherson's  courage,  the  book  relates 
that  on  the  llth,  there  being  signs  of  the  enemy  evacuating 
Dalton,  orders  were  given  for  the  movement  of  all  the  army 
through  Snake  Gap,  except  the  Fourth  Corps  and  Stoneman's 
cavalry,  which  were  left  in  front  of  Buzzard's  Roost.  During 
the  12th  and  13th,  the  greater  part  of  Thomas' and  Schofield's 
army  passed  through  the  gap  and  were  deployed  against' 
Resaca,  where,  now  writes  General  Sherman,  the  enemy,  "as 
I  anticipated,  had  abandoned  all  his  well-prepared  defenses 
at  Dalton,  and  was  found  inside  of  Resaca  with  the  bulk  of 
his  army,  holding  his  divisions  well  in  hand,  acting  purely  on 
the  defensive,  and  fighting  well  at  all  points  of  conflict. 
*  *  *  On  the  14th  we  closed  in." 


100  RESACA. 

He  thus  closes  the  account  of  these  opening  operations  of 
the  Atlanta  campaign: 

"  On  the  night  of  May  15th  Johnston  got-  his  army  across  the  bridges,  set 
them  on  fire,  and  we  entered  Resaca  at  daylight  Our  loss  up  to  that  time 
was  about  six  hundred  dead  and  thirty-three  hundred  and  seventy-five 
wounded — mostly  light  wounds  that  did  not  necessitate  sending  the  men 
to  the  rear  for  treatment.  That  Johnston  had  deliberately  designed  in 
advance  to  give  up  such  a  strong  position  as  Dalton  and  Resaca,  for  the 
purpose  of  drawing  us  further  south,  is  simply  absurd.  Had  he  remained 
in  Dalton  another  hour  it  would  have  been  his  total  defeat,  and  he  only 
evacuated  Resaca  because  his  safety  demanded  it.  The  movement  by  us 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap  was  a  total  surprise  to  him.  My  army  about 
doubled  his  in  size,  but  he  had  all  the  advantages  of  natural  positions  of 
artificial  forts  and  roads,  and  of  concentrated  action.  We  were  compelled  to 
grope  our  way  through  forests,  across  mountains,  with  a  large  army,  neces 
sarily  more  or  less  dispersed.  Of  course  I  was  disappointed  not  to  have 
crippled  his  army  more  at  that  particular  stage  of  the  game ;  but,  as  it 
resulted,  these  rapid  successes  gave  us  the  initiative,  and  the  usual  impulse 
of  a  conquering  army.  Johnston  having  retreated  in  the  night  of  May  15th, 
immediate  pursuit  was  begun." 

Thus,  seven  days  after  the  movement  began,  General  Sher 
man  had  finally  accomplished  what  General  Thomas,  who, 
assisted  by  General  Schofield,  had  thoroughly  reconnoitered 
the  position  in  February,  had  urged  should  be  done  at  the 
first,  as  will  now  appear  from  the  record  history  of  Buzzard 
Roost  and  Resaca. 

On  the  28th  of  February,  1864,  before  General  Sherman 
had  succeeded  General  Grant  in  the  command  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  General  Thomas,  who  was  in 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  Chattanooga, 
telegraphed  General  Grant  at  Nashville,  proposing  the  follow 
ing  plan  for  a  Spring  campaign : 

"I  believe  if  I  can  commence  the  campaign  with  the  Fourteenth  and 
Fourth  Corps  in  front,  with  Howard's  corps  in  reserve,  that  I  can  move  along  the 
line  of  the  railroad  and  overcome  all  opposition  as  far,  at  least,  as  Atlanta." 

In  a  subsequent  report  upon  the  campaign,  dated  March  10, 
1864,  General  Thomas  thus  speaks  of  this  proposition  : 

"The  above  proposition  was  submitted  to  General  Grant  for  his  approval, 


RESACA.  101 

and  if  obtained,  it  was  my  intention  (having  acquired  by  the  reconnoissance 
of  February  23d,  24th,  and  25th,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  approaches 
direct  upon  Dalton,  from  Ringgold  and  Cleveland),  to  have  made  a  strong 
demonstration  against  Buzzard  Boost,  attracting  Johnston's  whole  attention 
to  that  point,  and  to  have  thrown  the  main  body  of  my  infantry  and  cavalry 
through  Snake  Creek  Gap  upon  his  communications,  which  I  had  ascertained 
from  scouts  he  had,  up  to  that  time,  neglected  to  observe  or  guard.  With 
this  view  I  had  previously  asked  for  the  return  to  me  of  Granger's  corps  and 
my  cavalry  from  East  Tennessee,  and  had  already  initiated  preparations  for 
the  execution  of  the  above  movement  as  soon  as  the  Spring  opened  sufficiently 
to  admit  of  it." 

On  the  17th  of  March  General  Grant  was  made  Lieutenant- 
General,  and  was  succeeded  in  command  at  Nashville  by 
General  Sherman.  In  the  same  report  General  Thomas  con 
tinues  : 

"  Shortly  after  his  assignment  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi,  General  Sherman  came  to  see  me  at  Chattanooga,  to  consult 
as  to  the  position  of  affairs,  and  adopt  a  plan  for  a  Spring  campaign.  At 
that  interview  I  proposed  to  General  Sherman  that  if  he  would  use  McPherson 
and  Schofield's  armies  to  demonstrate  on  the  enemy's  position  at  Dalton,  by 
the  direct  roads  through  Blizzard  Roost  Gap,  and  from  the  direction  of 
Cleveland,  I  would  throw  my  whole  force  through  Snake  Creek  Gap,  which 
I  knew  to  be  unguarded,  fall  upon  the  enemy's  communications  between 
Dalton  and  Resaca,  thereby  turning  his  position  completely,  and  force  him 
either  to  retreat  toward  the  east,  through  a  difficult  country,  poorly  supplied 
with  provisions  and  forage,  with  a  strong  probability  of  total  disorganization 
of  his  force, or  attack  me;  in  which  latter  event  I  felt  confident  that  my  army 
was  sufficiently  strong  to  beat  him,  especially  as  I  hoped  to  gain  a  position 
on  his  communications  before  he  could  be  made  aware  of  my  movement. 
General  Sherman  objected  to  this  plan  for  the  reason  that  he  desired  my 
army  to  form  the  reserve  of  the  united  armies,  and  to  serve  as  a  rallying 
point  for  the  two  wings,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  and  that  of  the  Tennessee,  to 
operate  from. 

"(Later,  when  the  campaign  in  Georgia  was  commenced,  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  was  sent  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  to  accomplish  what 
I  had  proposed  doing  with  my  army,  but  not  reaching  Snake  Creek  Gap 
before  the  enemy  had  informed  himself  of  the  movement,  McPherson  was 
unable  to  get  upon  his  communications  before  Johnston  had  withdrawn 
part  of  his  forces  from  Dalton,  and  had  made  dispositions  to  defend 
Resaca.") 

Such  is  General  Thomas'  brief  account  of  this  movement. 


102  RESACA. 

Below  will  be  found  its  history  as  presented  in  General 
Sherman's  own  dispatches,  to  which  scarcely  any  allusion 
is  made  in  his  book. 

On  the  24th  of  April  General  Sherman  wrote  as  follows 
to  General  Grant,  informing  him  of  the  intention  to  attack 
Johnston  in  position  at  Dalton: 

"At  Lafayette  all  our  armies  will  be  together,  and  if  Johnston  stands  at 
Dalton  we  must  attack  him  in  position." 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  CHATTANOOGA,  May  1,  1864.     j 

General  GRANT,  Oulpepper,  Va. 

*  *  *  *  The  first  move  will  be  Thomas,  Tunnel  Hill ;  Schofield, 
Catoosa  Springs ;  and  McPherson,  Villanow.  Next  move  will  be  battle. 
*  *  *  *  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  CHATTANOOGA,  May  4,  1864.      j 

General  GRANT,  Culpepper,  Va. 

Thomas'  center  is  at  Ringgold,  left  at  Catoosa,  right  at  Leets'  tan-yard. 
Dodge  is  here,  Fifteenth  corps  at  Whiteside,  Schofield  closing  up  on  Thomas. 
All  move  to-morrow,  but  I  hardly  expect  serious  battle  till  the  7th.  Every 
thing  very  quiet  with  the  enemy.  Johnston  evidently  awaits  my  initiative. 
I  will  first  secure  Tunnel  Hill,  then  throw  McPherson  rapidly  on  his  com 
munications,  attacking  at  the  same  time  in  front,  cautiously,  and  in  force. 
"VV.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General  commanding. 

May  5th,  he  notified  General  McPherson  of  the  move 
which  Thomas  and  Schofield  were  directed  to  make  against 
Rocky  Face,  and  directed  him  to  march  to  Snake  Creek  Gap, 
secure  it,  attack  the  enemy  boldly  from  it,  attempt  to  so 
break  the  railroad  that  it  would  require  some  days  to  repair 
it,  and  then  "  withdraw  to  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  come  to  us, 
or  wait  the  developments  according  to  your  judgment  and 
the  information  you  may  receive."  In  the  same  order  Gen 
eral  Sherman  expresses  the  hope  that  "the  enemy  will  fight 
at  Dalton." 

In  the  forenoon  of  May  7th,  he  directed  General  Schofield 
to  "see  if  Rocky  Face  Ridge  can  be  reached  from  your 
position,"  and  at  two  o'clock,  "  reconnoiter  the  ridge  to-night 


RESACA.  103 

and  make  a  lodgment  to-morrow  morning,  but  don't  be  drawn 
into  battle." 

On  the  8th,  General  Thomas  was  ordered  "to  get,  if  pos 
sible,  a  small  force  on  Rocky  Face  Ridge/'  and  General 
Schofield  "to  follow  from  Lee's  along  down  Rocky  Face  to 
the  enemy's  signal  station,  if  possible." 

On  the  same  day,  the  8th,  he  telegraphed  from  Tunnel 
Hill,  in  front  of  Buzzard  Roost,  to  General  Halleck,  at 
Washington : 

"  I  have  been  all  day  reconnoitering  the  mountain  range  through  whose 
gap  the  railroad  and  common  road  pass.  By  to-night  McPherson  will  be  in 
Snake  Creek  Gap  threatening  Resaca,  and  to-morrow  all  will  move  to  the 
attack.  Army  in  good  spirits  and  condition.  I  hope  Johnston  will  fight  here 
instead  of  drawing  me  far  down  into  Georgia." 

On  the  9th  he  telegraphed  General  J.  D.  Webster,  at  Nash 
ville  : 

"  Have  been  fighting  all  day  against  rocks  and  defiles.  General  McPherson 
was  at  2  p.  M.  within  two  miles  of  Resaca,  and  will  there  break  the  road,  and 
leave  Johnston  out  of  rations.  To-morrow  will  tell  the  story." 

And  on  the  9th,  at  8  p.  M.,  from  Tunnel  Hill,  to  General 
Halleck  as  follows : 

"  We  have  been  fighting  all  day  against  precipices  and  mountain  gaps  to 
keep  Johnston's  army  busy,  while  McPherson  could  march  to  Resaca  to 
destroy  the  railroad  behind  him.  I  heard  from  McPherson  up  to  2  P.M., 
when  he  was  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  the  railroad. 

"  After  breaking  the  road  good,  his  orders  are  to  retire  to  the  mouth  of 
Snake  Creek  Gap  and  be  ready  to  work  on  Johnston's  flank  in  case  he  retreats 
south.  I  will  pitch  in  again  early  in  the  morning." 

Which  shows  conclusively  that  Sherman  ordered  McPherson 
back  to  Snake  Gap,  and  that  the  charge  of  timidity  is  gratui 
tous.  It  also  shows  that  on  the  night  of  the  9th,  Sherman 
was  still  expecting  to  attack  by  Rocky  Face  and  Buzzard 
Roost. 

On  the  9th,  General  Thomas,  from  his  headquarters  at 
Tunnel  Hill,  sent  to  General  Sherman  the  following  statement 


104  RESACA. 

of  Captain  Merril,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Department  of  the 
Cumberland,  who  had  just  returned  from  Geary's  camp: 

"He  says  that  Geary  attempted  to  carry  Mill  Gap  by  assault,  but  was 
repulsed  with  a  loss  probably  of  two  hundred  to  three  hundred  killed  and 
wounded;  that  the  enemy  were  still  in  force  (only  infantry),  but  strongly 
posted  ;  that  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  possession  of  the  gap  by  direct  assault, 
or  only  at  the  expense  of  fearful  loss ;  that  Geary's  last  orders  were  to  with 
draw  into  the  valley,  and  encamp  beyond  artillery  range.  Geary  was  not 
making  an  attempt  to  turn  the  position.  The  only  way  to  do  so  is  to  get  a 
force  upon  the  mountain  "somewhere"  where  the  enemy  can  not  defend  it  so 
strongly." 

On  the  10th  he  wrote  from  Tunnel  Hill  to  General  Thomas: 
"  I  think  you  are  satisfied  that  your  troops  can  not  take  Rocky 
Face  Ridge,  and  also  the  attempt  to  put  our  columns  into  the 
jaws  of  Buzzard  Roost  would  be  fatal  to  us." 

And  later  in  the  same  day : 

"  I  propose  to  leave  hereabouts  one  of  your  corps,  say  Howard's,  the  cav 
alry  of  Colonel  McCook,  and  the  cavalry  of  General  Stoneman,  to  keep  up 
the  feint  of  a  direct  attack  on  Dalton,  through  Buzzard  Boost,  as  long  as 
possible ;  and  with  all  the  remainder  of  the  three  armies  to  march  to,  and 
through,  Snake  Creek  Gap,  and  to  attack  the  enemy  in  force  from  that  quar 
ter.  *  *  *  *  we  will  calculate  all  to  go  to  Snake  Creek  and  close 
up  on  General  McPherson  during  the  day  after  to-morrow." 

At  7  A.  M.  of  the  10th  this  telegram  was  sent  to  Halleck: 

"I  am  starting  for  the  extreme  front  in  Buzzard  Boost  Gap,  and  make 
this  dispatch  that  you  may  understand  Johnston  acts  purely  on  the  defen 
sive.  I  am  attacking  him  on  his  strongest  fronts,  viz.:  west  and  north,  till 
McPherson  breaks  his  line  at  Kesaca,  when  I  will  swing  round  through 
Snake  Creek  Gap  and  interpose  between  him  and  Georgia.  I  am  not  driving 
things  too  fast,  because  I  want  two  columns  of  cavalry  that  are  rapidly  com 
ing  up  to  me  from  the  rear — Stoneman  on  my  left  and  Garrard  on  my  right, 
both  due  to-day. 

"  Yesterday  I  pressed  hard  to  prevent  Johnston  detaching  against  McPher 
son,  but  to-day  I  will  be  more  easy,  as  I  believe  McPherson  has  destroyed 
Resaca,  when  he  is  ordered  to  fall  back  to  the  mouth  of  Snake  Creek  Gap, 
and  act  against  Johnston's  flank  when  he  does  start.  All  are  in  good  con 
dition." 

On  the  10th  of  May,  for  the  first  time,  he  notified  General 


RES  AC  A.  105 

McPherson  of  his  intention  to  attack  in  force,  through  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  as  follows  :  "  The  Buzzard  Roost  Gap  is  so  well 
defended,  and  naturally  is  so  strong,  that  I  \vill  undertake  to 
attack  Johnston  through  Snake  Creek  Gap. 
we  may  not  be  able  to  put  our  project  in  operation  by  the 
day  after  to- morrow,  but  we  will  all  get  ready. 

Do  you  think  Johnston  has  yet  discovered  the  nature  of 
your  forces?" 

On  the  10th  he  also  telegraphed  General  Halleck  as  fol 
lows  : 

"  General  McPherson  reached  Resaca,  but  found  the  place  strongly  fortified 
and  guarded,  and  did  not  break  the  road.  According  to  his  instructions,  he 
drew  back  to  the  debouche  of  the  gorge,  where  he  has  a  strong  defensive  posi 
tion,  and  guards  the  only  pass  into  the  valley  of  the  Oostanaula  available  to 
us.  Buzzard  Roost  Gap,  through  which  the  railroad  passes,  is  naturally  and 
artificially  too  strong  to  be  attempted.  I  must  feign  on  Buzzard  Roost,  but 
pass  through  the  Snake  Creek  Gap  and  place  myself  between  Johnston  and 
Resaca,  where  we  will  have  to  fight  it  out.  I  am  making  the  preliminary 
move.  Certain  that  Johnston  can  make  no  detachments,  I  will  be  in  no 
hurry." 

So  it  was  not  until  some  days  after  the  attack  began  that  he 
came  to  the  conclusion,  as  he  tells  Halleck,  that  he  "must 
feign  on  Buzzard  Roost,"  but  attack  through  Snake  Creek 
Gap,  which  statement — as  well  as  several  dispatches  already 
quoted — conflicts  pointedly  with  the  assertion  that,  from  the 
first  he  "  had  no  intention  to  attack  the  position  seriously  in 
front," 

General  Sherman  having  refrained  from  hurrying,  and 
Johnston  having  virtually  escaped  him,  he  telegraphed  to 
General  Halleck  on  the  14th :  "  By  the  flank  movement  on 
Resaca  we  have  forced  Johnston  to  evacuate  Dalton,  and  are 
on  his  flank  and  rear;  but  the  parallelism  of  the  valleys  and 
mountains  does  not  give  us  all  the  advantages  of  an  open 
country;  but  I  will  press  him  all  that  is  possible."  And  on 
the  loth:  "  We  intend  to  fight  Joe  Johnston  until  he  is  satis 
fied,  and  I  hope  he  will  not  attempt  to  escape ;  if  he  does,  my 


106  KESACA. 

bridges  are  down,  and  we  will  be  after  him."  And  on  the 
16th  :  "  We  are  in  possession  of  Resaca. 
Generals  Stoneman's  and  Garrard's  cavalry  are  trying  to  get 
into  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  I  hope  will  succeed.  Our 
difficulties  will  increase  beyond  the  Etowah,  but  if  Johnston 
will  not  fight  us  behind  such  works  as  we  find  here,  I  will 
fight  him  on  any  open  ground  he  may  stand  at." 

It  is  easy  to  see  what  good  ground  there  was  for  the  opinion 
which  prevailed  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  that  the 
failure  of  these  first  movements  of  the  Atlanta  campaign  re 
sulted  from  General  Sherman's  refusal  to  accept  the  advice 
of  General  Thomas,  and  persisting,  instead,  in  pushing  two 
armies  for  three  days  against  "  precipices,"  only  to  be  obliged, 
when  it  was  too  late,  to  try  the  plan  of  Thomas,  and  failing 
solely  because  of  delay. 

The  injustice  of  the  attempt  to  lay  the  responsibility  of  the 
failure  upon  General  McPherson  can  also  be  clearly  seen  in 
the  light  of  these  records. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

KENESAW — UNGENEROUS    TREATMENT    OF   THOMAS — INACCU 
RATE    STATEMENTS. 

THERE  was  no  military  movement  made  by  Sherman,  from 
the  time  he  began  the  Atlanta  campaign  till  the  end  of  the 
war,  which  brought  such  severe  criticism  upon  him  from  the 
armies  which  he  commanded  as  the  assault  upon  Kenesaw 
Mountain.  By  the  almost  universal  verdict  along  the  lines, 
it  was  adjudged  an  utterly  needless  move,  and  so  an  inexcus 
able  slaughter.  Before  the  assault  he  had  Thomas,  with  sixty 
thousand  men,  in  front  of  the  enemy's  center.  That  enemy 
was  not  over  forty-five  thousand  strong,  and  he  had  Schofield 
and  McPherson,  with  over  thirty-five  thousand,  to  operate  on 
the  flank,  and  force  the  evacuation  of  Kenesaw  without  a 
battle,  exactly  as  was  done  a  few  days  after  the  assault.  And 
these  three  armies,  which  had  been  fighting  for  three  years, 
did  not  appreciate  then,  and  have  never  appreciated  Sher 
man's  reasons  for  hurling  two  of  them  against  an  impregnable 
mountain,  which  were  mainly,  as  he  wrote,  to  teach  his  own 
army  that  it  was  sometimes  necessary  to  assault  fortified  lines, 
and  show  the  enemy  that,  on  occasion,  "he  would  assault,  and 
that  boldly." 

And  it  cost  over  two  thousand  veterans  killed  and  wounded 
to  teach  those  who  survived  such  a  lesson  as  this! 

Those  who  read  Sherman's  Memoirs  from  the  stand-point 
of  the  three  armies  then  operating  under  him,  will  naturally 
look  for  his  account  of  Kenesaw,  and  all  material  points  are 
hereby  given  in  full : 

"  During  the  24th  and  25th  of  June,  General  Schofield  extended  his  right 

(107) 


108  KENESAW. 

as  far  as  prudent,  so  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to  thin  out  his  lines  correspond 
ingly,  with  the  intention  to  make  two  strong  assaults  at  points  where  success 
would  give  us  the  greatest  advantage.  I  had  consulted  Generals  Thomas, 
McPherson,  and  Schofield,  and  we  all  agreed  that  we  could  not,  writh  pru 
dence,  stretch  out  any  more ;  and,  therefore,  there  was  no  alternative  but  to 
attack  '  fortified  lines,'  a  thing  carefully  avoided  up  to  that  time.  I  reasoned, 
if  we  could  make  a  breach  any  where  near  the  rebel  center,  and  thrust  in  a 
strong  head  of  column,  that  with  the  one  moiety  of  our  army  we  could  hold 
in  check  the  corresponding  wing  of  the  enemy,  and  with  the  other  sweep  in 
flank  and  overwhelm  the  other  half.  The  27th  of  June  was  fixed  as  the  day 
for  the  attempt,  and  in  order  to  oversee  the  whole,  and  to  be  in  close  com 
munication  with  all  parts  of  the  army,  I  had  a  place  cleared  on  the  top  of  a 
hill  to  the  rear  of  Thomas'  center,  and  had  the  telegraph  wires  laid  to  it. 
The  points  of  attack  were  chosen,  and  the  troops  were  all  prepared  with  as 
little  demonstration  as  possible.  About  9  A.  M.  of  the  day  appointed  the 
troops  moved  to  the  assault,  and  all  along  our  lines  for  ten  miles  a  furious 
fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  was  kept  up.  At  all  points  the  enemy  met  us 
with  determined  courage  and  in  great  force.  McPherson's  attacking  column 
fought  up  the  face  of  the  lesser  Kenesaw,  but  could  not  reach  the  summit. 
About  a  mile  to  the  right,  just  below  the  Dallas  road,  Thomas'  assaulting 
column  reached  the  parapet,  where  Brigadier-General  Harker  was  shot  down 
mortally  wounded,  and  Brigadier-General  Daniel  McCook  (my  old  law  part 
ner)  was  desperately  wounded,  from  the  effects  of  which  he  afterward  died. 

"  By  11:30  the  assault  was,  in  fact,  over,  and  had  failed.  We  had  not 
broken  the  rebel  line  at  either  point,  but  our  assaulting  columns  held  their 
ground  within  a  few  yards  of  the  rebel  trenches,  and  there  covered  themselves 
with  parapet.  McPherson  lost  about  five  hundred  men  and  several  valuable 
officers,  and  Thomas  lost  nearly  two  thousand  men.  *  *  *  * 

"  While  the  battle  was  in  progress  at  the  center,  Schofield  crossed  Olley's 
Creek  on  the  right,  and  gained  a  position  threatening  Johnston's  line  of 
retreat;  and  to  increase  the  effect,  I  ordered  Stoneman's  cavalry  to  proceed 
rapidly  still  further  to  the  right  to  Sweetwater.  Satisfied  of  the  bloody  cost 
of  attacking  intrenched  lines,  I  at  once  thought  of  moving  the  whole  army 
to  the  railroad  at  a  point  (Fulton)  about  ten  miles  below  Marietta,  or  to  the 
Chattahoochee  River  itself,  a  movement  similar  to  the  one  afterward  so  suc 
cessfully  practiced  at  Atlanta.  All  the  orders  were  issued  to  bring  forward 
supplies  enough  to  fill  our  wagons,  intending  to  strip  the  railroad  back  to 
Allatoona,  and  leave  that  place  as  our  depot,  to  be  covered  as  well  as  possi 
ble  by  Garrard's  cavalry.  General  Thomas,  as  usual,  shook  his  head,  deeming 
it  risky  to  leave  the  railroad;  but  something  had  to  be  done,  and  I  had 
resolved  on  this  move,  as  reported  in  my  dispatch  to  General  Halleck  on 
July  1st : 

"  General  Schofield  is  now  south  of  Olley's  Creek,  and  on  the  head  of 
Nickajack.  I  have  been  hurrying  down  provisions  and  forage,  and  to-morrow 
night  propose  to  move  McPherson  from  the  left  to  the  extreme  right,  back  of 


KENESAW.  109 

General  Thomas.  This  will  bring  my  right  within  three  miles  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee  Kiver,  and  about  five  miles  from  the  railroad.  By  this  movement 
I  think  I  can  force  Johnston  to  move  his  whole  army  down  from  Kenesaw  to 
defend  his  railroad  and  the  Chattahoochee,  when  I  will  (by  the  left  flank) 
reach  the  railroad  below  Marietta;  but  in  this  I  must  cut  loose  from  the 
railroad  with  ten  days'  supplies  in  wagons.  Johnston  may  come  out  of  his 
intrenchments  to  attack  Thomas,  which  is  exactly  what  I  want,  for  General 
Thomas  is  well  intrenched  on  a  line  parallel  with  the  enemy  south  of  Kene 
saw.  I  think  that  Allatoona  and  the  line  of  the  Etowah  are  strong  enough 
for  me  to  venture  on  this  move.  The  movement  is  substantially  down  the 
Sandtown  road  straight  for  Atlanta. 

"  McPherson  drew  out  his  lines  during  the  night  of  July  2d,  leaving  Gar- 
rard's  cavalry,  dismounted,  occupying  his  trenches,  and  moved  to  the  rear  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  stretching  down  the  Nickajack;  but  Johnston 
detected  the  movement,  and  promptly  abandoned  Marietta  and  Kenesaw.  I 
expected  as  much,  for  by  the  earliest  dawn  of  the  3d  of  July  I  was  up  at  a 
large  spy-glass,  mounted  on  a  tripod,  which  Colonel  Poe,  United  States 
Engineers,  had  at  his  bivouac  close  by  our  camp.  I  directed  the  glass  on 
Kenesaw,  and  saw  some  of  our  pickets  crawling  up  the  hill  cautiously.  Soon 
they  stood  upon  the  very  top,  and  I  could  plainly  see  their  movements  as 
they  ran  along  the  crest  just  abandoned  by  the  enemy.  In  a  minute  I  roused 
my  staff,  and  started  them  off  with  orders  in  every  direction  for  a  pursuit  by 
every  possible  road,  hoping  to  catch  Johnston  in  the  confusion  of  retreat, 
especially  at  the  crossing  of  the  Chattahoochee  Eiver.  *  *  *  * 

"As  before  explained,  on  the  3d  of  July,  by  moving  McPherson's  entire 
army  from  the  extreme  left,  at  the  base  of  Kenesaw,  to  the  right,  below 
Olley's  Creek,  and  stretching  it  down  the  Nickajack  toward  Turner's  Ferry 
of  the  Chattahoochee,  we  forced  Johnston  to  choose  between  a  direct  assault 
on  Thomas'  intrenched  position,  or  to  permit  us  to  make  a  lodgment  on  his 
railroad  below  Marrietta,  or  even  to  cross  the  Chattahoochee.  Of  course,  he 
chose  to  let  go  Kenesaw  and  Marietta,  and  fall  back  on  an  intrenched  camp, 
prepared  by  his  orders  in  advance,  on  the  north  and  west  bank  of  the  Chatta 
hoochee,  covering  the  railroad  crossing  and  his  several  pontoon  bridges." 

The  points  of  this  narrative  are  very  clearly  made,  but 
most  contradictory  of  each  other,  as  even  a  causual  reading 
will  reveal,  and  wholly  at  variance  in  important  particulars 
with  the  official  record,  as  will  shortly  be  made  to  appear. 
They  may  be  fairly  summed  up  as  follows : 

1.  During  the  25th  of  June,  the  assault  being  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  27th,  General  Schofield  had  extended  his  right  as 
far  as  prudent. 

2.  After   a   consultation    with    Thomas,    McPherson,    and 
Schofield,  it  was  agreed,  because  the  line  was  then  extended 


110  KENESAW. 

as  far  as  prudent,  that  there  was  no  alternative  but  to  assault 
the  mountain. 

3.  Notwithstanding  it  was  so  imprudent  to  stretch  out  any 
more,  that  an  assault  was  necessary  instead,  still   Schofield, 
while  the  assault  was  in  progress,  moved  off  to  the   right, 
across  Olley's  Creek,  while  the  cavalry  extended  his  line  still 
further,  to  the  Sweetwater. 

4.  Satisfied  of  the  bloody  cost  of  assaulting  the  position  at 
Kenesaw,  General  Sherman  concluded  to  flank  it  by  extending 
his  lines  to  the  right  as  far  as  Fulton,  and  possibly  to  the 
Chattahoochee  River,  still  further  beyond. 

5.  "  General  Thomas,  as  usual,  shook  his  head,  deeming  it 
risky  to  leave  the  railroad/7  but  something  had  to  be  done, 
and  so  he  (Sherman)  decided  to  extend  his  lines  as  above. 

6.  The    moment   Johnston   detected    this    movement,    he 
promptly,  and    as  a  matter  of   course,  let  go  Kenesaw  and 
Marietta  without  a  fight. 

In  answer  to  the  contradictions  implied  by  the  third  point 
above,  it  may  be  claimed  that  it  was  the  assault  which  fixed 
Johnston's  attention,  and  required  help  from  his  flanks,  that 
made  it  possible  for  Schofield  to  extend  his  lines.  But  the 
official  records  show  that  Schofield  was  actually  prolonging 
his  lines  the  whole  day  preceding  the  battle — that  is,  during 
the  26th — in  spite  of  the  statements  in  the  text  that,  "  during 
the  24th  and  25th,  he  had  extended  his  right  as  far  as  pru 
dent."  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  be  claimed  that  Schofield's 
movement  on  the  26th  was  to  compel  the  enemy  to  withdraw 
part  of  his  force  from  Kenesaw  to  strengthen  the  flank  in 
front  of  Schofield,  and  thus  make  the  assault  practicable,  it 
would  appear  that  a  stronger  flanking  movement  might  have 
caused  the  enemy  to  withdraw  entirely,  without  the  necessity 
of  an  assault,  exactly  as  did  occur  a  few  days  after. 

The  records  have  much  to  say  about  Kenesaw  that  is  not 
even  referred  to  in  the  Memoirs. 

The  following  field  dispatches  from  General  Sherman  to  Gen 
eral  Schofield,  who  was  operating  on  the  right,  will  be  suffi- 


KENESAVV.  Ill 

cient  to  show  that  the  latter  was  extending  his  lines  during 
the  26th  and  also  during  the  27th,  the  day  of  the  assault : 

Sherman  to  Schofield,  June  26 :  "  Is  the  brigade  across 
Olley's  Creek  above  the  Sandtown  road,  or  at  the  road?" 

Sherman  to  Schofield,  June  26  :  "  All  right.  Be  careful  of 
a  brigade  so  exposed,  but  I  am  willing  to  risk  a  good  deal." 

Sherman  to  Schofield,  June  26  :  "  Good  bridge  should  be 
made  to-night  across  Olley's  Creek,  where  the  brigade  is 
across,  and  operations  resumed  there  in  the  morning  early." 

Sherman  to  Schofield,  June  27,  11:45  A.  M.:  "Neither 
McPherson  nor  Thomas  has  succeeded  in  breaking  through, 
but  each  has  made  substantial  progress  at  some  cost.  Push 
your  operations  on  the  flank  and  keep  me  advised." 

The  following  parts  of  dispatches  to  General  Thomas  bear 
upon  the  same  point: 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  1:30  p.  M.:  "  Schofield  has 
one  division  close  up  on  the  Powder  Spring  road,  and  the 
other  (division)  across  Olley's  Creek,  about  two  miles  to  his 
right  and  rear." 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,4:10  P.M.:  "Schofield  has 
gained  the  crossing  of  Olley's  Creek  on  the  Sandtown  road, 
the  only  advantage  of  the  day." 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  evening :  "  Schofield  has  the 
Sandtown  road,  within  eleven  miles  of  the  Chattahoochee,  and 
we  could  move  by  that  flank." 

As  will  be  seen  from  the  extracts  quoted  from  the  Memoirs, 
General  Sherman  claims  that  the  assault  was  the  result  of  a 
consultation  and  agreement  between  himself  and  Generals 
Thomas,  McPherson,  and  Schofield.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
latter  did  not  favor  an  assault  but  earnestly  discouraged  it. 
Two  of  these  officers  are  now  dead,  but  the  field  orders  of 
General  Thomas  are  accessible,  and  the  whole  tenor  of  these 
disputes  General  Sherman's  claim,  as  will  now  appear. 

From  his  telegraph   station,  on  a  hill   in   rear  of  Thomas' 


112  KENESAW. 

center,  General  Sherman  communicated  with  him  throughout 
the  day.  Of  these  dispatches  the  following  bear  upon  the 
question  at  issue : 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  8  A.M.,  June  27:  "The  movement  of 
my  troops  against  the  enemy's  work  has  commenced." 

Which  was  answered  as  follows: 

"  Every  thing  moving  well  on  this  flank,  and  Schofield 
reports  the  same.  Push  your  troops  with  all  the  energy  pos 
sible.  W.  T.  S." 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  in  the  field,  9  A.  M.,  June  27 :  "  Gen 
eral  Howard  reports  that  he  has  advanced  and  is  doing  well. 
I  have  not  yet  received  report  from  Palmer." 

Answered  as  follows: 

"All  well.     Keep  things  moving. 

"9:50  A.M.  W.  T.  S." 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  10:45  A.M.,  June  27:  "Yours  received.  General 
Barker's  brigade  advanced  to  within  twenty  paces  of  the  enemy's  breast 
works,  and  was  repulsed  with  canister  at  that  range,  General  Harker  losing 
an  arm.  General  Wagner's  brigade  of  Newton's  division,  supporting  Gen 
eral  Harker,  was  so  severely  handled  that  it  is  compelled  to  reorganize. 
Colonel  Mitchell's  brigade  of  Davis'  division  captured  one  line  of  rebel 
breastworks,  which  they  still  hold.  McCook's  brigade  was  also  very  severely 
handled,  nearly  every  colonel  being  killed  or  wounded.  Colonel  McCook 
wounded.  It  is  compelled  to  fall  back  and  reorganize.  The  troops  are  all 
too  much  exhausted  to  advance,  but  we  hold  all  we  have  gained." 

General  Sherman  upon  receiving  this  urged  another  attempt 
to  break  the  line,  as  follows : 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  11:45  A.  M.:  "McPherson's  column  marched 
to  the  top  of  the  hill  through  very  tangled  brush,  but  was  repulsed ;  it  is 
found  almost  impossible  to  deploy,  but  they  still  hold  the  ground.  I  wish 
you  to  study  well  the  positions,  and  if  it  be  possible  to  break  the  line  do  it; 
it  is  easier  now  than  it  will  be  hereafter.  I  hear  Leggett's  guns  well  behind 
the  mountain." 


KENESAW.  113 

A  little  later  Sherman  again  urged  Thomas  to  make  a  sec 
ond  assault,  as  the  following  dispatch  shows : 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  1:30  p.  M.:  "McPherson  and  Schofield  are  at 
a  dead-lock?  Do  you  think  you  can  carry  any  of  the  enemy's  main  line 
to-day  ?  McPherson's  men  are  up  to  the  abattis,  and  can't  move  without 
the  direct  assault.  I  will  order  the  assault  if  you  think  you  can  succeed  at 
any  point.  Schofield  has  one  division  close  up  on  the  Powder  Spring  road, 
and  the  other  across  Olley's  Creek,  two  miles  to  his  right  and  rear." 

To  both  of  these  dispatches  General  Thomas  sent  the  fol 
lowing  reply,  expressing  himself  decidedly  against  a  second 
assault : 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  1:40  P.  M.,  27th  June:  "Your  dispatches  11:45  A.  M. 
and  1:30  P.  M.  received.  Davis'  two  brigades  are  now  within  sixty  yards  of 
the  enemy's  intrenchments.  Davis  reports  that  he  does  not  think  he  can 
carry  the  works  by  assault  on  account  of  the  steepness  of  the  hill,  but  he  can 
hold  his  position,  put  in  one  or  two  batteries  to-night,  and  probably  drive 
them  out  to-morrow  morning.  General  Howard  reports  the  same.  Their 
works  are  from  six  to  seven  feet  high  and  nine  feet  thick.  In  front  of  How 
ard  they  have  a  very  strong  abattis.  Davis'  loss  in  officers  has  been  very 
heavy.  Nearly  all  the  field  officers  of  McCook's  brigade,  with  McCook  have 
been  killed  or  wounded.  From  what  the  officers  tell  me  I  do  not  think  we 
can  carry  the  works  by  assault  at  this  point  to-day,  but  they  can  be 
approached  by  saps  and  the  enemy  driven  out. 

''Very  respectfully,  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General." 

General  Sherman  replied  as  follows,  still  suggesting  another 
assault  by  intimating  that  the  difficulties  were  not  sufficient  to 
warrant  the  use  of  time  enough  for  regular  approaches : 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  2:25  p.  M.;  ''Secure  what  advantageous 
ground  you  have  gained;  but  is  there  any  thing  in  the  enemy's  present  position 
that  if  we  should  approach  by  regular  saps,  he  could  not  make  a  dozen  new 
parapets  before  our  saps  were  completed?  Does  the  nature  of  the  ground 
warrant  the  time  necessary  for  regular  approaches?" 

To  this  Thomas  returned  the  following  very  decided  answer: 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  June  27:  "Your  dispatch  of  2:25  received.     We  still 

hold  all  the  ground  we  have  gained,  and  the  division  commanders  report 

their   ability  to   hold.     They  also   report   the   enemy's  works   exceedingly 

strong ;  in  fact,  so  strong  that  they  can  not  be  carried  by  assault,  except  by 

8 


114  KENESAW. 

immense  sacrifice,  even  if  they  can  be  carried  at  all.  I  think,  therefore,  the 
best  chance  is  to  approach  them  by  regular  saps,  and  if  we  can  find  a  favorable 
approach  to  batter  them  down.  We  have  already  lost  heavily  to-day  without 
gaining  any  material  advantage.  One  or  two  more  such  assaults  would  use 
up  this  army.  G.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General." 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  4:10  P.  M.:  "Schofield  has  gained  the  cross 
ing  of  Olley's  Creek,  on  the  Sandtown  road,  the  only  advantage  of  the  day. 
You  may  order  all  ground  of  value  gained  to-day  to  be  secured,  and  prepare 
batteries  in  the  manner  proposed  by  Davis.  I  doubt  if  we  can  resort  to 
regular  approaches." 

Thomas  to  Sherman,  June  27,  6  P.  M  :  "The  assault  of  the  enemy's  works 
in  my  front  was  well  arranged,  and  the  officers  and  men  went  to  their  work 
with  the  greatest  coolness  and  gallantry.  The  failure  to  carry  them  is  due 
only  to  the  strength  of  the  works,  and  to  the  fact  that  they  were  well  manned, 
thereby  enabling  the  enemy  to  hold  them  securely  against  the  assault.  We 
have  lost  nearly  two  thousand  officers  and  men,  among  them  two  brigade 
commanders,  General  Harker,  commanding  a  brigade  in  Newton's  division, 
and  Colonel  Dan.  McCook,  commanding  a  brigade  in  Jeff.  Davis'  division, 
both  reported  to  be  mortally  wounded,  besides  some  six  or  eight  field  officers 
killed.  Both  General  Harker  and  Colonel  McCook  were  wounded  on  the 
enemy's  breastworks,  and  all  say  that  had  they  not  been  wounded  we  would 
have  driven  the  enemy  from  his  works.  Both  Generals  Howard  and  Palmer 
think  that  they  can  find  favorable  positions  on  their  lines  for  placing  batteries 
for  enfilading  the  enemy's  works.  We  took  between  ninety  and  one  hundred 
prisoners." 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  evening:  "Let  your  troops  fortify  as  close 
up  to  the  enemy  as  possible.  Get  good  positions  for  artillery,  and  group 
your  command  as  conveniently  as  you  can  by  corps  and  divisions,  keeping 
reserves.  Schofield  has  the  Sandtown  road  within  eleven  miles  of  the  Chat- 
tahoochee,  and  we  could  move  by  that  flank.  The  question  of  supplies  will 
be  the  only  one.  I  regret  beyond  measure  the  loss  of  two  such  young  and 
dashing  officers,  as  Harker  and  Dan.  McCook.  McPherson  lost  two  or  three 
of  his  young  and  dashing  officers,  which  is  apt  to  be  the  case  in  unsuccessful 
assaults.  Had  we  broken  the  line  to-day  it  would  have  been  most  decisive; 
but,  as  it  is,  our  loss  is  small  compared  with  some  of  those  East.  It  should 
not  in  the  least  discourage  us.  At  times  assaults  are  necessary  and  inevitable. 
At  Arkansas  Post  we  succeeded ;  at  Vicksburg  we  failed.  I  do  not  think  our 
loss  to-day  greater  than  Johnston's  when  he  attacked  Hooker  and  Schofield 
the  first  day  we  occupied  our  present  ground." 

The  excuses  made  to  General  Thomas  for  the  assault  in  the 
last  part  of  the  above  dispatch  are  significant. 

The  same  evening  he  telegraphed  Halleck,  intimating  as  a 


KENESAW.  115 

reason   for  the  assault  that  the   position  could   not  well  be 
turned  without  abandoning  the  railroad  : 

"  I  can  not  well  turn  the  position  of  the  enemy  without  abandoning  my 
railroad,  and  we  are  already  so  far  from  our  supplies  that  it  is  as  much  as 
the  road  can  do  to  feed  and  supply  the  army.  There  are  no  supplies  of  any 
kind  here.  I  can  press  Johnston  and  keep  him  from  reenforcing  Lee,  but  to 
assault  him  in  position  will  cost  us  more  lives  than  we  can  spare." 

And  yet  at  9  o'clock  the  same  evening  he  telegraphed  Gen 
eral  Thomas : 

"Are  you  willing  to  risk  the  move  on  Fulton,  cutting  loose  from  our 
railroad?  It  would  bring  matters  to  a  crisis,  and  Schofield  has  secured 
the  way." 

But  his  excuses  to  Generals  Halleck  and  Grant  a  few  days 
later  cap  the  climax  of  all  which  the  records  contain  in  regard 
to  Kenesaw.  Witness  the  following  : 

Sherman  to  Halleck,  July  9  :  "  The  assault  I  made  was  no  mistake.  I  had 
to  do  it.  The  enemy,  and  our  own  army  and  officers,  had  settled  down  into 
the  conviction  that  the  assault  of  lines  formed  no  part  of  my  game,  and  the 
moment  the  enemy  was  found  behind  any  thing  like  a  parapet,  why,  every 
body  would  deploy,  throw  up  counter-works  and  take  it  easy,  leaving  it  to 
the  'Old  Man'  to  turn  the  position.  Had  the  assault  been  made  with  one- 
fourth  more  vigor,  mathematically,  I  would  have  put  the  head  of  George 
Thomas'  whole  army  right  through  Johnston's  deployed  line,  on  the  best 
ground  for  'go-ahead,'  while  my  whole  forces  were  well  in  hand  on  roads 
converging  to  my  then  object,  Marietta." 

And  the  following: 

Sherman  to  Grant,  July  12:  "I  regarded  an  assault  on  the  27th  June 
necessary,  for  two  good  reasons :  first,  because  the  enemy,  as  well  as  my  own 
army,  had  settled  down  into  the  belief  that  'flanking'  alone  was  my  game; 
and  second,  that  on  that  day  and  ground,  had  the  assault  succeeded,  I  could 
have  broken  Johnston's  center  and  pushed  his  army  back  in  confusion  and 
with  great  loss  to  his  bridges  over  the  Chattahoochee.  We  lost  nothing  in 
morale  in  the  assault,  for  I  followed  it  up  on  the  extreme  right,  and  compelled 
him  to  quit  the  very  strong  lines  of  Kenesaw,  Smyrna  camp  ground,  and  the 
Chattahoochee  in  quick  succession." 

But  Sherman  states  that  the  enemy  lost  only  eight  hundred 


116  KENESAW. 

and  eight  in  killed  and  wounded  during  the  attack.  So  it 
could  not  have  been  the  assault  that  finally  induced  him  to 
leave,  but  the  "  flanking.'7  And  this  was  just  as  practicable 
before  the  assault  as  after  it,  and  was  subsequently  made  with 
out  the  cost  of  a  battle. 

The  above  dispatches  and  extracts  suggest  all  needed 
comment. 

In  the  extract  from  the  Memoirs  quoted  above,  there  is  a 
slur  upon  General  Thomas,  which  deserves  notice. 

Says  General  Sherman : 

"Satisfied  of  the  bloody  cost  of  attacking  intrenched  lines,!  at  once  thought 
of  moving  the  whole  army  to  a  point  (Fulton)  about  ten  miles  below  Mari 
etta.  *  *  *  *  General  Thomas,  as  usual,  shook  his  head,  deeming 
it  risky  to  leave  the  railroad  " 

For  this  insinuation  there  is  no  excuse.  The  following  is 
the  telegram  from  Sherman  to  Thomas,  proposing  this  very 
move  to  the  latter : 

HEADQUARTERS,  June  27,  9  P.  M. 

General  THOMAS: 

Are  you  willing  to  risk  the  move  on  Fulton,  cutting  loose  from  our  rail 
road?  It  would  bring  matters  to  a  crisis,  and  Schofield  has  secured  the  way. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  commanding. 

In  the  first  place,  as  General  Sherman  communicated  with 
General  Thomas  upon  this  subject  by  telegraph  and  in  cipher, 
it  is  evident  that  Thomas  could  not  have  shaken  his  head 
through  that  medium;  and  second,  while  a  figurative  shaking 
might  have  been  communicated  in  very  plain  terms,  the  dis 
patches  show  not  only  that  this  indication  of  dissent  was 
wholly  wanting,  but  that  on  the  contrary,  Thomas  approved 
the  plan  in  the  following  exceedingly  suggestive  and  emphatic 
manner : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  June  27. 
General  SHERMAN: 

What  force  do  you  think  of  moving  with?  If  with  the  greater  part  of 
the  army  I  think  it  decidedly  better  than  butting  against  breastworks  twelve 
feet  thick  and  strongly  abattised. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  U.  S.  V. 


KENESAW.  117 

Immediately  after  the  above,  Thomas  telegraphed  the  fol 
lowing  inquiry,  having  in  view,  evidently,  the  possibility  that 
his  pontoons  might  be  needed : 

General  SHERMAN.  June  27. 

How  far  is  Fulton  from  the  crossing  of  Olley's  Creek?  Will  we  have  to 
cross  any  other  streams  of  much  size  ?  When  do  you  wish  to  start  ? 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General. 

And  yet  with  these  telegrams  in  the  record,  showing  prompt 
approval  of  his  move,  and  a  disposition  to  cooperate  in  it 
immediately,  General  Sherman  ventures  the  above  fling  at 
General  Thomas. 

These  last  dispatches  were  answered  as  follows,  Sherman 
to  Thomas,  June  27th,  9:30  P.M.:  " According  to  Merrill's 
map  it  is  about  ten  miles.  Nickajack  the  only  stream  to  cross. 
Time  for  starting  day  after  to-morrow." 

Sherman  to  Thomas,  June  27,  9:45  P.  M. :  u  If  we  move  on 
Fulton,  we  must  move  with  the  whole  army,  leaving  our 
railroad  on  the  chance  of  success.  Go  where  we  may,  we  will 
find  the  breastworks  and  abattis,  unless  we  move  more  rapidly 
than  we  have  heretofore." 

The  dispatches  thus  far  quoted,  have  been  at  all  times 
accessible  to  General  Sherman,  and  they  are  quite  sufficient  to 
show  that  the  correct  history  of  the  battle  at  Kenesaw  is  not 
set  forth  in  his  Memoirs. 

Of  the  immediate  effect  of  the  flanking  movement  on 
Kenesaw,  begun  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July  following 
the  assault,  General  Sherman  says : 

"As  before  explained,  on  the  3d  of  July,  by  moving  McPherson's  entire 
army  from  the  extreme  left,  at  the  base  of  Kenesaw  to  the  right,  below 
Olley's  Creek,  and  stretching  it  down  the  Nickajack  toward  Turner's  Ferry  of 
the  Chattahoochee,  we  forced  Johnston  to  choose  between  a  direct  assault  on 
Thomas'  intrenched  position,  or  to  permit  us  to  make  a  lodgment  on  his 
railroad  below  Marietta,  or  even  to  cross  the  Chattahoochee.  Of  course  he 
chose  to  let  go  Kenesaw  and  Marietta,  and  fall  back  on  an  intrenched  camp 
prepared  by  his  orders  in  advance  on  the  north  and  west  bank  of  the  Chatta 
hoochee,  covering  the  railroad  crossing  and  his  several  pontoon  bridges. 
I  confess  I  had  not  learned  beforehand  of  the  existence  of  this  strong  place, 


118  KENESAW. 

in  the  nature  of  a  tete-du-pont,  and  had  counted  on  striking  him  an  effectual 
blow  in  the  expected  confusion  of  his  crossing  the  Chattahoochee,  a  broad 
and  deep  river  then  to  his  rear.  Ordering  every  part  of  the  army  to  pursue 
vigorously  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  July,  I  rode  into  Marietta,  just 
quitted  by  the  rebel  rear  guard,  and  was  terribly  angry  at  the  cautious  pursuit 
by  Garrard's  cavalry,  and  even  by  the  head  of  our  infantry  columns.  But 
Johnston  had  in  advance  cleared  and  multiplied  his  roads;  whereas  ours 
had  to  cross  at  right  angles  from  the  direction  of  Powder  Springs  toward 
Marietta,  producing  delay  and  confusion.  By  night  Thomas'  head  of  column 
ran  up  against  a  strong  rear  guard  intrenched  at  Smyrna  camp  ground,  six 
miles  below  Marietta,  and  there,  on  the  next  day,  we  celebrated  our  Fourth 
of  July,  by  a  noisy  but  not  a  desperate  battle,  designed  chiefly  to  hold  the 
enemy  there  till  Generals  McPherson  and  Schofield  could  get  well  into 
position  below  him,  near  the  Chattahoochee  crossings.  It  was  here  that 
General  Noyes,  late  Governor  of  Ohio,  lost  his  leg.  *  *  *  *  During 
the  night  Johnston  drew  back  all  his  army  and  trains  inside  the  tcte  du-pont 
at  the  Chattahoochee,  which  proved  one  of  the  strongest  pieces  of  field 
fortification  I  ever  saAV." 

This  "noisy  but  not  desperate  battle*1  of  July  4th  was 
nothing  less  than  an  attack  upon  the  strong  works  at  Smyrna 
camp  ground  by  the  Sixteenth  Corps  under  General  Dodge, 
who  pressed  close  up,  and  then  sent  a  storming  party  of  two 
brigades  over  them.  It  was  one  of  the  most  gallant  and  suc 
cessful  fights  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  and  one  of  the  very 
few  instances  where  heavy  intrenchments  were  carried  by 
direct  assault.  General  Sherman  ordered  General  McPherson 
to  attack  these  lines,  and  he  in  turn,  forwarded  the  order  to 
General  Dodge,  directing  the  latter  to  move  against  the  works 
if  he  thought  he  could  carry  them.  They  were  stormed, 
General  Noyes  of  Ohio,  having  prominent  command  in  the 
charging  column,  and  carried.  As  a  consequence,  the  rebels 
let  go  the  strong  line  of  Smyrna  camp  ground  and  retreated. 


CHAPTER    X. 

THE    BATTLE   OF   ATLANTA    AND    ITS   POLITICAL   GENERALS. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  recollections  fail  to  supply  the  inter 
esting  and  significant  inside  history  of  the  battle  of  Atlanta, 
by  which  name  the  action  of  July  22d  was  usually  known  in 
his  army. 

Speaking  of  two  of  the  prominent  actors  in  that  battle,  he 
says: 

"I  regarded  both  Generals  Logan  and  Blair  as  'volunteers,'  that  looked  to 
personal  fame  and  glory  as  auxiliary  and  secondary  to  their  political  ambition, 
and  not  as  professional  soldiers." 

And  again : 

"Both  were  men  of  great  courage  and  talent,  but  were  politicians  by  nature 
and  experience,  and  it  may  be  that  for  this  reason  they  were  mistrusted  by 
regular  officers  like  Generals  Schofield,  Thomas,  and  myself." 

The  first  of  these  paragraphs  suggests  the  reflection  whether 
it  is  any  more  reprehensible  for  volunteer  generals  to  be 
actuated  by  "  political  ambition/'  than  for  professional  soldiers 
to  look  upon  "  personal  fame  and  glory  "  as  their  chief  incen 
tive — for  such  is  the  position  in  which  General  Sherman  leaves 
his  friends.  The  public  will  not  judge  them  so  harshly. 
The.se  two  brief  extracts  form  a  portion  of  General  Sherman's 
comments  upon  the  battle  of  Atlanta. 

At  the  very  opening  of  this  action,  McPherson  then  com 
manding  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  killed,  and  the 
desperate  battle  was  fought  through  from  noon  till  after  night 
by  his  troops,  commanded  by  these  same  political  Generals 

(119) 


120  ATLANTA. 

and  volunteers,  Logan  and  Blair,  assisted  by  that  other  well 
known  politcian  and  volunteer,  General  Dodge,  then  command 
ing  the  Sixteenth  Corps. 

It  was  preeminently  a  battle  fought  and  won  by  the  class 
of  officers  and  men  thus  pointed  out  by  General  Sherman. 
These  saved  one  of  his  armies  that  day  from  the  results  of 
a  surprise  as  great  as  fell  upon  him  at  Shi] oh.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  would  be  natural  to  expect  that  high  soldierly 
sentiment,  if  possessed  by  him,  would  not  only  have  prompted 
a  full  acknowledgment  of  such  services,  unaccompanied  by 
any  questioning  of  motives,  but  would  also  have  led  him  to 
assume  the  responsibility  for  a  surprise  which  belonged  solely 
to  himself.  But  the  reader  of  these  Memoirs  will  look  in  vain 
for  the  key  with  which  to  unlock  the  mysteries  of  the  situation 
on  that  day.  The  official  record,  however,  supplies  it. 

Ten  pages  of  the  Memoirs  are  devoted  to  this  action. 

The  situation  was  as  follows :  On  the  night  of  the  21st 
of  July  Sherman's  army  had  fought  its  way  close  up  to  the 
outer  lines  of  the  rebels,  established  at  an  average  of  a  little 
over  three  miles  from  Atlanta,  and  north  and  east  of  the  city. 
Thomas  was  on  the  right,  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland ; 
Schofield,  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  occupied  the  center, 
and  McPherson's  Army  of  the  Tennessee  held  the  left. 

It  had  been  ascertained  three  days  before — that  is,  on  the 
18th — that  Hood  had  relieved  Johnston,  and  what  was  ex 
pected  of  the  former  is  shown  by  the  following  statement  in 
the  Memoirs : 

"I  immediately  inquired  of  General  Schofield,  who  was  his  classmate  at 
West  Point,  about  Hood — as  to  his  general  character,  etc.,  and  learned  that 
he  was  bold,  even  to  rashness,  and  courageous  in  the  extreme.  I  inferred 
that  the  change  of  commanders  meant  'fight.'  Notice  of  this  important 
change  was  at  once  sent  to  all  parts  of  the  army,  and  every  division  com 
mander  was  cautioned  to  be  always  prepared  for  battle  in  any  shape." 

It  would  have  been  fortunate,  as  the  sequel  will  show,  if 
General  Sherman  had  heeded  his  own  cautions. 

On  the  20th,  Hood  made  a  "furious  sally"  on  the  right. 


ATLANTA.  121 

The  Union  loss  was  about  two  thousand,  and  General  Sher 
man  thus  states  the  result : 

"We  had,  however,  met  successfully  a  bold  sally,  had  re 
pelled  it  handsomely,  and  were  also  put  on  our  guard ;  and 
the  event  illustrated  the  future  tactics  of  our  enemy."  After 
this  the  reader  would  not  expect  to  read  of  a  great  surprise. 
Nor  will  the  traces  of  it  be  found  very  clearly  marked  in  the 
book,  as  will  now  appear: 

"During  the  night"  (of  the  21st)  "I  had  lull  reports  from  all  parts  of  our 
line,  most  of  which  was  partially  intrenched  as  against  a  sally,  and  finding  that 
McPherson  was  stretching  out  too  much  on  his  left  flank,  I  wrote  him  a  note 
early  in  the  morning"  (of  the  22d)  "not  to  extend  so  much  by  his  left;  for  we 
had  not  troops  enough  to  completely  invest  the  place,  and  I  intended  to 
destroy  utterly  all  parts  of  the  Augusta  Railroad  to  the  east  of  Atlanta,  then 
to  withdraw  from  the  left  flank  and  add  to  the  right.  In  that  letter  I  ordered 
McPherson  not  to  extend  any  further  to  the  left,  but  to  employ  General 
Dodge's  corps  (Sixteenth),  then  forced  out  of  position,  to  destroy  every  rail 
and  tie  of  the  railroad  from  Decatur  up  to  his  skirmish  line,  and  I  wanted 
him  (McPherson)  to  be  ready,  as  soon  as  General  Garrard  returned  from 
Covington  (whither  I  had  sent  him)  to  move  to  the  extreme  right  of  Thomas, 
so  as  to  reach,  if  possible,  the  railroad  below  Atlanta,  viz.:  the  Macon  road. 

"  In  the  morning  we  found  the  strong  line  of  parapet,  '  Peach-tree  line,'  to 
the  front  of  Schofield  and  Thomas,  abandoned,  and  our  lines  were  advanced 
rapidly  close  up  to  Atlanta.  For  some  moments  I  supposed  the  enemy 
intended  to  evacuate,  and  in  person  was  on  horseback  at  the  head  of  Scho- 
field's  troops.  *  *  *  *  Schofield  was  dressing  forward  his  lines, 
and  I  could  hear  Thomas  further  to  the  right  engaged,  when  General 
McPherson  and  his  staff  rode  up.  We  went  back  to  the  Howard  House,  a 
double  frame  building,  with  a  porch,  and  sat  on  the  step  discussing  the 
chances  of  battle  and  of  Hood's  general  character.  McPherson  had  also 
been  of  the  same  class  at  West  Point  with  Hood,  Schofield,  and  Sheridan. 
We  agreed  that  we  ought  to  be  unusually  cautious,  and  prepared  at  all  times 
for  sallies  and  for  hard  fighting,  because  Hood,  though  not  deemed  much  of 
a  scholar,  or  of  great  mental  capacity,  was  undoubtedly  a  brave,  determined, 
and  rash  man;  and  the  change  of  commanders  at  that  particular  crisis  argued 
the  displeasure  of  the  Confederate  Government  with  the  cautious  but  prudent 
conduct  of  General  Joe.  Johnston.  McPherson  was  in  excellent  spirits, 
well  pleased  at  the  progress  of  events  so  far,  and  had  come  over  purposely  to  see 
me  about  the  order  I  had  given  him  to  use  Dodge's  corps  to  break  up  the  rail 
road,  *  *  *  *  saying  that  before  receiving  my  order  he  had  diverted 
Dodge's  two  divisions  (then  in  motion)  from  the  main  road,  along  a  diagonal 


122  ATLANTA. 

one  that  led  to  his  extreme  left  flank,  then  held  by  Giles  A.  Smith's  division 
(Seventeenth  Corps),  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  that  flank.  *  *  *  * 
Of  course  I  assented  at  once.  *  *  *  *  While  we  sat  there  we  could 
hear  lively  skirmishing  going  on  near  us  (down  about  the  distillery),  and 
occasionally  round  shot  from  twelve  or  twenty -four  pound  guns  came  through 
the  trees  in  reply  to  those  of  Schofield,  and  we  could  hear  similar  sounds  all 
along  down  the  lines  of  Thomas  to  our  right,  and  his  own  to  the  left,  but 
presently  the  firing  appeared  a  little  more  brisk  (especially  over  about  Giles 
A.  Smith's  division),  and  then  we  heard  an  occasional  gun  back  toward 
Decatur.  I  asked  him  what  it  meant.  We  took  my  pocket  compass  (which 
I  always  carried),  and  by  noting  the  direction  of  the  sound,  we  became  satisfied 
that  the  firing  was  too  far  to  our  left  rear  to  be  explained  by  known  facts, 
and  he  hastily  called  for  his  horse,  his  staff,  and  his  orderlies,  *  *  *  * 
jumped  on  his  horse,  saying  he  would  hurry  down  his  line  and  send  me  back 
word  what  these  sounds  meant.  *  *  *  *  (Soon  after) — one  of 
McPherson's  staff,  with  his  horse  covered  with  sweat,  dashed  up  to  the  porch, 
and  reported  that  General  McPherson  was  either  'killed  or  a  prisoner.'  He 
explained  that  when  they  had  left  me,  a  few  minutes  before,  they  had  ridden 
rapidly  across  to  the  railroad,  the  sounds  of  battle  increasing  as  they  neared  the 
position  occupied  by  General  Giles  A.  Smith's  division,  and  that  McPherson 
had  sent  first  one,  then  another  of  his  staff  to  bring  some  of  the  reserve 
brigades  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  over  to  the  exposed  left  flank;  that  he  had 
reached  the  head  of  Dodge's  corps  (marching  by  the  flank  on  the  diagonal 
road  as  described),  and  had  ordered  it  to  hurry  forward  to  the  same  point ; 
that  then,  almost,  if  not  entirely  alone,  he  had  followed  this  road  leading 
across  the  wooded  valley  behind  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  and  had  disappeared 
in  these  woods,  doubtless  with  a  sense  of  absolute  security.  The  sound  of 
musketry  was  there  heard  and  McPherson's  horse  came  back,  bleeding, 
wounded,  and  riderless.  I  ordered  the  staff  officer  who  brought  this  message 
to  return  at  once,  to  find  General  Logan  (the  senior  officer  present  with  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee),  to  report  the  same  facts  to  him,  and  to  instruct  him 
to  drive  back  this  supposed  small  force,  which  had  evidently  got  around  the 
Seventeenth  Corps  through  the  blind  woods  in  rear  of  our  left  flank.  I  soon 
dispatched  one .  of  my  own  staff  (McCoy,  I  think)  to  General  Logan,  with 
similar  orders,  telling  him  to  refuse  his  left  flank,  and  to  fight  the  battle 
(holding  fast  to  Leggett's  Hill)  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee;  that  I 
would  personally  look  to  Decatur  and  to  the  safety  of  his  rear,  and  would 
reenforce  him  if  he  needed  it."  *  *  *  * 

After  explaining  how  Hood  had  first  withdrawn  from  his 
outer  line  on  the  night  of  the  21st,  occupied  the  fortified  line 
next  to  Atlanta,  and  then  sallied  out  with  part  of  his  force, 
passed  entirely  around  the  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 


ATLANTA.  123 

and  struck  it  in  flank  and  rear  while  a  portion  of  it  was  in 
motion,  General  Sherman  continues: 

"  The  enemy  was,  therefore,  enabled,  under  cover  of  the  forest,  to  approach 
quite  near  before  he  was  discovered;  indeed,  his  skirmish  line  had  worked 
through  the  timber  and  got  into  the  field  to  the  rear  of  Giles  A.  Smith's 
division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps  unseen,  had  captured  Murray's  battery  of 
regular  artillery,  moving  through  these  woods  entirely  unguarded,  and  had 
got  possession  of  several  of  the  hospital  camps. 

"  The  right  of  this  rebel  line  struck  Dodge's  troops  in  motion ;  but,  fortun 
ately,  this  corps  (Sixteenth)  had  only  to  halt,  face  to  the  left,  and  was  in  line 
of  battle ;  and  this  corps  not  only  held  in  check  thte  enemy,  but  drove  him 
back  through  the  woods.  About  the  same  time  this  same  force  had  struck 
General  Giles  A.  Smith's  left  flank,  doubled  it  back,  captured  four  guns  in 
position  and  the  party  engaged  in  building  the  very  battery,  which  was  the 
special  object  of  McPherson's  visit  to  me,  and  almost  enveloped  the  entire  left 
flank.  The  men,  however,  were  skillful  and  brave,  and  fought  for  a  time 
with  their  backs  to  Atlanta.  They  gradually  fell  back,  compressing  their 
own  line,  and  gaining  strength  by  making  junction  with  Leggett's  division 
of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  well  and  strongly  posted  on  the  hill.  One  or  two 
brigades  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  ordered  by  McPherson,  came  rapidly  across 
the  open  field  to  the  rear,  from  the  direction  of  the  railroad,  filled  up  the  gap 
from  Blair's  new  left  to  the  head  of  Dodge's  column — now  facing  to  the  general 
left — thus  forming  a  strong  left  flank  at  right  angles  to  the  original  line  of 
battle.  The  enemy  attacked,  boldly  and  repeatedly,  the  whole  of  this  flank, 
but  met  an  equally  fierce  resistance,  and  on  that  ground  a  bloody  battle  raged 
from  little  after  noon  till  into  the  night.  *  *  *  * 

"  I  rode  over  the  whole  of  it "  (the  field)  "  the  next  day,  and  it  bore  the  marks 
of  a  bloody  conflict.  The  enemy  had  retired  during  the  night  inside  of 
Atlanta,  and  we  remained  master  of  the  situation  outside.  I  purposely 
allowed  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee"  [then  in  the  hands  of  three  political 
generals]  '"to  fight  this  battle  almost  unaided,  save  by  demonstrations  on  the 
part  of  Generals  Schofield  and  Thomas  against  the  fortified  lines  to  their  im 
mediate  fronts,  and  by  detaching,  as  described,  one  of  Schofield's  brigades  to 
Decatur,  because  I  knew  that  the  attacking  force  could  only  be  a  part  of 
Hood's  army,  and  that,  if  any  assistance  were  rendered  by  either  of  the  other 
armies,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  would  be  jealous.  Nobly  did  they  do 
their  work  that  day,  and  terrible  was  the  slaughter  done  to  our  enemy,  though 
at  sad  cost  to  ourselves." 

In  reporting  upon  the  battle  to  General  Halleck,  General 
Sherman  telegraphed : 

"  McPherson's  sudden  death,  and  Logan  succeeding  to  the  command,  as  it 
were,  in  the  midst  of  battle,  made  some  confusion  on  our  extreme  left;  but  it 


124  ATLANTA. 

soon  recovered,  and  made  sad  havoc  with  the  enemy,  who  had  practiced  one 
of  his  favorite  games  of  attacking  our  left  when  in  motion,  and  before  it  had 
time  to  cover  its  weak  flank." 

Following  this,  among  some  general  observations  upon  the 
battle,  and  the  question  of  a  successor,  the  extracts  given  at 
the  opening  of  this  chapter  are  found. 

From  the  above  fair  outlines  of  General  Sherman's  account, 
the  reader  would  conclude  that  some  of  the  warnings  received 
in  regard  to  Hood's  methods  were  disregarded,  and  that  the 
new  Confederate  commander  had  sallied  against,  and  passed 
entirely  around  our  left,  finding  it  unprepared  and  partly  in 
motion  by  the  flank,  and  that  some  confusion  resulted,  and  a 
bloody  battle,  which  was  not  particularly  unexpected  by 
General  Sherman,  and  did  not,  in  a  great  degree,  disturb 
him. 

The  real  reason  for  this  confusion  on  the  left  does  not 
appear  in  the  Memoirs.  The  key  to  unlock  the  bloody  mys 
teries  of  the  22d  of  July,  where  the  Union  loss  was  thirty- 
five  hundred  men,  with  General  McPherson,  and  ten  pieces  of 
artillery,  lies  deeply  covered  under  the  sentence:  "For  some 
moments  I  supposed  the  enemy  intended  to  evacuate." 

Some  omitted  leaves  from  the  official  record  will  show  how 
long  these  "  moments  "  were. 

In  a  report  made  by  General  Sherman  to  General  Halleck, 
dated  August  15,  1864,  this  paragraph  occurs,  though  it  is 
not  mentioned  in  his  book : 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  22d,  somewhat  to  my  surprise,  this  whole  line  was 
found  abandoned,  and  I  confess  I  thought  the  enemy  had  resolved  to  give  us 
Atlanta  without  further  contest.  But  General  Johnston  had  been  relieved 
of  the  command,  and  General  Hood  substituted.  A  new  policy  seemed 
resolved  upon,  of  which  a  bold  attack  upon  our  right  was  an  index,  *  * 
*  *  About  10  A.  M.  I  was  in  person  with  General  Schofield  examining 
the  appearance  of  the  enemy's  line  opposite  the  distillery,  where  we  attracted 
enough  of  the  enemy's  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  to  satisfy  me  the  enemy 
was  in  Atlanta  in  force,  and  meant  to  fight." 

The  last  order  recorded  in  General  McPherson's  field  letter 


ATLANTA.  125 

book,  in  the  morning  of  the  day  he  was  killed,  furnishes  a 
further  commentary  upon  those  "moments/*  during  which 
General  Sherman  thought  the  enemy  "intended  to  evacuate:" 

THREE  AND  A  HALF  MILES  EAST  OF  ATLANTA,  GEORGIA,  ) 

July  22,  1864.      j 

Major-General  JOHN  A.  LOGAN,  Commanding  Fifteenth  Army  Corps: 

The  enemy  having  evacuated  their  works  in  front  of  our  lines,  the  suppo 
sition  of  Major-General  Sherman  is  that  they  have  given  up  Atlanta,  and  are 
retreating  in  the  direction  of  East  Point. 

You  Avill  immediately  put  your  command  in  pursuit  to  the  south  and  east 
of  Atlanta,  without  entering  the  town.     You  will  keep  a  route  to  the  left  of 
that  taken  by  the  enemy,  and  try  to  cut  off  a  portion  of  them  while  they  are 
pressed  in  the  rear  and  on  our  right  by  Generals  Schofield  and  Thomas. 
Major-General  Sherman  desires  and  expects  a  vigorous  pursuit. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JAMES  B.  MCPHERSON,  Major-General. 

The  following  telegram  also  furnishes  testimony  to  the  same 

end  : 

CAMP  ox  RAILROAD,  FOUR  MILES  FROM  ATLANTA,  ) 
9  P.  M.,  July  22,  1864.      } 
Major  THOMAS  T.  ECKERT,  Washington. 

At  daylight  to-day  it  was  found  that  the  rebels  had  gone  from  our  entire 
front,  and  General  Sherman  announced  the  occupation  of  Atlanta  by  Schofield, 
and  ordered  pursuit  by  Thomas  and  McPherson.  Vigorous  pursuit  was  made, 
and  the  enemy  found  in  the  fortifications  of  Atlanta,  and  not  Schofield.  We 
hold  the  railroad  to  within  two  and  a  half  miles  of  the  center  of  the  place ; 
that  is  about  the  average  distance  of  the  whole  line,  though  Schofield  and 
Dodge  are  nearer.  The  fighting  has  been  severe,  and  we  lose  McPherson, 
killed  by  a  shot  through  the  lungs  while  on  a  reconnoissance.  It  is  thought 
that  the  enemy  will  be  gone  in  the  morning,  as  they  have  attacked  and  been 
repulsed  since  dark.  Hood  fights  his  graybacks  desperately. 

J.  C.  VAN  DUZEN,  Cipher  Operator,  U.  S.  M.  T. 

One  of  the  political  generals  however  had  informed  himself 
very  early  in  the  morning  that  the  rebels  had  not  evacuated 
Atlanta,  as  General  Sherman  supposed  :  but  instead,  held  the 
inner  lines,  near  the  city,  in  force.  This  appears  from  Gen 
eral  Dodge's  report  of  the  operations  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps 
on  the  Atlanta  campaign,  in  which  he  says : 

"At  4  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  22d  of  July,  General  Sweeney,  commanding  the 


126  ATLANTA. 

Second  Division,  reported  to  me  that  the  enemy  had  disappeared  from  his 
front,  and  I  immediately  ordered  him  to  push  forward  a  heavy  skirmish  line, 
which  he  did  promptly,  and  reported  the  enemy  in  force  in  the  works  sur 
rounding  Atlanta." 

Upon  this  corps,  a  few  hours  later,  fell  the  chief  brunt  of 
the  battle,  as  it  was  hastening  to  defend  the  left,  and  the  char 
acter  of  its  fighting  is  sufficiently  shown  by  the  facts  that  it 
first  held  its  ground,  then  repulsed  the  enemy,  and  that  every 
field  officer  engaged  appears  to  have  been  on  the  list  of  the 
killed  or  wounded. 

The  character  of  the  surprise  upon  the  left  is  shown  by 
the  following  extract  from  General  Blair's  report  of  the 
battle : 

"  In  the  morning  of  the  22d  the  enemy  came  in  on  my  rear  and  left  in  very 
heavy  force,  with  the  intention  of  overpowering  and  destroying  this  corps. 
Although  we  had  no  warning  of  his  approach,  and  although  attacked  imme 
diately  in  rear,  the  men  and  officers  behaved  with  unparalleled  gallantry, 
repulsing  every  assault,  changing  front  repeatedly  with  a  coolness  and  courage 
which  can  not  be  too  highly  praised." 

The  account  given  in  the  above  narrative,  of  the  early  note 
to  McPherson  not  to  extend  so  far  to  the  left,  certainly  needs 
further  explanation  in  the  light  of  the  order,  also  an  early 
one,  to  pursue  the  rebels  well  to  the  left,  past  Atlanta  even, 
and  on  toward  East  Point. 

The  question  also  arises,  if  Hood,  in  his  sally,  was  prac 
tising  one  of  his  "  favorite  games,"  why  he  was  allowed  to 
succeed  so  well  in  his  play. 

But  the  one  point  that  will  stand  out  in  bolder  relief  than 
any  other,  is  the  flippancy  with  which  the  terms"  volunteers" 
and  "political  generals"  are  used  against  those  who,  in  the 
midst  of  grave  surprise,  brought  on  by  the  order  of  the  com 
manding  general,  rallied  their  three  corps  in  the  face  of  an 
army  that  had  outflanked  them,  and  burst  upon  them  in 
reverse  as  well,  and  fought  for  hours  with  the  rebel  line — 
sometimes  from  one  face  of  abandoned  Confederate  works, 
sometimes  from  the  other,  through  that  long  Summer  after- 


ATLANTA.  127 

noon  and  far  into  the  night,  and  against  every  disadvantage 
finally  achieved  victory,  and  retrieved  the  one  great  mistake 
with  which  the  commanding  general  began  the  day ;  namely, 
announcing  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta  and  starting  two  of  his 
armies  by  the  flank  in  pursuit. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA — DID  GRANT  OR  SHERMAN   PLAN  IT? 

DID  General  Sherman  originate  the  idea  of  the  March  to 
the  Sea?  This  is  a  question  which  he  makes  very  prominent 
in  his  Memoirs,  and  answers  at  length  and  most  decidedly  in 
the  affirmative.  But  here,  as  in  other  instances  which  have 
been  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  public,  the  distinguished 
author  and  historian  ignores  some  important  portions  of  the 
official  records  which  others  may  find  interesting. 

The  following  is  the  version  of  the  origin  of  this  move 
ment  given  in  Volume  II  of  the  Memoirs : 

"  I  have  often  been  asked  by  well-meaning  Iriends,  when  the  thought  of 
that  march  first  entered  my  mind.  I  knew  that  an  army  which  had  pene 
trated  Georgia  as  far  as  Atlanta  could  not  turn  back.  It  must  go  ahead ; 
but  when,  how,  and  where,  depended  on  many  considerations.  As  soon  as 
Hood  had  shifted  across  from  Lovejoy's  to  Palmetto  I  saw  the  move  in  my 
"mind's  eye;"  and,  after  Jeff.  Davis'  speech  at  Palmetto,  of  September  26,  I 
was  more  positive  in  my  conviction,  but  was  in  doubt  as  to  the  time  and 
manner.  When  General  Hood  first  struck  our  railroad  above  Marietta  we 
were  not  ready,  and  I  was  forced  to  watch  his  movements  further  till  he  had 
"caromed  off"  to  the  west  of  Decatur.  Then  I  was  perfectly  convinced,  and 
had  no  longer  a  shadow  of  doubt.  The  only  possible  question  was  as  to 
Thomas'  strength  and  ability  to  meet  Hood  in  the  open  field." — Page  166. 

Hood  shifted  to  Palmetto  September  21st;  Davis'  speech 
was  on  the  26th  of  September,  and  Hood  moved  to  the  west 
of  Decatur  October  26th;  so  that  Sherman's  account  fixes  the 
following  points  for  himself: 

The  move  was  in  his  "mind's  eye,"  September  21,  1864. 
He  was  in  doubt  as  to  time  and  manner  after  September  26. 

(1280 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  129 

He  had  no  doubt  about  the  move  October  26. 
The  points  of  the  narrative,  in  the  chapter  devoted  to  the 
question  of  planning  the  March  to  the  Sea,  are  these : 

Hood  having  moved  upon  Sherman's  railroad  communica 
tions,  General  Thomas  returned  to  Chattanooga  with  a  con 
siderable  force,  and  on  the  29th  of  September  Sherman  tele 
graphed  the  condition  of  affairs  to  Halleck,  saying,  among 
other  things,  "I  prefer  for  the  future  to  make  the  movement 
on  Milledgeville,  Millen,  and  Savannah." 

On  that  day  (October  1)  he  telegraphed  Grant : 

*  *  *  *"  "Why  will  it  not  do  to  leave  Tennessee  to  the  forces 
which  Thomas  has,  and  the  reserves  soon  to  come  to  Nashville,  and  for  me 
to  destroy  Atlanta  and  march  across  Georgia  to  Savannah  or  Charleston, 
breaking  railroads  and  doing  irreparable  damage?  We  can  not  remain  on 
the  defensive." 

On  the  9th  (October)  he  telegraphed  General  Thomas  at 
Nashville : 

"I  want  to  destroy  all  the  road  below  Chattanooga,  including  Atlanta,  and 
to  make  for  the  sea-coast.  We  can  not  defend  this  long  line  of  road." 

On  that  same  day  he  telegraphed  to  General  Grant  at  City 
Point: 

"It  will  be  a  physical  impossibility  to  protect  the  roads,  now  that  Hood, 
Forrest,  Wheeler,  and  the  whole  batch  of  devils  are  turned  loose  without 
home  or  habitation.  *  *  *  *  I  propose  that  we  break  up  the  rail 
road  from  Chattanooga  forward,  and  that  we  strike  out  with  our  wagons  for 
Milledgeville,  Millen,  and  Savannah.  *  *  *  *  I  can  make  this 
march,  and  make  Georgia  howl!" 

October  10th  he  telegraphed  Thomas  as  follows : 

"  He  (Hood)  is  now  crossing  the  Coosa  River  below  Rome,  looking  west. 
Let  me  know  if  you  can  hold  him  with  your  forces  now  in  Tennessee  and 
the  expected  reinforcements,  as,  in  that  event,  you  know  what  I  propose 
to  do." 

And  on  the  same  day  to  General  Grant: 

"  Hood  is  now  crossing  the  Coosa  twelve  miles  below  Rome,  bound  west, 
9 


130  THE  MAR€H  TO  THE  SEA. 

If  he  passes  over  to  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad,  had  I  better  not  execute  the 
plan  of  my  letter  sent  you  by  Colonel  Porter,  and  leave  General  Thomas 
with  the  troops  now  in  Tennessee  to  defend  the  State?  He  will  have  an 
ample  force  when  the  reinforcements  ordered  reach  Nashville.  *  *  *  * 

"  From  General  Corse,  at  Rome,  I  learned  that  Hood's  army  had  disap 
peared,  but  in  what  direction,  he  was  still  in  doubt ;  and  I  was  so  strongly 
convinced  of  the  wisdom  of  my  proposition  to  change  the  whole  tactics  of  the 
campaign,  to  leave  Hood  to  General  Thomas,  and  to  march  across  Georgia 
to  Savannah  or  Charleston,  that  I  again  telegraphed  to  General  Grant: 

"  'KINGSTON,  GA.,  October  11,  11  A.  M. 
" ' Lieutenant-  General  GRANT. 

"  '  We  can  not  now  remain  on  the  defensive.  With  twenty-five  thousand 
infantry,  and  the  bold  cavalry  he  has,  Hood  can  constantly  break  my  road. 
I  would  infinitely  prefer  to  make  a  wreck  of  the  road  and  of  the  country  from 
Chattanooga  to  Atlanta,  including  the  latter  city,  send  back  all  my  wounded 
and  unserviceable  men,  and  with  my  effective  army  move  through  Georgia, 
smashing  things  to  the  sea.  *  *  *  *  I  can  make  Savannah, 
Charleston,  or  the  mouth  of  the  Chattahoochie  (Appalachicola).  Answer 
quick,  as  I  know  we  will  not  have  the  telegraph  long.' 

"I  received  no  answer  to  this  at  the  time. 

"  It  was  at  Ship's  Gap  that  a  courier  brought  me  the  cipher  message  from 
General  Halleck  which  intimated  that  the  authorities  in  Washington  were 
willing  I  should  undertake  the  march  across  Georgia  to  the  sea.  The  trans 
lated  dispatch  named  '  Horse-i-bar  Sound '  as  the  point  where  the  fleet  would 
await  my  arrival.  After  much  time  I  construed  it  to  mean  'Ossabaw  Sound,' 
below  Savannah,  which  was  correct.  [General  Sherman  gives  none  of  the 
dispatches  which  passed  in  regard  to  the  matter.] 

"On  the  16th  I  telegraphed  General  Thomas  at  Nashville: 

" '  Send  me  Morgan's  and  Newton's  old  divisions.  Reestablish  the  road, 
and  I  will  follow  Hood  wherever  he  may  go.'  *  *  *  * 

"General  Thomas'  reply  was  (October  17): 

*  *  *"  *  " '  Mower  and  Wilson  have  arrived  and  are  on  their  way 
to  join  you.  I  hope  you  will  adopt  Grant's  idea  of  turning  Wilson  loose, 
rather  than  undertake  the  plan  of  a  march  with  the  whole  force  through 
Georgia  to  the  sea,  inasmuch  as  General  Grant  can  not  cooperate  with  you  as 
at  first  arranged.' 

"So  it  is  clear  that  at  that  date  neither  General  Grant  nor  General  Thomas 
heartily  favored  my  proposed  plan  of  campaign.  *  *  *  * 

"On  the  26th  of  October  I  learned  that  Hood's  whole  army  had  made  its 
appearance  about  Decatur,  Alabama,  and  at  once  caused  a  strong  reconnois- 
sance  to  be  made  down  the  Coosa  to  near  Gadsden,  which  revealed  the  truth 
that  the  enemy  was  gone,  except  a  small  force  of  cavalry,  commanded  by 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  131 

General  Wheeler,  which  had  been  left  to  watch  us.  I  then  finally  resolved 
on  my  future  course,  which  was  to  leave  Hood  to  be  encountered  by  General 
Thomas,  while  I  should  carry  into  full  effect  the  long-contemplated  project  of 
marching  for  the  sea-coast,  and  thence  to  operate  toward  Richmond.  But  it 
was  all-important  to  me  and  to  our  cause  that  General  Thomas  should  have 
an  ample  force,  equal  to  any  and  every  emergency. 

"He  then  had  at  Nashville  about  eight  or  ten  thousand  new  troops,  and  as 
many  more  civil  employe's  of  the  quartermaster's  department,  which  were 
not  suited  for  the  field,  but  would  be  most  useful  in  manning  the  excellent 
forts  that  already  covered  Nashville.  At  Chattanooga  he  had  General  Steed- 
man's  division,  about  five  thousand  men,  besides  garrisons  for  Chattanooga, 
Bridgeport,  and  Stevenson ;  at  Murfreesboro  he  also  had  General  Rousseau's 
division,  which  was  full  five  thousand  strong,  independent  of  the  necessary 
garrisons  for  the  railroad.  At  Decatur  and  Huntsville,  Alabama,  was  the 
infantry  division  of  General  R.  S.  Granger,  estimated  at  four  thousand,  and 
near  Florence,  Alabama,  watching  the  crossings  of  the  Tennessee,  were  Gen 
eral  Edward  Hatch's  division  of  cavalry,  four  thousand ;  General  Croxton's 
brigade,  twenty  five  hundred,  and  Colonel  Capron's  brigade,  twelve  hundred. 
Besides  which  General  J.  H.  Wilson  had  collected  in  Nashville  about  ten 
thousand  dismounted  cavalry,  for  which  he  was  rapidly  collecting  the  nec 
essary  horses  for  a  remount.  All  these  aggregated  about  forty-five  thou 
sand  men. 

"General  A.  J,  Smith  at  that  time  was  in  Missouri  with  the  two  divisions 
of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  which  had  been  diverted  to  that  quarter  to  assist 
General  Rosecrans  in  driving  the  rebel  General  Price  out  of  Missouri.  This 
object  had  been  accomplished,  and  these  troops,  numbering  from  eight  to  ten 
thousand,  had  been  ordered  to  Nashville.  To  these  I  proposed  at  first  to  add 
only  the  Fourth  Corps  (General  Stanley),  fifteen  thousand,  and  that  corps  was 
ordered  from  Gaylesville  to  march  to  Chattanooga  and  thence  to  report  for 
orders  to  General  Thomas;  but  subsequently,  on  the  30th  of  October,  at 
Rome,  Georgia,  learning  from  General  Thomas  that  the  new  troops  promised 
by  General  Grant  were  coming  forward  very  slowly,  I  concluded  to  further 
reenforce  him  by  General  Schofield's  corps  (Twenty-third),  twelve  thousand, 
which  corps  accordingly  marched  for  Resaca,  and  there  took  the  cars  for 
Chattanooga.  I  then  kneAV  that  General  Thomas  would  have  an  ample  force 
with  which  to  encounter  General  Hood  any  where  in  the  open  field,  besides 
garrisons  to  secure  the  railroad  to  his  rear,  and  as  far  forward  as  Chatta 
nooga.  *  *  *  * 

"  On  the  1st  of  November  I  telegraphed  very  fully  to  General  Grant  [Gen 
eral  Sherman  does  not  give  this  dispatch],  and  on  the  2d  of  November 
received  (at  Rome)  this  dispatch : 

"'CiTY  POINT,  Novemlcr  I,  1864,  6  P.  M. 
"  'Major-  General  SHERMAN. 

"'L>o  you  not  think  it  advisable,  now  that  Hood  has  gone  so  far  north,  to 
entirely  ruin  him  before  starting  on  your  proposed  campaign  ?  With  Hood's 


132  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

army  destroyed  you  can  go  where  you  please  with  impunity.  I  believed,  and 
still  believe,  if  you  had  started  south  while  Hood  was  in  the  neighborhood  of 
you,  he  would  have  been  forced  to  go  after  you.  Now  that  he  is  far  away  he 
might  look  upon  the  chase  as  useless,  and  he  will  go  in  one  direction  while 
you  are  pushing  in  the  other.  If  you  can  see  a  chance  of  destroying  Hood's 
army,  attend  to  that  first  and  make  your  other  move  secondary. 

"  'U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General.' 
11  My  answer  is  dated : 

"  '  ROME,  GA.,  November  2,  1864. 
'' '  General  GRANT. 

" '  Your  dispatch  is  received.  If  I  could  hope  to  overhaul  Hood  I  would 
turn  against  him  with  my  whole  force;  then  he  would  retreat  to  the  south 
west,  drawing  me  as  a  decoy  away  from  Georgia,  which  is  his  chief  object. 
If  he  ventures  north  of  the  Tennessee  River,  I  may  turn  in  that  direction  and 
endeavor  to  get  below  him  on  his  line  of  retreat;  but,  thus  far,  he  has  not 
gone  above  the  Tennessee  River.  General  Thomas  will  have  a  force  strong 
enough  to  prevent  his  reaching  any  country  in  which  we  have  an  interest, 
and  he  has  orders,  if  Hood  turns  to  follow  me,  to  push  for  Selma,  Alabama. 
No  single  army  can  catch  Hood,  and  I  am  convinced  the  best  results  will 
iollow  from  our  defeating  Jeff.  Davis'  cherished  plan  of  making  me  leave 
Georgia  by  maneuvering. 

"  'Thus  far  I  have  confined  my  efforts  to  thwart  this  plan,  and  have  reduced 
baggage  so  that  I  can  pick  up  and  start  in  any  direction ;  but  I  regard  the 
pursuit  of  Hood  as  useless.  Still,  if  he  attempts  to  invade  Middle  Tennessee, 
I  will  hold  Decatur,  and  be  prepared  to  move  in  that  direction ;  but,  unless  I 
let  go  of  Atlanta,  my  force  will  not  be  equal  to  his.' 

"From  that  place,  on  the  same  day  (November  2),  [I]  again  telegraphed  to 
General  Grant : 


1. 1 ' 


'If  I  turn  back  the  whole  effect  of  my  campaign  will  be  lost.  By  my 
movements  I  have  thrown  Beauregard  (Hood)  well  to  the  west,  and  Thomas 
will  have  ample  time  and  sufficient  troops  to  hold  him  until  the  reenforce- 
ments  from  Missouri  reach  him.  We  have  now  ample  supplies  at  Chattanooga 
and  Atlanta,  and  can  stand  a  month's  interruption  to  our  communications. 
I  do  not  believe  the  Confederate  army  can  reach  our  railroad  lines,  except  by 
cavalry  raids,  and  Wilson  will  have  cavalry  enough  to  checkmate  them.  I 
am  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  best  results  will  follow  my  contemplated 
movement  through  Georgia.' 

"  That  same  day  I  received,  in  answer  to  the  Rome  dispatch,  the  following : 

'"CiTY  POINT,  VA.,  November  2,  1864, 11:30  A.  M. 
" (  To  Major- General  SHERMAN. 

" '  Your  dispatch  of  9  A.  M.  yesterday  is  just  received.  I  dispatched  you  trre 
same  date,  advising  that  Hood's  army,  now  that  it  had  worked  so  far  north, 
ought  to  be  looked  upon  now  as  the  object.  With  the  force,  however,  you 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  133 

have  left  with  General  Thomas,  he  must  be  able  to  take  care  of  Hood  and 
destroy  him.  I  do  not  see  that  you  can  withdraw  from  where  you  are  to 
follow  Hood  without  giving  up  all  we  have  gained  in  territory.  I  say,  then, 
go  on  as  you  propose.  U.  S.  GRANT,  lieutenant- General.' 

"  This  was  the  first  time  that  General  Grant  assented  to  the  March  to  the 
Sea,  and,  although  many  of  his  warm  friends  and  admirers  insist  that  he  was 
the  author  and  projector  of  that  march,  and  that  I  simply  executed  his  plans, 
General  Grant  has  never,  in  my  opinion,  thought  so  or  said  so.  The  truth  is 
fully  given  in  an  original  letter  of  President  Lincoln,  which  I  received  at 
Savannah,  Georgia,  and  have  at  this  instant  before  me,  every  word  of  which 
is  in  his  own  familiar  handwriting.  It  is  dated : 

"  '  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  26,  1864. 

*  *  *  *  "  'When  you  were  about  leaving  Atlanta  for  the  Atlantic 
coast,  I  was  anxious,  if  not  fearful ;  but,  feeling  that  you  were  the  better 
judge,  and  remembering  *  nothing  risked,  nothing  gained,'  I  did  not  inter 
fere.  Now,  the  undertaking  being  a  success,  the  honor  is  all  yours;  for  I 
believe  none  of  us  went  further  than  to  acquiesce ;  and,  taking  the  work  of 
General  Thomas  into  account,  as  it  should  be  taken,  it  is  indeed  a  great 
success.  *  *  *  *  A.  LINCOLN.'" 

Following  this,  in  General  Sherman's  narrative,  is  the 
extract  from  page  167,  given  in  the  opening  of  this  letter.  A 
few  brief  extracts  will  close  the  account  : 

"On  the  6th  of  November,  at  Kingston,  I  wrote  and  telegraphed  to  General 
Grant  [General  Sherman  does  not  give  these  papers]  reviewing  the  whole 
situation,  gave  him  my  full  plan  of  action,  stated  that  I  was  ready  to  march 
as  soon  as  the  election  was  over,  and  appointed  November  10th  as  the  day 
for  starting.  On  the  8th  I  received  this  dispatch : 

"  <CiTY  POINT,  VA.,  November  7,  1864,  10:30  P.  M. 

"'Major-General  SHERMAN. 

"'Your  dispatch  of  this  evening  received.  I  see  no  present  reason  for 
changing  your  plan.  Should  any  arise,  you  will  see  it,  or  if  I  do  I  will 
inform  you.  I  think  every  thing  here  is  favorable  now.  Great  good  fortune 
attend  you !  I  believe  you  will  be  eminently  successful,  and  at  worst  can 
only  make  a  march  less  fruitful  of  results  than  hoped  for. 

"  '  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General.' 

"On  the  10th  of  November  the  movement  may  be  said  to  have  fairly 
begun." 

The  above  is  a  full  and  fair  summary  of  the  account  in  the 
Memoirs  of  the  discussion  attending  Sherman's  starting  for 


134  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Savannah.  It  is  in  brief  an  extended  argument  to  show  that 
General  Sherman  planned  the  March  to  the  Sea,  and  that 
General  Grant  and  the  authorities  at  Washington  opposed  his 
plan  for  several  weeks,  but  finally  gave  a  reluctant  consent  to 
its  execution.  This  view  has  been  impressed  upon  the  country 
ever  since  the  close  of  the  war. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a  more  skillful  misuse  of  official 
records  has  ever  before  been  made  to  uphold  an  erroneous 
history  of  a  military  movement,  and  this  will  now  be  made 
to  appear. 

The  question  under  discussion  between  the  parties  named 
was  not  whether  General  Sherman  should  make  a  campaign  to 
the  sea,  but  whether  he  should  begin  it  by  abandoning  Atlanta 
and  the  line  of  the  railroad,  and  especially  before  he  destroyed 
Hood's  army.  A  campaign  to  the  sea  to  cut  the  Confederacy 
in  two,  was  decided  upon  by  General  Grant  during  the  previ 
ous  January,  when  he  was  in  command  at  Nashville,  and  eight 
months  before  the  time  when  General  Sherman  claims  to  have 
had  such  a  move  in  his  "  mind's  eye."  General  Thomas,  General 
Halleck,  and  General  Sherman  were  each  notified  at  that  time 
of  this  plan  of  General  Grant. 

The  first  idea  of  the  latter,  as  expressed  in  January,  1864, 
was  to  march  through  to  Mobile,  holding  Atlanta  and  Mont 
gomery  as  intermediate  points,  but  the  Union  forces  having 
occupied  Mobile  Bay  on  the  23d  of  August,  just  before  the 
capture  of  Atlanta,  General  Grant,  immediately  after  the  fall 
of  the  latter  place,  telegraphed  General  Sherman  that,  as  our 
forces  had  now  secured  the  control  of  Mobile,  he  thought 
Sherman  had  better  move  on  Augusta  as  soon  as  his  men  were 
rested,  while  Canby  acted  on  Savannah.  The  following  letters 
and  telegrams  are  sufficiently  explicit  upon  these  points : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  January  15,  1864.      j 
[Confidential.] 
Major- General  HALLECK,  Washington. 

*      *      *      *      I  look  upon  the  next  line  for  me  to  secure,  to  be  that 
from  Chattanooga  to  Mobile,  Montgomery  and  Atlanta  being  the  important 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  135 

intermediate  points.  To  do  this,  large  supplies  must  be  secured  on  the 
Tennessee  River,  so  as  to  be  independent  of  the  railroad  from  here  to  the 
Tennessee  for  a  considerable  length  of  time.  Mobile  would  be  a  second  base. 
The  destruction  which  Sherman  will  do  the  roads  around  Meridian  will  be  of 
material  importance  to  us  in  preventing  the  enemy  from  drawing  supplies 
and  in  clearing  that  section  of  all  large  bodies  of  rebel  troops.  I  do  not 
look  upon  any  points  except  Mobile  in  the  south  and  the  Tennessee  River  in 
the  north  as  presenting  practical  starting  points  from  which  to  operate  against 
Atlanta  and  Montgomery.  They  are  objectionable  as  starting  points  to  be 
all  under  one  command,  from  the  fact  that  the  time  it  will  take  to  com 
municate  from  one  to  the  other  will  be  so  great  But,  Sherman  or  McPherson, 
one  of  whom  would  be  entrusted  with  the  distant  command,  are  officers  of 
such  experience  and  reliability,  that  all  objections  on  that  score,  except  that 
of  enabling  the  two  armies  to  act  as  an  unit,  would  be  removed.  *  *  * 

The  same  objection  will  exist  probably  not  to  so  great  an  extent,  however, 
if  the  movement  is  made  in  more  than  one  column.  This  will  have  to  be 
with  an  army  of  the  size  we  will  be  obliged  to  use. 

Heretofore  I  have  refrained  from  suggesting  what  might  be  done  in  other 
commands  than  my  own,  in  cooperation  with  it,  or  even  to  think  much  over 
the  matter.  But,  as  you  have  kindly  asked  me  in  your  letter  of  the  8th  of 
January,  only  just  received,  for  an  interchange  of  views  on  our  present  situa 
tion,  I  will  write  you  again  in  a  day  or  two,  going  outside  of  my  own  opera 
tions.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

Afterward,  when  General  Grant  was  made  Lieutenant- 
General  and  ordered  East,  turning  over  his  command  at  Nash 
ville  to  General  Sherman,  he  sent  the  latter  a  copy  of  the 
above  letter  for  his  guidance. 

Four  days  after  thus  unfolding  his  plan  for  the  Atanta  and 
Gulf  campaign  to  General  Halleck,  and  while  General  Sher 
man  was  on  the  Mississippi  preparing  his  Meridian  campaign, 
General  Thomas,  who  was  then  in  command  at  Chattanooga, 
was  made  acquainted  with  General  Grant's  design  by  the 
following  letter : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
NASHVILLE,  January  19,  1864.      j 

Major- General  GEORGE  II.  THOMAS,  Chattanooaa. 

Owing  to  the  presence  of  Longstreet  in  East  Tennessee  it  will  be  impossible 
to  attempt  any  movement  from  your  present  position  while  he  remains. 

The  great  number  of  veterans  now  absent  and  yet  to  be  furloughed  will  be 
another  difficulty  in  the  way  of  any  movement  this  Winter.  Sherman,  how- 


136  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

ever,  will  be  able  to  collect  about  twenty  thousand  men  from  that  part  of  his 
command  now  along  the  Mississippi  River  available  for  a  movement  eastward 
from  Vicksburg.  He  expects  to  have  these  ready  to  start  about  the  24th  inst. 
He  will  proceed  eastward  as  far  as  Meridan,  at  least,  and  will  thoroughly  destroy 
the  roads  east  and  south  from  there,  and,  if  possible,  will  throw  troops  as  far 
east  as  Selma;  or  if  he  finds  Mobile  so  far  unguarded  as  to  make  his  force 
sufficient  for  the  enterprise,  will  go  there.  To  cooperate  with  this  movement, 
you  want  to  keep  up  appearances  of  preparation  of  an  advance  from  Chat 
tanooga.  It  may  be  necessary  even  to  move  a  column  as  far  as  Lafayette. 

The  time  for  the  advance,  however,  would  not  be  before  the  30th  inst.,  or 
when  you  might  learn  the  enemy  were  contemplating  an  attack.  Logan  will 
also  be  instructed  to  move,  at  the  same  time,  what  force  he  can  from  Belle- 
fontaine  toward  Rome.  We  will  want  to  be  ready  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  in  the  Spring  for  the  advance.  I  look  upon  the  line  for  this  army  to 
secure  in  the  next  campaign  to  be  that  from  Chattanooga  to  Mobile,  Atlanta 
and  Montgomery  being  the  important  intermediate  points. 

I  look  upon  the  Tennessee  River  and  Mobile  as  being  the  most  practicable 
points  from  which  to  start,  and  to  hold  as  bases  of  supplies  if  the  line  is 
secured.  I  have  so  written  to  the  General-in-Chief,  only  giving  my  views 
more  fully,  and  shall  write  him  to-day,  giving  my  views  of  the  cooperation 
we  should  have  from  the  Eastern  armies. 

I  shall  recommend  that  no  attempt  be  made  toward  Richmond  by  any  of 
the  routes  heretofore  operated  upon,  but  that  a  moving  force  of  sixty 
thousand  men  be  thrown  into  Newbern  or  Suffolk,  favoring  the  latter  place; 
and  move  out,  destroying  the  road  as  far  toward  Richmond  as  possible.  Then 
move  toward  Raleigh  as  rapidly  as  possible,  hold  that  point,  and  open  com 
munication  with  Newbern,  even  Wilmington.  From  Raleigh  the  enemy's 
most  important  line  would  be  so  threatened  as  to  force  them  to  keep  on  it  a 
guard  that  would  reduce  their  armies  in  the  field  much  below  our  own. 
Before  any  part  of  this  programme  can  be  carried  out,  Longstreet  must  be 
driven  from  East  Tennessee. 

To  do  this  it  may  be  necessary  to  send  more  force  from  your  command. 

I  write  this  to  give  you  an  idea  of  what  I  propose,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
hear  such  suggestions  as  you  may  have  to  propose. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-  General. 

By  the  last  of  February,  General  Sherman  having  been 
meantime  in  the  depths  of  his  raid  to  Meridian,  the  prepa 
rations  for  the  campaign  thus  marked  out  by  General 
Grant  had  progressed  so  far  that  General  Thomas  was  send 
ing  in  estimates  of  the  number  of  troops  needed  to  guard 
the  roads  and  bridges  from  Nashville  south,  both  by  way  of 
Decatur  and  of  Stevenson,  on  to  Chattanooga,  and  south  to 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  137 

Atlanta.     This  appears  clearly  enough    from   the   following 
telegram  : 

[By  telegraph  from  Chattanooga,  February  28,  1864.] 
Major- General  GRANT,  Nashville. 

General  Butterfield,  by  my  direction,  has  recently  examined  the  line  between 
here  and  Nashville,  and  reports  that  he  thinks  six  thousand  men  will  be 
sufficient  to  guard  that  line,  two  regiments  of  which  force  should  be  cavalry. 

From  what  I  know  of  the  road  between  Nashville  and  Decatur,  two 
thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry  will  be  sufficient  to  protect  that 
line.  One  thousand  infantry  will  be  sufficient  to  protect  the  line  from 
Athens  to  Stevenson.  Probably  both  lines  of  communication  can  be  guarded 
by  six  thousand  infantry  and  two  thousand  cavalry,  a  great  portion  of  which 
should  be  made  up  from  the  local  militia  of  Tennessee,  or  troops  organized 
especially  for  the  preservation  of  order  in  the  State. 

I  believe  if  I  can  commence  the  campaign  with  the  Fourteenth  and  Fourth 
Corps  in  front,  with  Howard's  corps  in  reserve,  that  I  can  move  along  the 
line  of  the  railroad  and  overcome  all  opposition  as  far,  at  least,  as  Atlanta. 
I  should  want  a  strong  division  of  cavalry  in  advance.  As  soon  as  Captain 
Merrill  returns  from  his  reconnoissance  along  the  railroad  lines,  I  can  give 
you  a  definite  estimate  of  the  number  of  troops  required  to  guard  the  bridges 
along  the  road.  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General  U.  S.  Volunteers. 

General  Grant  having  been  made  Lieutenant  General,  and 
ordered  to  Washington,  summoned  General  Sherman,  who 
had  returned  from  Meridian,  to  Nashville,  which  latter  point 
he  reached  on  the  17th  of  March,  1864.  On  that  day  he  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  immediately  afterward  left  with  General 
Grant,  accompanying  the  latter,  then  on  his  way  to  Washington, 
as  far  as  the  Burnet  House,  in  Cincinnati,  where  about  the 
20th  of  March,  a  further  consultation  was  held  in  regard  to 
the  forthcoming  campaign. 

Immediately  upon  arriving  at  his  headquarters  in  the  East, 
General  Grant  notified  Halleck  of  the  orders  he  had  given 
Banks  for  a  move  on  Mobile,  to  cooperate  with  Sherman,  as 
is  indicated  in  the  following  extract: 

HEADQUARTERS  IN  THE  FIELD,") 
CULPEPPER,  VA.,  4  P.  M.,  March  25,  1864.      J 

Major- General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Chief  of  Staff. 
I  sent  a  letter  to  General  Banks  before  leaving  Nashville,  directing  him  to 


138  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

finish  his  present  expedition  and  assemble  all  his  available  force  at  New 
Orleans  as  soon  as  possible,  and  prepare  to  receive  orders  for  the  taking  of 
Mobile. 

If  Shreveport  is  carried,  about  eight  thousand  (8,000)  troops  can  be  spared 
from  Steele  and  Bosecrans  to  join  Banks,  and,  if  necessary,  to  insure  success 
against  Mobile,  they  can  be  taken  from  Sherman.  *  *  *  * 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

The  letter  to  General  Banks  thus  referred  to,  coupled  with 
further  instructions  to  the  same  end,  was  published  at  length 
in  General  Grant's  final  report  dated  July  22,  1865: 

Major-General  N.  P.  Banks,  then  on  an  expedition  up  the  Red  River 
against  Shreveport,  Louisiana,  (which  had  been  organized  previous  to  my 
appointment  to  command),  was  notified  by  me  on  the  15th  of  March,  of  the 
importance  it  was  that  Shreveport  should  be  taken  at  the  earliest  possible 
day,  and  that  if  he  found  that  the  taking  of  it  would  occupy  from  ten  to 
fifteen  days  more  time  than  General  Sherman  had  given  his  troops  to  be 
absent  from  their  command,  he  would  send  them  back  at  the  time  specified 
by  General  Sherman,  even  if  it  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  main  object  of 
the  Red  River  expedition,  for  this  force  was  necessary  to  movements  east  of 
the  Mississippi ;  that  should  his  expedition  prove  successful,  he  would  hold 
Shreveport  and  the  Red  River  with  such  force  as  he  might  deem  necessary, 
and  return  the  balance  of  his  troops  to  the  neighborhood  of  New  Orleans, 
commencing  no  move  for  the  further  acquisition  of  territory,  unless  it  was  to 
make  that  then  held  by  him  more  easily  held ;  that  it  might  be  a  part  of  the 
Spring  campaign  to  move  against  Mobile;  that  it  certainly  Would  be,  if 
troops  enough  could  be  obtained  to  make  it  without  embarrassing  other 
movements ;  that  New  Orleans  would  be  the  point  of  departure  for  such  an 
expedition;  also,  that  I  had  directed  General  Steele  to  make  a  real  move 
from  Arkansas  as  suggested  by  him  (General  Banks),  instead  of  a  demonstra 
tion,  as  Steele  thought  advisable.  On  the  31st  of  March,  in  addition  to  the 
foregoing  notification  and  directions,  he  was  instructed  as  follows : 

1st.  If  successful  in  your  expedition  against  Shreveport,  that  you  turn  over 
the  defense  of  the  Red  River  to  General  Steele  and  the  navy. 

2d.  That  you  abandon  Texas  entirely,  with  the  exception  of  your  hold  upon 
the  Rio  Grande.  This  can  be  held  with  four  thousand  men,  if  they  will  turn 
their  attention  immediately  to  fortifying  their  positions.  At  least  one-half 
of  the  force  required  for  this  service  might  be  taken  from  the  colored  troops. 

3d.  By  properly  fortifying  on  the  Mississippi  River,  the  force  to  guard  it 
from  Port  Hudson  to  New  Orleans  can  be  reduced  to  ten  thousand  men,  if 
not  to  a  less  number.  Six  thousand  more  would  then  hold  all  the  rest  of  the 
territory  necessary  to  hold  until  active  operations  can  again  be  resumed  west 
of  the  river.  According  to  your  last  return,  this  would  give  you  a  force  of 
over  thirty  thousand  effective  men  with  which  to  move  against  Mobile.  To 
this  I  expect  to  add  five  thousand  men  from  Missouri.  If,  however,  you 
think  the  force  here  stated  too  small  to  hold  the  territory  regarded  as 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  139 

necessary  to  hold  possession  of,  I  would  say  concentrate  at  least  twenty-five 
thousand  men  of  your  present  command  for  operations  against  Mobile.  With 
these  and  such  additions  as  I  can  give  you  from  elsewhere,  lose  no  time  in 
making  a  demonstration,  to  be  followed  by  an  attack  upon  Mobile.  Two  or 
more  iron-clads  will  be  ordered  to  report  to  Admiral  Farragut.  This  gives 
him  a  strong  naval  fleet  with  which  to  cooperate. 

You  can  make  your  own  arrangements  with  the  Admiral  for  his  coopera 
tion,  and  select  your  own  line  of  approach. 

My  own  idea  of  the  matter  is,  that  Pascagaula  should  be  your  base;  but, 
from  your  long  service  in  the  Gulf  Department,  you  will  know  best  about 
the  matter.  It  is  intended  that  your  movements  shall  be  cooperative  with 
movements  elsewhere,  and  you  can  not  now  start  too  soon.  All  I  would  now 
add  is,  that  you  commence  the  concentration  of  your  forces  at  once.  Preserve 
a  profound  secresy  of  what  you  intend  doing,  and  start  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenat- General. 

Major-  General  N.  P.  BANKS. 

In  addition  to  sending  General  Sherman  a  copy  of  the 
letter  to  Halleck,  dated  Nashville,  January  15th,  General 
Grant,  a  few  days  after  sending  the  above  letter  to  General 
Banks,  again  wrote  the  outlines  of  his  plans  to  General  Sher 
man,  as-  will  be  seen  by  the  letters  which  follow: 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April!,  1864. 

Major- General  W,  T.   SHERMAN,   Commanding  MUita/ry  Division  of  the  Mis- 


GENERAL  :  It  is  my  design,  if  the  enemy  keep  quiet  and  allow  me  to  take 
the  initiative  in  the  Spring  campaign,  to  work  all  parts  of  the  army  together, 
and  somewhat  towards  a  common  center.  For  your  information  I  now  write 
you  my  programme  as  at  present  determined  upon. 

I  have  sent  orders  to  Banks  by  private  messenger  to  finish  up  his  present 
expedition  against  Shreveport  with  all  dispatch ;  to  turn  over  the  defense  of 
the  Red  River  to  General  Steele  and  the  navy,  and  return  your  troops  to  you 
and  his  own  to  New  Orleans ;  to  abandon  all  of  Texas  except  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  to  hold  that  with  not  to  exceed  four  thousand  men ;  to  reduce  the  num 
ber  of  troops  on  the  Mississippi  to  the  lowest  number  necessary  to  hold  it,  and 
to  collect  from  his  command  not  less  than  twenty-five  thousand  (25,000)  men. 
To  this  I  will  add  five  thousand  (5,000)  from  Missouri.  With  this  force  he 
is  to  commence  operations  against  Mobile  as  soon  as  he  can.  It  will  be 
impossible  for  him  to  commence  too  early. 

Gilmore  joins  Butler  with  ten  thousand  (10,000)  men,  and  the  two  operate 
against  Richmond  from  the  south  side  of  James  River.  This  will  give  Butler 
thirty  three  thousand  (33,000)  men  to  operate  with ;  General  W.  F.  Smith 
commanding  the  right  wing  of  his  forces,  and  Gilmore  the  left  wing.  I  will 
stay  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  increased  by  Burnside's  corps  of  not  less 


140  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

than  twenty -live  thousand  (25,000)  effective  men,  and  operate  directly  against 
Lee's  army  wherever  it  may  be  found. 

Sigel  collects  all  his  available  force  in  two  columns — one,  under  Ord  and 
Averill,  to  start  from  Beverly,  Virginia;  and  the  other,  under  Crooke,  to 
start  from  Charleston,  on  the  Kanawha,  to  move  against  the  Virginia 
&  Tennessee  Railroad.  Crooke  will  have  all  cavalry,  and  will  endeavor  to 
get  in  about  Saltville  and  move  east  from  there  to  join  Ord.  His  force  will 
be  all  cavalry,  while  Ord  will  have  from  ten  to  twelve  thousand  men  of  all 
arms. 

You  I  propose  to  move  against  Johnston's  army,  to  break  it  up,  and  to  get 
into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as  far  as  you  can,  inflicting  all  the 
damage  you  can  against  their  war  resources. 

I  do  not  propose  to  lay  down  for  you  a  plan  of  campaign,  but  simply  to  lay 
down  the  work  it  is  desirable  to  have  done,  and  leave  you  free  to  execute  in 
your  own  way.  Submit  to  me,  however,  as  early  as  you  can,  your  plan  of 
operations. 

As  stated  Banks  is  ordered  to  commence  operations  as  soon  as  he  can.  Gil- 
more  is  ordered  to  report  at  Fortress  Monroe  by  the  18th  inst.,  or  as  soon 
thereafter  as  practicable.  Sigel  is  concentrating  now.  None  will  move  from 
their  places  of  rendezvous  until  I  direct  except  Banks.  I  want  to  be  ready  to 
move  by  the  25th  inst.  if  possible ;  but  all  I  can  now  direct  is  that  you  get 
ready  as  soon  as  possible.  I  know  you  will  have  difficulties  to  encounter 
getting  through  the  mountains  to  where  supplies  are  abundant,  but  I  believe 
you  will  accomplish  it. 

From  the  expedition  from  the  Department  of  West  Virginia  I  do  not  cal 
culate  on  very  great  results,  but  it  is  the  only  way  I  can  take  troops  from 
there.  With  the  long  line  of  railroad  Sigel  has  to  protect  he  can  spare  no 
troops  except  to  move  directly  to  his  front.  In  this  way  he  must  get  through 
to  inflict  great  damage  on  the  enemy,  or  the  enemy  must  detach  from  one  of 
his  armies  a  large  force  to  prevent  it.  In  other  words,  if  Sigel  can't  skin 
himself,  he  can  hold  a  leg  whilst  some  one  else  skins. 

I  am,  General,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

General  Grant  had  assumed  command  of  all  the  armies  on 
the  17th  of  March,  and  before  the  month  closed  matured  his 
general  plans  for  the  Spring  campaign  and  sent  to  all  army 
commanders  a  map,  which  he  thus  describes  in  his  final  report 

of  operations : 

-N. 

"  The  accompanying  map,  a  copy  of  which  was  sent  to  General  Sherman 
and  other  comanders  in  March,  1864,  shows  by  red  lines  the  territory  occu 
pied  by  us  at  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion  and  at  the  opening  of  the 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  141 

campaign  of  1864,  while  those  in  blue  are  the  lines  which  it  was  proposed  to 
occupy." 

General  Sherman  thus  acknowledges  its  receipt: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  April  5,  1864.      J 

Colonel  C.  B.  COMSTOCK,  General  GRANT'S  Staff,  Washington,  D.  C. 

DEAR  COLONEL  :  Your  letter  of  March  26th  came  to  me  on  the  2d  inst., 
and  the  mail  brought  me  the  map  yesterday.  The  parcel  had  evidently  been 
opened  and  the  postmaster  had  marked  some  additional  postage  on  it.  I  will 
cause  inquiries  to  be  made  lest  the  map  has  been  seen  by  some  eye  intelligent 
enough  to  read  the  meaning  of  the  blue  and  red  lines.  We  can  not  be  too 
careful  in  these  matters. 

That  map  to  me  contains  more  information  and  ideas  than  a  volume  of 
printed  matter.  Keep  your  retained  copies  with  infinite  care,  and  if  you  have 
occasion  to  send  out  to  other  commanders  any  more  I  would  advise  a  special 
courier.  From  that  map  I  see  all,  and  glad  am  I  that  there  are  minds  now 
at  Washington  able  to  devise ;  and  for  my  part,  if  we  can  keep  our  counsels, 
I  believe  I  have  the  men  and  ability  to  march  square  up  to  the  position 
assigned  me,  and  to  hold  it.  Of  course,  it  will  cost  us  many  a  hard  day,  but 
I  believe  in  fighting  in  a  double  sense — first,  to  gain  physical  results,  and 
next,  to  inspire  respect  on  which  to  build  up  our  nation's  power. 

Of  course,  General  Grant  will  not  have  time  to  give  me  the  details  of  move 
ments  East,  and  the  times.  Concurrent  action  is  the  thing.  It  would  be  wise 
if  the  General,  through  you  or  some  educated  officer,  should  give  me  timely 
notice  of  all  contemplated  movements,  with  all  details  that  can  be  foreseen. 
I  now  know  the  results  aimed  at,  I  know  my  base  and  have  a  pretty  good 
idea  of  my  lines  of  operation.  No  time  shall  be  lost  in  putting  my  forces  in 
mobile  condition,  so  that  all  I  ask  is  notice  of  time,  that  all  over  the  grand 
theater  of  war  there  shall  be  simultaneous  action.  We  saw  the  beauty  of 
time  in  the  battle  of  Chattanooga,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  the  same  har 
mony  of  action  should  not  pervade  a  continent. 

I  am  well  pleased  with  Captain  Poe,  and  would  not  object  to  half  a  dozen 
thoroughly  educated  young  engineer  officers. 

I  am,  with  respect,  your  friend, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General  commanding. 

In  reply  to  further  letters  from  General  Grant,  setting  forth 
his  plans,  Sherman  wrote: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  April  10,  1864.      j 

Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  GRANT,  Commander-in- Chief,  Washington,  D.  C. 
DEAR  GENERAL:  Your  two  letters  of  April  4  are  now  before  me,  and 


142  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

afford  me  infinite  satisfaction.     That  we  are  now  all  to  act  on  a  common 
plan,  converging  on  a  common  center,  looks  like  enlightened  war. 

Like  yourself,  you  take  the  biggest  load,  and  from  me  you  shall  have 
thorough  and  hearty  cooperation.  I  will  not  let  side  issues  draw  me  off  from 
your  main  plans  in  which  I  am  to  knock  Joe  Johnston,  and  do  as  much 
damage  to  the  resources  of  the  enemy  as  possible.  I  have  heretofore  written 
to  General  Rawlins  and  Colonel  Comstock,  of  your  staff,  somewhat  of  the 
method  in  which  I  propose  to  act.  I  have  seen  all  my  army,  corps,  and 
division  commanders,  and  signified  only  to  the  former,  viz.:  Schofield,  Thomas, 
and  McPherson,  our  general  plans,  which  I  inferred  from  the  purport  of  our 
conversations  here  and  at  Cincinnati.  *  *  *  * 

Should  Johnston  fall  behind  Chattahoochee,  I  would  feign  to  the  right,  but 
pass  to  the  left  and  act  on  Atlanta  or  its  eastern  communications  according 
to  developed  facts. 

This  is  about  as  far  ahead  as  I  feel  disposed  to  look,  but  I  would  ever  bear 
in  mind  that  Johnston  is  at  all  times  to  be  kept  so  busy  that  he  can  not  in 
any  event  send  any  part  of  his  command  against  you  or  Banks. 

If  Banks  can  at  the  same  time  carry  Mobile  and  open  up  the  Alabama 
River,  he  will  in  a  measure  solve  the  most  difficult  part  of  my  problem — 
provisions.  But  in  that  I  must  venture.  Georgia  has  a  million  of  inhabi 
tants.  If  they  can  live  we  should  not  starve.  If  the  enemy  interrupt  my 
communications  I  will  be  absolved  from  all  obligations  to  subsist  on  our  own 
resources,  but  will  feel  perfectly  justified  in  taking  whatever  and  whenever  I 
can  find. 

I  will  inspire  my  command  if  successful,  with  my  feelings  that  beef  and 
salt  are  all  that  is  absolutely  necessary  to  life,  and  parched  corn  fed  General 
Jackson's  army  once  on  that  very  ground. 

As  ever,  your  friend  and  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

Under  date  of  Nashville,  April  16th,  1864,  General  Sher 
man  wrote  General  McPherson  as  follows : 

"I  take  it  for  granted  that,  unless  Banks  gets  out  of  Red  River  and 
attacks  Mobile  (which  is  a  material  part  of  General  Grant's  plan),  we  will 
have  to  fight  Folk's  army  as  well  as  Johnston's." 

Mobile  Bay  having  been  captured  a  few  weeks  before  the 
fall  of  Atlanta,  General  Grant,  a  few  days  after  General  Sher 
man  had  occupied  the  latter  place,  suggested  the  following 
modification  of  his  plan : 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  September  10,  1864. 
Major- General  SHERMAN  : 

As  soon  as  your  men  are  properly  rested,  and  preparations  can  be  made,  it 
is  desirable  that  another  campaign  should  be  commenced. 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  143 

We  want  to  keep  the  enemy  continually  pressed  to  the  end  of  the  war.  If 
we  give  him  no  peace  while  the  war  lasts,  the  end  can  not  be  far  distant. 
Now  that  we  have  all  of  Mobile  Bay  that  is  valuable,  I  do  not  know  but  it 
will  be  the  best  move  for  Major-General  Canby's  troops  to  act  upon  Savannah, 
while  you  move  on  Augusta.  I  should  like  to  hear  from  you,  however,  on 
this  matter.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

To  the  above  suggestion  Sherman  replied  that  it  would  risk 
his  whole  army  to  move  as  suggested  by  Grant,  unless  the 
latter  could  capture  the  Savannah  River  up  to  Augusta,  or  the 
Chattahoochee  up  to  Columbus.  The  following  is  this  reply, 
dated  September  10,  8  p.  M.: 

General  GRANT. 

I  have  your  dispatch  of  to-day.  My  command  need  some  rest  and  pay. 
Our  roads  are  also  broken  back  near  Nashville,  and  Wheeler  is  not  yet  dis 
posed  of.  Still  I  am  perfectly  alive  to  the  importance  of  pushing  our  advan 
tage  to  the  utmost.  I  do  not  think  we  can  afford  to  operate  further,  depend 
ent  on  the  railroad.  It  takes  so  many  men  to  guard  it,  and  even  then  it  is 
nightly  broken  by  the  enemy's  cavalry  that  swarms  about  us.  Macon  is 
distant  one  hundred  and  three  miles  and  Augusta  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
miles.  If  I  could  be  sure  of  finding  provisions  and  ammunition  at  Augusta 
or  Columbus,  Georgia,  I  can  march  to  Milledgeville  and  compel  Hood  to 
give  up  Augusta  or  Macon,  and  could  then  turn  on  the  other.  The  country 
will  afford  forage  and  many  supplies,  but  not  enough  in  any  one  place  to 
admit  of  a  delay.  In  scattering  for  forage  we  have  a  great  many  men  picked 
up  by  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

If  you  can  manage  to  take  the  Savannah  River  as  high  as  Augusta,  or  the 
Chattahoochee  as  far  up  as  Columbus,  I  can  sweep  the  whole  State  of  Georgia, 
otherwise  I  would  risk  our  whole  army  by  going  too  far  from  Atlanta. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General. 

In  reply  to  this  telegram  holding  that  there  would  be  great 
risk  in  moving  far  beyond  Atlanta,  Grant  wrote  at  length, 
under  date  of  September  12th,  stating  his  own  plans  for  move 
ments  East,  and  telling  Sherman  that  he  plainly  saw  the  diffi 
culties  in  supplying  his  army,  except  when  it  should  be 
constantly  moving  beyond.  The  following  extract  is  sufficient 
to  show  its  bearing  upon  the  question  now  under  discussion: 

"What  you  are  to  do  with  the  forces  at  your  command,  I  do  not  exactly 
see.  The  difficulties  of  supplying  your  army,  except  when  they  are  constantly 


144  THE   MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

moving  beyond  where  you  are,  I  plainly  see.  If  it  had  not  been  for  Price's 
movement,  Canby  could  have  sent  twelve  thousand  more  men  to  Mobile. 
From  your  command  on  the  Mississippi  an  equal  number  could  have  been 
taken.  With  these  forces,  my  idea  would  have  been  to  divide  them,  sending 
one-half  to  Mobile  and  the  other  half  to  Savannah.  You  could  then  move 
as  proposed  in  your  telegram,  so  as  to  threaten  Macon  and  Augusta  equally. 
Whichever  one  should  be  abandoned  by  the  enemy  you  could  take  and  open 
up  a  new  base  of  supplies."  *  *  *  * 

General  Sherman's  letter,  in  reply  to  the  above,  was  dated 
September  20th,  and  contains  these  extracts : 

"  Now  that  Mobile  is  shut  out  to  the  commerce  of  our  enemy,  it  calls  for 
no  further  effort  on  our  part,  unless  the  capture  of  the  city  can  be  followed 
by  the  occupation  of  the  Alabama  River  and  the  railroad  to  Columbus, 
Georgia,  when  that  place  would  be  a  magnificent  auxiliary  to  my  further 
progress  into  Georgia.  *  *  *  * 

"  If  successful,  I  suppose  that  Fort  Caswell  will  be  occupied,  and  the  fleet  at 
once  sent  to  the  Savannah  River.  Then  the  reduction  of  that  city  is  the  next 
question.  It  once  in  our  possession,  and  the  river  open  to  us,  I  would  not 
hesitate  to  cross  the  State  of  Georgia  with  sixty  thousand  men,  hauling  some 
stores  and  depending  on  the  country  for  the  balance.  Where  a  million  of 
people  find  subsistence,  my  army  won't  starve.  *  •••  *  * 

"  I  will,  therefore,  give  it  as  my  opinion  that  your  army  and  Canby's  should 
be  reenforced  to  the  maximum ;  that,  after  you  get  Wilmington,  you  should 
strike  for  Savannah  and  its  river;  that  General  Canby  should  hold  the 
Mississippi  River,  and  send  a  force  to  take  Columbus,  Georgia,  either  by  way 
of  the  Alabama  or  Appalachicola  River ;  that  I  should  keep  Hood  employed, 
and  put  my  army  in  fine  order  for  a  march  011  Augusta,  Columbia,  and 
Charleston,  and  start  as  soon  as  Wilmington  is  sealed  to  commerce,  and  the 
city  of  Savannah  is  in  our  possession.  *  *  *  * 

"  If  you  will  secure  Wilmington  and  the  city  of  Savannah  from  your 
center,  and  let  General  Canby  have  command  over  the  Mississippi  River  and 
the  country  west  of  it,  I  will  send  a  force  to  the  Alabama  and  Appalachicola, 
provided  you  give  me  one  hundred  thousand  of  the  drafted  men  to  fill  up  my 
old  regiments;  and  if  you  will  fix  a  day  to  be  in  Savannah  I  will  insure  our 
possession  of  Macon  and  a  point  on  the  river  below  Augusta."  *  *  * 

This  last  is  sufficiently  explicit  as  to  the  conditions  upon 
which  General  Sherman  was  willing  to  undertake  a  march  to 
the  sea. 

On  the  4th  of  October,  while  the  subject  of  Sherman's 
further  movement  from  Atlanta  was  under  consideration,  and 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  145 

three  weeks  before  the  time  he  now  claims  in  his  Memoirs 
that  he  had  fully  made  up  his  mind  in  regard  to  the  march  to 
Savannah,  General  Grant  wrote  the  following  letter  to  General 
Halleck,  both  in  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  original  plan  and 
the  modifications  suggested  by  the  success  in  Mobile  Bay : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  ) 
CITY  POINT,  VA.,  October  4,  1864.      J 

Major- General  HALLECK,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. 

GENERAL:  Your  letter  of  the  2d  inst.,  in  relation  to  the  movements  of  the 
Western  armies  and  the  preparations  ordered  by  the  staff  officers  of  General 
Canby,  is  received.  When  this  campaign  was  commenced  nothing  else  was 
in  contemplation  but  that  Sherman,  after  capturing  Atlanta,  should  connect 
with  Canby  at  Mobile.  Drawing  the  Nineteenth  Corps,  however,  from  Canby, 
and  the  movements  of  Kirby  Smith  demanding  the  presence  of  all  of  Canby's 
surplus  forces  in  another  direction,  has  made  it  impossible  to  carry  out  the  plan 
as  early  as  was  contemplated.  Any  considerable  force  to  cooperate  with 
Sherman  on  the  sea-coast  must  now  be  sent  from  here.  The  question  is 
whether,  under  such  circumstances,  Augusta  and  Savannah  would  not  be  a 
better  line  than  Selma,  Montgomery,  and  Mobile.  I  think  Savannah  might 
be  taken  by  surprise  with  one  corps  from  here  and  such  troops  as  Foster 
could  spare  from  the  Department  of  the  South.  This  is  my  view,  but  before 
giving  positive  orders  I  want  to  make  a  visit  to  Washington  and  consult  a 
little  on  the  subject..  All  Canby  can  do  with  his  present  force  is  to  make 
demonstrations  on  Mobile  and  up  the  Appalachicola  toward  Columbus.  He 
can  not  positively  have  the  force  to  require  the  transportation  your  letters 
would  indicate  he  has  called  for,  or  to  consume  the  supplies.  Either  line 
indicated  would  cut  off  the  supplies  from  the  rich  districts  of  Georgia,  Ala 
bama  and  Mississippi  equally  well.  Whichever  way  Sherman  moves  he  will 
undoubtedly  encounter  Hood's  army,  and  in  crossing  to  the  sea-coast  will 
sever  the  connection  between  Lee's  army  and  this  district  of  country.  I  wrote 
to  Sherman  on  this  subject,  sending  my  letter  by  a  staff  officer.  He  is  ready 
to  attempt  (and  feels  confident  of  his  ability  to  succeed)  to  make  his  way  to 
either  the  Savannah  Kiver  or  any  of  the  navigable  streams  emptying  into 
the  Atlantic  or  Gulf,  if  he  is  only  certain  of  finding  a  base  open  for  him  when 
he  arrives.  The  supplies  Canby  was  ordering,  I  presume,  were  intended  for  the 
use  of  Sherman's  army.  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  accumulate  them  in 
any  great  quantity  until  the  base  to  which  he  is  to  make  his  way  is  secured. 
Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

That  General  Sherman  had  heard  nothing  of  the  plan  for 
the  Spring  campaign  up  to  the  time  of  his  arrival  in  Nash- 
10 


146  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

ville,  about  the  17th  of  March,  1864,  is  quite  evident  from 
the  following  extracts  from  one  of  his  own  letters : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  TENNESSEE,} 
MEMPHIS,  March  Uth,  1864.      j 

Maj 'or- General  McPHERSON,  commanding,  etc.,  Vicksburg. 

DEAR  GENERAL:  *  *  *  *  I  am  summoned  by  General  Grant 
to  be  in  Nashville  on  the  17th,  and  it  will  keep  me  moving  night  and  day  to 
get  there  by  that  date.  *  *  *  * 

I  don't  know,  as  yet,  the  grand  strategy  of  the  next  campaign,  but  on 
arrival  at  Nashville  I  will  soon  catch  the  main  points,  and  will  advise  you  of 
them.  *  *  *  *  I  am  truly  your  friend, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  commanding. 

These  various  extracts  from  the  records  show  conclusively 
that  a  campaign  from  Chattanooga  through  to  the  Gulf, 
originated  with  General  Grant,  and  that  he  subsequently 
modified  it  on  account  of  the  control  of  Mobile  having  been 
secured  before  Atlanta  was  captured.  It  will  now  be  made 
to  appear  that  the  discussion  which  took  place  between  Gen 
eral  Sherman  and  General  Grant  was  not  over  the  question 
whether  a  march  to  the  sea  should  be  made,  but  whether  it 
should  be  undertaken  before  Hood's  army  was  overthrown, 
this  army  having  passed  to  General  Sherman's  rear.  As  soon 
as  the  last  move  of  the  enemy  had  developed  itself,  and 
Thomas  had  been  sent  back  to  shoulder  the  responsibility 
of  taking  care  of  him,  General  Sherman  became  strongly 
possessed  with  the  idea  of  marching  through  to  the  sea 
without  first  destroying  Hood.  He  saw  no  risk  in  leaving 
Atlanta,  and  no  longer  seemed  to  think  it  necessary  for  Grant 
to  first  take  Savannah,  and  Canby  to  take  Columbus.  Any 
route  through  Georgia,  in  the  absence  of  Hood,  was,  as 
General  Sherman  expressed  it  in  a  telegram  to  Grant  (not 
given-  in  the  Memoirs),  "all  open,  with  no  serious  enemy  to 
oppose  at  present.77 

Then  the  discussion  between  Sherman  and  Grant  already 
alluded  to  began. 

Finally,    by    underestimating   Hood's   forces,   and    largely 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  147 

overestimating  those  proposed  to  be  left  with  Thomas,  Sher 
man  obtained  the  desired  permission,  and  when  Grant  had 
thus  been  made  to  believe  that  Thomas  would  have  ample 
force  to  meet  Hood  in  the  field  and  destroy  him,  and  not  till 
then,  did  he  allow  Sherman  to  go. 

The  overestimates  of  Thomas'  forces,  and  underestimates 
of  Hood's  were  as  follows: 

November  1st  Sherman  telegraphed  Grant  (the  dispatch 
not  being  given  in  the  Memoirs),  that  Hood's  force  was 
thirty  thousand  infantry,  and  from  seven  to  ten  thousand 
cavalry,  and  that  General  Thomas  would  have  (according  to 
a  summary  of  General  Sherman's  figures,  as  given  in  detail 
in  this  dispatch),  from  fifty-three  to  sixty  thousand,  beside 
a  large  force  of  cavalry — now  stated  in  the  Memoirs  to  have 
been  about  ten  thousand — thus  representing  to  General  Grant 
that  Hood's  whole  force  was  only  from  thirty-seven  to  forty 
thousand,  while  Thomas  had  from  sixty-three  to  seventy 
thousand.  In  the  same  dispatch  he  informed  Grant  that  he 
had  retained  only  fifty  thousand  men  for  his  March  to  the  Sea, 
when,  as  the  official  returns  now  printed  in  his  Memoirs 
(Vol.  II,  page  172),  show,  he  retained  over  sixty-two  thousand. 

No  wonder  General  Grant  was  finally  persuaded  to  give  up 
that  part  of  his  plan  which,  for  its  first  step,  involved  the 
destruction  of  Hood. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  book  (Vol.  II,  page  162),  as  already 
quoted,  now  that  he  deems  it  necessary  for  history  to  vindicate 
his  march  away  from  the  very  enemy  that  for  five  months 
had  so  stoutly  resisted  his  combined  forces,  thus  allowing  Hood 
to  turn  upon  the  fragments  left  for  General  Thomas  to  gather 
up,  states  the  forces  available  to  General  Thomas  for  a  fight 
at  Nashville  at  from  sixty-five  to  seventy-one  thousand,  beside 
seventeen  thousand  seven  hundred  cavalry,  or  a  total  force 
of  from  eighty-two  thousand  seven  hundred  to  eighty-eight 
thousand  seven  hundred.  This  appears  from  a  summary  of 
his  figures  and  not  in  direct  terms. 

The  official  returns  of  the  forces  actually  available  for  the 


148  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

battle  of  Nashville,  which  returns  were  at  General  Sherman's 
service  when  he  prepared  the  above  figures,  are  as  follows: 
Infantry,  forty-one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  fifteen ;  cav 
alry,  ten  thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-six ;  artillery, 
three  thousand  and  sixty-one;  total,  fifty-five  thousand  four 
hundred  and  seventy-two,  or  twenty-seven  thousand  two 
hundred  and  twenty-eight  less  than  Sherman's  lowest  estimate. 
A  few  extracts  from  General  Thomas'  report  of  his  cam 
paign  will  test  all  the  above  statements  of  Sherman : 

"  At  this  time  I  found  myself  confronted  by  the  army  which,  under  General 
J.  E.  Johnston,  had  so  skillfully  resisted  the  advance  of  the  whole  active 
army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  from  Dal  ton  to  the  Chatta- 
hoochee,  reenforced  by  a  well  equipped  and  enthusiastic  cavalry  command 
of  over  twelve  thousand  (12,000),  led  by  one  of  the  boldest  and  most  successful 
commanders  in  the  rebel  army.  My  information  from  all  sources  confirmed 
the  reported  strength  of  Hood's  army  to  be  from  forty  to  forty-five  thousand 
infantry,  and  from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  cavalry.  My  effective  force,  at 
this  time,  consisted  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  about  twelve  thousand  (12,000), 
under  Major-General  D.  S.  Stanley;  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  about  ten 
thousand  (10,000),  under  Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield;  Hatch's  division 
of  cavalry,  about  four  thousand  (4,000) ;  Croxton's  brigade,  twenty -five  hun 
dred  (2,500),  and  Capron's  brigade,  of  about  twelve  hundred  (1,200).  The 
balance  of  my  force  was  distributed  along  the  railroad,  and  posted  at  Mur- 
freesboro,  Stevenson,  Bridgeport,  Huntsville,  Decatur,  and  Chattanooga,  to 
keep  open  our  communications,  and  hold  the  posts  above  named,  if  attacked, 
until  they  could  be  reenforced,  as  up  to  this  time  it  was  impossible  to 
determine  which  course  Hood  would  take — advance  on  Nashville,  or  turn 
toward  Huntsville.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  was  manifestly  best  to  act 
on  the  defensive  until  sufficiently  reenforced  to  justify  taking  the  offen 
sive.  *  *  *  * 

"  It  was  therefore  with  considerable  anxiety  that  we  watched  the  forces  at 
Florence  to  discover  what  course  they  would  pursue  with  regard  to  General 
Sherman's  movements,  determining  thereby  whether  the  troops  under  my 
command,  numbering  less  than  half  those  under  Hood,  were  to  act  on  the 
defensive  in  Tennessee,  or  to  take  the  offensive  in  Alabama.  *  *  *  * 
The  possibility  of  Hood's  forces  following  General  Sherman  was  now  at  an 
end,  and  I  quickly  took  measures  to  act  on  the  defensive.  Two  divisions  of 
infantry,  under  Major-General  A.  J.  Smith,  were  reported  on  their  way  to 
join  me  from  Missouri,  which,  with  several  one-year  regiments  then  arriving 
in  the  Department,  and  detachments  collected  from  points  of  minor  import 
ance,  would  swell  my  command  when  concentrated  to  an  army  nearly  as 
large  as  that  of  the  enemy.  *  *  *  * 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  149 

"My  only  resource  then  was  to  retire  slowly  toward  my  reinforcements, 
delaying  the  enemy's  progress  as  much  as  possible  to  gain  time  foJ  reenforce- 
ments  to  arrive  and  concentrate.  *  *  *  Since  the  departure  of 

General  Sherman  about  seven  thousand  (7,000)  men  belonging  to  his  column 
had  collected  at  Chattanooga,  comprising  convalescents  returning  to  their 
commands  and  men  returning  from  furlough. 

"These  men  had  been  organized  into  brigades  to  be  made  available  at  such 
points  as  they  might  be  needed.  My  command  had  also  been  reenforced  by 
twenty  (20)  new  one-year  regiments,  most  of  which,  however,  were  absorbed 
in  replacing  old  regiments  whose  term  of  service  had  expired." 

The  very  dispatch  which  General  Sherman  quotes  as  Grant's 
assent  to  the  march,  shows  that  he  gave  it  upon  the  ground 
that  Thomas,  with  the  force  Sherman  said  he  had  left  him, 
could  destroy  Hood.  This  telegram  was  in  reply  to  one  of 
November  1st,  given  just  above,  mis-stating  Thomas7  avail 
able  force.  After  saying  he  had  telegraphed  Sherman  on  the 
same  day  that  Hood's  army  should  be  looked  upon  as  the 
"object,"  the  dispatch  continued: 

"With  the  force,  however,  that  you  have  left  with  General  Thomas,  he 
must  be  able  to  take  care  of  Hood  and  destroy  him.  *  *  *  *  I  say, 
then,  go  on  as  you  propose." 

General  Sherman  interprets  the  last  clause  of  this  order  as 
if  it  read :  "  Go  on  and  execute  the  March  to  the  Sea,  which 
you  have  originated,"  when,  in  fact,  he  should  have  interpreted 
it:  aYou  propose  to  march  without  first  destroying  Hood. 
As  Thomas  can  now  take  care  of  him,  I  say  go." 

There  is  an  expression  in  the  congratulatory  order  issued 
by  General  Sherman  to  his  army,  after  reaching  Savannah, 
which  can  not  well  be  explained  in  accordance  with  his  theory 
that  he  planned  the  March  to  the  Sea.  Speaking  of  Hood's 
movement  to  his  rear  as  an  attempt  to  decoy  him  out  of 
Georgia,  General  Sherman  in  that  order  wrote : 

"  But  we  were  not  thus  to  be  led  away  by  him,  and  preferred  to  lead  and 
control  events  ourselves.  Generals  Thomas  and  Schofield,  commanding  the 
departments  to  our  rear,  returned  to  their  posts  and  prepared  to  decoy  Gen 
eral  Hood  into  their  meshes,  while  we  came  on  to  complete  the  original 
journey."  *  *  *  * 


150  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

When  General  Sherman  wrote  of  our  "  original  journey," 
he  may  have  had  in  mind  a  letter  he  sent  General  Banks,  then 
in  Louisiana,  dated  Nashville,  April  3,  1864.  It  contained 
the  following  paragraph : 

"  All  is  well  in  this  quarter,  and  I  hope  by  the  time  you  turn  against 
Mobile  our  forces  will  again  act  toward  the  same  end,  though  from  distant 
points.  General  Grant,  now  having  lawful  control,  will  doubtless  see  that 
all  minor  objects  are  disregarded,  and  that  all  the  armies  act  on  a  common 
plan." 

Two  weeks  before  this  he  had  returned  from  the  Cincinnati 
conference  with  General  Grant,  where  the  latter  communicated 
to  him  the  plan  of  the  Atlanta  campaign  and  the  movement 
beyond  to  Mobile,  as  he  had  in  the  previous  January  made 
them  known  to  Generals  Halleck  and  Thomas.  As  will  be 
seen  these  letters  were  written  about  a  month  before  the  open 
ing  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  and  over  five  months  before  the 
date  claimed  by  General  Sherman  as  the  earliest  time  when  he 
had  the  March  to  the  Sea  in  his  "  mind's  eye." 

There  are  some  singular  and  important  omissions  in  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  story.  On  page  166,  after  quoting  Grant's 
dispatch  of  November  2d,  given  above,  he  says:  "This  [No 
vember  2d]  was  the  first  time  that  General  Grant  assented  to 
the  March  to  the  Sea." 

And  yet,  on  November  1st,  as  appears  in  a  dispatch  to 
General  Grant,  given  in  one  of  General  Sherman's  published 
reports,  he  said: 

"Hood's  cavalry  may  do  a  good  deal  of  damage,  and  I  have  sent  Wilson 
back  with  all  dismounted  cavalry,  retaining  only  about  four  thousand  five 
hundred.  This  is  the  best  I  can  do,  and  shall  therefore,  when  I  get  to  Atlanta 
the  necessary  stores,  move  south  as  soon  as  possible." 

Was  he  going  without  the  permission  which  he  here  says  he 
did  not  receive  until  November  2d  ? 

The  fact  is,  however,  that,  notwithstanding  the  statement 
that  Grant's  dispatch  of  November  2d  was  his  first  assent  to 
the  March,  he  had  really  given  such  assent  three  weeks 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  151 

before,   in   the    following   answer  to   Sherman's  telegram  of 
October  llth,  heretofore  quoted: 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  October  11,  1864,  11:30  P.  M. 
Major- General  SHERMAN. 

Your  dispatch  of  to-day  received.  If  you  are  satisfied  the  trip  to  the  sea- 
coast  can  be  made,  holding  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  River  firmly,  you  may 
make  it,  destroying  all  the  railroad  south  of  Dalton  or  Chattanooga,  as  you 
think  best.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

In  this  permission  also,  the  condition  of  holding  Tennessee 
firmly  against  Hood  is  prominent. 

The  next  day  General  Grant  again  telegraphed  as  follows: 

CITY  POINT,  October  12,  1864,  1  P.  M. 
General  SHERMAN,  Kingston. 

On  reflection  I  think  better  of  your  proposition.  It  will  be  much  better  to 
go  south  than  to  be  forced  to  come  north.  You  will,  no  doubt,  clear  the 
country  where  you  go  of  railroad  tracks  and  supplies.  *  *  *  * 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

General  Sherman,  on  page  154,  says  he  received  no  answrer 
to  his  Kingston  dispatch  "  at  the  tim'e."  The  reason  is  obvi 
ous.  It  was  dated  11:30  p.  M.  of  the  llth,  and  the  next  day 
Sherman  left  for  Eome.  His  telegraphic  communications 
with  Kingston  and  with  Washington,  however,  remained 
perfect,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  a  dispatch  from  the  Lieuten- 
ant-General,  directing  the  march  of  an  army  through  to  the 
sea-coast,  would  be  long  delayed.  If  he  had  never  received 
it  in  the  field,  however,  he  need  not  now  have  made  the  above 
mistake  of  three  weeks  in  so  important  a  date,  since  General 
Grant's  reply  of  October  llth  was  printed  in  full  in  his  final 
report  of  the  operations  of  the  armies. 

On  page  157  Sherman  says:  aSo  it  is  clear  that  at  that 
date  [October  17]  neither  General  Grant  nor  General  Thomas 
heartily  favored  my  proposed  plan  of  campaign."  And  yet 
the  day  before  this  he  had  telegraphed  Halleck: 

"I  got  the  dispatch  in  cipher  about  providing  me  a  place  to  come  out  on 
salt  water,  but  the  cipher  is  imperfect,  and  I  can  not  make  out  whether 


152  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

Savannah  or  Mobile  be  preferred;  but  I  also  want  to  know  if  you  are  willing 
that  I  should  destroy  Atlanta  and  the  railroad." 

And  on  this  very  date  (October  17)  he  had  received  the 
following  from  General  Grant: 

"The  moment  I  know  you  have  started  south,  stores  will  be  shipped  to 
Hilton  Head,  where  there  are  transports  ready  to  take  them  to  meet  you  at 
Savannah.  In  case  you  go  south  I  would  not  propose  holding  any  thing 
south  of  Chattanooga,  certainly  not  south  of  Dalton.  Destroy  in  such  case 
all  of  military  value  in  Atlanta." 

As  early  as  October  13th,  two  weeks  before  General  Sher 
man  claims  that  he  finally  decided  on  this  march,  General 
Grant  had  ordered  cooperating  forces  to  proceed  to  the  coast 
below  Savannah  and  move  inland  against  the  Gulf  Railroad. 
This  appears  in  the  following  from  Halleck  to  Grant,  dated 
Washington,  October  22d : 

"I  had  prepared  instructions  to  General  Canby  to  move  all  available 
forces  in  Mobile  Bay  and  elsewhere  to  Brunswick  and  up  the  Savannah  and 
Gulf  Kailroad,  as  directed  by  you  on  the  13th,  but  on  learning  that  Sher 
man's  operations  were  uncertain  I  withheld  the  order." 

October  19th  Sherman  telegraphed  Thomas: 

*  *  *  *  "  I  propose  with  the  Armies  of  Ohio,  Tennessee,  and 
two  corps  of  this,  to  sally  forth  and  make  a  hole  in  Georgia  and  Alabama 
that  will  be  hard  to  mend.  I  will,  probably,  about  November  1st,  break  up 
the  railroads  and  bridges,  destroy  Atlanta,  and  make  a  break  for  Mobile,  Sa 
vannah,  or  Charleston."  *  *  *  * 

Under  date  of  October  19,  1864,  General  Sherman  wrote 
General  Halleck  as  follows : 

"  I  must  have  alternatives ;  else,  being  confined  to  one  route,  the  enemy 
might  so  oppose,  that  delay  and  want  would  trouble  me ;  but,  having  alterna 
tives,  I  can  take  so  eccentric  a  course  that  no  general  can  guess  my  objective. 
Therefore,  when  you  hear  I  am  off,  have  lookouts  at  Morris  Island,  S.  C., 
Ossabaw  Sound,  Ga.,  Pensacola  and  Mobile  Bays.  I  will  turn  up  somewhere, 
and,  believe  me,  I  can  take  Macon,  Milledgeville,  Augusta,  and  Savannah, 
Ga.,  and  wind  up  with  closing  the  neckband  of  Charleston  so  that  they  will 
ctarve  out. 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  153 

"This  movement  is  not  purely  military  or  strategic,  but  it  will  illustrate 
the  vulnerability  of  the  South." 

Colonel  Bowman,  in  his  "  Sherman  and  his  Campaigns,"  a 
work  written  in  the  interest  of  Sherman,  commenting  upon 
the  above  letter,  says: 

"General  Grant  promptly  authorized  the  proposed  movement,  indicating, 
however,  his  preference  for  Savannah  as  the  objective,  and  fixing  Dalton  as 
the  northern  limit  for  the  destruction  of  the  railway." 

To  this  alternative  letter  Halleck  replied,  under  date  of 
October  31 : 

"  The  alternatives  mentioned  in  your  letter  of  October  19th  will  be  pre 
pared  for  by  boats  at  Hilton  Head  and  Pensacola,  with  means  of  transporta 
tion  to  any  point  where  required." 

Certain  correspondence,  which  passed  between  General 
Sherman  before  Atlanta  and  General  Canby  before  Mobile, 
has  a  forcible  bearing  upon  the  questions  under  consideration. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  this  correspondence  began  some  weeks 
before  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  and  related  to  a  move  beyond 
upon  Montgomery: 

NEAR  ATLANTA,  August  17,  1864. 
Major- General  CANBY,  Mobile. 

Dispatch  of  the  6th  received.  *  *  *  *  If  possible  the  Alabama 
River  should  be  possessed  by  us  in  connection  with  my  movement.  I  could 
easily  open  communication  to  Montgomery,  but  I  doubt  if  you  will  have 
troops  enough  until  the  September  draft.  I  can  press  on  Atlanta  good,  but 
I  do  not  want  Kirby  Smith  here.  *  *  *  * 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

NEW  ORLEANS,  August  27th.     By  way  of  CAIRO,  September  9th, ) 
Received  at  HEADQUARTERS,  September  29,  1804.      ) 

Major- General  SHERMAN. 

*  *  *  #  I  have  a  reserve  of  twelve  thousand  men  up  the  river  to 
watch  Kirby  Smith.  I  do  not  think  he  can  cross  in  any  force  without  being 
discovered  in  time  to  prevent  it,  but  I  can  not  use  this  force  against  Mobile 
and  prevent  a  passage. 

The  route  you  suggested  has  been  considered,  and  with  twenty  thousand 
men  we  could  control  the  Alabama  Kiver  from  Mobile  to  Montgomery.  * 


154  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

*      *      *      I  will  keep  the  enemy  about  Mobile  uneasy,  and  will  act  against 
the  city  and  river  the  moment  I  can  gather  a  sufficient  force. 

ED.  K.  CANBY,  Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI.     IN  THE  FIELD,  j 
ATLANTA,  GEORGIA,  September  10,  1864.      j 

General  CANBY,  New  Orleans. 

Dispatch  of  the  27th  received.  I  got  to  Atlanta  by  a  couple  of  good 
moves.  You  succeeded  at  Fort  Morgan  sooner  than  I  expected.  We  must 
have  the  Alabama  River  now,  and  also  the  Appalachicola  at  the  old  arsenal, 
and  up  to  Columbus.  My  line  is  so  long  now  that  it  is  impossible  to  protect 
it  against  cavalry  raids;  but  if  we  can  get  Montgomery  and  Columbus, 
Georgia,  as  bases  in  connection  with  Atlanta,  we  have  Georgia  and  Alabama 
at  our  feet.  You  ought  to  have  more  men,  and  it  is  a  burning  shame  that  at 
this  epoch  we  should  need  men,  for  the  North  is  full  of  them. 

They  can  raise  a  political  convention  any  time  of  fifty  to  one  hundred 
thousand  men,  and  yet  they  pretend  they  can  not  give  us  what  we  want.  But 
keep  at  it,  and  I  only  want  to  express  my  idea  that  I  would  not  bother  with 
the  city  of  Mobile,  which  will  simply  absorb  a  garrison  for  you,  but  Avould 
use  the  Tensas  channel  and  notify  General  Gardner,  of  the  rebel  army,  to 
maintain  good  order,  etc.,  in  the  now  useless  streets  of  Mobile. 

I  will  be  ready  to  sally  forth  again  in  October,  but  ought  to  have  some 
assurance  that,  in  case  of  necessity,  I  can  swing  into  Appalachicola  or  Mont 
gomery,  and  find  friends. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  commanding. 

By  telegrnph  from  NEW  ORLEANS,  j 
17th  September,  via  CAIRO,  24th.     j 
Major-General  SHERMAN. 

Your  dispatch  of  the  10th  has  just  been  received.  The  plans  you  suggested 
have  been  under  consideration,  and  preparations  are  now  in  progress. 

I  think  I  can  give  you  the  assurance  that  you  will  find  friends  in  Mobile, 
if  the  trouble  in  Arkansas  River  should  be  soon  ended,  how  far  east  of  that 
will  depend  upon  the  reinforcements  that  can  be  spared  for  this  command? 

ED.  R.  CANBY,  Major-General. 

KINGSTON,  GEORGIA,  November  7, 1864. 
General  CANBY,  New  Orleans. 

Beauregard  has  left  Georgia  altogether  and  shifted  across  to  the  neighbor 
hood  of  Florence,  Alabama,  threatening  to  invade  Tennessee.  We  are  all 
ready  for  him  there,  and  I  have  still  an  army  with  which  to  go  on.  If  you 
hear  I  have  destroyed  Atlanta  and  marched  south,  be  prepared  with  boats  to 
send  me  supplies  from  Ponchartrain,  and  have  the  navy  look  out  for  my  fires 
and  rocket  signals  along  the  east  side  of  Mobile  Bay,  as  high  up  as  Old 
Blakely.  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  155 

The  last  letter  written  by  General  Sherman  to  General 
Grant  before  cutting  loose  from  Atlanta,  was  dated  November 
6th.  It  is  referred  to  in  the  Memoirs,  but  not  quoted.  It 
contains  the  following  significant  passages: 

"  The  only  question  in  my  mind  is  whether  I  ought  not  to  have  dogged  him 
[Hood]  far  over  into  Mississippi,  *  *  *  *  but  then  I  thought  that 
by  so  doing  I  would  play  into  his  hands  by  being  drawn  or  decoyed  too  far 
away  from  our  original  line  of  advance." 

And  again,  he  argues  for  a  movement  on  Pensacola  and 
Mobile  as  follows : 

"Admitting  this  reasoning  to  be  good,  that  such  a  movement  [to  the  sea] 
per  se  be  right ;  still  there  may  be  reasons  why  one  route  would  be  better  than 
another.  There  are  three  from  Atlanta — south-east,  south,  and  south-west — 
all  open,  with  no  serious  enemy  to  oppose  at  present. 

"  The  first  would  carry  me  across  the  only  east  and  west  railroad  remaining 
to  the  Confederacy,  which  would  be  destroyed,  and  thereby  the  communica 
tions  between  the  armies  of  Lee  and  Beauregard  severed.  Incidentally  I 
might  destroy  the  enemy's  depots  at  Macon  and  Augusta,  and  reach  the  sea 
shore  at  Charleston  or  Savannah,  from  either  of  which  points  I  could  ree'n- 
force  our  armies  in  Virginia. 

"  The  second  and  easiest  route  would  be  due  south,  following  substantially 
the  valley  of  Flint  River,  which  is  very  fertile  and  well  supplied,  and  fetching 
up  on  the  navigable  waters  of  the  Appalachicola,  destroying  en  route  the  same 
railroad,  taking  up  the  prisoners  of  war  still  at  Andersonville,  and  destroying 
about  four  hundred  thousand  (400,000)  bales  of  cotton  near  Albany  and  Fort 
Gaines. 

"  This,  however,  would  leave  the  army  in  a  bad  position  for  future  move 
ments. 

"  The  third,  down  the  Chattahoochee  to  Opelika  and  Montgomery,  thence  to 
Pensacola  or  Tensas  Bayou,  in  communication  with  Fort  Morgan. 

"This  latter  route  would  enable  me  at  once  to  cooperate  with  Gen 
eral  Can  by  in  the  reduction  of  Mobile,  and  occupation  of  the  line  of  the 
Alabama. 

"  In  my  judgment  the  first  would  have  a  material  effect  upon  your  cam 
paign  in  Virginia ;  the  second  would  be  the  safest  of  execution  ;  but  the  third 
would  more  properly  fall  within  the  sphere  of  my  own  command,  and  have  a 
direct  bearing  upon  my  own  enemy,  '  Beauregard.'  If,  therefore,  I  should 
start  before  I  hear  further  from  you,  or  before  further  developments  turn  my 
course,  you  may  take  it  for  granted  that  I  have  moved  via  Griffin  to  Barnes- 
ville ;  that  I  break  up  the  road  between  Columbus  and  Macon  good',  and  then, 
if  I  feign  on  Columbus,  will  move  via  Macon  and  Milieu  to  Savannah;  or, 


156  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

if  I  feign  on  Macon,  you  may  take  it  for  granted  that  I  have  shot  off  toward 
Opelika,  Montgomery  and  Mobile  Bay  or  Pensacola." 

The  following  extracts  from  the  final  report  of  General 
Grant,  dated  Washington,  July  22,  1865,  bear  pointedly 
upon  the  questions  under  consideration.  In  describing  the 
combined  movements  ordered  for  the  Spring  of  1864,  he 

says : 

"  General  Sherman  was  instructed  to  move  against  Johnston's  army,  break 
it  up,  and  to  go  into  the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country  as  far  as  he  could, 
inflicting  all  the  damage  he  could  upon  their  war  resources.  If  the  enemy 
in  his  front  showed  signs  of  joining  Lee,  to  follow  him  up  to  the  full  extent 
of  his  ability,  while  I  would  prevent  the  concentration  of  Lee  upon  him,  if  it 
was  in  the  power  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  do  so.  More  specific 
instructions  were  not  given,  for  the  reason  that  I  had  talked  over  with  him 
the  plans  of  the  campaign,  and  was  satisfied  that  he  understood  them  and 
would  execute  them  to  the  fullest  extent  possible." 

And  again : 

"It  was  the  original  design  to  hold  Atlanta,  and  by  getting  through  to  the 
coast,  with  a  garrison  left  on  the  southern  railroads,  leading  east  and  west 
through  Georgia,  to  effectually  sever  the  East  from  the  West. 

"  In  other  words,  cut  the  would-be  Confederacy  in  two  again,  as  it  had  been 
cut  once  by  our  gaining  possession  of  the  Mississippi  Eiver.  General  Sher 
man's  plan  virtually  effected  this  object." 

That  part  of  Sherman's  plan  here  referred  to,  is  his  propo 
sition  to  march  through  Georgia  without  holding  Atlanta. 

The  above  citations  from  the  official  records,  and  chiefly 
from  those  in  General  Sherman's  possession,  are  quite  sufficient 
to  show  that  the  correct  history  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  is 
not  given  in  the  Memoirs. 

There  was  this  important  difference  between  Grant's  plan 
and  Sherman's:  Grant's  contemplated  a  prior  destruction  of 
Hood's  army.  Sherman's  was  a  march  away  from  an  enemy. 
This  branch  of  the  subject  will  be  treated  at  length  in  a  subse 
quent  chapter. 

The  records  thus  far  produced  are  sufficient  to  show  that 
General  Grant,  while  still  in  command  at  Nashville,  and  two 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  157 

months  before  his  promotion  as  Lieutenant-General,  had 
planned  a  movement  from  Chattanooga  through  to  Mobile, 
and  that  he  then  had  in  mind  a  cooperation  on  the  part  of  the 
Eastern  armies.  There  are  records  to  show,  further,  that  in  the 
preceding  November  he  was  contemplating  a  concert  of  action 
between  these  armies,  and  his  idea  was  to  secure  a  commander 
for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  who  would  act  in  full  accord 
with  him.  He  settled  upon  W.  F.  Smith  as  that  officer,  and 
thus  urged  his  promotion: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
CHATTANOOGA,  TENN.,  November  12,  1863.      J 

Hon.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

I  would  respectfully  recommend  that  Brigadier-General  W.  F.  Smith  be 
placed  first  on  the  list  for  promotion  to  the  rank  of  Major-General.  He  is 
possessed  of  one  of  the  clearest  heads  in  the  army,  is  very  practical  and 
industrious.  No  man  in  the  service  is  better  qualified  than  he  for  our  largest 
commands.  I  have  the  honor,  etc., 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THK  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
CHATTANOOGA,  TENNESSEE,  November  30,  1863.      j 

His  Excellency,  A.  LINCOLN,  President  of  the  United  States. 

In  a  previous  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  I  recommended 
Brigadier-General  W.  F.  Smith  for  promotion.  Becent  events  have  entirely 
satisfied  me  of  his  great  capacity  and  merits,  and  I  hasten  to  renew  the 
recommendation  and  to  urge  it.  The  interests  of  the  public  service  would 
be  better  subserved  by  this  promotion  than  the  interests  of  General  Smith 
himself.  My  reason  for  writing  this  letter  now  is  to  ask  that  W.  F.  Smith's 
name  be  placed  first  on  the  list  for  promotion  of  all  those  previously  recom 
mended  by  me.  I  have  the  honor,  etc., 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-General. 

His  object  in  making  these  recommendations  appears  from 
further  correspondence. 

Early  in  December  he  wrote  General  Halleck  expressing 
the  opinion  that  East  Tennessee  and  his  immediate  front  were 
safe;  that  the  roads  were  such  that  extensive  movements  in 
that  latitude  were  impossible  for  either  army,  and  so  a  small 
force  could  hold  his  lines  while  he  should  move  on  Mobile, 
and  thus  greatly  advance  the  Spring  operations.  In  this  letter 


158  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

his  intention  of  including  Mobile  in  his  plan  of  a  movement 
in  the  Spring  from  Chattanooga,  also  appears.  Omitting  the 
description  of  the  general  situation,  it  is  as  follows: 

CHATTANOOGA,  December  7,  1863. 
Major- General  HALLECK,  Washington. 

*  *  *  *  I  feel  unwilling,  or  rather  desirous  to  avoid  keeping  so 
large  a  force  idle  for  many  months.  I  take  the  liberty  of  suggesting  a  plan 
of  campaign  that  I  think  will  go  far  toward  breaking  down  the  rebellion 
before  Spring.  It  will  at  least  keep  the  enemy  harassed,  and  prevent  that 
reorganization  which  could  be  effected  by  Spring  if  left  unimpeded. 

I  propose,  with  the  concurrence  of  higher  authority,  to  move  by  way  of 
New  Orleans  and  Pascagoula  on  Mobile.  I  would  hope  to  secure  that  place, 
or  its  investment  by  the  last  of  January.  Should  the  enemy  make  an 
obstinate  resistance  at  Mobile,  I  would  fortify  outside  and  leave  a  garrison 
sufficient  to  hold  the  garrison  of  the  town,  and  with  the  balance  of  the  army 
make  a  campaign  into  the  interior  of  Alabama  and  possibly  Georgia.  The 
campaign  of  course  would  be  suggested  by  the  movements  of  the  enemy.  It 
seems  to  me  this  move  would  secure  the  entire  States  of  Alabama  and  Missis 
sippi,  and  a  part  of  Georgia,  or  force  Lee  to  abandon  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina.  Without  his  force  the  enemy  have  not  got  army  enough  to  resist 
the  army  I  can  take. 

I  am  General,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major-General. 

The  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  having  visited  General 
Grant,  and  talked  over  the  question  of  this  campaign,  re 
turned  to  Washington  and  reported  fully  to  the  authorities. 

General  Halleck  then  telegraphed  General  Grant  as  follows: 

WASHINGTON,  December  21,  1863,  4:30  P.  M. 

Major-General  II.  S.  GRANT. 

As  I  understand  from  your  dispatch  of  the  7th,  and  from  conversation  with 
Mr.  Dana,  you  propose  : 

1.  To  expel  the  enemy  from  East  Tennessee,  and  to  provide  against  his 
return  into  that  valley. 

2.  To  either  force  the  rebels  further  back  into  Georgia  or  to  provide  against 
their  return  by  that  line  into  Tennessee. 

3.  To  clean  out  West  Tennessee. 

4.  To  move  a  force  down  the  Mississippi  and  operate  against  Mobile. 
The  importance  of  these  objects  is  considered  to  be  in  the  order  above 

stated.  It  is  thought  that  the  fourth  should  not  be  definitely  determined 
upon  till  the  other  three  are  accomplished,  or  their  accomplishment  made 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  159 

reasonably  certain.  Moreover,  circumstances  may  be  such  by  the  time  that 
your  spare  forces  reach  Port  Hudson  or  New  Orleans  as  to  require  their 
services  west  of  the  Mississippi.  If  so,  the  latter  part  of  the  plan  would  be 
somewhat  varied,  or  its  execution  delayed. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief. 

The  communication  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  which  pre 
sented  the  matter  at  greater  length,  shows  that  the  question 
of  putting  General  "W.  F.  Smith  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  had  been  thoroughly  discussed,  and  Grant, 
the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Halleck 
agreed  that  it  would  be  better  to  select  Smith  than  General 
Sherman : 

WASHINGTON,  December  21,  1863,  6  P.  M. 
Major- General  U.  S.  GRANT,  Chattanooga. 

I  have  had  detailed  conversations  with  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  General  Halleck,  with  respect  to  your  project  of  a  campaign  in  Alabama. 
It  meets  the  full  approval  of  them  all  in  every  respect,  not  only  because  it 
keeps  your  army  active  during  the  otherwise  useless  weather  of  the  Winter, 
but  because  it  appears  to  them  well  conceived  and  as  certain  of  producing 
the  desired  effect  as  any  plan  can  be.  "If  it  succeed"  said  the  Secretary  of 
War,  "  Bragg's  army  become  prisoners  of  war  without  our  having  the  trouble 
of  providing  for  them."  You  would  be  authorized  to  proceed  immediately 
with  its  execution  but  for  the  anxiety  which  seems  to  exist  respecting  East 
Tennessee.  If  Longstreet  were  expelled  from  that  country,  you  could  star; 
for  Mobile  at  once;  I  suppose  General  Halleck  will  communicate  with  you 
fully  on  this  subject.  I  judge  from  my  conversation  with  him  that  he  does 
not  understand  clearly  how  an  army,  large  enough  to  make  Longstreet's 
dislodgment  certain,  can  be  supplied  while  operating  against  Kogersville  and 
Bristol,  and  accordingly  I  presume  that,  first,  as  soon  as  it  is  settled  that  he 
must  be  left  in  that  region,  you  will  be  allowed  to  proceed  south  with  the 
main  body  of  your  forces,  leaving,  of  course,  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  to 
observe  Longstreet,  and  prevent  his  getting  hold  of  Knoxville,  Cumberland 
Gap,  or  any  other  controlling  point  now  in  our  hands. 

To  my  suggestion  that  the  surest  means  of  getting  the  rebels  altogether  out 
of  East  Tenneseee  is  to  be  found  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  the  reply  is, 
that  that  is  true,  but  from  that  army  nothing  is  to  be  hoped  under  its  present 
commander.  This  naturally  led  to  your  second  proposition,  namely,  that 
either  Sherman  or  W.  F.  Smith  should  be  put  in  command  of  that  army. 
To  this  the  answer  is  such  as  to  leave  but  little  doubt  in  my  mind  that  the 
second  of  these  officers  will  be  appointed  to  that  post.  Both  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  General  Halleck  said  to  me  that,  as  long  as  a  fortnight  before  my 
arrival,  they  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  when  a  change  should  be  made, 


160  THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA. 

General  W.  F.  Smith  would  be  the  best  person  to  try.  Some  doubts  which 
they  seemed  to  have  respecting  his  disposition  and  personal  character  I  think 
I  was  able  to  clear  up.  The  Secretary  of  War  has  also  directed  me  to  inform 
him  that  he  is  to  be  promoted  on  the  first  vacancy.  The  President,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Halleck,  agree  with  you  in  thinking  that  it 
would  be,  on  the  whole,  much  better  to  select  him  than  Sherman.  As  yet, 
however,  nothing  has  been  decided  upon,  and  you  will  understand  that  I  have 
somewhat  exceeded  my  instructions  from  the  Secretary  of  War  in  this  com 
munication,  especially  in  the  second  branch  of  it,  but  it  seems  to  me  necessary 
that  you  should  know  all  these  particulars.  Q  j 


While  all  the  records  show  that  General  Grant  planned  that 
Atlanta  campaign  which  was  finally  executed,  and  that  from 
its  inception,  it  was  in  his  mind  a  march  to  the  sea,  designed  to 
divide  the  Confederacy;  it  is  also  true  that  this  question  of  cut 
ting  through  the  territory  of  the  rebels  from  the  West,  had  been 
discussed  at  one  or  two  prominent  headquarters  in  the  East, 
sometime  before  General  Grant,  in  a  different  way  from  any 
suggested  at  these  discussions,  entered  practically  upon  the 
work.  Notes  are  in  existence  of  a  conversation  at  General 
McDowell's  headquarters,  on  the  day  following  the  battle 
of  Cedar  Mountain  in  August,  1862,  upon  the  policy  of  sever 
ing  the  Confederacy  by  an  army  operating  from  the  West 
through  Atlanta,  a  movement  on  Savannah  and  Charleston 
from  the  rear,  and  a  march  up  the  coast.  These  were  Gen 
eral  McDowell's  ideas,  though  no  definite  combinations  of 
troops  were  suggested  for  carrying  them  out. 

Early  in  the  following  year,  General  Pope  wrote  Secretary 
Stanton  presenting  a  very  elaborate  plan  for  an  advance  from 
Murfreesboro  to  Mobile,  through  Atlanta.  It  involved  the 
immediate  abandonment  of  Grant's  move  against  Vicksburg, 
and  the  transfer  of  his  army  to  Rosecrans'  front,  an  advance 
by  Burnside  through  Cumberland  Gap,  the  occupation  of 
Chattanooga  with  a  permanent  garrison  of  sixty  thousand 
men,  and  a  movement  thence  on  Atlanta  with  a  force  at  least 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  strong.  At  the  same  time  he 
proposed  that  forty  thousand  men  from  the  Eastern  army 
should  be  thrown  into  Pensacola,  and  marched  north  on 


THE  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA.  161 

Montgomery  to  meet  an  equal  number  to  be  sent  from  the 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  at  Atlanta.  The  line  thus 
taken  was  to  be  permanently  held  by  sixty  thousand  at 
Chattanooga,  one  hundred  thousand  at  Atlanta,  sixty  thousand 
at  Montgomery,  and  ten  thousand  at  Mobile  and  Pensacola. 
Such  a  division  of  the  Confederacy,  General  Pope  argued  at 
length,  would  soon  lead  to  its  overthrow.  This  plan  involved 
the  abandonment  of  the  attempt  to  open  the  Mississippi.  It 
remained  for  General  Grant,  however,  to  achieve  this  most 
important  river  division  of  the  Confederacy,  and  then  turning 
eastward  to  divide  it  again  by  the  move  from  Chattanooga. 
And  this  division,  Sherman,  under  the  direction  of  Grant, 
accomplished  with  his  force  of  one  hundred  thousand,  which 
furnished  both  his  garrisons  and  his  moving  column. 

So  the  records  not  only  show  that  General  Grant  planned 
the  March  to  the  Sea  which  was  finally  executed,  but  also,  that 
general  plan  of  operations  for  the  closing  year  of  the  war 
was  his  conception. 

11 


CHAPTER     XII. 

HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH. 

GENERAL  SHP:RMAN,  having  seen  the  enemy  he  had  been 
fighting  throughout  the  Spring  and  Summer  well  on  his  way 
toward  the  North,  marched  down  to  the  sea  at  Savannah,  and 
moved  against  a  new  enemy  there. 

Of  the  preparations,  and  the  departure  from  Atlanta  to 
the  sea,  General  Sherman  writes: 

"It  was  surely  a  strange  event — two  hostile  armies  marching  in  opposite 
directions,  each  in  the  full  belief  that  it  was  achieving  a  final  and  conclusive 
result  in  a  great  war."  *  *  *  * 

And  again : 

"  Of  course  General  Thomas  saw  that  on  him  would  likely  fall  the  real 
blow,  and  was  naturally  anxious." 

And  the  day  of  leaving  Atlanta  he  thus  records  what  he 
thought  the  general  verdict  would  be : 

"There  was  a  "devil-may-care"  feeling  pervading  officers  and  men  that 
made  me  feel  the  full  load  of  responsibility,  for  success  would  be  accepted  as 
a  matter  of  course,  whereas,  should  we  fail,  this  'march'  would  be  adjudged, 
the  wild  adventure  of  a  crazy  fool." 

It  will  be  well  in  the  outset  to  look  at  the  situation. 

Sherman  had  marched  off  to  the  sea  with  over  sixty-two  V 
thousand  men.  He  had  taken  two  of  the  strongest  corps,  the 
Fourteenth  and  the  Twentieth,  numbering  over  twenty-eight 
thousand  men,  from  General  Thomas'  own  army;  had  taken 
his  efficient  pontoon  train,  and  dismounted  General  Wilson's 
(162) 


HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH.  163 

cavalry  to  give  Kilpatrick  fresh  horses.  In  short,  every  thing 
wanted  in  the  shape  of  organized  men,  equipment,  horses,  and 
batteries,  was  taken  from  Thomas  to  fit  out  Sherman.  Two 
small  but  organized  and  well-disciplined  corps,  numbering 
together  twenty-two  thousand  men,  were  given  Thomas.  For 
the  rest  he  had  orders  for  two  divisions  of  veteran  troops  to 
come  from  Missouri ;  he  had  bridge-guards  distributed  over 
four  railroads,  and  small  garrisons  in  a  dozen  towns.  In 
Nashville  he  had  quartermasters'  employe's  to  man  the  forts; 
and  to  meet  Hood's  twelve  thousand  well-equipped  and  enthu 
siastic  cavalry  he  had  seven  thousand  and  General  J.  H.  Wil 
son's  dismounted  men.  To  further  strengthen  him,  some 
twenty  new  one-year  regiments  were'  arriving  to  replace 
veteran  troops,  whose  terms  had  expired. 

Hood's  army,  fully  concentrated,  confronted  Thomas.  The 
concentration  of  Thomas'  army  had  only  begun.  A.  J. 
Smith's  veterans  were  still  in  Missouri.  To  meet  Hood  he 
had  less  than  half  Hood's  force.  To  fall  back  slowly  while 
he  gathered  his  army  from  the  immense  territory  over  which 
the  fragments  which  were  finally  to  compose  it  were  scattered, 
was,  of  course,  his  only  chance  of  success.  How  well  this 
object  was  accomplished,  all  the  world  knows.  How  Schofield 
gathered  the  troops  in  hand,  reached  Franklin  and  defeated 
Hood,  will  not  be  forgotten.  The  very  day  he  fought  there, 
Smith's  veterans  began  to  arrive  at  Nashville,  and  the  next 
night  Schofield  and  Smith  had  made  the  concentration  com 
plete  at  the  latter  place.  Then  came  storms  and  sleet  when 
Thomas  would  not  risk  his  army,  the  threats  to  remove  him, 
the  order  removing  him,  the  clearing  up  of  the  storm,  the 
melting  of  the  ice  which  had  prevented  man  or  horse  from 
moving,  the  great  battle  and  his  decisive  victory.  And 
Sherman,  with  the  bulk  of  the  organized  army  which  Hood 
had  so  often  checked  upon  the  Atlanta  campaign,  had  marched 
down  to  the  sea,  the  roads  before  him,  wherever  he  might 
choose,  being,  as  he  expressed  it  in  a  dispatch  to  Grant,  "all 
open,  with  no  serious  enemy  to  oppose  at  present." 


164  HAKDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH. 

On  the  10th  of  December  Sherman,  with  sixty  thousand 
men,  had  announced  the  investment  of  Savannah  garrisoned 
by  Hardee  with  a  force  supposed  to  be  fifteen  thousand.  On 
the  17th  he  had  demanded  its  surrender,  and  been  refused 
on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  invested  the  city,  and  that  his 
guns  could  not  even  reach  it. 

On  the  14th  Thomas  had  successfully  attacked  Hood,  and 
on  the  15th  had  utterly  defeated  and  routed  him,  and  the 
War  Department  had  telegraphed  Thomas : 

WAK  DEPARTMENT,  December  15,  1864. 
Major- General  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

I  rejoice  in  tendering  to  you  and  the  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  of  your 
command  the  thanks  of  this  department  for  the  brilliant  achievements  of  this 
day,  and  hope  that  it  is  the  harbinger  of  a  decisive  victory  that  will  crown 
you  and  your  army  with  honor,  and  do  much  toward  closing  the  war.  We 
shall  give  you  a  hundred  guns  to-morrow. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

On  the  24th  Mr.  Stanton  had  notified  Thomas  of  his 
nomination  as  a  Major-General  in  the  regular  army  for  the 
"recent  brilliant  military  operations"  under  his  command, 
and  expressed  the  opinion  that  "no  one  has  more  justly 
earned  promotion  by  devoted,  disinterested,  and  valuable 
services  to  his  country." 

On  the  18th  of  December,  in  a  letter  to  Sherman  of  warm 
congratulation  over  the  success  of  the  march  to  Savannah, 
General  Grant  added : 

"  MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  *  *  *  *  If  you  capture  the  garrison  of 
Savannah  it  certainly  will  compel  Lee  to  detach  from  Richmond,  or  give  us 
nearly  the  whole  South.  *  *  *  *  Congratulating  you  and  the 
army  again  upon  the  splendid  results  of  your  campaign,  the  like  of  which  is 
not  read  of  in  past  history,  I  subscribe  myself  more  than  ever,  if  possible,  your 
friend." 

Eight  days  after,  when  the  news  arrived  of  the  capture  of 
Savannah  and  the  escape  of  Hardee,  it  was  guardedly  acknowl 
edged  by  Grant  as  follows,  under  date  of  December  26th : 

"  GENERAL  :  Your  very  interesting  letter  of  the  22d  inst.,  brought  by  Major 
Gray,  of  General  Foster's  staff,  is  just  at  hand.  As  the  Major  starts  back  at 


HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH.  165 

once,  I  can  do  no  more  at  present  than  simply  acknowledge  its  receipt.  The 
capture  of  Savannah  with  all  its  immense  stores  must  tell  upon  the  people  of 
the  South.  All  well  here." 

Under  the  same  date  Secretary  Stanton  telegraphed  Grant 
at  City  Point : 

"  I  wish  you  a  merry  Christmas,  if  it  is  not  too  late,  and  thank  you  for  the 
Savannah  news. 

"  It  is  a  sore  disappointment  that  Hardee  was  able  to  get  off  his  fifteen 
thousand  from  Sherman's  sixty  thousand.  It  looks  like  protracting  the  war 
while  their  armies  continue  to  escape. 

"  I  hope  you  will  give  immediate  instructions  to  seize  and  hold  the  cotton. 
Thomas  has  been  nominated  for  Major-General." 

Of  the  approach  to  the  coast,  General  Sherman  writes : 

"  The  weather  was  fine,  the  roads  good,  and  every  thing  seemed  to  favor  us 
Never  do  I  recall  a  more  agreeable  sensation  than  the  sight  of  our  camps  by 
night,  lit  up  by  the  fires  of  fragrant  pine  knots.  *  *  No 

enemy  opposed  us,  and  we  could  only  occasionally  hear  the  faint  rever 
beration  of  a  gun  to  our  left  rear,  where  we  knew  that  General  Kilpatrick 
was  skirmishing  with  Wheeler's  cavalry,  which  persistently  followed  him. 
But  the  infantry  columns  had  met  with  no  opposition  whatever.  * 

*  That  night  (December  8)  we  reached  Pooler's  Station,  eight  miles  from 
Savannah,  and  during  the  next  two  days,  December  9  and  10,  the  several 
corps  reached  the  defenses  of  Savannah,       *      *       *      *       thus  completely 
investing  the  city." 

This  question  of  investing  the  city  involves  the  one  of 
responsibility  for  the  escape  of  Hardee,  and  will  bear  a  little 
attention. 

On  the  13th  December  General  Sherman  wrote  Mr.  Stanton, 
as  quoted  at  page  201,  Volume  II : 

"Before  opening  communication  we  had  completely  destroyed  all  railroads 
leading  into  Savannah  and  invested  the  city." 

And  on  the  16th  to  General  Grant,  quoted  on  page  207  : 

"  I  had  previously  made  you  a  hasty  scrawl  *  *  *  *  advising 
you  that  the  army  had  reached  the  sea-coast  *  *  *  *  investing 
closely  the  city  of  Savannah,  and  had  made  connection  with  the  fleet. 

*  *       *       *       General  Slocum  occupies  Argyle  Island  and  the  upper  end 
of  Hutchinson's  Island  and   has   a  brigade  on   the  South  Carolina  shore 


166  HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM   SAVANNAH. 

opposite,  and  is  very  urgent  to  pass  one  of  his  corps  over  to  that  shore. 
*  #  -:•:-  *  jje  [Hood]  can  draw  nothing  from  South  Carolina,  save 
from  a  small  corner  down  in  the  south-east,  and  that  by  a  disused  wagon 
road.  I  could  easily  get  possession  of  this,  but  hardly  deem  it  worth  the  risk 
of  making  a  detachment,  which  would  be  in  danger  by  its  isolation  from  the 
main  army."  *  *  *  * 

In  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  city,  on  the  17th,  he 
wrote  Hardee : 

"Also,  I  have  for  some  days  held  and  controlled  every  avenue  by  which 
the  people  and  garrison  of  Savannah  can  be  supplied,  and  I  am,  therefore, 
justified  in  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  city  of  Savannah  and  its  de 
pendent  forts ;  and  shall  wait  a  reasonable  time  for  your  answer  before 
opening  with  heavy  ordnance." 

The  same  day  Hardee,  in  refusing  to  surrender,  thus  gave 
him  notice  that  he  had  not  invested  the  city : 

"Your  statement  that  you  have,  for  some  days,  held  and  controlled  every 
avenue  by  which  the  people  and  garrison  can  be  supplied,  is  incorrect.  I  am 
in  free  and  constant  communication  with  my  department." 

The  effect  of  this  last  communication  General  Sherman 
thus  relates  (page  216) : 

"  On  the  18th  of  December,  at  my  camp  by  the  side  of  the  plank  road, 
eight  miles  back  of  Savannah,  I  received  General  Hardee's  letter  declining 
to  surrender,  when  nothing  remained  but  to  assault.  The  ground  was  difficult, 
and  as  all  former  assaults  had  proved  so  bloody,  I  concluded  to  make  one 
more  effort  to  completely  surround  Savannah  on  all  sides,  so  as  further  to 
excite  Hardee's  fears,  and,  in  case  of  success,  to  capture  the  whole  of  his 
army.  We  had  already  completely  invested  the  place  on  the  north,  west,  and 
south ;  but  there  remained  to  the  enemy,  on  the  east,  the  use  of  the  old  dike 
or  plank  road  leading  into  South  Carolina,  and  I  knew  that  Hardee  would 
have  a  pontoon  bridge  across  the  river." 

On  the  same  day,  December  18,  he  wrote  General  Grant  in 
reference  to  this  incredukmsness  of  Hardee,  as  follows: 

"In  relation  to  Savannah,  you  will  remark  that  General  Hardee  refers  to 
his  still  being  in  communication  with  his  department.  This  language  he 
thought  would  deceive  me,  but  I  am  confirmed  in  the  belief  that  the  route  to 
which  he  refers  (the  Union  plank  road  on  the  South  Carolina  shore)  is 


HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH.  167 

inadequate  to  feed  his  army  and  the  people  of  Savannah,  and  General  Foster 
assures  me  that  he  has  his  force  on  that  very  road,  near  the  head  of  Broad 
River,  so  that  cars  no  longer  run  between  Charleston  and  Savannah." 

And  yet,  with  this  letter  spread  at  length  on  the  pages  of 
his  book,  General  Sherman  goes  on  to  say,  following  the  last 
quotation  preceding  this  letter  to  Grant : 

"On  examining  my  maps,  I  thought  that  the  division  of  John  P.  Hatch, 
belonging  to  General  Foster's  command,  might  be  moved  from  its  then 
position  at  Broad  River,  by  water,  down  to  Bluffton,  from  which  it  could 
reach  this  plank  road,  fortify,  and  hold  it — at  some  risk,  of  course,  because 
Hardee  could  avail  himself  of  his  central  position  to  fall  on  this  detachment 
with  his  whole  army." 

That  is  to  say,  while  writing  to  General  Grant,  after 
receiving  Hardec's  letter  and  before  any  further  word  from 
Foster,  that  the  latter  held  this  plank  road,  he  thought,  by 
looking  at  his  maps,  that  one  of  Foster's  divisions  might  be 
moved  down  to  a  point  from  which  it  could  reach  this  road; 
but  there  would  be  risk,  since  Hardee  with  fiffceeen  thousand 
men  could  leave  Savannah  in  the  %ce  of  Sherman's  sixty 
thousand  men,  cross  the  river  on  pontoons,  march  ten  miles 
inland  over  this  one  road  leading  through  swamps  or  over 
flowed  rice  lands,  and  "fall  on  this  detachment  with  his  whole 
army." 

General  Sherman  then  continues  (page  216,  Vol.  II) : 

*  *  *  *  "So,  taking  one  or  two  of  my  personal  staff,  I  rode  back 
to  King's  Bridge,  leaving  with  Generals  Howard  and  Slocum  orders  to  make 
all  possible  preparations,  but  not  to  attack,  during  my  two  or  three  days' 
absence ;  and  there  I  took  a  boat  for  Warsaw  Sound,  whence  Admiral  Dahl- 
gren  conveyed  me  in  his  own  boat  (the  Harvest  Moon)  to  Hilton  Head, 
where  I  represented  the  matter  to  General  Foster,  and  he  promptly  agreed 
to  give  his  personal  attention  to  it.  During  the  night  of  the  20th  we  started 
back,  the  wind  blowing  strong.  Admiral  Dahlgren  ordered  the  pilot  of  the 
Harvest  Moon  to  run  into  Tybee,  and  to  wo»k  his  way  through  to  Warsaw 
Sound  and  the  Ogeechee  River  by  the  Romney  marshes.  We  were  caught  by 
a  low  tide  and  stuck  in  the  mud.  After  laboring  some  time,  the  Admiral 
ordered  out  his  barge-  In  it  we  pulled  through  this  intricate  and  shallow 
channel,  and  toward  evening  of  December  21  we  discovered  coming  toward 
us  a  tug,  called  the  Red  Legs,  belonging  to  the  quartermaster's  department, 


168  HARDEE'S  ESCAPE   FROM  SAVANNAH. 

with  a  staff  officer  on  board  bearing  letters  from  Colonel  Dayton  to  myself 
and  the  Admiral,  reporting  that  the  city  of  Savannah  had  been  found 
evacuated  on  the  morning  of  December  21,  and  was  then  in  our  possession. 
General  Hardee  had  crossed  the  Savannah  River  by  a  pontoon  bridge,  carry 
ing  off  his  men  and  light  artillery,  blowing  up  his  iron-clads  and  navy-yard, 
but  leaving  for  us  all  the  heavy  guns,  stores,  cotton,  railway  cars,  steamboats, 
and  an  immense  amount  of  public  and  private  property."  *  *  *  * 

Some  light  is  thrown  upon  the  question  of  the  responsibility 
for  Hardee's  escape  by  the  official  records. 

The  aggregate  strength  of  Sherman's  army  before  Savannah 
on  December  20,  the  day  before  its  evacuation,  was  sixty 
thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety-eight  men. 

Hardee's  field  returns  for  the  same  day  showed  an  aggregate 
for  his  garrison,  of  all  arms  and  all  sorts,  of  nine  thousand 
and  eighty-nine  men. 

On  the  16th  of  December  General  Sherman,  in  a  let 
ter  to  General  Grant,  gave  this  opinion  of  the  Confederate 
strength : 

"  I  think  Hardee,  in  Savannah,  has  good  artillerists ;  some  five  or  six 
thousand  good  infantry,  and,  it  may  be,  a  mongrel  mass  of  eight  to  ten 
thousand  militia." 

General  Sherman  had  "surrounded"  the  city,  as  he  so  fully 
explained — that  is,  he  had  not  surrounded  it.  Hardee  held 
the  entire  Savannah  River  front  of  the  city.  Hutchinson 
Island,  opposite,  reached  from  a  point  below  the  place  to  a 
point  opposite  the  left  of  the  Union  line.  Between  Hutchin 
son  Island  and  the  South  Carolina  shore  was  Pennyworth 
Island.  The  only  possible  way  of  escape  for  Hardee,  unless 
he  cut  through  Sherman's  sixty  thousand,  was  by  building 
pontoon  bridges  connecting  these  islands  and  the  two  shores. 
General  Slocum,  who  occupied  the  Union  left  with  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps,  had  captured  two  small  steamers,  and  collected 
a  number  of  flats  and  small  boats  immediately  after  reaching 
the  Savannah  River,  and  was  extremely  anxious  to  cross  a 
corps  to  the  South  Carolina  side,  which  would  have  effectually 
invested  the  city.  With  an  army  of  four  corps,  and  either 


HARDEE'S  ESCAPE    FROM  SAVANNAH.  169 

corps  stronger  than   Hardee's  entire  army,  his  desire  would 
appear  to  have  been  most  judicious. 

General  Sherman  thus  explains  why  he  did  not  accede 
to  General  Slocum's  proposition  to  pass  a  sufficient  force 
to  the  South  Carolina  shore,  to  close  Hardee's  only  line  of 
escape : 

"  General  Slocum  had  already  captured  a  couple  of  steamboats  trying  to 
pass  dowji  the  Savannah  River  from  Augusta,  and  had  established  some  of 
his  men  on  Argyle  and  Hutchinson  Islands  above  the  city,  and  wanted  to 
transfer  a  whole  corps  to  the  South  Carolina  bank ;  but,  as  the  enemy  had 
iron-clad  gun-boats  in  the  river,  I  did  not  deem  it  prudent,  because  the  same 
result  would  be  better  accomplished  from  General  Foster's  position  at  Broad 
River. 

The  following  extracts  from  General  Slocum's  report  of 
operations  in  the  rear  of  Savannah  will  illustrate  the  vacil 
lating  course  his  orders  obliged  him  to  pursue : 

"  From  the  13th  to  the  20th  [December]  several  changes  were  made  in  the 
position  of  the  troops.  *  *  *  *  Two  regiments  from  Geary  occu 
pied  the  upper  end  of  Hutchinson's  Island.  Carman's  brigade,  First  Division, 
was  sent  to  Argyle  Island,  and  subsequently  across  to  the  South  Carolina 
shore,  with  one  section  of  Battery  I,  First  New  York  Artillery.  *  * 
*  *  During  the  20th  the  report  from  Carman's  brigade  indicated  that 
large  columns  were  crossing  to  the  Carolina  shore,  either  to  cover  their  own 
line  of  communication  or  preparatory  to  the  final  evacuation  of  the  city. 

"  In  the  night  General  Geary  reported  to  me  that  the  movements  across  the 
river  were  still  going  on.  The  different  commanders  were  instructed  to  keep 
on  the  alert  and  press  their  pickets  close  to  the  rebel  works,  but  the  enemy, 
intending  to  abandon  his  heavy  guns,  kept  up  a  fire  until  the  moment  of  quit 
ting  the  works." 

The  following  orders  from  General  Slocum's  headquarters 
to  various  officers  under  his  command  show  the  details  of 
this  movement  threatening  the  rebel  line  of  communication : 

"December  11. — To  General  Geary:  The  General  commanding  directs  that, 
if  you  can  find  any  boats  in  the  river,  you  send  fifty  or  sixty  men  to  Hutch 
inson's  Island  to  ascertain  what  they  can. 

"December  13. — To  General  Geary:  The  General  commanding  directs  that 
the  forty-seven  men  of  your  command,  under  Major  Hoyt,  now  on  Hutchin 
son's  Island,  remain  there  until  further  orders. 


170  HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH. 

" December  16. — To  Colonel  Hawley:  The  General  commanding  the  corps 
directs  that  you  have  all  the  boats  in  your  charge,  or  in  that  of  Colonel 
Bloodgood,  on  your  side  of  the  river  by  8  A.  M.  to-morrow,  and  in  readiness 
to  cross  troops.  The  whole  of  Colonel  Carman's  brigade  will  cross. 

" December  16. — To  General  Jackson:  In  accordance  witli  directions  from 
the  General  commanding  the  corps,  the  order  for  Colonel  Carman  to  cross 
his  brigade  to  the  South  Carolina  side  of  the  Savannah  River  to-morrow 
morning  is  hereby  countermanded. 

"The  General  commanding  directs  that  you  have  him  send  over  a  force  of 
ninety  or  one  hundred  men  in  small  boats  to  effect  a  lodgment,  if  possible, 
and  feel  the  enemy's  position.  He  wishes  him  to  take  only  such  force  as  can 
be  readily  brought  back  in  case  the  enemy  be  too  strong  for  him. 

" December  18. — To  Colonel  Carman:  The  Brigadier-General  commanding 
the  corps  directs  that  you  cross  your  command  to  the  South  Carolina  side  of 
the  Savannah  River  to-morrow  morning.  You  will  commence  the  movement 
before  daylight. 

"December  21. — General  Jackson:  The  General  commanding  directs  that 
General  Carman's  brigade  be  moved  to  this  side  of  the  river,  leaving  one 
regiment  on  the  island  for  the  present.  He  wishes  the  brigade  encamped  on 
this  side  so  that  they  will  protect  the  two  rice  mills." 

Colonel  Charles  C.  Jones,  Chief  of  Artillery  on  the  staff  of 
General  Hardee  during  the  siege  of  Savannah,  in  a  work 
which  he  has  published,  thus  describes  the  evacuation : 

"December  14. — The  evacuation  of  Savannah  having  been  resolved  upon, 
and  it  being  impracticable  by  means  of  the  few  steamboats  and  river  craft  at 
command  to  cross  the  garrison,  artillery,  and  requisite  stores  with  con 
venience  and  safety  to  Screven's  Ferry,  orders  were  issued  for  the  immediate 
construction  of  suitable  pontoon  bridges.  The  line  of  retreat  selected  by  the 
engineers,  and  adopted  upon  the  evacuation  of  the  city,  involved  the  location 
of  a  pontoon  bridge  extending  from  the  foot  of  West  Broad  street  to  Hutch- 
inson's  Island,  a  distance  of  about  a  thousand  feet,  a  roadway  across  that 
island  in  the  direction  of  Pennyworth  Island,  a  second  pontoon  bridge  across 
the  middle  river,  another  roadway  across  Pennyworth  Island,  and  a  third 
pontoon  bridge  across  Back  River,  the  further  end  of  which  rested  upon  the 
rice  field  on  the  Carolina  shore.  The  route  then  followed  the  most  sub 
stantial  and  direct  rice  dam  running  north,  a  canal  being  on  one  side  and  an 
impracticable  rice  field  on  the  other.  This  dam  was  just  wide  enough  to 
permit  the  careful  movement  of  field  artillery  and  army  wagons.  The  plan 
tation  bridges  along  the  line  of  march  were  strengthened  to  bear  the  passage 
of  these  heavy  conveyances.  *  *  *  * 

"All  available  rice-field  flats  were  collected.  These  being  between  seventy- 
five  and  eighty  feet  in  length,  and  possessing  sufficient  width  for  the  purpose, 
were  swung  into  position  with  the  tide,  lashed  end  to  end  by  means  of  ropes 


HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH.  171 

and  stringers  running  from  boat  to  boat  continuously  the  entire  length  of  the 
bridge,  and  were  kept  in  their  places  by  car  wheels,  the  only  anchors  which 
could  be  procured.  Above  the  stringers  was  a  flooring  of  plank  obtained 
from  the  city  wharves. 

"  At  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  17th,  the  first  pontoon  bridge  span 
ning  the  Savannah  River  from  the  foot  of  West  Broad  street  to  Hutchinson 
Island  was  completed,  and  by  half-past  eight  o'clock  p.  M.  on  Monday,  the 
19th,  the  remaining  bridges  were  finished,  and  the  route  in  readiness  for  the 
retreat  of  the  Confederate  garrison.  *  *  *  *  Two  regiments  of 
General  Geary's  division  occupied  the  upper  end  of  Hutchinson's  Island,  and 
Carman's  brigade  was  pushed  forward  to  Argyle  Island.  *  *  *  * 

"Heavy  skirmishing  occurred  between  General  P.  M.  B.  Young's  command 
and  the  Federals  on  Argyle  Island. 

"In  the  effort  to  advance  in  the  direction  of  the  Confederate  line  of 
communication  with  the  Carolina  shore,  the  enemy  was  repulsed  with  con 
siderable  loss.  The  fighting  along  the  rice  dams  was  obstinate  and  bloody. 
As  the  retention  of  this  route  was  essential  to  the  safety  of  the  troops  engaged 
in  the  defense  of  Savannah,  all  General  Wheeler's  available  forces,  assisted 
by  Young's  troops,  and  such  of  the  South  Carolina  light  batteries  as  could  be 
spared  from  points  along  the  Charleston  and  Savannah  Railroad,  were  con 
centrated  for  its  protection.  By  these  troops  all  attempts  of  the  enemy  to 
move  upon  our  line  were  stubbornly  and  successfully  resisted.  *  *  *  * 
The  troops  from  the  western  lines  were  quietly  withdrawn,  in  the  order  and 
at  the  hours  indicated  in  the  circulars  issued  by  the  Lieuten ant-General  for 
the  evacuation  of  the  city.  No  confusion  prevailed,  and  the  movement  was 
executed  silently  and  in  good  order. 

"Guns  were  spiked,  and  ammunition  destroyed  as  far  as  this  could  con 
veniently  be  done  without  attracting  the  notice  of  the  enemy  in  our  immediate 
front. 

"To  conceal  the  movement,  occasional  firing  was  kept  up  until  the  latest 
moment.  Forty-nine  pieces  of  artillery,  with  limbers,  caissons,  forges,  battery 
wagons,  and  baggage  wagons,  were  safely  transported  over  the  pontoon 
bridges.  A  single  battery  wagon  was  lost.  Through  some  negligence  of 
the  driver,  it  got  off  the  bridge.  The  horses  attached  to  it  were  saved.  No 
interruption  was  encountered  at  the  hand  of  the  enemy,  and  the  Confederate 
army  rendezvoused  the  next  day  at  Hardeeville,  South  Carolina." 

So  much  for  what  the  records  and  this  last  account  have 
to  say  in  regard  to  Hardee's  escape  from  General  Sherman. 
The  latter  now  contents  himself  with  the  following  reflections 
(Vol.  II,  page  218) : 

"I  was  disappointed  that  Hardee  had  escaped  with  his  army,  but  on  the 
whole  we  had  reason  to  be  content  with  the  substantial  fruits  of  victory." 


172  HARDEE'S  ESCAPE  FROM  SAVANNAH. 

And  at  the  time,  in  a  letter  to  General  Halleck,  dated 
December  24th  (not  given  in  the  Memoirs),  he  wrote : 

"I  felt  somewhat  disappointed  at  Hardee's  escape  from  me,  but  really  am 
not  to  blame.  I  moved  as  quick  as  possible  to  close  up  the  "Union  cause 
way,"  but  intervening  obstacles  were  such  that  before  I  could  get  my  troops 
on  the  road  Hardee  had  slipped  out.  Still,  I  know  that  the  men  that  were 
in  Savannah  will  be  lost,  in  a  measure,  to  Jeff.  Davis,  for  the  Georgia  troops 
under  G.  W.  Smith  declared  they  would  not  fight  in  South  Carolina,  and 
they  have  gone  north  en  route  for  Augusta ;  and  I  have  reason  to  believe  the 
North  Carolina  troops  have  gone  to  Wilmington;  in  other  words,  they  are 
scattered." 

But  these  reflections  will  scarcely  break  the  force  of  Mr. 
Stanton's  words,  heretofore  quoted,  from  a  dispatch  to  General 
Grant : 

"It  is  a  sore  disappointment  that  Hardee  was  able  to  get  off  his  fifteen 
thousand  from  Sherman's  sixty  thousand.  It  looks  like  protracting  the  war 
while  their  armies  continue  to  escape." 

It  might  be  supposed  that  in  treating  of  the  Savannah 
campaign  after  the  lapse  of  so  many  years,  General  Sherman 
would  not  introduce  matter  reflecting  upon  Thomas,  whose 
victory  at  Nashville  furnished  the  only  justification  for  the 
March  to  the  Sea.  How  far  he  does  violence  to  so  charitable 
a  supposition  will  appear  in  another  chapter. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

AFFAIRS   AT   NASHVILLE   CRITICISED   FROM   SAVANNAH. 

No  sooner  had  our  army  reached  Savannah  than  a  sickening 
anxiety  set  in  about  headquarters  to  hear  from  Nashville. 
An  army  of  sixty  thousand  men  had  marched  away  from  its 
enemy,  leaving  him  moving  toward  the  North,  to  be  taken 
care  of  with  what  General  Sherman  calls  the  "somewhat 
broken  forces"  at  the  disposal  of  Thomas.  Exultation  over 
the  "great  march"  was  fast  dying  away  at  headquarters. 
The  all-important  question  there  was:  Will  Hood  evade  or 
defeat  Thomas,  and  invade  Kentucky  and  the  North? 
Writing  the  day  after  he  entered  Savannah  to  General 
Webster,  at  Nashville,  Sherman  said  in  a  letter,  referred 
to  in  the  Memoirs,  but  not  given  : 

"I  have  also  from  the  War  Department  a  copy  of  General  Thomas' 
dispatch,  giving  an  account  of  the  attack  on  Hood  on  the  15th,  which  was 
successful,  but  not  complete.  I  await  further  accounts  with  anxiety,  as 
Thomas'  complete  success  is  necessary  to  vindicate  my  plans  for  this  cam 
paign,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  my  calculation  that  Thomas  had  in  hand 
(including  A.  J.  Smith's  troops)  a  force  large  enough  to  whip  Hood  in  a  fair 
fight  was  correct." 

There  was  no  peace  at  headquarters  till  this  doubt  was 
fully  resolved,  and  the  painful  suspense  removed  by  the  news 
of  final  and  complete  victory  at  Nashville.  This  victory  was 
full  deliverance  for  General  Sherman  from  the  verdict  he  had 
recorded  as  the  march  began,  when  he  wrote:  "Should  we 
fail,  this  march  would  be  adjudged  the  wild  adventure  of 
a  crazy  fool."  Had  Hood  defeated  Thomas,  or  reached  the 

(173) 


174  AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE. 

Ohio  River,  this  verdict  would  assuredly  have  passed  into 
history. 

And  so,  considering  the  bearings  which  the  battle  of  Nash 
ville  had  upon  Sherman's  campaign  to  the  sea,  his  best  friends 
may  well  be  surprised  to  find  his  book  stained  by  unjust 
reflections  upon  Thomas. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  Memoirs  indicate  the 
treatment  which  this  branch  of  the  subject  receives : 

"As  soon  as  the  army  had  reached  Savannah,  and  had  opened  communica 
tion  with  the  fleet,  I  endeavored  to  ascertain  what  had  transpired  in  Tennessee 
since  our  departure.  *  *  *  * 

"As  before  described,  General  Hood  had  three  full  corps  of  infantry — 
S.  D.  Lee's,  A.  P.  Stewart's,  and  Cheatham's — at  Florence,  Alabama,  with 
Forrest's  corps  of  cavalry,  numbering  in  the  aggregate  about  forty-five 
thousand  men.  General  Thomas  was  in  Nashville,  Tennessee,  quietly 
engaged  in  reorganizing  his  army  out  of  the  somewhat  broken  forces  at  his 
disposal.  He  had  posted  his  only  two  regular  corps — the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-third — under  the  general  command  of  Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield, 
at  Pulaski,  directly  in  front  of  Florence,  with  the  three  brigades  of  cavalry 
(Hatch,  Croxton,  and  Capron),  commanded  by  Major-General  Wilson,  watch 
ing  closely  for  Hood's  initiative. 

"  This  force  aggregated  about  thirty  thousand  men,  was  therefore  inferior  to 
the  enemy;  and  General  Schofield  was  instructed,  in  case  the  enemy  made  a 
general  advance,  to  fall  back  slowly  toward  Nashville,  fighting  till  he  should 
be  reenforced  by  General  Thomas  in  person.  *  *  *  * 

"Meantime  General  Thomas  had  organized  the  employes  of  the  quarter 
master's  department  into  a  corps,  commanded  by  the  Chief -Quartern!  aster, 
General  J.  L.  Donaldson,  and  placed  them  in  the  fortifications  of  Nashville, 
under  the  general  direction  of  Major-General  Z.  B.  Tower,  now  of  the  United 
States  Engineers.  He  had  also  received  the  two  veteran  divisions  of  the 
Sixteenth  Corps,  under  General  A.  J.  Smith,  long  absent  and  long  expected, 
and  he  had  drawn  from  Chattanooga  and  Decatur  (Alabama),  the  divisions 
of  Steedman  and  of  K.  S.  Granger. 

"These,  with  General  Schofield's  army,  and  about  ten  thousand  good 
cavalry,  under  General  J.  H.  Wilson,  constituted  a  strong  army,  capable, 
not  only  of  defending  Nashville,  but  of  beating  Hood  in  the  open  field.  Yet 
Thomas  remained  inside  of  Nashville,  seemingly  passive,  until  General  Hood 
had  closed  upon  him  and  had  intrenched  his  position.  *  *  *  *  At 
that  time  the  weather  was  cold  and  sleety,  the  ground  was  covered  with  ice 
and  snow,  and  both  parties  for  a  time  rested  on  the  defensive.  Thus  matters 
stood  at  Nashville,  while  we  were  closing  down  on  Savannah,  in  the  early 
part  of  December,  1864;  and  the  country,  as  well  as  General  Grant,  was 


AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE.  175 

alarmed  at  the  seeming  passive  conduct  of  General  Thomas;  and  General 
Grant  at  one  time  considered  the  situation  so  dangerous  that  he  thought  of 
going  to  Nashville  in  person,  but  General  John  A.  Logan,  happening  to  be 
at  City  Point,  was  sent  out  to  supersede  General  Thomas.  Luckily  for  the 
latter,  he  acted  in  time,  gained  a  magnificent  victory,  and  thus  escaped  so 
terrible  a  fate." 

It  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  General  Sherman  that 
much  of  this  trouble  came  to  General  Thomas  through  the 
misrepresentations  he  himself  had  made  to  General  Grant  of 
Thomas'  force,  in  the  dispatch  of  November  1st,  and  others 
of  a  similar  purport. 

After  narrating  the  demand  on  Hardee  to  surrender  Savan 
nah,  his  refusal  and  subsequent  escape,  and  the  occupation 
of  the  city,  General  Sherman  again  recurs  to  Thomas  before 
Nashville,  and  in  more  generous  terms : 

"Meantime,  on  the  15th  and  16th  of  December,  were  fought,  in  front  of 
Nashville,  the  great  battles  in  which  General  Thomas  so  nobly  fulfilled  his 
promise  to  ruin  Hood,  the  details  of  which  are  fully  given  in  his  own  official 
reports,  long  since  published.  Rumors  of  these  great  victories  reached  us  at 
Savannah  by  piecemeal,  but  his  official  report  came  on  the  24th  of  December, 
with  a  letter  from  General  Grant,  giving  in  general  terms  the  events  up  to 
the  18th,  and  I  wrote  at  once  through  my  Chief-of-Staflf,  General  Webster,  to 
General  Thomas,  complimenting  him  in  the  highest  terms.  His  brilliant 
victory  at  Nashville  was  necessary  to  mine  at  Savannah  to  make  a  complete 
whole,  and  this  fact  was  perfectly  comprehended  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  who 
recognized  it  fully  in  his  personal  letter  of  December  26th,  hereinbefore 
quoted  at  length,  and  which  I  also  claimed  at  the  time,  in  my  Special  Field 
Order  No.  6,  of  January,  8,  1865,  here  given."  *  *  *  * 

In  comparing  the  above  statements  with  the  records,  it 
is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  estimate  General  Sherman 
placed  upon  the  forces  of  Hood,  and  those  under  the  control 
of  Thomas,  when  the  object  was  to  procure  General  Grant's 
permission  to  march  for  the  sea  without  first  destroying  Hood. 

From  Resaca  on  November  1st,  he  telegraphed  Grant  as 
follows : 

"  As  you  foresaw,  and  as  Jeff.  Davis  threatened,  the  enemy  is  now  in  the 
full  tide  of  execution  of  his  grand  plan  to  destroy  my  communications  and 
defeat  this  army.  His  infantry,  about  thirty  thousand  (30,000),  with  Wheeler 


176  AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE. 

and  Eoddy's  cavalry,  from  seven  to  ten  thousand  (7,000  to  10,000),  are  no-w 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Tuscumbia  and  Florence,  and  the  water  being  low, 
are  able  to  cross  at  will.  *  *  *  * 

"General  Thomas  has  near  Athens  and  Pulaski,  Stanley's  corps,  about 
fifteen  thousand  strong,  and  Schofield's  corps,  ten  thousand,  en  route  by  rail, 
and  has  at  least  twenty  to  twenty- five  thousand  men,  with  new  regiments  and 
conscripts  arriving  all  the  time,  also.  General  Eosecrans  promises  the  two 
divisions  of  Smith  and  Mower,  belonging  to  me,  but  I  doubt  if  they  can 
reach  Tennessee  in  less  than  ten  days.  *  *  *  *  I  have  retained 
about  fifty  thousand  good  troops  and  have  sent  back  full  twenty-five  thousand, 
and  have  instructed  General  Thomas  to  hold  defensively  Nashville,  Chatta 
nooga,  and  Decatur,  all  strongly  fortified  and  provisioned  for  a  long 
siege."  *  *  *  * 

The  points  to  be  noted  in  connection  with  this  telegram 
are,  that  Hood's  forces  were  then  estimated  by  Sherman  at 
from  thirty-seven  to  forty  thousand,  while  Thomas7  troops 
were  stated  to  be  from  forty-five  to  fifty  thousand  besides  new 
regiments,  conscripts  arriving  all  the  time,  and  the  two 
divisions  of  A.  J.  Smith. 

Instead  of  Smith's  troops  reaching  Thomas  in  ten  days, 
they  did  not  reach  him  for  thirty  days. 

General  Sherman  instead  of  retaining  fifty  thousand  troops 
retained  over  sixty-two  thousand. 

Thomas  was  instructed  to  hold  Nashville  defensively. 

To  write  at  this  late  day  of  General  Thomas  being  in 
Nashville  " seemingly  passive,"  and  "quietly  engaged  in 
reorganizing  his  army,"  is,  in  view  of  the  almost  superhuman 
efforts  which  he  with  the  "  somewhat  broken  forces  at  his  dis 
posal  "  was  making  to  prepare  for  the  defeat  of  Hood,  to 
perpetrate  an  injustice  to  the  dead  which  the  General  of  the 
army  could  easily  have  avoided. 

And,  as  if  to  make  this  "passiveness  and  quiet"  apparent  to 
all  and  the  more  inexcusable,  and  the  great  risk  which  he  saw 
in  leaving  Thomas  to  grapple  Hood  at  every  disadvantage 
less  apparent,  the  Memoirs  present  the  estimate  given  below 
of  Thomas'  strength,  which  agrees  neither  with  the  dispatch 
of  November  1st,  already  quoted,  nor  with  the  fact  as  recorded 
in  the  official  records.  A  summing  up  of  the  statement  will 


AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE.  177 

show  that  it  places  Thomas'  strength  of  all  kinds  at  from 
eighty-two  thousand  seven  hundred  to  eighty -eight  thousand 
seven  hundred,  besides  several  garrisons,  when  in  fact  the 
official  returns  show  that  the  effective  force  present  at  the 
battle  of  Nashville  was  fifty-five  thousand  four  hundred  and 
seventy-two,  while  the  dispatch  of  November  1st  fixed  it  at 
from  sixty-three  to  seventy  thousand. 

Says  General  Sherman,  Vol.  II,  page  162: 

"  He  then  had  at  Nashville  about  eight  or  ten  thousand  new  troops,  and  as 
many  more  civil  employe's  of  the  quartermaster's  department,  which  were 
not  suited  for  the  field,  but  would  be  most  useful  in  manning  the  excellent 
forts  that  already  covered  Nashville.  At  Chattanooga  he  had  General  Steed- 
man's  division,  about  five  thousand  men,  besides  garrisons  for  Chattanooga, 
Bridgeport,  and  Stevenson ;  at  Murfreesboro  he  also  had  General  Rousseau's 
division,  which  was  full  five  thousand  strong,  independent  of  the  necessary 
garrisons  for  the  railroad.  At  Decatur  and  Huntsville,  Alabama,  was  the 
infantry  division  of  General  R.  S.  Granger,  estimated  at  four  thousand,  and 
near  Florence,  Alabama,  watching  the  crossings  of  the  Tennessee,  were  Gen 
eral  Edward  Hatch's  division  of  cavalry,  four  thousand ;  General  Croxton's 
brigade,  twenty-five  hundred,  and  Colonel  Capron's  brigade,  twelve  hundred. 
Besides  which  General  J.  H.  Wilson  had  collected  in  Nashville  about  ten 
thousand  dismounted  cavalry,  for  which  he  was  rapidly  collecting  the  nec 
essary  horses  for  a  remount.  All  these  aggregated  about  forty-five  thou 
sand  men. 

"General  A.  J.  Smith  at  that  time  was  in  Missouri  with  the  two  divisions 
of  the  Sixteenth  Corps  which  had  been  diverted  to  that  quarter  to  assist 
General  Rosecrans  in  driving  the  rebel  General  Price  out  of  Missouri.  This 
object  had  been  accomplished,  and  these  troops,  numbering  from  eight  to  ten 
thousand,  had  been  ordered  to  Nashville.  To  these  I  proposed  at  first  to  add 
only  the  Fourth  Corps  (General  Stanley),  fifteen  thousand,  and  that  corps  was 
ordered  from  Gaylesville  to  march  to  Chattanooga  and  thence  to  report  for 
orders  to  General  Thomas;  but  subsequently,  on  the  30th  of  October,  at 
Rome,  Georgia,  learning  from  General  Thomas  that  the  new  troops  promised 
by  General  Grant  were  coming  forward  very  slowly,  I  concluded  to  further 
reenforce  him  by  General  Schofield's  corps  (Twenty -third),  twelve  thousand, 
which  corps  accordingly  marched  for  Resaca,  and  there  took  the  cars  for 
Chattanooga.  I  then  knew  that  General  Thomas  would  have  an  ample  force 
with  which  to  encounter  General  Hood  any  where  in  the  open  field,  besides 
garrisons  to  secure  the  railroad  to  his  rear,  and  as  far  forward  as  Chatta 
nooga." 

,In  the  earlier  quotations  of  this  chapter  will  be  found  some 
12 


178  AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE. 

generous  words  spoken  of  Thomas'  success  at  Nashville, 
coupled  with  the  statement  that,  upon  learning  the  result, 
he  wrote  through  General  Webster,  "  complimenting  him 
[Thomas]  in  the  highest  terms."  Though  not  produced  that 
letter  exists  in  the  records,  and  the  part  of  it  in  any  degree 
complimentary  in  its  character  is  as  follows: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  December  23,  1864.      J 

General  J.  D.  WEBSTER,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  Major  Dixon  arrived  last  night,  bringing  your  letter  oi 
the  10th  December,  for  which  I  am  very  much  obliged,  as  it  gives  me  a  clear 
and  distinct  view  of  the  situation  of  affairs  at  Nashville  up  to  that  date.  I 
have  also  from  the  War  Department  a  copy  of  General  Thomas'  dispatch, 
giving  an  account  of  the  attack  on  Hood  on  the  15th,  which  was  successful, 
but  not  complete.  I  await  further  accounts  with  anxiety,  as  Thomas'  com 
plete  success  is  necessary  to  vindicate  my  plans  for  this  campaign,  and  I  have 
no  doubt  that  my  calculation  that  Thomas  had  in  hand  (including  A.  J. 
Smith's  troops)  a  force  large  enough  to  whip  Hood  in  a  fair  fight  was  correct. 
I  approve  of  Thomas'  allowing  Hood  to  come  north  far  enough  to  enable 
him  to  concentrate  his  own  men,  though  I  would  have  preferred  that  Hood 
should  have  been  checked  about  Columbia.  Still,  if  Thomas  followed  up  his 
success  of  the  15th,  and  gave  Hood  a  good  whaling,  and  is  at  this  moment 
following  him  closely,  the  whole  campaign  in  my  division  will  be  even  more 
perfect  than  the  Atlanta  campaign,  for  at  this  end  of  the  line  I  have  realized 
all  I  had  reason  to  hope  for,  except  in  the  release  of  our  prisoners,  which  was 
simply  an  impossibility. 

December  24. — I  have  just  received  a  letter  from  General  Grant,  giving  a 
detail  of  General  Thomas'  operations  up  to  the  18th,  and  I  am  gratified 
beyond  measure  at  the  result. 

Show  this  letter  to  General  Thomas,  and  tell  him  to  consider  it  addressed 
to  him,  as  I  have  not  time  to  write  more  now.  *  *  *  * 

I  am,  very  truly,  yours,  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General 

Perhaps  the  most  glaring  instance  of  injustice  to  General 
Thomas  found  in  the  book  appears  on  page  209.  It  is  con 
tained  in  a  general  letter  to  Grant  upon  the  situation  before 
Savannah,  and  plans  for  a  coming  campaign,  dated  in  front 
of  the  latter  place  December  16th.  It  has  the  following  par 
agraph  in  regard  to  Thomas: 

€l  I  myself  am  somewhat  astonished  at  the  attitude  of  things  in  Tennessee.    I 


AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE.  179 

purposely  delayed  at  Kingston  until  General  Thomas  assured  me  that  he  was 
all  ready,  and  my  last  dispatch  from  him  of  the  12th  of  November  was  full  of 
confidence,  in  which  he  promised  me  that  he  would  ruin  Hood  if  he  dared  to 
advance  from  Florence,  urging  me  to  go  ahead  and  give  myself  no  concern 
about  Hood's  army  in  Tennessee. 

"  Why  he  did  not  turn  on  him  at  Franklin,  after  checking  and  discomfiting 
him,  surpasses  my  understanding.  Indeed,  I  do  not  approve  of  his  evacuat 
ing  Decatur,  but  think  he  should  have  assumed  the  offensive  against  Hood 
from  Pulaski  in  the  direction  of  Waynesburg.  I  know  full  well  that  General 
Thomas  is  slow  in  mind  and  in  action,  but  he  is  judicious  and  brave,  and  the 
troops  feel  great  confidence  in  him.  I  still  hope  he  will  outmaneuver  and 
destroy  Hood." 

This  letter,  with  the  exception  of  the  above  extract,  was 
printed  in  full  by  General  Sherman  in  the  report  he  placed 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  in  May, 
1865.  The  country  was  still  ringing  with  the  praise  of 
Thomas.  It  would  have  been  a  serious  thing  to  print  it 
then;  but  now,  when  Thomas  is  dead,  and  Sherman  is  vin 
dicating  himself  for  history,  this  unjust  paragraph  is  hunted 
up  and  given  to  the  world,  with  the  remark  (page  207) 
that  the  letter  now  produced  "is  a  little  more  full  than  the 
one  printed  in  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,  because  in  that  copy  I  omitted  the  matter 
concerning  General  Thomas  which  now  need  no  longer  be 
withheld." 

Even  if  General  Sherman  believed  the  paragraph  was  just 
when  he  wrote  it,  he  well  knew  it  to  be  cruelly  unjust  when 
he  printed  it. 

On  the  23d  of  December,  only  a  few  days  after  the  date 
of  this  letter,  he  had  written  General  Webster  in  the  one 
already  quoted : 

"I  approve  of  Thomas'  allowing  Hood  to  come  north  far  enough  to  enable 
him  to  concentrate  his  own  men,  though  I  would  have  preferred  that  Hood 
should  have  been  checked  about  Columbia." 

And  in  the  text  of  his  Memoirs,  only  a  few  pages  in  advance 
of  where  he  reproduces  this  paragraph,  after  enumerating  all 


180  AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE. 

the   force   available    about    Pulaski,    he   writes,   as    already 
quoted : 

"This  force  aggregated  about  thirty  thousand  men,  was  therefore  inferior 
to  the  enemy ;  and  General  Schofield  was  instructed,  in  case  the  enemy  made 
a  general  advance,  to  fall  back  slowly  toward  Nashville,  fighting  till  he 
should  be  reenforced  by  General  Thomas  in  person." 

General  Sherman  also  knew  well  that  only  a  portion  of  the 
veteran  reinforcements  ordered  to  General  Thomas  had  suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  Nashville  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Franklin, 
and  that  the  rest  did  not  arrive  till  the  day  succeeding  that 
battle. 

Among  the  last  dispatches  he  sent  to  General  Thomas  at 
Nashville,  before  starting  on  the  March  to  the  Sea,  was  this 
order,  dated  October  31st: 

"You  must  unite  all  your  men  into  one  army  and  abandon  all  minor  points 
if  you  expect  to  defeat  Hood." 

And  the  very  last  dispatch,  before  starting  south,  was  one 
notifying  Thomas  of  his  belief  that  all  information  seemed  to 
indicate  that  Beauregard  (Hood)  would  attempt  to  work 
against  Nashville : 

"I  can  hardly  believe  that  Beauregard  would  attempt  to  work  against 
Nashville  from  Corinth  as  a  base  at  this  stage  of  the  war,  but  all  information 
seems  to  point  that  way." 

Why  General  Thomas  did  not  turn  on  Hood  at  Franklin 
appears  from  the  following  field  dispatches  from  General 
Schofield,  who  was  fighting  a  splendid  battle  at  that  place : 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  November  30,  1864,  12  M. 
Major-General  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

Your  dispatch  of  10:25  A.  M.  is  received.  I  am  satisfied  that  I  have  hereto 
fore  run  too  much  risk  in  trying  to  hold  Hood  in  check  while  so  far  inferior 
to  him  in  both  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  slightest  mistake  on  my  part,  or 
failure  of  a  subordinate,  during  the  last  three  days,  might  have  proved  dis 
astrous.  I  don't  want  to  get  into  so  tight  a  place  again. 

I  will  cheerfully  act  in  accordance  with  your  views  if  you  think  it 
expedient  to  hold  Hood  back  as  long  as  possible.  When  you  get  all  your 


AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE.  181 

troops  together,  and  in  fighting  condition,  we  can  whip  Hood  easily,  and  I 
believe  make  the  campaign  a  decisive  one.  Before  that  the  most  we  can  do 
is  to  husband  our  strength  and  increase  it  as  much  as  possible.  *  *  *  * 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-  General. 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  November  30,  3  P.  M. 
Major-General  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

I  have  just  received  your  dispatch,  asking  whether  I  can  hold  Hood  here 
three  days.  I  do  not  believe  I  can.  I  can  doubtless  hold  him  one  day,  but 
will  hazard  something  in  doing  that.  He  now  has  a  large  force,  probably 
two  corps,  in  my  front,  and  seems  preparing  to  cross  the  river  above  and 
below.  I  think  he  can  effect  a  crossing  to-morrow  in  spite  of  all  my  efforts 
to  prevent,  or  to-night  if  he  attempts  it.  A  worse  place  than  this  for  an 
inferior  force  could  hardly  be  found.  I  will  refer  your  question  to  General 
Wilson  this  evening,  yet  fear  he  can  do  very  little.  I  have  no  doubt  Forrest 
will  be  in  my  rear  to-morrow  doing  some  greater  mischief. 

It  appears  to  me  that  I  ought  to  take  position  at  Brentwood  at  once.  If 
A.  J.  Smith's  division  and  the  Murfreesboro  garrison  join  me  there,  I  ought 
to  be  able  to  hold  Hood  in  check  for  some  time.  I  have  just  learned  that 
the  enemy's  cavalry  is  already  crossing  three  miles  below.  I  will  have 
lively  times  with  my  trains  again.  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 

And,  if  all  thus  far  related  is  not  enough  to  show  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  situation  at  Nashville  surpassing  Sherman's 
understanding,  the  terms  of  the  congratulatory  order  he  prints 
in  full  a  few  pages  beyond  where  he  records  the  shock  to  his 
powers  of  comprehension,  are  conclusive,  and  a  brief  extract 
will  suffice: 

"  Generals  Thomas  and  Schofield,  commanding  the  departments  to  our  rear, 
returned  to  their  posts  and  prepared  to  decoy  General  Hood  into  their 
meshes,  while  we  came  on  to  complete  the  original  journey. 

"  Almost  at  the  moment  of  our  victorious  entry  into  Savannah  came  the 
welcome  and  expected  news  that  our  comrades  in  Tennessee  had  also  fulfilled 
nobly  and  well  their  part,  had  decoyed  General  Hood  to  Nashville  and  then 
turned  on  him,  defeating  his  army  thoroughly,  capturing  all  his  artillery, 
great  numbers  of  prisoners,  and  were  still  pursuing  the  fragments  down 
in  Alabama." 

There  were  several  other  paragraphs  reflecting  upon  General 
Thomas,  omitted  from  the  letters  furnished  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  which  are  now  reproduced  by  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  but  the  citation  of  one  is  sufficient. 


182  AFFAIRS  AT  NASHVILLE. 

There  is  a  brief  letter  in  the  records,  not  quoted  in  the 
Memoirs,  which  contains  a  sentence  fitted  for  the  close  of  a 
chapter  on  the  operations  at  Nashville  and  Savannah.  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  written  General  Sherman,  in  a  letter  before 
quoted : 

"Now,  the  undertaking  being  a  success,  the  honor  is  all  yours;  for  I 
believe  none  of  us  went  further  than  to  acquiesce.  And  taking  the  work  of 
General  Thomas  into  the  count,  as  it  should  be  taken,  it  is  indeed  a  great 
success.  Not  only  does  it  afford  the  obvious  and  immediate  military  ad 
vantages,  but  in  showing  to  the  world  that  your  army  could  be  divided, 
putting  the  stronger  part  to  an  important  new  service,  and  yet  leaving 
enough  to  vanquish  the  old  opposing  force  of  the  whole  (Hood's  army),  it 
brings  those  who  sat  in  darkness  to  see  great  light." 

To  which  General  Sherman  replied: 

"I  am  gratified  at  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of  December  26th,  at  the  hands 
of  General  Logan,  especially  to  observe  that  you  appreciate  the  division  I 
made  of  my  army,  and  that  each  part  was  duly  proportioned  to  its  work." 

Two  pictures  will  rise  here  before  the  mind.  In  one  ap 
pears  General  Thomas,  struggling  in  the  face  of  a  veteran  and 
concentrated  enemy,  then  far  outnumbering  him  at  every 
point,  to  collect  enough  fragments  to  give  battle,  finally 
accomplishing  the  task,  and  achieving  victory. 

In  the  other  picture,  Sherman,  with  sixty-two  thousand 
selected  men,  thoroughly  armed  and  equipped,  marches  down 
to  the  sea  unopposed,  summons  Hardee's  ten  thousand  to 
surrender,  who  first  refuse,  and  three  days  thereafter  escape. 
And  yet  General  Sherman  was  especially  gratified  with  the 
conceit  that  each  part  of  his  army  was  duly  proportioned  to 
its  work. 


CHAPTER    XIY. 


CONTEMPLATED    REMOVAL. 

THE  causes  which  produced  the  dissatisfaction  at  City  Point 
and  Washington,  over  the  apparent  slowness  of  General 
Thomas  at  Nashville,  can  now  be  clearly  traced.  They  sprung 
directly  from  the  telegrams  of  General  Sherman,  overesti 
mating  the  forces  he  had  left  to  take  care  of  Hood.  General 
Grant  and  the  authorities  at  the  Capital  looked  upon  Hood's 
northward  advance  with  alarm.  Sherman  had  been  repeat 
edly  notified  that  he  must  leave  an  ample  force  with  Thomas 
to  enable  this  officer  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee.  He 
as  often  replied  that  he  had  fully  complied  with  these  direc 
tions.  General  Grant  naturally  became  solicitous  lest  Hood, 
if  not  attacked,  should  pass  around  Thomas,  invade  Kentucky, 
and  possibly  reach  the  North.  As  a  result  of  this  anxiety 
and  unjust  dissatisfaction,  an  order  was  given  for  the  removal 
of  Thomas,  which  order,  however,  was  not  executed  in  conse 
quence  of  his  battle  and  victory. 

As  has  been  seen,  Sherman  thus  refers  to  this  matter : 

"Yet  Thomas  remained  inside  of  Nashville,  seemingly  passive,  until  Gen 
eral  Hood  had  closed  upon  him  and  had  intrenched  his  position.  *  *  *  * 

"At  that  time  the  weather  was  cold  and  sleety,  the  ground  was  covered 
with  ice  and  snow,  and  both  parties  for  a  time  rested  on  the  defensive.  Thus 
matters  stood  at  Nashville  while  we  were  closing  down  on  Savannah  in  the 
early  part  of  December,  1864;  and  the  country,  as  well  as  General  Grant, 
was  alarmed  at  the  seeming  passive  conduct  of  General  Thomas;  and  General 
Grant  at  one  time  considered  the  situation  so  dangerous  that  he  thought  oi 
going  to  Nashville  in  person,  but  General  John  A.  Logan,  happening  to  be 
at  City  Point,  was  sent  out  to  supersede  General  Thomas;  luckily  for  the 

(183) 


184  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

latter,  he  acted  in  time,  gained  a  magnificent  victory,  and  thus  escaped  so 
terrible  a  fate." 

The  full  correspondence  relating  to  this  subject  is  not  only 
interesting,  but  it  throws  much  new  light  upon  General 
Sherman's  account  of  the  movements  connected  with  the 
March  to  the  Sea. 

General  Thomas  was  in  Nashville  directing  the  concentra 
tion  of  his  army.  General  Schofield  was  in  command  at  the 
front.  The  great  object  was  to  hold  Hood  back  until  all 
available  forces  could  be  united  to  meet  him,  and  the  remount 
of  the  cavalry  accomplished.  Under  these  circumstances,  and  a 
week  before  the  advance  of  A.  J.  Smith's  troops  arrived  at 
Nashville,  the  enemy  had  reached  Columbia,  and  his  large 
force  of  cavalry  under  Forrest  was  becoming  very  active.  At 
this  time  the  correspondence  between  General  Thomas  and  the 
authorities  at  the  East  began,  and  continued  until  the  battle 
was  fought. 

Its  opening  dispatch  was  as  follows : 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  November  21, 1864,  4  P.  M. 
Major- General  GEOEGE  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

*       #       #      *       j)o  not  i^  Forrest  get  off  without  punishment. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

The  answer  gave  strong  reasons  for  not  implicitly  obeying 
this  order,  and,  together  with  the  telegrams  which  succeeded 
it,  shows  the  real  condition  in  which  General  Sherman  left 
Thomas : 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND, ) 
NASHVILLE,    TKNN.,    November  25,    1864,  11  A.  M.      j 

Lieutenant  General  GRANT,  City  Point,  Va. 

Your  dispatch  of  4  p.  M.  yesterday  just  received.  Hood's  entire  army  is 
in  front  of  Columbia,  and  so  greatly  outnumbers  mine  at  this  time  that  I  am 
compelled  to  act  on  the  defensive.  None  of  General  Smith's  troops  have 
arrived  yet,  although  they  embarked  at  St.  Louis  on  Tuesday  last.  The 
transportation  of  Generals  Hatch's  and  Grierson's  cavalry  was  ordered  by 
General  Washburne  I  am  told,  to  be  turned  in  at  Memphis,  which  has  crippled 
the  only  cavalry  I  had  at  this  time.  All  of  my  cavalry  was  dismounted  to  fur 
nish  horses  to  Kilpatrick's  division,  which  went  with  General  Sherman.  My 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE.  185 

dismounted  cavalry  is  now  detained  at  Louisville,  awaiting  arms  and  horses. 
Horses  are  arriving  slowly,  and  arms  have  been  detained  somewhere  en  route 
for  more  than  a  month.  General  Grierson  has  been  delayed  by  conflicting 
orders  in  Kansas,  and  from  Memphis,  and  it  is  impossible  to  say  when  he 
will  reach  here.  Since  being  placed  in  charge  of  affairs  in  Tennessee,  I  have 
lost  nearly  fifteen  thousand  men  discharged  by  expiration  of  service  and  per 
mitted  to  go  home  to  vote.  My  gain  is  probably  twelve  thousand  perfectly 
raw  troops.  Therefore,  as  the  enemy  so  greatly  outnumbers  me,  both  in 
infantry  and  cavalry,  I  am  compelled  for  the  present  to  act  on  the  defensive. 
The  moment  I  can  get  my  cavalry,  I  will  march  against  Hood,  and  if  Forrest 
can  be  reached  he  shall  be  punished. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  Volunteers  commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  December  1,  1864,  9:30  P.  M. 
Major- General  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

After  General  Schofield's  fight  of  yesterday,  feeling  convinced  that  the 
enemy  very  far  outnumbered  him  both  in  infantry  and  cavalry,  I  determined 
to  retire  to  the  fortifications  around  Nashville  until  General  Wilson  can  get 
his  cavalry  equipped.  He  has  now  but  about  one-fourth  the  number  of  the 
enemy,  and  consequently,  is  no  match  for  him.  I  have  two  iron-clads  here, 
with  several  gun-boats,  and  Commodore  Fitch  assures  me  that  Hood  can 
neither  cross  the  Cumberland,  nor  blockade  it.  I,  therefore,  think  it  best  to 
wait  here  until  Wilson  can  equip  all  his  cavalry.  If  Hood  attacks  me  here 
he  will  be  more  seriously  damaged  than  he  was  yesterday.  If  he  remains 
until  Wilson  gets  equipped,  I  can  whip  him,  and  will  move  against  him  at 
once.  I  have  Murfreesboro  strongly  held,  and  therefore  feel  easy  in  regard 
to  its  safety.  Chattanooga,  Bridgeport,  Stevenson,  and  Elk  River  bridges 
have  strong  garrisons. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General  II.  S.  Volunteers  commanding. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ) 

WASHINGTON,  December  2,  10:30  A.  M.      J 
Lieutenant- General  GRANT,  City  Point. 

The  President  feels  solicitous  about  the  disposition  of  Thomas  to  lay  in 
fortifications  for  an  indefinite  period,  "  until  Wilson  gets  equipments."  This 
looks  like  the  McClellan  and  Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing,  and  let  the 
enemy  raid  the  country.  The  President  wishes  you  to  consider  the  matter. 

EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  2,  1864,  11  A.  M. 
Major-General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

If  Hood  is  permitted  to  remain  quietly  about  Nashville,  we  will  lose  all 
the  roads  back  to  Chattanooga,  and  possibly  have  to  abandon  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  River.  Should  he  attack  you  it  is  all  well,  but  if  he  does  not  you 
should  attack  him  before  he  fortifies.  Arm  and  put  in  the  trendies  your 
quartermaster's  employes,  citizens,  etc.  u.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 


186  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  2,  1864,  1:30  P.  M. 
Major- General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

With  your  citizen  employes  armed  you  can  move  out  of  Nashville  with  all 
your  army  and  force  the  enemy  to  retire  or  fight  upon  ground  of  your  own 
choosing.  After  the  repulse  of  Hood  at  Franklin  it  looks  to  me  that  instead 
of  falling  back  to  Nashville  we  should  have  taken  the  offensive  against  the 
enemy,  but  at  this  distance  may  err  as  to  the  method  of  dealing  with  the 
enemy.  You  will  suffer  incalculable  injury  upon  your  railroads  if  Hood  is 
not  speedily  disposed  of.  Put  forth,  therefore,  every  possible  exertion  to 
attain  this  end.  Should  you  get  him  to  retreating  give  him  no  peace. 

U.  S.  GKANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  1 
NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  2,  1864,  10  P.  M.      } 

General  U.  S.  GRANT,  City  Point,  Va. 

Your  two  telegrams  of  14  A.  M.  and  1:30  p.  M,  to-day  are  received.  At  the 
time  Hood  was  whipped  at  Franklin  I  had  at  this  place  but  about  five  thou 
sand  (5,000)  men  of  General  Smith's  command,  which,  added  to  the  force 
under  General  Schofield,  would  not  have  given  me  more  than  twenty-five 
thousand  (25,000)  men.  Besides,  General  Schofield  felt  convinced  that  he 
could  not  hold  the  enemy  at  Franklin  until  the  five  thousand  could  reach 
him.  As  General  Wilson's  cavalry  force  also  numbered  only  about  one- 
fourth  that  of  Forrest,  I  thought  it  best  to  draw  the  troops  back  to  Nashville 
and  await  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  General  Smith's  force,  and  also  a 
force  of  about  five  thousand  (5,000),  commanded  by  General  Steedman, 
which  I  had  ordered  up  from  Chattanooga.  The  division  of  General  Smith 
arrived  yesterday  morning,  and  General  Steedman's  troops  arrived  last 
night.  I  now  have  infantry  enough  to  assume  the  offensive  if  I  had 
more  cavalry,  and  will  take  the  field  anyhow  as  soon  as  the  remainder  of 
General  McCook's  division  of  cavalry  reaches  here,  which  I  hope  it  will  in 
two  or  three  days. 

We  can  neither  get  reinforcements  nor  equipments  at  this  great  distance 
from  the  North  very  easily,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that  my  command 
was  made  up  of  the  two  weakest  corps  of  General  Sherman's  army,  and  all 
the  dismounted  cavalry  except  one  brigade,  and  the  task  of  reorganizing  and 
equipping  has  met  with  many  delays  which  have  enabled  Hood  to  take 
advantage  of  my  crippled  condition.  I  earnestly  hope,  however  in  a  few 
more  days  I  shall  be  able  to  give  him  a  fight. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-  General  U.  S.  Volunteers  commanding. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  5,  1864,  6:30  P.  M. 
Major-  General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Is  there  not  danger  of  Forrest's  moving  down  the  Tennessee  Eiver  where 
he  can  cross  it?  It  seems  to  me,  while  you  should  be  getting  up  your  cavalry 


OF  THE 

|    UNIVERSITY 

OF 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASH 

as  rapidly  as  possible  to  look  after  Forrest,  Hood  should  be  attacked  where 
he  is. 
Time  strengthens  him,  in  all  probability,  as  much  as  it  does  you. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-  General. 

NASHVILLE,  December  6,  1864. 
lieutenant-  General  U.  S.  GRANT,  City  Point. 

Your  telegram  of  6:30  P.  M.,  December  5,  is  just  received.  As  soon  as  I 
get  up  a  respectable  force  of  cavalry  I  will  march  against  Hood.  General 
Wilson  has  parties  out  now  pressing  horses,  and  I  hope  to  have  some  six  or 
eight  thousand  cavalry  mounted  in  three  days  from  this  time.  General 
Wilson  has  just  left  me,  having  received  instructions  to  hurry  the  cavalry 
remount  as  rapidly  as  possible.  I  do  not  think  it  prudent  to  attack  Hood 
with  less  than  six  thousand  (6,000)  cavalry  to  cover  my  flanks,  because  he 
has  under  Forrest  at  least  twelve  thousand  (12,000).  I  have  no  doubt 
Forrest  will  attempt  to  cross  the  river,  but  I  am  in  hopes  the  gun-boats  will 
be  able  to  prevent  him.  The  enemy  has  made  no  new  developments  to-day. 
Breckinridge  is  reported  at  Lebanon  with  six  thousand  (6,000)  men,  but 
I  can  not  believe  it  possible. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-  General  U.  S.  Volunteers  commanding. 

This  statement  did  not  give  satisfaction,  and  the  following 
order  for  an  attack  was  telegraphed  : 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  6,  1864,  4  P.  M. 
Major-  General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

Attack  Hood  at  once  and  wait  no  longer  for  a  remount  for  your  cavalry. 
There  is  great  danger  in  delay  resulting  in  a  campaign  back  to  the  Ohio. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-General. 

This  was  acted  upon,  but  General  Thomas  protested  against 
the  wisdom  of  the  order  : 

NASHVILLE,  December  6,  1864,  9  P.  M. 
Lieutenant-  General  U.  S.  GRANT,  City  Point. 

Your  dispatch  of  4  p.  M.  this  day  received.     I  will  make  the  necessary 
disposition   and  attack  Hood   at  once,   agreeably  to  your  orders,  though   I 
believe  it  will  be  hazardous  with  the  small  force  of  cavalry  now  at  my  service. 
GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-  General  U.  S.  Volunteers  commanding. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,      ) 

WASHINGTON,  December  7,  1864,  10:20  A.  M.  j 
Lieutenant-  General  GRANT. 

You  remember  that  when  Steele  was  relieved  by  Canby  he  was  ordered  to 
Cairo  to  report  to  this  department.  What  shall  be  done  with  him?  The 
order  superseding  Rosecrans  by  Dodge  has  been  issued.  Thomas  seems 


188  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

unwilling  to  attack  because  it  is  hazardous,  as  if  all  war  was  any  but  hazard 
ous.  If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to  get  ready,  Gabriel  will  be  blowing  his  last 
horn.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  8,  1864. 
Major- General  HALLECK,  Washington. 

Please  direct  General  Dodge  to  send  all  the  troops  he  can  spare  to  General 
Thomas.  With  such  an  order  he  can  be  relied  on  to  send  all  that  can 
properly  go.  They  had  probably  better  be  sent  to  Louisville,  for  I  fear 
either  Hood  or  Breckinridge  will  go  to  the  Ohio  River.  I  will  submit 
whether  it  is  not  advisable  to  call  on  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  for  sixty 
thousand  men  for  thirty  days.  If  Thomas  has  not  struck  yet  he  ought  to  be 
ordered  to  hand  over  his  command  to  Schofield.  There  is  no  better  man  to 
repel  an  attack  than  Thomas,  but  I  fear  he  is  too  cautious  to  take  the 
initiative.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  8,  1864. 

Lieutenant- General  GRANT,  City  Point. 

If  you  wish  General  Thomas  relieved  give  the  order.  No  one  here  will,  I 
think,  interfere.  The  responsibility,  however,  will  be  yours,  as  no  one  here, 
so  far  as  I  am  informed,  wishes  General  Thomas  removed. 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major- General,  Chief  of  Staff. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  7,  1864,  9  P.  M. 
Major- General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

The  enemy  has  not  increased  his  force  on  our  front.  Have  sent  gun-boats 
up  the  river  above  Carthage.  One  returned  to-day  and  reported  no  signs  of 
the  enemy  on  the  river  bank  from  forty  miles  above  Carthage  to  this  place. 
Captain  Fitch,  United  States  Navy,  started  down  the  river  yesterday  with  a 
convoy  of  transport  steamers,  but  was  unable  to  get  them  down,  the  enemy 
having  planted  three  batteries  on  a  bend  of  the  river  between  this  and 
Clarksville.  Captain  Fitch  was  unable  to  silence  all  three  of  the  batteries 
yesterday,  and  will  return  again  to-morrow  morning,  and  with  the  assistance 
of  the  Cincinnati,  now  at  Clarksville,  I  am  in  hope's  will  now  be  able  to 
clear  them  out.  So  far  the  enemy  has  not  materially  injured  the  Nashville 
and  Chattanooga  Eailroad. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General  U.  S.  Volunteers  commanding. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  8,  7:30  P.  M. 
Major-General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  received.  It  looks  to  me  evident  the  enemy  are 
trying  to  cross  the  Cumberland,  and  are  scattered.  Why  not  attack  at  once? 
By  all  means  avoid  the  contingency  of  a  foot  race  to  see  which,  you  or  Hood, 
can  beat  to  the  Ohio.  If  you  think  necessary  call  on  the  Governors  of  States 
to  send  a  force  into  Louisville  to  meet  the  enemy  if  he  should  cross  the  river. 
You  clearly  never  should  cross,  except  in  rear  of  the  enemy.  Now  is  one  of 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE.  189 

the  fairest  opportunities  ever  presented  of  destroying  one  of  the  three  armies 
of  the  enemy.  If  destroyed  he  can  never  replace  it  Use  the  means  at  your 
command,  and  you  can  do  this  and  cause  a  rejoicing  from  one  end  of  the 
land  to  the  other.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  8,  1864,  10  P.  M. 
Major- General  HALLECK,   Washington. 

Your  dispatch  of  9  P.  M.  just  received.  I  want  General  Thomas  reminded 
of  the  importance  of  immediate  action.  I  sent  him  a  dispatch  this  evening, 
which  will  probably  urge  him  on.  I  would  not  say  relieve  him  until  I  hear 
further  from  him.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  8,  1864,  11:30  P.  M. 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  GRANT,  City  Point,  Fa. 

Your  dispatch  of  7:30  P.  M.  is  just  received.  I  can  only  say,  in  further 
extenuation  why  I  have  not  attacked  Hood,  that  I  could  not  concentrate  my 
troops,  and  get  their  transportation  in  order,  in  shorter  time  than  it  has  been 
done,  and  am  satisfied  I  have  made  every  effort  that  was  possible  to  complete 
the  task.  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General  commanding. 

WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1864,  10:30  A.  M. 
Major- General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville,  Tenn. 

Lieutenant-General  Grant  expresses  much  dissatisfaction  at  your  delay  in 
attacking  the  enemy.  If  you  wait  till  General  Wilson  mounts  all  his  cavalry 
you  will  wait  till  doomsday,  for  the  waste  equals  the  supply.  Moreover,  you 
will  be  in  the  same  condition  that  Rosecrans  was  last  year — with  so  many 
animals  that  you  can  not  feed  them.  Reports  already  come  in  of  a  scarcity 
of  forage.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

NASHVILLE,  December  9,  1864,  2  P.  M. 
Major-General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Your  dispatch  of  10:30  A.  M.,  this  date,  is  received.  I  regret  that  General 
Grant  should  feel  dissatisfaction  at  my  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy.  I  feel 
conscious  that  I  have  done  everything  in  my  power  to  prepare,  and  that  the 
troops  could  not  have  been  gotten  ready  before  this.  And  if  he  should  order 
me  to  be  relieved  I  will  submit  without  a  murmur. 

A  terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has  come  on  since  daylight,  which  will 
render  an  attack  impossible  till  it  breaks. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.  commanding. 

The  next  step  was  a  dispatch  from  General  Grant,  ordering 
that  General  Thomas  should  be  relieved : 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864,  11  A.M. 
Major-General  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dispatch  of  8  p.  M.  last  evening,  from  Nashville,  shows  the  enemy  scattered 


190  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

for  more  than  seventy  miles  down  the  river,  and  no  attack  yet  made  by 
Thomas.  Please  telegraph  orders  relieving  him  at  once,  and  placing  Schofield 
in  command.  Thomas  should  be  ordered  to  turn  over  all  orders  and  dis 
patches,  received  since  the  battle  of  Franklin,  to  Schofield. 

XL  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

In  obedience  to  this  dispatch,  according  to  Halleck,  the 
following  order  was  drawn  up  in  the  War  Department,  but 
never  issued,  and  no  trace  of  it  can  now  be  found  there : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  ) 
WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1864.      J 

[General  Orders  No.  — .] 

The  following  dispatch  having  been  received  from  Lieutenant-General 
Grant,  viz. :  "  Please  telegraph  orders  relieving  him  (General  Thomas)  at 
once,  and  placing  (General)  Schofield  in  command,"  the  President  orders : 

1.  That  Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield  relieve,  at  once,  Major-General  G. 
H.  Thomas,  in  command  of  the  Department  and  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

2.  General  Thomas  will  turn  over  to  General  Schofield  all  orders  and 
instructions  received  by  him  since  the  battle  of  Franklin. 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  A.  A.  G. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  9,  1864,  1  P.  M. 
Lieutenant-General  IT.  S.  GRANT,  City  Point. 

Your  dispatch  of  8:30  P.  M.  of  the  8th  is  just  received.  I  have  nearly 
completed  my  preparations  to  attack  the  enemy  to-morrow  morning,  but  a 
terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has  come  on  to-day,  which  will  make  it  im 
possible  for  our  men  to  fight  to  any  advantage.  I  am,  therefore,  compelled 
to  wait  for  the  storm  to  break  and  make  the  attack  immediately  after. 
Admiral  Lee  is  patrolling  the  river  above  and  below  the  city,  and  I  believe 
will  be  able  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing.  There  is  no  doubt  but 
Hood's  forces  are  considerably  scattered  along  the  river,  with  the  view  of 
attempting  a  crossing,  but  it  has  been  impossible  for  me  to  organize  and 
equip  the  troops  for  an  attack  at  an  earlier  time.  Major-General  Halleck 
informs  me  that  you  are  very  much  dissatisfied  with  my  delay  in  attacking. 
I  can  only  say  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  prepare,  and  if  you  should 
deem  it  necessary  to  relieve  me,  I  shall  submit  without  a  murmur. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.  commanding. 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
WASHINGTON,  December  9,  1864,  4  P.  M.      } 

Lieutenant- General  GRANT,  City  Point. 

Orders  relieving  General  Thomas  had  been  made  out  when  his  telegram 
of  this  p.  M.  was  received.  If  you  still  wish  these  orders  telegraphed  to 
Nashville  they  will  be  forwarded.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  .  Chief  of  Staff. 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE.  191 

CITY  POIXT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864,  5:30  P.  M. 
Major- General  HALLECK,   Washington. 

General  Thomas  has  been  urged  in  every  possible  way  to  attack  the  enemy ; 
even  to  giving  the  positive  order.  He  did  say  he  thought  he  should  be  able 
to  attack  on  the  7th,  but  he  did  not  do  so,  nor  has  he  given  a  reason  for  not 
doing  it  I  am  very  unwilling  to  do  injustice  to  an  officer  who  has  done  so 
much  good  service  as  General  Thomas  has,  however,  and  will,  therefore, 
suspend  the  order  relieving  him  until  it  is  seen  whether  he  will  do  anything. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  9,  1864,  7:30  P.  M. 
Major-General  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

Your  dispatch  of  1  P.  M.  to-day  is  received.  I  have  as  much  confidence  in 
your  conducting  the  battle  rightly  as  I  have  in  any  other  officer,  but  it  has 
seemed  to  me  you  have  been  slow,  and  I  have  had  no  explanation  of  affairs 
to  convince  me  otherwise.  Receiving  your  dispatch  to  Major-General  Hal- 
leek  of  2  P.  M.  before  I  did  the  first  to  me,  I  telegraphed  to  suspend  the  order 
relieving  you  until  we  should  hear  further.  I  hope  most  sincerely  that  there 
will  be  no  necessity  of  repeating  the  order,  and  that  the  facts  will  show  that 
you  have  been  right  all  the  time.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  11,  1864,  4  P.  M. 
Major-  General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

If  you  delay  attacking  longer,  the  mortifying  spectacle  will  be  witnessed 
of  a  rebel  army  moving  for  the  Ohio,  and  you  will  be  forced  to  act,  accepting 
such  weather  as  you  find.  Let  there  be  no  further  delay.  Hood  can  not 
stand  even  a  drawn  battle  so  far  from  his  supplies  of  ordnance  stores.  If  he 
retreats  and  you  follow,  he  must  lose  his  material  and  most  of  his  army.  I 
am  in  hopes  of  receiving  a  dispatch  from  you  to-day  announcing  that  you 
have  moved.  Delay  no  longer  for  weather  or  reinforcements. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  11,  1864,  10:30  P.  M 
Lieutenant- General  U.  S.  GRANT,  City  Point,  Va. 

Your  dispatch  of  4  p.  M.  this  day  is  just  received.  I  will  obey  the  order  as 
promptly  as  possible,  however  much  I  may  regret  it,  as  the  attack  will  have 
to  be  made  under  every  disadvantage.  The  whole  country  is  covered  with 
a  perfect  sheet  of  ice  and  sleet,  and  it  is  with  difficulty  the  troops  are  able 
to  move  about  on  level  ground.  It  was  my  intention  to  attack  Hood  as 
soon  as  the  ice  melted,  and  would  have  done  so  yesterday  had  it  not  been 
for  the  storm. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  U.  S.   Vols.  commanding. 

The  following  telegram  shows  that  an  attempt  was  made  by 


192  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

General  Thomas  to  obey  implicitly  the  order  for  attack,  and 
the  reason  why  the  movement  was  not  made : 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  12,  1864,  10:30  P.  M. 
Major-General  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

I  have  the  troops  ready  to  make  the  attack  on  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the 
sleet,  which  now  covers  the  ground,  has  melted  sufficiently  to  enable  the  men 
to  march.  The  whole  country  is  now  covered  with  a  sheet  of  ice  so  hard  and 
slippery  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  troops  to  ascend  the  slopes,  or  even  move 
over  level  ground  in  any  thing  like  order.  It  has  taken  the  entire  day  to 
place  my  cavalry  in  position,  and  it  has  only  been  finally  effected  with  im 
minent  risk  and  many  serious  accidents,  resulting  from  the  numbers  of  horses 
falling  with  their  riders  on  the  road.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  believe 
that  an  attack  at  this  time  would  only  result  in  a  useless  sacrifice  of  life. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-  General  U.  S.  Vols.  commanding. 

On  the  13th  of  December  General  Logan,  then  at  City 
Point,  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  Nashville,  and  informed  by 
General  Grant  that  he  was  to  take  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  relieving  General  Thomas,  provided  no 
movement  had  taken  place  upon  his  arrival  at  Nashville ;  and, 
further,  that  he  (Grant)  would  leave  in  a  few  days  to  assume 
command  of  the  forces  around  Nashville  and  fight  a  battle. 

The  order  to  General  Logan  was  as  follows : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES,  ) 
CITY  POINT,  VA.,  December  13,  1864.      j 

[Special  Orders  No.  149.] 

I.  Major-General  John  A.  Logan,  United  States  Volunteers,  will  proceed 
immediately  to  Nashville,  Tennessee,  reporting  by  telegraph  to  the  Lieutenant- 
General  his  arrival  at  Louisville,  Kentucky,  and  also  his  arrival  at  Nash 
ville,  Tennessee.  »  *  *  » 

By  command  of  Lieutenant- General  GRANT. 

T.  S.  BOWERS,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

WASHINGTON,  December  14,  1864,  12:30  M. 
Major-General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

It  has  been  seriously  apprehended  that  while  Hood,  with  a  part  of  his 
forces,  held  you  in  check  near  Nashville,  he  would  have  time  to  cooperate 
against  other  important  points,  left  only  partially  protected.  Hence,  Lieu- 
ten  ant-General  Grant  was  anxious  that  you  should  attack  the  rebel  forces  in 
your  front,  and  expresses  great  dissatisfaction  that  his  order  has  not  been  car 
ried  out.  Moreover,  so  long  as  Hood  occupies  a  threatening  position  in  Tennes- 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE.  193 

see,  General  Canby  is  obliged  to  keep  large  forces  on  the  Mississippi  River  to 
protect  its  navigation,  and  to  hold  Memphis,  Vicksburg,  etc.,  although  General 
Grant  had  directed  a  part  of  these  forces  to  cooperate  with  Sherman. 

Every  day's  delay  on  your  part,  therefore,  seriously  interferes  with  General 
Grant's  plans.  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 

On  the  14th  General  Grant  himself  left  City  Point  for 
Nashville  to  assume  command,  but  was  met  at  Washington  by 
the  news  of  Thomas7  victory. 

NASHVILLE,  December  14,  1864,  8  P.  M. 
Major- General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Your  telegram  of  12:30  M.  to-day  is  received.  The  ice  having  melted  away 
to-day,  the  enemy  will  be  attacked  to-morrow  morning.  Much  as  I  regret 
the  apparent  delay  in  attacking  the  enemy,  it  could  not  have  been  done 
before  with  any  reasonable  prospect  of  success. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.  commanding. 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  9  P.  M.,  December  15,  1864. 
Major-General  HALLECK,  Chief  of  Staff. 

Attacked  enemy's  left  this  morning,  drove  it  from  the  river,  below  city, 
very  nearly  to  Franklin  pike,  distance  about  eight  miles.  *  *  *  * 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General. 

The  body  of  the  above  dispatch  contains  a  lengthy  account 
of  the  movements. 

WASHINGTON",  December  15,  1864,  11:30  P.  M. 
Major-  General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

I  was  just  on  my  way  to  Nashville,  but  receiving  a  dispatch  from  Van 
Duzen,  detailing  your  splendid  success  of  to-day,  I  shall  go  no  further.  Push 
the  enemy  now,  and  give  him  no  rest  until  he  is  entirely  destroyed.  Your 
army  will  cheerfully  suffer  many  privations  to  break  up  Hood's  army,  and 
make  it  useless  for  future  operations.  Do  not  stop  for  trains  or  supplies,  but 
take  them  from  the  country,  as  the  enemy  has  done.  Much  is  now  expected. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- Geneml. 

WASHINGTON,  December  15,  1864,  12  Midnight. 
Major-General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

Your  dispatch  of  this  evening  just  received.  I  congratulate  you  and  the 
army  under  your  command  for  to-day's  operations,  and  feel  a  conviction  that 
to-morrow  will  add  more  fruits  to  your  victory. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant- General. 

13 


194  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMRERLAND,  EIGHT  MILES  FROM  NASHVILLK,  ) 

6  P.  M.,  December  16,  1864.      j 

To  the  President  of  the  United  States,  Hon.  E.  M.  STANTON  and  General  U.  S. 

GRANT. 

This  army  thanks  you  for  your  approbation  of  its  conduct  yesterday,  and 
begs  to  assure  you  that  it  is  not  misplaced. 

I  have  the  honor  to  report,  etc.     [Here  follows  a  second  report  in  detail.] 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General. 

On  reaching  Louisville,  General  Logan  learned  that  Thomas 
had  made  a  successful  move,  and  in  reporting  to  General 
Grant,  requested  that  he  might  be  ordered  back  to  his  com 
mand: 

LOUISVILLE,  KY.,  10  A.  M.,  December  17,  1864. 
Lieutenant-  General  U.  S.  GRANT,  Burlington,  N.  J. 

Have  just  arrived.  Weather  bad ;  raining  since  yesterday  morning.  Peo 
ple  here  jubilant  over  Thomas'  success.  Confidence  seems  to  be  restored.  I 
will  remain  here  to  hear  from  you.  All  things  going  right.  It  would  seem 
best  that  I  return  to  join  my  command  with  Sherman. 

JOHN  A.  LOGAN,  Major-  General. 

In  reply  to  this,  General  Grant  telegraphed  an  order  direct 
ing  Logan  to  report  to  General  Sherman. 

Immediately  after  the  congratulatory  dispatches,  and  while 
every  effort  was  being  made  to  press  Hood's  retreat,  General 
Thomas  was  appealed  to  by  Halleck  to  "capture  or  destroy 
Hood's  army  in  order  that  General  Sherman  can  entirely  crush 
out  the  rebel  military  power  in  all  the  Southern  States." 

WASHINGTON,  December  21,  1864,  12  M. 
Major-  General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS. 

Permit  me,  General,  to  urge  the  vast  importance  of  a  hot  pursuit  of  Hood's 
army.  Every  possible  sacrifice  should  be  made,  and  your  men  for  a  few  dayr 
will  submit  to  any  hardships  and  privations  to  accomplish  the  great  result. 
If  you  can  capture  or  destroy  Hood's  army  General  Sherman  can  entirely 
crush  out  the  rebel  military  force  in  all  the  Southern  States.  He  begins  a 
new  campaign  about  the  first  of  January,  which  will  have  the  most  important 
results  if  Hood's  army  can  now  be  used  up.  A  most  vigorous  pursuit  on 
your  part  is,  therefore,  of  vital  importance  to  General  Sherman's  plans.  No 
sacrifice  must  be  spared  to  obtain  so  important  a  result. 

H.  W-  HALLECK,  Major-General  and  Chief  of  Staff. 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE.  195 

To  this  General  Thomas  replied  at  length  and  with  spirit: 

IN  THE  FIELD,  December  21,  1864. 
Major- General  HALLECK,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Your  dispatch  of  12  M.,  this  day,  is  received.  Genera]  Hood's  army  is 
being  pursued  as  rapidly  and  as  vigorously  as  it  is  possible  for  one  army  to 
pursue  another.  We  can  not  control  the  elements,  and  you  must  remember 
that,  to  resist  Hood's  advance  into  Tennessee,  I  had  to  reorganize  and  almost 
thoroughly  equip  the  force  now  under  my  command.  I  fought  the  battle  of 
the  15th  and  16th  instants  with  the  troops  but  partially  equipped ;  and, 
notwithstanding  the  inclemency  of  the  weather  and  the  partial  equipment, 
have  been  enabled  to  drive  the  enemy  beyond  Duck  River,  crossing  two 
streams  with  my  troops,  and  driving  the  enemy  from  position  to  position, 
without  the  aid  of  pontoons,  and  with  but  little  transportation  to  bring  up 
supplies  of  provisions  and  ammunition.  I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  to 
crush  Hood's  army,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  will  destroy  it.  But  pursuing  an 
enemy  through  an  exhausted  country,  over  mud  roads  completely  sogged  with 
heavy  rains,  is  no  child's  play,  and  can  not  be  accomplished  as  quickly  as 
thought  of.  I  hope,  in  urging  me  to  push  the  enemy,  the  department 
remembers  that  General  Sherman  took  with  him  the  complete  organization 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  well  equipped  in  every  respect,  as 
regards  ammunition,  supplies,  and  trasportation,  leaving  me  only  two  corps, 
partially  stripped  of  their  transportation  to  accommodate  the  force  taken 
with  him,  to  oppose  the  advance  into  Tennessee  of  that  army  which  had 
resisted  the  advance  of  the  army  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi 
on  Atlanta,  from  the  commencement  of  the  campaign  till  its  close,  and  which 
is  now,  in  addition,  aided  by  Forrest's  cavalry.  Although  my  progress  may 
appear  slow,  I  feel  assured  that  Hood's  army  can  be  driven  from  Tennessee, 
and  eventually  driven  to  the  wall  by  the  force  under  my  command.  But  too 
much  must  not  be  expected  of  troops  which  have  to  be  reorganized,  especially 
when  they  have  the  task  of  destroying  a  force,  in  a  Winter's  campaign,  which 
was  able  to  make  an  obstinate  resistance  to  twice  its  numbers  in  Spring  and 
Summer.  In  conclusion,  I  can  safely  state  that  this  army  is  willing  to  submit 
to  any  sacrifice  to  oust  Hood's  army,  or  to  strike  any  other  blow  which  may 
contribute  to  the  destruction  of  the  rebellion. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General. 

WASHINGTON,  December  22,  1304,  9  P.  M. 
Major-General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS. 

I  have  seen  to-day  General  Halleck's  dispatch  of  yesterday,  and  your 
reply.  It  is  proper  for  me  to  assure  you  that  this  department  has  the  most 
unbounded  confidence  in  your  skill,  vigor,  and  determination  to  employ  to 
the  best  advantage  all  the  means  in  your  power  to  pursue  and  destroy  the 
enemy.  No  department  could  be  inspired  with  more  profound  admiration 


196  THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE. 

and  thankfulness  for  the  great  deeds  which  you  have  already  performed,  or 
more  confiding  faith  that  human  effort  could  do  no  more,  and  no  more  than 
will  be  done  by  you  and  the  accomplished  and  gallant  officers  and  soldiers  of 
your  command.  E>  M>  STANTON,  Secretory  of  War. 

On  the  same  day  General  Grant  telegraphed : 

CITY  POINT,  December  22,  1864. 
Major- General  GEO.  H.  THOMAS. 

You  have  the  congratulations  of  the  public  for  the  energy  with  which  you 
are  pushing  Hood.  I  hope  you  will  succeed  in  reaching  his  pontoon  bridge 
at  Tuscumbia  before  he  gets  there.  Should  you  do  so,  it  looks  to  me  that 
Hood  is  cut  off.  If  you  succeed  in  destroying  Hood's  army,  there  will  be  but 
one  army  left  to  the  so-called  Confederacy,  capable  of  doing  us  harm.  I  will 
take  care  of  that,  and  try  to  draw  the  sting  from  it,  so  that  in  the  Spring  we 
shall  have  easy  sailing.  You  have  now  a  big  opportunity,  which  I  know  you 
are  availing  yourself  of.  Let  us  push  and  do  all  we  can  before  the  enemy 
can  derive  benefit,  either  from  the  raising  of  negro  troops  on  the  plantations 
or  white  troops  now  in  the  field.  u.  S.  GRANT,  Lieutenant-  General. 

Two  dispatches  properly  close  this  correspondence : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  December  24,  1864. 
Major- General  THOMAS,  Nashville. 

With  great  pleasure  I  inform  you  that  for  your  skill,  courage,  and  conduct 
in  the  recent  brilliant  military  operations  under  your  command,  the  President 
has  directed  your  nomination  to  be  sent  to  the  Senate  as  a  Major-General  in 
the  United  States  Army,  to  fill  the  only  vacancy  existing  in  that  grade. 
No  official  duty  has  been  performed  by  me  with  more  satisfaction,  and  no 
commander  has  more  justly  earned  promotion  by  devoted,  disinterested,  and 
valuable  services  to  his  country.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

To  which  General  Thomas,  then  in  the  field  directing  the 
pursuit  of  Hood,  replied: 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND,  j 
MCKANES'  CHURCH,  TENN.      j 

Hon.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

I  am  profoundly  sensible  of  the  kind  expressions  of  your  telegram  of 
December  24th,  informing  me  that  the  President  had  directed  my  name  to 
be  sent  to  the  Senate  for  confirmation  as  Major-General  United  States  Army, 
and  beg  to  assure  the  President  and  yourself,  that  your  approval  of  my 
services  is  of  more  value  to  me  than  the  commission  itself. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General  commanding. 


THOMAS'  TROUBLES  AT  NASHVILLE.  197 

In  the  succeeding  July,  General  Grant  in  that  portion  of 
his  final  report  which  related  to  the  campaign  about  Nash 
ville,  made  the  following  manly  acknowledgment  that  the 
result  had  vindicated  General  Thomas' judgment : 

"Before  the  battle'  of  Nashville  I  grew  very  impatient  over,  as  it  appeared 
to  me,  the  unnecessary  delay.  This  impatience  was  increased  upon  learning 
that  the  enemy  had  sent  a  force  of  cavalry  across  the  Cumberland  into 
Kentucky.  I  feared  Hood  would  cross  his  whole  army  and  give  us  great 
trouble  there.  After  urging  upon  General  Thomas  the  necessity  of  im 
mediately  assuming  the  offensive,  I  started  West  to  superintend  matters  there 
in  person.  Reaching  Washington  City,  I  received  General  Thomas'  dispatch 
announcing  his  attack  upon  the  enemy,  and  the  result  as  far  as  the  battle 
had  progressed.  I  was  delighted.  All  fears  and  apprehensions  were  dis 
pelled.  I  am  not  yet  satisfied  but  that  General  Thomas,  immediately  upon 
the  appearance  of  Hood  before  Nashville,  and  before  he  had  time  to  fortify 
should  have  moved  out  with  his  whole  force  and  given  him  battle,  instead  of 
waiting  to  remount  his  cavalry,  which  delayed  him  until  the  inclemency  of 
the  weather  made  it  impracticable  to  attack  earlier  than  he  did.  But  his 
final  defeat  of  Hood  was  so  complete,  that  it  will  be  accepted  as  a  vindication 
of  that  distinguished  officer's  judgment." 

General  Sherman  himself,  after  introducing  into  his  book 
several  passages  that  he  has  for  years  suppressed,  and  which 
severely  reflected  upon  General  Thomas'  action  before  Nash 
ville,  closes  his  consideration  of  the  subject  with  these  more 
generous  words: 

"Meantime,  on  the  15th  and  16th  of  December,  were  fought  in  front  of 
Nashville,  the  great  battles  in  which  General  Thomas  so  nobly  fulfilled  his 
promise  to  ruin  Hood,  the  details  of  which  are  fully  given  in  his  own  official 
reports,  long  since  published." 


CHAPTER    XV. 

THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH  —  CHAEACTER  OF 
THE  ATTACK  ON  SECRETARY  STANTON  —  THE  JEFF. 
DAVIS  GOLD. 

ATTACKS  upon  dead  men  may  fairly  be  called  one  of  the 
features  of  General  Sherman's  Memoirs.  Thomas,  McPher- 
son,  and  Stanton,  with  others  less  prominent,  are  in  turn 
rudely  and  unjustly  assailed  in  their  graves.  In  writing 
history  it  would  have  been  not  only  allowable  for  an 
honorable  author  to  set  down  exact  truth  in  regard  to  these 
noted  actors  in  the  war,  even  though  it  were  unpalatable  to 
their  friends,  but  his  bounden  duty  to  do  so.  But  when  an 
author  of  General  Sherman's  position  writes  of  his  famous 
associates,  having  close  at  hand  and  conveniently  arranged  for 
reference  all  means  of  ascertaining  the  exact  facts  about  every 
question  which  could  arise,  he  stands  without  excuse  before 
his  countrymen  if  he  wrongfully  writes  disgrace  over  graves 
where  he  should  strew  laurel. 

On  page  243,  Vol.  II,  of  his  Memoirs,  General  Sherman 
relates  that  he  was  instructed  by  Mr.  Stanton  to  transfer  the 
cotton  captured  in  Savannah  to  an  agent  of  the  Treasury. 
This  General  Sherman  did  by  an  order  dated  January  12, 
1865.  He  then  continues  as  follows,  charging  that  Mr. 
Stanton's  action  in  this  matter  caused  great  loss  to  the  Gov 
ernment  : 

"Up  to  this  time  all  the  cotton  had  been  carefully  guarded,  with  orders  to 
General  Easton  to  ship  it  by  the  return  vessels  to  New  York  for  the  adjudi 
cation  of  the  nearest  prize  court,  accompanied  with  invoices  and  all  evidence 
(198) 


THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH.  199 

of  title  to  ownership.  Marks,  numbers,  and  other  figures  were  carefully 
preserved  on  the  bales,  so  that  the  court  might  know  the  history  of  each  bale. 
But  Mr.  Stanton,  who  surely  was  an  able  lawyer,  changed  all  this,  and 
ordered  the  obliteration  of  all  the  marks,  so  that  no  man,  friend  or  foe,  could 
trace  his  identical  cotton.  I  thought  it  strange  at  the  time,  and  think  it 
more  so  now,  for  I  am  assured  that  claims  real  and  fictitious  have  been 
proved  up  against  this  identical  cotton  of  three  times  the  quantity  actually 
captured,  and  that  reclamations  on  the  Treasury  have  been  allowed  for  more 
than  the  actual  quantity  captured,  viz.,  thirty-one  thousand  bales." 

Here  General  Sherman,  ouce  a  practicing  attorney,  forgot 
both  his  law  and  the  facts,  for  cotton  thus  captured  would  not 
fall  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  prize  court,  and  the  records 
show  that  what  he  charges  upon  Mr.  Stanton  never  occurred. 

As  there  were  nearly  forty  thousand  bales  of  this  cotton,  in 
view  of  the  high  price  then  prevailing  and  the  necessities  of  the 
Treasury,  the  proper  care  and  handling  of  this  most  valuable 
capture  were  matters  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  Gov 
ernment.  That  Mr.  Stanton  was  fully  aware  of  all  this,  that 
he  caused  the  business  to  be  promptly  and  properly  attended 
to,  and  that  every  reflection  made  upon  him  by  General  Sher 
man  in  the  above  extract  is  utterly  unfounded,  will  now  be 
made  to  appear. 

Secretary  Stan  ton's  first  dispatch,  upon  learning  of  the 
capture  of  Savannah,  related  to  the  care  of  this  cotton,  and  a 
copy  of  it  was  immediately  sent  to  General  Sherman  and  its 
receipt  acknowledged  by  him.  It  was  as  follows: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,      ) 
WASHINGTON,  December  26,  1864.  j 
Lieutenant- General  GRANT,  City  Point. 

I  wish  you  a  merry  Christmas  if  not  too  late,  and  thank  you  for  the 
Savannah  news.  It  is  a  sore  disappointment  that  Hardee  was  able  to  get  off 
his  fifteen  thousand  from  Sherman's  sixty  thousand.  It  looks  like  protracting 
the  war  while  their  armies  continue  to  escape.  I  hope  you  will  give  imme 
diate  instructions  to  seize  and  hold  the  cotton.  All  sorts  of  schemes  will  be 
got  up  to  hold  it  under  sham  titles  of  British  and  other  private  claimants. 
They  should  all  be  disregarded;  and  it  ought  not  to  be  turned  over  to  any 
Treasury  agent,  but  held  by  the  military  authorities  until  a  special  order 
of  the  department  is  given  for  the  transfer.  Thomas  has  been  nominated  for 
Major-General.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 


200      THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH. 

The  part  relating  to  cotton  was  sent  by  General  Grant  to 
General  Sherman,  and  was  thus  answered  by  the  latter : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  January  2,  1865.      j 

Hon.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War,  Washington,  D.  C. 

I  have  just  received  from  Lieuten ant-General  Grant  a  copy  of  that  part  of 
your  telegram  to  him  of  December  26th  relating  to  cotton,  a  copy  of  which 
has  been  immediately  furnished  to  General  Easton,  Chief  Quartermaster,  who 
will  be  strictly  governed  by  it. 

I  had  already  been  approached  by  all  the  consuls  and  half  the  people  of 
Savannah  on  this  cotton  question,  and  my  invariable  answer  was  that  all  the 
cotton  in  Savannah  was  prize  of  war,  belonged  to  the  United  States,  and 
nobody  should  recover  a  bale  of  it  with  my  consent ;  that,  as  cotton  had  been 
one  of  the  chief  causes  of  this  war,  it  should  have  to  pay  its  expenses;  that 
all  cotton  became  tainted  with  treason  from  the  hour  the  first  act  of  hostility 
was  committed  against  the  United  States  some  time  in  December,  1860,  and 
that  no  bill  of  sale  subsequent  to  that  date  could  convey  title. 

My  orders  were  that  an  officer  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  United 
States  Army,  might  furnish  the  holder,  agent,  or  attorney  a  mere  certificate 
of  the  fact  of  seizure,  with  description  of  the  bales,  marks,  etc.,  the  cotton 
then  to  be  turned  over  to  the  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department  to  be  shipped 
to  New  York  for  sale.  But  since  the  receipt  of  your  dispatch  I  have  ordered 
General  Easton  to  make  the  shipment  himself  to  the  quartermaster  at  New 
York,  where  you  can  dispose  of  it  at  pleasure.  I  do  not  think  the  Treasury 
Department  ought  to  bother  itself  with  the  prizes  as  captures  of  war. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General. 

Soon  after  Mr.  Stanton  reached  Savannah,  and  his  first  order 
there  in  regard  to  the  cotton  was  this : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
SAVANNAH,  GA.,  January  12,  1865.      ) 

Brevet  Major- General  MEIGS,  Quartermaster- General  U.  S.  A.,  Savannah,  Ga. 

SIR  :  The  Secretary  of  War  directs  that  you  assume  the  charge  of  the  cap 
tured  cotton  in  this  city,  and  provide  for  its  proper  care  and  preservation 
until  further  orders. 

You  will  consider  yourself  charged  with  the  duty  of  having  sufficient 
guards  and  precautions  for  its  security,  and  will  apply  to  the  commanding 
general  for  any  force  required. 

You  will  also  detail  a  competent  quartermaster  for  the  special  duty  of 
seeing  to  its  being  turned  over  and  receipted  for  by  the  agents  of  the  Treasury 
Department. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH.  201 

In  pursuance  of  this  order  General  Meigs,  then  in  Savan 
nah,  issued  the  following: 

[Special  Orders,  No.  1.] 

SAVANNAH,  GA.,  January  12,  1865. 

The  Secretary  of  War  having  directed  the  Quartermaster-General  to 
assume  the  charge  of  the  captured  cotton  in  this  city  and  provide  for  its 
proper  care  and  preservation,  and  to  detail  a  competent  quartermaster  for 
the  special  duty  of  seeing  to  its  being  turned  over  and  receipted  for  by  the 
agents  of  the  Treasury  Department,  Lieutenant-Colonel  H.  C.  Ransom  Ls 
hereby  detailed  for  this  duty. 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  L.  C.  Easton  will  place  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ransom  in  charge  of  all  the  cotton  in  his  possession. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Ransom  will  immediately  make  a  careful  inspection  of 
the  stores  containing  the  captured  cotton,  and  will  make  requisition  for 
guards  sufficient  to  prevent  all  danger  of  unauthorized  persons  entering  the 
storehouses  or  meddling  with  the  cotton. 

No  person  not  in  the  employment  of  the  United  States  will  be  permitted 
to  enter  into  or  to  loiter  about  the  neighborhood  of  the  buildings. 

He  will  afford  every  facility  for  the  operations  of  the  Treasury  agent, 
Simeon  Draper,  collector  of  the  port  of  New  York,  who  is  charged  by  the 
Treasury  Department  with  the  care  and  disposition  of  this  captured  property. 

He  will  employ  competent  clerks  to  attend  to  the  weighing  of  each  bale, 
who  will  keep  an  accurate  register  of  the  number  and  weight  of  each  bale, 
and  will  take  duplicate  receipts  in  detail  from  the  special  agent  of  the  Treas 
ury  Department  before  allowing  any  of  it  to  leave  the  harbor.  He  will 
forward  one  copy  of  these  receipts  to  the  Quartermaster-General's  office  in 
Washington  by  the  first  mail  after  their  execution. 

The  other  copy  and  the  books  and  all  papers  containing  the  records  of  this 
business  he  will  himself  carry  in  person  to  Washington,  and  will  deliver 
them  to  the  Quartermaster-General. 

For  the  cotton  already  stored  on  board  vessels,  he  will  take  receipts  in 
detail  from  the  special  agent,  based  upon  the  accounts  and  invoices  of  this 
property  prepared  by  Captain  George  B.  Cadwallader,  heretofore  in  charge  of 
this  duty. 

In  default  of  such  receipts  he  will  order  the  vessels  to  proceed  to  New 
York,  invoicing  the  cotton  to  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Van  Vliet,  Chief 
Quartermaster,  forwarding  with  the  bills  of  lading  an  official  copy  of  this  order. 

General  Van  Vliet  will  transfer  the  cotton  in  this  case  to  the  special  agent 
of  the  Treasury  in  New  York,  upon  receiving  such  receipts  as  are  herein 
prescribed. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Ransom  will  collect  and  register  all  the  information 
offered  to  him  of  claims  to  the  former  ownership  of  this  cotton.  He  will 
take  this  information  with  him  to  Washington,  but  will  give  copies  or  ex 
tracts  from  it  to  no  one  in  Savannah  but  the  Quartermaster-General. 


202  THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH. 

The  utmost  vigilance  will  be  exercised  by  Colonel  Ransom  in  the  execu 
tion  of  this  important  trust  committed  to  him.  He  will  himself  visit  the 
guards,  and  the  presses  and  storehouses  continually.  He  will  see  that  no 
fires  are  lighted  near  the  storehouses,  or  in  the  open  streets  or  squares  sur 
rounding  them.  He  will  report  to  the  officer  commanding  the  guards  all 
neglect  or  inattention  on  the  part  of  the  guards,  and  if  this  does  not  imme 
diately  produce  a  reform  he  will  report  the  facts  to  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  post  of  Savannah.  *  *  *  * 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Ransom  will  confer  freely  with  the  special  agent  of  the 
Treasury  Department,  and  will  call  for  such  military  assistance  as  may  be 
necessary  to  discover  and  place  him  in  possession  of  all  the  cotton  in  the 
city  of  Savannah,  or  within  the  lines  occupied  by  its  garrison.  It  is  all  prize 
of  war.  *  *  *  * 

M.  C.  MEIGS,  Quartermaster- General,  Brevet  Major- General. 

Next,  in  order  that  there  might  be  no  mistake  in  regard  to 
the  responsibility  of  the  various  parties  charged  with  these 
duties,  the  following  memorandum  was  drawn  up,  signed,  and 
put  on  record : 

OFFICK  OF  THE  GENERAL  AGENCY  FOR  CAPTURED  AND  ABANDONED  PROPERTY,  ) 

SAVANNAH,  UA.   j 

1.  Cotton  captured  in  Savannah,  that  is,  all  the  cotton  within  the  military 
post  of  Savannah  and  its  defenses,  has  been  taken  possession  of  and  is  now 
held  by  the  Quartermaster-General,  under  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

2.  The  Quartermaster-General  has  also,  under  the  order  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  detailed  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ransom,  of  the  Quartermaster  Depart 
ment,  to  take  charge  of  the  cotton  personally,  to  cause  it  to  be  weighed  and 
a  careful  and  accurate  account  to  be  taken  and  recorded. 

To  exclude  all  persons  not  employed  by  the  United  States  and  needed  in 
this  operation  from  the  warehouses  and  docks  and  their  vicinity. 

To  transfer  the  cotton  to  the  special  agent  of  the  Treasury  Department, 
taking  duplicate  receipts  therefor  in  detail,  said  receipts  specifying  the  num 
ber  and  weight  of  every  bale  thus  transferred  to  the  special  agent  of  the 
Treasury  Department. 

To  allow  none  of  the  cotton  to  leave  the  harbor  until  said  receipts  are  given 
to  him  by  the  agent  aforesaid.  *  *  *  * 

4.  The  original  instructions  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of  28th 
December,  1864,  designated  Simeon  Draper,  Esq.,  as  the  special  agent  to  take 
charge  of  the  captured  cotton,  and  to  give  receipts  therefor  as  provided  by 
law. 

The  instructions  of  the  7th  January  to  Albert  G.  Browne,  special  agent, 
communicated  also  to  Simeon  Draper,  Esq.,  direct  that  Mr.  Browne  shall 
receive  from  the  military  authorities  who  are  in  possession  of  the  cotton, 


TliE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH.  203 

and  give  receipts  therefor  in  the  form  prescribed  by  the  Treasury  regula 
tions.       *       *       *      * 

M.  C.  MEIGS,  Q.  M.  Gen.,  Brevet  Mayor-Gen.  U.  S.  A. 

ALBERT  G.  BROWNE,  Supervising  Special  Ag't  Treas.  Dep't. 

S.  DRAPER,  Treasury  Agent. 

S.  H.  KAUFFMAN. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  Mr.  Draper  carried  special  instruc 
tions  from  Secretary  Fessenden,  and  approved  by  the  Presi 
dent,  for  his  "  government  in  the  examination  of  marks  and 
numbers,  former  ownership,  as  near  as  it  can  be  ascertained, 
and  its  shipment." 

Among  many  other  details  these  instructions  provided 
that: 

"  The  marks  and  numbers  must  be  carefully  recorded,  not  only  such  as  are 
complete,  but  also  such  as  have  been  in  part  obliterated,  as  nearly  as  can  be 
ascertained. 

"  These  directions  you  will  cause  to  be  carefully  observed,  that  the  records 
may  be  complete  in  regard  to  any  bales,  or  package,  or  number  of  packages, 
belonging  to  the  same  lot,  so  that  any  package  or  lot,  or  the  proceeds  thereof, 
may  be  clearly  identified  should  any  question  in  relation  thereto  hereafter  be 
brought  before  the  Court  of  Claims." 

These  various  extracts  from  the  open  records  are  quite 
sufficient  to  show  that,  so  far  from  ordering  any  marks  ob 
literated,  directions  were  given  to  have  the  greatest  care 
exercised  to  obtain  a  full  record  of  them.  The  single  para 
graph  in  the  order  given  by  Mr.  Stanton,  directing  all  receipts 
to  be  given  in  the  form  prescribed  by  the  Treasury  regula 
tions,  insured  the  preservation  of  every  mark. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  records  in  Washington  which  relate 
to  this  cotton  are  very  complete.  Every  bale  captured  was 
fully  and  carefully  registered,  and  the  military  officers  in 
charge  received  and  filed  a  receipt  from  the  Treasury  agents 
for  every  pound  of  it.  These  receipts  are  on  file  in  the  War 
Department  and  in  the  Treasury,  and  accessible  to  all  who 
desire  information,  and  they  have  been  constantly  consulted 
by  counsel  of  the  United  States  and  of  claimants  in  all  cases 
yet  tried  or  prepared  for  trial.  In  a  few  instances,  in  re- 


204  THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH. 

pressing  and  repairing  torn  covering,  some  of  the  marks  were 
unavoidably  defaced. 

The  officers  charged  with  preserving  all  means  of  identifica 
tion,  employed  a  force  of  citizen  clerks,  who  had  long  been 
engaged  in  the  cotton  warehouses  of  Savannah,  to  superintend 
the  re-pressing  and  shipping  of  the  cotton,  and  they  selected 
the  books  and  blanks  in  common  use  for  this  purpose,  and 
copied  into  and  upon  these  all  marks  by  which  the  merchants 
of  Savannah  and  the  shippers  from  that  port  had  been  accus 
tomed  to  insure  the  perfect  identification  of  cotton. 

Aside  from  the  records  thus  made,  and  forwarded  afterward 
to  Washington,  there  existed  in  each  of  the  great  cotton  ware 
houses  of  Savannah  a  full  record  and  description  of  each 
bale  on  hand  when  General  Sherman's  army  took  possession 
of  the  city,  and  these  have  been  accessible  to  all  interested. 

Of  the  existence  and  completeness  of  the  records  here, 
General  Sherman  could  have  satisfied  himself  in  a  very  few 
moments  on  any  occasion.  He  could  have  ascertained  all  the 
above  facts  any  day,  and  in  less  time  than  it  must  have  taken 
him  to  compile  the  page  of  errors  concerning  the  matter 
which  his  book  contains. 

If  these  records  had  been  filed  away  among  the  musty  docu 
ments  pertaining  to  the  war,  there  would  have  been  a  slight 
show  of  excuse  for  General  Sherman ;  but  what  shall  be  said 
for  him  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  wrote  thus  recklessly  about 
Secretary  Stanton,  with  these  records  open  to  all  men,  in  the 
War  Department,  with  duplicates  of  them  in  the  Treasury,  in 
the  Court  of  Claims,  and  in  the  printed  files  of  Congress. 
They  are  records  of  the  most  public  character.  They  have 
been  consulted  by  the  parties  to  every  suit  in  which  this 
cotton  was  involved.  The  War  Department  had  furnished 
transcripts  of  the  marks  for  seventy-seven  cases  to  the  Court 
of  Claims,  and  the  Government  had  printed  them.  Congress 
had  called  on  the  War  Department  for  the  entire  record,  em 
bracing  all  the  orders  and  directions  which  were  given,  and 
the  receipts  in  full  taken  by  Colonel  Ransom,  setting  forth  all 


THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH. 


205 


the  marks  collected  by  the  officers  detailed  for  the  duty  by 
Mr.  Stanton's  order,  and  had  printed  the  whole  of  it,  and 
furnished  copies  to  the  War  Department,  and  the  completed 
history  of  the  matter  was  at  Sherman's  elbow  in  the  very 
building  where  he  wrote. 

The  statement  of  the  Memoirs  that  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment  has  allowed  claims  for  more  than  the  total  amount  of 
cotton  captured,  and  that  claims  have  been  proved  up  amount 
ing  to  three  times  the  whole  capture,  is  without  the  least 
foundation. 

The  following  is  a  statement  prepared  at  the  Treasury 
Department  in  regard  to  this  Savannah  cotton : 

"  The  Treasury  Department  has  not  passed  upon  a  single  claim  for  cotton 
captured  at  Savannah,  nor  has  it  paid  out  a  dollar  on  such  claims,  except 
upon  judgments  of  the  Court  of  Claims,  under  the  act  of  March  12th,  1863. 

"  The  following  is  a  statement  of  the  proceeds  of  said  cotton  and  the  claims 
therefor : 


No.  bales  sold  at  New  York 39,358 

No.  bales  allowed  by  Court  of  Claims...  31,657 

7,701 

No.  bales  claimed  in  cases  pending  in 
Court  of  Claims 4,901 

2,800 


Net  proceeds  paid  into  Treasury...$7,259,499  78 
Amount  allowed  by  the  Court  of 
Claims 5,873,159  90 

$1,3*6,339  88 
Proceeds  claimed  in  pending  cases,    865,67S  26 

$520,661  62 


"If  all  pending  claims  are  allowed  there  will  remain  two  thousand  eight 
hundred  bales  which  are  unclaimed,  and  a  balance  of  $520,661  62  in  the 
Treasury." 

And  now  it  will  be  interesting,  in  view  of  the  severe 
though  unjust  strictures  in  which  General  Sherma,n  indulges 
upon  Mr.  Stanton,  to  see  what  kind  of  orders  Sherman  gave 
looking  to  the  preservation  of  the  marks  upon  this  cotton, 
when  it  was  passing  from  his  possession  into  the  hands  of  the 
Treasury  Departft>ent.  He  had  previously  preserved  the 
marks,  but  on  transferring  it,  directed  the  receipt  to  be  taken 
in  gross.  This  is  the  order: 

[Special  Field  Orders  No.  10.] 

HEADQUARTKRS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SAVANNAH,  GA.,  January  12,  1865.      j 

1.  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Easton,  Chief  Quartermaster,  will  turn  over 


206  THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH. 

to  Simeon  Draper,  Esq.,  agent  of  the  United  States  Treasury  Department,  all 
cotton  now  in  the  city  of  Savannah,  prize  of  war,  taking  his  receipt  for  the 
same  in  gross,  and  returning  for  it  to  the  Quartermaster- General.     *     *      * 
By  order  of  General  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 

L.  M.  DAYTON,  Aide-de-Camp. 

And  so  it  appears  that  General  Sherman's  transfer  called 
only  for  a  receipt  in  gross,  and  that  Mr.  Stanton's  orders  alone 
secured  the  full  record  with  which  the  Government  has  pro 
tected  itself  against  fictitious  claims. 

There  is  another  instance  in  which  General  Sherman 
attempts,  with  as  little  reason  and  success,  to  be  severe  upon 
Mr.  Stanton,  which  may  properly  be  presented  in  this  con 
nection. 

In  the  second  bulletin  which  the  Secretary  of  War  published 
on  April  27th,  concerning  General  Sherman's  arrangements 
with  General  Johnston,  the  following  paragraphs  appeared 
from  a  dispatch  of  General  Halleck's.  dated  Richmond,  April 
26th,  9:30  p.  M.: 

"The  hankers  here  have  information  to-day  that  Jeff.  Davis'  specie  is 
moving  south  from  Goldsboro,  in  wagons,  as  fast  as  possible.  *  *  *  * 

"  The  specie  taken  with  them  is  estimated  here  at  from  six  to  thirteen  million 
dollars." 

Commenting  upon  these  paragraphs,  General  Sherman  says : 

"The  assertion  that  Jeff.  Davis'  specie  train,  of  six  to  thirteen  million 
dollars  was  reported  to  be  moving  south  from  Goldsboro  in  wagons  as  fast  as 
possible,  found  plenty  of  willing  ears,  though  my  army  of  eighty  thousand 
men  had  been  at  Goldsboro  from  March  22d  to  the  date  of  his  dispatch, 
April  26th ;  and  such  a  train  would  have  been  composed  of  from  fifteen  to 
thirty-two  six-mule  teams  to  have  hauled  this  specie,  even  if  it  all  were  in 
gold.  I  suppose  the  exact  amount  of  treasure  which  Davis  had  with  him  is 
now  known  to  a  cent;  some  of  it  was  paid  to  his  escort  when  it  disbanded  at 
and  near  Washington,  Georgia,  and  at  the  time  of  his  capture  he  had  a  small 
parcel  of  gold  and  silver  coin,  not  to  exceed  ten  thousand  dollars,  which  is 
now  retained  in  the  United  States  Treasury  vault  at  Washington,  and  shown 
to  the  curious. 

"The  thirteen  millions  of  treasure  with  which  Jeff.  Davis  was  to  corrupt  our 
armies  and  buy  his  escape,  dwindled  down  to  the  contents  of  a  hand  valise ! 
To  say  that  I  was  merely  angry  at  the  tone  and  substance  of  these  published 
bulletins  of  the  War  Department,  would  hardly  express  the  state  of  my 


THE  CAPTURED  COTTON  AT  SAVANNAH.  207 

feelings.     I  was  outraged  beyond  measure,  and  was  resolved  to  resent  the  in 
sult,  cost  what  it  might." 

This  ridicule  of  Halleck  is  based  upon  a  perfectly  evident 
misprint  of  "Goldsboro"  for  "  Greensboro'7  in  transmitting 
Ha  Heck's  dispatch  of  the  26th  April,  as  it  was  through  the 
latter  place  the  rebel  Cabinet  passed. 

How  little  reason  he  had  for  this  outburst  upon  the  question 
of  Jeff.  Davis7  gold,  will  appear  from  the  fact  that  the  day  before 
this  telegram  of  Halleck's  was  written,  General  Sherman  had 
himself  telegraphed  substantially  the  same  thing  to  Admiral 
Dahlgren,  and  also  to  General  Gillmore.  The  following  is 
Sherman's  gold  dispatch : 

RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  April  25,  1865. 
Major-General  G.  A.  GILLMORE,  Commanding  Department  of  the  South, 

and 
Real-Admiral  JOHN  A.  DAHLGREN,  Commanding  S.  A.  B.  Squadron. 

I  expect  Johnston  will  surrender  his  army.  We  have  had  much  negotia 
tion,  and  things  are  settling  down  to  the  terms  of  Lee's  army.  Jeff.  Davis 
and  his  Cabinet,  with  considerable  specie,  is  making  his  way  toward  Cuba.  He 
passed  Charlotte,  going  south,  on  the  23d,  and  I  think  he  will  try  to  reach 
the  Florida  coast  either  at  Cedar  Keys  or  lower  down.  It  would  be  well  to 
catch  him.  Can't  you  watch  the  East  coast,  and  send  word  round  to  the 
West  coast?  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General. 

The  facts  presented  from  the  records  in  this  chapter,  are 
quite  sufficient  to  show  the  totally  unreliable  character  of  what 
the  General  of  the  army  has  written  reflecting  upon  the  great 
War  Secretary. 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    BENTONVILLE THE    CARELESS    ADVANCE 

OF   AN   ARMY. 

THE  battle  of  Bentonville  affords  one  of  the  most  marked 
examples  of  carelessness  in  the  management  of  a  great  army 
which  can  be  found  in  the  history  of  the  Avar. 

Unlike  the  march  from  Atlanta  to  the  sea,  that  from 
Savannah  northward  through  the  Carolinas  originated  with 
General  Sherman.  And  in  all  respects  it  was  a  wonderful 
movement. 

The  first  instructions  of  General  Grant  contemplated  an 
entrenched  camp  near  Savannah,  and  the  transportation  of 
the  bulk  of  Sherman's  force  by  sea  to  City  Point.  General 
Sherman  was  very  anxious,  however,  to  capture  Savannah, 
and  then  march  northward  by  land.  The  reasons  he  gave 
Grant  were  such  as  to  induce  the  latter  to  accept  Sherman's 
plan  as  better  than  his  own. 

The  campaign  from  Savannah  was  in  every  way  more 
difficult  and  hazardous  than  the  march  from  Atlanta.  Tn 
coming  down  to  the  sea  there  had  been  no  veteran  enemy  in 
front,  nor  indeed,  any  force  worthy  of  mention,  nor  had 
there  been  important  garrisons  on  either  flank  to  threaten  or 
annoy.  The  roads  were  in  the  general  direction  of  the  larger 
streams,  and  the  country  was  well  adapted  to  the  march  of 
an  army. 

But  from  the  moment  of  leaving  Savannah  grave  difficulties 
were  to  be  expected  at  every  step.  The  country  was  low  and 
exceedingly  swampy,  the  rains  had  swollen  the  streams  and 
(208) 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE.  209 

flooded  the  low  lands,  and  the  direction  of  the  march  was 
across  them  all.  In  front  was  Hardee  with  a  force  which 
might  be  formidable  in  contending  the  passage  of  the  largei 
rivers.  On  the  right  were  the  garrisons  of  Charleston, 
Georgetown,  and  Wilmington.  There  was  reason  to  expect 
that  a  portion  of  Hood's  army  would  arrive  on  the  left  and 
strike  from  the  direction  of  Augusta.  Lastly,  Wade  Hamp 
ton,  then  popular  in  South  Carolina,  had  been  sent  down 
from  Lee's  army  to  rally  an  opposing  force.  And,  as  the 
result  proved,  before  serious  battle  was  delivered,  an  army  esti 
mated  at  thirty-seven  thousand  veteran  Confederate  troops  con 
centrated  at  Bentonville,  under  Sherman's  old  antagonist  John 
ston.  The  Union  force  at  the  time  was  fifty-seven  thousand. 

In  free  conversation  between  General  Schofield's  officers 
and  the  prominent  commanders  in  the  Confederate  forces, 
when  they  were  paroled  a  few  weeks  later,  all  expressed  great 
admiration  for  the  campaign  northward  from  Savannah  and 
astonishment  at  its  success.  They  had  confidently  expected, 
when  the  Union  army  began  to  push  through  the  great 
swamps,  that  it  would  lose  its  artillery  and  its  trains,  and 
never  emerge  in  an  organized  condition.  But  the  roads,  con 
structed  of  logs  and  brush,  wrhich  sunk  to  the  axles  of  the 
artillery  under  the  march  of  each  successive  division,  were 
rebuilt  by  the  division  which  followed,  and  the  resistless 
columns  moved  steadily  and  surely  against  natural  difficulties 
such  as  no  other  army  breasted  during  the  war. 

Sherman  had  left  smoking  South  Carolina,  with  its  ruined 
railroads,  behind  him  ,r  his  four  corps  had  converged  at  Fayette- 
ville,  and  there  crossed  the  Cape  Fear  River.  Here  the  right 
and  left  wings  again  separated,  but  marched  in  the  general 
direction  of  Goldsboro.  All  the  Confederate  garrisons  of 
points  below  were  piled  up  in  his  front,  the  provisions  were 
running  low  in  his  trains,  and  there  was  need  of  unusual  care 
and  prudence.  How  great  was  the  neglect  instead,  and  how 
narrow  the  escape  of  Sherman  from  serious  disaster,  the 
history  of  the  battle  of  Bentonville  will  show. 
14 


210         THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE. 

Little  became  known  at  the  time,  of  the  real  character  of 
this  battle.  The  surrender  of  Lee,  which  occurred  before  the 
facts  connected  Avith  Bentonville  could  be  disclosed,  and  the 
appalling  death  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  occupied  the  full  attention 
of  the  country.  By  the  time  it  so  recovered  as  to  turn  its 
mind  toward  North  Carolina,  Johnston  had  offered  to  sur 
render,  and  so  Bentonville  passed  almost  unnoticed. 

It  is  just  to  General  Sherman  to  say,  that  in  his  Memoirs 
he  brings  the  real  facts  connected  with  this  action  into 
bolder  relief  than  any  other  of  his  mistakes  of  which  he 
treats.  But  the  official  record  supplies  some  important  omis 
sions. 

Concerning  the  start  from  Savannah  northward,  General 
Sherman  writes : 

"I  knew  full  well  at  the  time  that  the  broken  fragments  of  Hood's  army 
(which  had  escaped  from  Tennessee)  were  being  hurried  rapidly  across 
Georgia,  by  Augusta,  to  make  junction  in  my  front,  estimating  them  at  the 
maximum,  twenty-five  thousand  men,  and  Hardee's,  Wheeler's,  and  Hamp 
ton's  forces  at  fifteen  thousand,  made  forty  thousand,  which,  if  handled  with 
spirit  and  energy,  would  constitute  a  formidable  force,  and  might  make  the 
passage  of  such  rivers  as  the  Santee  and  Cape  Fear  a  difficult  undertaking." 

His  whole  army  reached  Fayetteville,  North  Carolina,  and 
crossed  the  Cape  Fear  to  move  on  Goldsboro,  where  he 
expected  to  make  a  junction  with  General  Schofield,  then 
advancing  from  Newbern.  From  this  point,  in  a  letter  to 
General  Grant,  dated  March  12,  1865,  he  said: 

"Jos.  Johnston  may  try  to  interpose  between  me  here  and  Schofield  about 
Newbern,  but  I  think  he  will  not  try  that,  but  concentrate  his  scattered 
armies  at  Ealeigh,  and  I  will  go  straight  at  him  as  soon  as  I  get  our  men 
reclothed  and  our  wagons  reloaded." 

And  in  another  letter  of  the  same  date  to  General  Terry, 
he  wrote: 

"I  can  whip  Jos.  Johnston  provided  he  does  not  catch  one  of  my  corps  in 
flank,  and  I  will  see  that  the  army  marches  hence  to  Goldsboro  in  compact 
form." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE.         211 

But,  in  spite  of  this  good  resolution,  the  right  and  left 
wings  were  inarched  on  roads  from  ten  to  fifteen  miles  apart, 
and  each  wing  was  strung  out  at  great  length. 

Of  the  start  from  Fayetteville,  General  Sherman  writes : 

"I  then  knew  that  my  special  antagonist,  General  Jos.  Johnston,  wag 
back,  with  part  of  his  old  army ;  that  he  would  not  be  misled  by  feints  and 
false  reports,  and  would,  somehow,  compel  me  to  exercise  more  caution  than 
I  had  hitherto  done.  I  then  overestimated  his  force  at  thirty-seven  thousand 
infantry,  supposed  to  be  made  up  of  S.  D.  Lee's  corps,  four  thousand ; 
Cheatham's,  five  thousand ;  Hope's,  eight  thousand  ;  Hardee's,  ten  thousand ; 
and  other  detachments,  ten  thousand ;  with  Hampton's,  Wheeler's,  and  But 
ler's  cavalry,  about  eight  thousand.  Of  these,  only  Hardee  and  the  cavalry 
were  immediately  in  our  front,  while  the  bulk  of  Johnston's  army  was  sup 
posed  to  be  collecting  at  or  near  Raleigh.  *  *  *  * 

"On  the  15th  of  March  the  whole  army  was  across  Cape  Fear  River,  and 
at  once  began  its  march  for  Goldsboro — the  Seventeenth  Corps  still  on  the 
right,  the  Fifteenth  next  in  order,  then  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  on  the 
extreme  left,  the  cavalry  acting  in  close  concert  with  the  left  flank.  With 
almost  a  certainty  of  being  attacked  on  this  flank,  I  had  instructed  General 
Slocum  to  send  his  corps  trains,  under  strong  escort,  by  an  interior  road, 
holding  four  divisions  ready  for  immediate  battle.  General  Howard  was  in 
like  manner  ordered  to  keep  his  trains  well  to  his  right,  and  to  have  four 
divisions,  unencumbered,  about  six  miles  ahead  of  General  Slocum,  within 
easy  support."  *  *  *  * 

On  the  16th,  about  Averysboro,  "the  opposition  continued 
stubborn,"  and  General  Slocum  had  quite  a  brisk  fight,  losing 
twelve  officers  and  sixty-five  men  killed,  and  four  hundred 
and  seventy-seven  wounded. 

The  succeeding  events  are  thus  described  in  the  Memoirs  : 

"  From  Averysboro  the  left  wing  turned  east  toward  Goldsboro,  the  Four 
teenth  Corps  leading.  I  remained  with  this  wing  until  the  night  of  the  18th, 
when  we  were  within  twenty -seven  miles  of  Goldsboro,  and  five  from  Benton- 
ville;  and,  supposing  that  all  danger  was  over,  I  crossed  over  to  join  How 
ard's  column,  to  the  right,  so  as  to  be  nearer  to  Generals  Schofield  and  Terry, 
known  to  be  approaching  Goldsboro.  I  overtook  General  Howard  at  Falling 
Creek  Church,  and  found  his  column  well  drawn  out,  by  reason  of  the  bad 
roads.  I  had  heard  some  cannonading  over  about  Slocum's  head  of  column, 
and  supposed  it  to  indicate  about  the  same  measure  of  opposition  by  Hardee's 
troops  and  Hampton's  cavalry,  before  experienced.  But,  during  the  day,  a 
messenger  overtook  me,  and  notified  me,  that,  near  Bentonville,  General 


212         THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE. 

Slocum  had  run  up  against  Johnston's  whole  army.  I  sent  back  orders  for  him 
to  fight  defensively,  to  save  time,  and  that  I  would  come  up,  with  reinforce 
ments,  from  the  direction  of  Cox's  Bridge,  by  the  road  which  wre  had  reached 
near  Falling  Creek  Church.  The  country  was  very  obscure,  and  the  maps 
extremely  defective. 

"  By  this  movement  I  hoped  General  Slocum  would  hold  Johnston's  army 
facing  west,  while  I  would  come  on  his  rear  from  the  east.  The  Fifteenth 
Corps,  less  one  division  (Hazen's),  still  well  to  the  rear,  was  turned  at  once 
toward  Bentonville ;  Hazen's  division  was  ordered  to  Slocum's  flank ;  and 
orders  were  also  sent  for  General  Blair,  with  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  to  come 
to  the  same  destination.  Meantime  the  sound  of  cannon  came  from  the  di 
rection  of  Bentonville. 

"  The  night  of  the  19th  caught  us  near  Falling  Creek  Church ;  but  early 
the  next  morning  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  General  C.  B.  Wood's  division  leading, 
closed  down  on  Bentonville,  near  which  it  was  brought  up  by  encountering 
a  line  of  fresh  parapet,  crossing  the  road  and  extending  north  toward  Mill 
Creek. 

"  After  deploying,  I  ordered  General  Howard  to  proceed  with  due  caution, 
using  skirmishers  alone,  till  he  had  made  junction  with  General  Slocum,  on 
his  left.  These  deployments  occupied  all  day,  during  which  two  divisions  of 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  also  got  up.  At  that  time  General  Johnston's  army 
occupied  the  form  of  a  V,  the  angle  reaching  the  road  leading  from  Averys- 
boro  to  Goldsboro,  and  the  flanks  resting  on  Mill  Creek,  his  lines  embracing 
the  village  of  Bentonville. 

"  General  Slocum's  wing  faced  one  of  these  lines,  and  General  Howard's 
the  other ;  and,  in  the  uncertainty  of  General  Johnston's  strength,  I  did  not 
feel  disposed  to  invite  a  general  battle,  for  we  had  been  out  from  Savannah 
since  the  latter  part  of  January,  and  our  wagon  trains  contained  but  little 
food.  I  had  also  received  messages  during  the  day  from  General  Schofield,  at 
Kinston,  and  General  Terry,  at  Faison's  Depot,  approaching  Goldsboro ;  both 
expected  to  reach  it  by  March  21.  During  the  20th  we  simply  held  our 
ground,  and  started  our  trains  back  to  Kinston  for  provisions,  which  would 
be  needed  in  the  event  of  being  forced  to  fight  a  general  battle  at  Benton 
ville.  The  next  day  (21st)  it  began  to  rain  again,  and  we  remained  quiet  till 
about  noon,  when  General  Mower,  ever  rash,  broke  through  the  rebel  line  on 
his  extreme  left  flank,  and  was  pushing  straight  for  Bentonville  and  the 
bridge  across  Mill  Creek.  I  ordered  him  back  to  connect  with  his  own  corps, 
and,  lest  the  enemy  should  concentrate  on  him,  ordered  the  whole  rebel  line 
to  be  engaged  with  a  strong  skirmish  fire. 

"  I  think  I  made  a  mistake  there,  and  should  rapidly  have  followed  Mowers' 
lead  with  the  whole  of  the  right  wing,  which  would  have  brought  on  a  gen 
eral  battle,  and  it  could  not  have  resulted  otherwise  than  successfully  to  us, 
by  reason  of  our  vastly  superior  numbers ;  but  at  the  moment,  for  the  rea 
sons  given,  I  preferred  to  make  junction  with  Generals  Terry  and  Schofield, 
before  engaging  Johnston's  army,  the  strength  of  which  was  utterly  unknown. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE.  213 

The  next  day  he  was  gone,  and  had  retreated  on  Smithfield ;  and,  the  roada 
all  being  clear,  our  army  moved  to  Goldsboro.  The  heaviest  fighting  at  Ben- 
tonville  was  on  the  first  day,  viz.:  the  19th,  when  Johnston's  army  struck  the 
head  of  Slocum's  column,  knocking  back  Carlin's  division.  But  as  soon  as 
General  Slocum  had  brought  up  the  rest  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  into  line, 
and  afterward  the  Twentieth  on  his  left,  he  received  and  repulsed  all  attacks, 
and  held  his  ground,  as  ordered,  to  await  the  coming  back  of  the  right  wing." 

General  Sherman's  formal  report  of  this  battle,  dated  Golds 
boro,  April  4,  1865,  contains  the  following  very  contradictory 
statements  concerning  the  attack  : 

"All  the  signs  induced  me  to  believe  that  the  enemy  would  make  no  fur 
ther  opposition  to  our  progress,  and  would  not  attempt  to  strike  us  in  flank 
while  in  motion." 

A  few  paragraphs  below,  in  the  same  report,  he  again  refers 
to  the  matter,  as  follows  : 

"Johnston  had  moved,  by  night,  from  Smithfield,  with  great  rapidity,  and 
without  unnecessary  wheels,  intending  to  overwhelm  my  left  flank  before  it 
could  be  relieved  by  its  cooperating  columns.  But  he  reckoned  without  his 
host.  I  had  expected  just  such  a  movement  all  the  way  from  Fayetteville, 
and  was  prepared  for  it." 

From  the  above  extracts  it  is  quite  evident  that  Johnston 
attempted  to  concentrate  his  forces,  fall  upon  the  left  wing  of 
Sherman's  army,  crush  it  before  the  others  could  arrive,  and 
then,  in  turn,  attack  the  right,  and  that  he  came  much  nearer 
success  than  it  is  pleasant  to  contemplate.  The  warnings  of 
such  a  concentration,  as  will  be  seen,  were  abundant.  That 
they  were  not  heeded  seems  marvelous  and  the  extreme  of 
carelessness.  Some  of  the  telegrams  accompanying  a  former 
printed  report  of  General  Sherman  make  the  situation  still 
clearer. 

The  advance  of  the  left  wing  began  at  seven  o'clock  on  the 
19th  of  March,  and  was  stubbornly  contested  from  the  first. 
About  ten  o'clock  General  Slocum  became  convinced  that  he 
had  encountered  the  enemy  in  force.  He  therefore  concluded 
to  assume  the  offensive,  and  communicate  with  General  Sher- 


214  THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE. 

man.  The  two  wings  were  so  far  separated  that  it  was  six  or 
seven  hours  before  the  commanding  general,  who  was  with 
the  right  wing,  could  be  reached. 

At  five  P.  M.,  of  the  19th,  he.  sent  the  following. dispatch  to 
General  Schofield,  then  approaching  Goldsboro  : 

"  Since  making  my  dispatch  to-day  (2  p.  M.)  General  Slocum  reports  the 
enemy  in  force  between  him  and  Cox's  Bridge ;  thinks  it  is  the  main  army 
of  the  enemy.  I  can  hardly  suppose  the  enemy  will  attempt  to  fight  us  this 
side  of  the  Neuse,  but  will  direct  all  my  columns  on  Cox's  Bridge  to-morrow. 
You  must  secure  Goldsboro,  and  fortify." 

At  the  same  hour  he  dispatched  General  Kilpatrick : 

"Your  report  of  to-day  is  received.  General  Slocum  thinks  the  whole 
rebel  army  is  in  his  front.  I  can  not  think  Johnston  would  fight  us  with  the 
Neuse  to  his  rear." 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  at  4  A.  M.,  General  Sherman 
wrote  as  follows  to  General  Terry : 

"  Johnston,  with  his  concentrated  force,  made  an  unsuccessful  attack  on  my 
left  wing  yesterday,  near  Bentonville.  I  am  just  starting  with  my  right 
wing  to  attack  him." 

And  again  to  General  Terry  at  6  A.  M.: 

"  Yesterday  Johnston,  with  his  force  concentrated,  struck  my  left  wing,  near 
Bentonville,  and  they  had  a  severe  battle,  lasting  until  night.  General 
Slocum  beat  them  off,  but  was  uneasy.  I  am  now  turning  the  right  wing  on 
Bentonville.  *  *  *  *  By  to-night  I  will  know  if  Jos.  Johnston 
intends  to  fight  me  in  force,  when  I  will  communicate  further." 

To  General  Schofield,  at  2  p.  M.,  of  the  20th,  he  wrote: 

"  I  am  now  within  two  miles  of  Slocum,  but  Johnston  is  between  us.  We 
are  now  skirmishing." 

As  will  be  observed,  this  was  twenty-eight  hours  after  the 
attack  in  force  began  on  Slocum. 

At  8  P.  M.,  of  the  20th,  he  wrote  General  Slocum  : 

"We  struck  the  enemy  on  his  left  rear  about  noon  and  have  pressed  him 
very  hard,  and  have  dislodged  him  from  all  his  barricades  except  the  line 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE.  215 

constructed  as  against  you,  which  may  be  double  or  inclosed,  for  our  men  find 
parapets  from  the  road  well  down  to  Mill  Creek.  Johnston  hoped  to  over 
come  your  wing  before  I  could  come  to  your  relief;  having  failed  in  that  I 
can  not  see  why  he  remains,  and  still  think  he  will  avail  himself  of  night  to 
get  back  to  Smithfield.  I  would  rather  avoid  a  general  battle  if  possible,  but 
if  he  insists  on  it  we  must  accommodate  him.  In  that  event,  if  he  be  in  posi 
tion  to-morrow,  I  want  you  to  make  a  good  road  around  his  flank  into  this, 
and  to-morrow  night  pass  your  trains  and  dispose  your  troops  so  that  we 
have  our  back  toward  Faison's  and  Goldsboro.  General  Schofield  was  to 
leave  Kinston  for  Goldsboro  to-day,  and  General  Terry  has  arrived  with 
nine  thousand  infantry  at  Faison's,  and  I  have  ordered  him  to  Cox's  Bridge 
to  be  drawn  up  here  if  we  need  him.  I  can  also  draw  on  General  Schofield 
in  a  few  days  for  ten  thousand  men,  but  I  think  we  have  enough." 

At  9  P.  M.  of  the  same  day  the  following  dispatch  was  sent 
General  Terry: 

"We  struck  Johnston  on  his  left  rear  to-day,  and  have  been  skirmishing 
pretty  hard  all  day.  We  have  opened  communication  with  General  Slocum, 
who  had  a  hard  fight  yesterday.  We  are  now  ready  for  battle,  if  Johnston 
desires  it,  to-morrow ;  but  as  he  has  failed  to  overcome  one  wing  he  will 
hardly  invite  battle  with  both.  I  don't  want  to  fight  now  or  here,  and 
therefore  won't  object  to  his  drawing  oft'  to-night  toward  Smithfield,  as  he 
should." 

To  General  Schofield  he  wrote,  March  21,  from  Bentonville : 

"Captain  Twining  is  here,  and  I  send  by  him  an  order  that  you  will  per 
ceive  looks  to  stayirg  here  some  days. 

"  I  thought  Johnston,  having  failed  as  he  attempted  to  crush  one  of  my 
wings,  finding  he  had  not  succeeded,  but  that  I  was  present  with  my  whole 
force,  would  withdraw;  but  he  has  not,  and  I  must  fight  him  here.  He  is 
twenty  (20)  miles  from  Smithfield,  and  with  a  bad  road  to  his  rear,  but  his 
position  is  in  the  swamps,  difficult  of  approach,  and  I  don't  like  to  assail  his 
parapets,  which  are  of  the  old  kind." 

In  a  letter  to  General  Grant  dated  March  22,  quoted  in  the 
Memoirs,  reviewing  the  affair  of  Bentonville  at  length,  the 
following  passage  occurs : 

"I  wrote  you  from  Fayetteville,  North  Carolina,  on  Tuesday,  the  14th 
instant,  that  I  was  all  ready  to  start  for  Goldsboro,  to  which  point  I  had  also 
ordered  General  Schofield  from  Newbern  and  General  Terry  from  Wilming 
ton.  I  knew  that  General  Jos.  Johnston  was  in  supreme  command  against 
me,  and  that  he  would  have  tried  to  concentrate  a  respectable  army  to  oppose 


216         THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE. 

the  last  stage  of  this  march  *  *  *  *  On  Tuesday,  the  15th  [probably 
a  misprint  for  Thursday  the  16th],  General  Slocum  found  Hardee's  army  from 
Charleston,  which  had  retreated  before  us  from  Cheraw,  in  position  across  the 
narrow  swampy  neck  between  Cape  Fear  and  North  Elvers  where  the  road 
branches  off  to  Goldsboro.  There  a  pretty  severe  fight  occurred,  in  which  Gen 
eral  Slocum's  troops  carried  handsomely  the  advanced  line,  held  by  a  South 
Carolina  brigade  commanded  by  a  Colonel  Butler.  *  *  *  * 

"We  resumed  the  march  toward  Goldsboro.  I  was  with  the  left  wing 
until  I  supposed  all  danger  had  passed,  but  when  General  Slocum's  head  of 
column  was  within  four  miles  of  Bentonville,  after  skirmishing  as  usual  with 
cavalry,  he  became  aware  that  there  was  infantry  at  his  front.  He  deployed 
a  couple  of  brigades,  which,  on  advancing,  sustained  a  partial  repulse,  but 
soon  rallied,  and  he  formed  a  line  of  the  two  leading  divisions,  Morgan's  and 
Carlin's,  of  Jeff.  C.  Davis'  corps.  The  enemy  attacked  these  with  violence, 
but  was  repulsed.  This  was  in  the  forenoon  of  Sunday,  the  19th.  General 
Slocum  brought  forward  the  two  divisions  of  the  Twentieth  Corps,  hastily 
disposed  of  them  for  defense,  and  General  Kilpatrick  massed  his  cavalry  on 
the  left. 

"General  Jos.  Johnston  had  the  night  before  marched  his  whole  army 
(Bragg,  Cheatham,  S.  D.  Lee,  Hardee,  and  all  the  troops  he  had  drawn  from 
every  quarter),  determined,  as  he  told  his  men,  to  crush  one  of  our  corps  and 
then  defeat  us  in  detail  He  attacked  General  Slocum  in  position  from  3  P.M. 
on  the  19th  till  dark,  but  was  every  where  repulsed  and  lost  heavily.  At  the 
time  I  was  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps  marching  on  a  road  more  to  the  right, 
but  on  hearing  of  General  Slocum's  danger  directed  that  corps  toward  Cox's 
Bridge,  in  the  night  brought  Blair's  corps  over,  and  on  the  20th  marched 
rapidly  on  Johnston's  flank  and  rear.  We  struck  him  about  noon  and  forced 
him  to  assume  the  defensive  and  to  fortify.  Yesterday  we  pushed  him  hard 
and  came  very  near  crushing  him,  the  right  division  of  the  Seventeenth 
Corps,  however,  having  broken  in  to  within  a  hundred  yards  of  where 
Johnston  himself  was,  at  the  bridge  across  Mill  Creek.  Last  night  he  retreated, 
leaving  us  in  possession  of  the  field,  dead,  and  wounded."  *  *  *  * 

The  report  of  General  Hazen,  commanding  the  First  Di 
vision  of  the  right  wing  which  started  to  the  relief  of  the  left, 
gives  a  clear  idea  of  the  distance  of  the  left  wing  from  the 
nearest  support.  Writing  of  his  march  to  the  relief  of  Gen 
eral  Slocum,  he  says: 

"  On  the  15th  the  march  was  resumed  in  the  direction  of  Goldsboro,  whicli 
was  continued  at  slow  stages  till  midnight  of  the  19th,  when  I  received  orders 
to  turn  back  to  the  assistance  of  General  Slocum,  and  reported  to  him  with 
the  division  near  Bentonville  at  daylight,  having  marched  since  sunset 
twenty  miles. 


THE  BATTLE  OF   BENTONVILLE.  217 

"At  12  M.  of  the  20th  the  division  was  moved  to  the  rear  of  the  Four 
teenth  Corps,  and  two  regiments  were  deployed  and  connected  witli  the  First 
Division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  on  the  right  and  the  Fourteenth  Corps  on  the 
left,  engaged  the  enemy  on  their  lines."  *  *  *  * 

The  extent  to  which  the  left  wing  was  stretched  out  on  the 
road  is  shown  by  a  paragraph  in  General  Slocum's  report: 

"  On  the  following  morning  (20th)  Generals  Baird  and  Geary,  each  with 
two  brigades  of  their  respective  divisions,  and  General  Hazen,  of  the  Fifteenth 
Corps,  with  his  entire  division,  arrived  on  the  field." 

The  first-named  generals  belonged  to  the  left  wing  and 
Hazen  to  the  right.  As  to  the  arrival  of  the  left  wing  in 
force  General  Slocum  says : 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  right  wing  came  up  and  connected  with 
General  Hazen." 

The  battle  began  about  ten  o'clock  on  the  19th.  One 
division  of  the  right  wing,  by  a  long  night  march,  came  up 
the  next  morning,  but  the  main  body  of  that  wing  was  not 
ready  to  strike  the  enemy  until  the  morning  of  the  21st. 

The  situation  of  affairs  around  Bentonville,  then,  was  about 
this:  With  a  full  knowledge  that  Johnston  was  rapidly  con 
centrating  all  available  forces  in  his  front,  the  two  wings  of 
the  Union  army,  each  inferior  to  Johnston's  supposed  num 
bers,  were  allowed  to  march  in  extremely  open  order,  and  so 
far  apart  that,  when  an  attack  in  force  began  on  the  left  wing 
at  ten  o'clock  on  the  19th,  it  was  not  until  noon  of  the  next 
day  that  part  of  the  other  wing  came  within  striking  distance, 
and  even  then  it  was  not  able  to  communicate  directly  with 
the  left  wing  because  the  enemy  was  interposed  in  force. 

The  total  strength  of  the  left  wing  was  less  than  twenty-six 
thousand,  and  only  a  portion  of  this  could  be  brought  up  for 
the  first  day's  fight.  General  Johnston's  force  was  then  esti 
mated  at  thirty-seven  thousand,  though  he  afterward  stated 
that  he  had  only  fourteen  thousand  infantry  engaged. 

The  Union  officers  and  men  fought  splendidly,  and  thus 


218         THE  BATTLE  OF  BENTONVILLE. 

neutralized  the  effect  of  General  Sherman's  carelessness  and 
saved  their  wing  of  the  army.  Still,  in  spite  of  their  gallant 
fighting  against  superior  numbers,  it  was  probably  owing  to  a 
mistake  on  the  Confederate  side  that  the  left  wing  was  not 
wholly  overpowered. 

A  general  assault  had  been  contemplated  by  the  Confederate 
generals  about  an  hour  before  sundown.  But  by  some  error 
in  conveying  commands,  or  in  obeying  them,  night  came  on 
before  their  lines  were  ready  for  the  movement,  and  so  the 
opportunity  for  crushing  Sherman's  left  wing  passed.  Thus 
narrowly  did  this  magnificent  army  escape  serious  disaster  in 
its  last  battle. 

General  Sherman  speaks  repeatedly  of  Generals  Schofield 
and  Terry  as  if  they  were  independent  commanders,  and  says : 
"  Wilmington  was  captured  by  General  Terry  on  the  22d  of 
February." 

Accurately,  General  Terry's  forces  formed  a  portion  of  the 
command  of  General  Schofield,  and  advanced  on  Wilmington 
upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Cape  Fear  River,  while  the  Twenty- 
Third  Corps  formed  the  other  part  of  Schofield's  army,  and 
advanced  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river.  General  J.  D.  Cox's 
troops  of  this  latter  corps,  with  one  division  of  Terry's  troops, 
assisted  by  the  fleet,  drove  the  enemy  out  of  Fort  Anderson, 
and  then  by  secretly  passing  Casement's  brigade  in  flats  over 
Town  Creek  near  its  mouth,  General  Cox  secured  the  main 
crossing  over  that  strongly  guarded  stream,  and  opened  the 
way  to  the  rear  of  Wilmington,  which,  as  a  consequence,  was 
immediately  evacuated.  As  General  Schofield  directed  all  the 
movements,  a  careful  writer  would  have  said  Wilmington  was 
captured  by  General  Schofield. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

THE   TEEMS   WITH    JOHNSTON — THE     FIRST    DRAFT    MADE    BY 
A    CONFEDERATE    CABINET    OFFICER. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN  sneers  at  political  generals,  and  then 
devotes  thirty  pages  of  his  Memoirs  to  an  inaccurate  history 
of  his  own  political  surrender  to  General  Jos.  E.  Johnston 
near  Raleigh. 

The  country  will  never  forget  its  joy  over  the  news  from 
Appomattox,  or  the  chill  which  shortly  after  fell  upon  it  when 
the  true  character  of  Sherman's  terms  became  known.  If  the 
country  at  large  ever  does  forget  the  circumstances  attending 
the  latter  event,  those  who  were  at  Raleigh  at  the  time  never 
will. 

The  real  character  of  these  terms  was  carefully  concealed 
there,  even  from  very  prominent  officers,  and  was  known 
first  at  the  North.  It  was  given  out  at  Sherman's  head 
quarters  that  the  terms  granted  Johnston  were  virtually  the 
same  as  those  extended  by  Grant  to  Lee,  and  special  stress 
was  laid  upon  the  statement  that  in  no  sense  had  General 
Sherman  recognized  the  political  existence  of  the  Confederacy. 

When  General  Grant  arrived  and  announced  the  prompt 
rejection  of  these  terms,  their  real  nature  first  became  known. 
There  was  much  indignation  in  consequence  at  Sherman's 
course,  and  many  comparisons  of  views  among  officers  of  rank 
as  to  his  motives.  The  speedy  and  successful  correction  of 
his  great  error,  and  the  immediate  close  of  the  war,  over  which 
the  Nation  was  so  busy  with  its  rejoicing,  alone  saved  him  from 
damaging  criticism.  If  it  had  been  made  known  then  that 

(219) 


220  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

the  first  draft  of  Sherman's  terms  was  written  by  the  rebel 
Postmaster-General  at  a  consultation  had  between  this  mem 
ber  of  Davis7  Cabinet,  his  Secretary  of  War,  Generals  John 
ston,  and  Wade  Hampton,  it  would  have  made  General 
Sherman's  position  most  uncomfortable  before  the  people. 
But  in  view  of  the  services  he  had  rendered,  this,  and  other 
unpleasant  facts  did  not  find  their  way  to  the  public  then. 
Now  that  he  has  so  recklessly  invited  criticism,  and  published 
an  inaccurate  version  of  these  very  negotiations,  he  can  not 
complain  if  the  beliefs  which  were  entertained  among  promi 
nent  officers  at  Raleigh,  find  expression,  and  documents  cap 
tured  soon  after  the  surrender  are  made  public. 

The  theory  of  General  Sherman's  negotiation  with  General 
Johnston,  as  held  by  many  prominent  officers,  whose  oppor 
tunities  for  obtaining  knowledge  were  excellent,  was  about 
this: 

General  Sherman  was  elated  almost  beyond  measure  at  his 
March  to  the  Sea,  and  northward  through  the  Carolinas.  He 
had  rested  and  refurnished  his  army  at  Goldsboro,  and  had  just 
issued  an  order  for  it  to  march  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  when  down  came  the  news,  first,  of 
the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  and,  following  close,  of  the  sur 
render  of  Lee.  General  Grant  had  captured  the  great  army 
of  the  Confederacy;  all  the  rest  must  follow,  as  a  matter  of 
course;  Sherman  was  not  in  at  the  death;  the  war  was  to 
close  with  General  Grant  its  greatest  military  hero.  Then  came 
the  proposal  for  a  conference  from  Johnston.  While  first 
writing  to  Johnston  that  he  would  extend  the  same  terms 
given  by  Grant  to  Lee,  and  immediately  writing  General 
Grant  that  he  wrould  abe  careful  not  to  complicate  any  points 
of  civil  policy ;"  yet,  doubtless  influenced  by  his  OAVU  reflec 
tions  upon  the  secondary  position  in  which  events  were  leav 
ing  him,  and  by  the  cunning  manipulations  of  the  rebel  Cabinet, 
he  conceived  the  idea,  not  only  of  receiving  the  surrender  of 
the  remaining  military  forces  of  the  rebellion,  and  declaring 
"peace  from  the  Potomac  to  the  Rio  Grande/'  but  of  becom- 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  221 

ing  the  political  reconstructor  of  the  Nation,  and  thus  the 
most  prominent  character  emerging  from  the  war. 

Before  any  pronounce  this  theory  chimerical,  let  them  read 
the  narratives,  extracts,  and  records  which  follow. 

The  material  points  of  General  Sherman's  account  of  his 
negotiations  with  General  Johnston  are  these : 

On  April  14, 1865,  a  note  was  received  from  Johnston,  dated 
the  day  before,  asking  whether,  since  "the  results  of  the  recent 
campaign  in  Virginia  have  changed  the  relative  military 
character  of  the  belligerents/7  General  Sherman  was  willing, 
in  order  "to  stop  the  further  effusion  of  blood  and  devastation 
of  property/7  to  ask  from  General  Grant  a  suspension  of  hos 
tilities  for  the  purpose  of  permitting  "the  civil  authorities  to 
enter  into  the  needful  arrangements  to  terminate  the  existing 
war." 

General  Sherman  wrote  Johnston  the  same  day  that  he  had 
authority  to  suspend  hostilities,  that  he  would  meet  Johnston 
to  confer  upon  the  subject,  and  added:  "that  a  basis  of  action 
may  be  had,  I  undertake  to  abide  by  the  same  terms  and  con 
ditions  as  were  made  by  Generals  Grant  and  Lee  at  Appo- 
mattox  Court  House  on  the  9th  inst.,  relative  to  our  two 
armies." 

The  same  evening  he  wrote  General  Grant  as  follows, 
•chough  this  letter  is  not  given  in  the  Memoirs : 

"  I  send  copies  of  a  correspondence  begun  with  General  Johnston,  which  I 
think  will  be  followed  by  terms  of  capitulation.  I  will  grant  the  same 
terms  as  General  Grant  gave  General  Lee,  and  be  careful  not  to  complicate 
any  points  of  civil  policy." 

On  the  17th  the  opposing  commanders  met  alone  in  a  farm 
house  near  Durham  Station,  when,  after  some  conversation 
over  the  assassination  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  Sherman  says : 

"I  then  told  Johnston  that  he  must  be  convinced  that  he  could  not  oppose 
my  army,  and  that  since  Lee  had  surrendered  he  could  do  the  same  with 
honor  and  propriety.  He  plainly  and  repeatedly  admitted  this,  and  added 
that  any  further  fighting  would  be  'murder,'  but  he  thought  that  instead  of 


222  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

surrendering  piecemeal  we  might  arrange  terms  that  would  embrace  all  the 
Confederate  armies.  I  asked  him  if  he  could  control  other  armies  than  his 
own.  He  said  not  then,  but  intimated  that  he  could  procure  authority  from 
Mr.  Davis.  I  then  told  him  that  I  had  recently  had  an  interview  with  Gen 
eral  Grant  and  President  Lincoln,  and  that  I  was  possessed  of  their  views. 
*  *  *  *  That  the  terms  that  General  Grant  had  given  to  General 
Lee's  army  were  certainly  most  generous  and  liberal.  All  this  he  admitted, 
but  always  recurred  to  the  idea  of  a  universal  surrender,  embracing  his  own 
army,  that  of  Dick  Taylor  in  Louisiana  and  Texas,  and  of  Maury,  Forrest, 
and  others  in  Alabama  and  Georgia.  *  *  *  * 

"  Our  conversation  was  very  general  and  extremely  cordial,  satisfying  me 
that  it  could  have  but  one  result,  and  that  which  we  all  desired,  viz.:  to  end 
the  war  as  quickly  as  possible;  and,  being  anxious  to  return  to  Raleigh 
before  the  news  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  assassination  could  be  divulged,  on  General 
Johnston's  saying  that  he  thought  that,  during  the  night,  he  could  procure 
authority  to  act  in  the  name  of  all  the  Confederate  armies  in  existence,  we 
agreed  to  meet  again  the  next  day  at  noon,  at  the  same  place,  and  parted,  he 
for  Hillsboro  and  I  for  Raleigh." 

On  the  18th  the  two  Generals  met  again  near  Durham. 
The  Memoirs  give  the  following  account  of  the  interview: 

*  *  *  *  "  We  again  entered  Bennett's  house  and  I  closed  the  door. 
General  Johnston  then  assured  me  that  he  had  authority  over  all  the  Con 
federate  armies,  so  that  they  would  obey  his  orders  to  surrender  on  the  same 
terms  with  his  own,  but  he  argued  that,  to  obtain  so  cheaply  this  desirable 
result,  I  ought  to  give  his  men  and  officers  some  assurance  of  their  political 
rights  after  their  surrender.  I  explained  to  him  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclama 
tion  of  amnesty  of  December  8,  1863,  still  in  force,  enabled  every  Confederate 
soldier  and  officer  below  the  rank  of  colonel  to  obtain  an  absolute  pardon  by 
simply  laying  down  his  arms  and  taking  the  common  oath  of  allegiance,  and 
that  General  Grant,  in  accepting  the  surrender  of  General  Lee's  army,  had 
extended  the  same  principle  to  att  the  officers,  General  Lee  included.  Such 
a  pardon,  I  understood,  would  restore  to  them  all  their  rights  of  citizenship. 
But  he  insisted  that  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Confederate  army  were 
unnecessarily  alarmed  about  this  matter  as  a  sort  of  bugbear.  He  then  said 
that  Mr.  Breckinridge  was  near  at  hand,  and  he  thought  that  it  would  be  well 
for  him  to  be  present.  I  objected  on  the  score  that  he  was  then  in  Davis'  Cabi 
net,  and  our  negotiations  should  be  confined  strictly  to  belligerents.  He  then 
said  Breckinridge  was  a  Major-General  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  might 
sink  his  character  of  Secretary  of  War.  I  consented,  and  he  sent  one  of  his  staff 
officers  back,  who  soon  returned  with  Breckinridge,  and  he  entered  the  room. 
General  Johnston  and  I  then  again  went  over  the  whole  ground,  and  Breckin 
ridge  confirmed  what  he  had  said  as  to  the  uneasiness  of  the  Southern  officers 
and  soldiers  about  their  political  rights  in  case  of  surrender.  While  we  were 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

in  consultation,  a  messenger  came  with  a  parcel  of  papers,  which  General 
Johnston  said  were  from  Mr.  Reagan,  Postmaster-General.  He  and  Breckin- 
ridge  looked  over  them,  and,  after  some  side  conversation,  he  handed  one  of 
the  papers  to  me.  It  was  in  Reagan's  handwriting,  and  began  with  a  long 
preamble  and  terms,  so  general  and  verbose  that  I  said  they  were  inadmissible. 
Then  recalling  the  conversation  of  Mr.  Lincoln  at  City  Point,  I  sat  down  at 
the  table  and  wrote  off  the  terms,  which,  I  thought,  concisely  expressed  his 
views  and  wishes,  and  explained  that  I  was  willing  to  submit  these  terms  to 
the  new  President,  Mr.  Johnson,  provided  that  both  armies  should  remain  in 
statu  quo  until  the  truce  therein  declared  should  expire.  I  had  full  faith  that 
General  Johnston  would  religiously  respect  the  truce,  which  he  did ;  and  that 
I  would  be  the  gainer,  for,  in  the  few  days  it  would  take  to  send  the  papers 
to  Washington  and  receive  an  answer,  I  could  finish  the  railroad  up  to 
Raleigh,  and  be  the  better  prepared  for  a  long  chase. 

"  Neither  Mr.  Breckinridge  nor  General  Johnston  wrote  one  word  of  that 
paper.  I  wrote  it  myself,  and  announced  it  as  the  best  I  could  do,  and  they 
readily  assented." 

General  Johnston,  in  his  Narrative,  gives  the  following 
account  of  the  consultation  held  at  President  Davis'  quarters 
at  Charlotte,  after  the  news  of  Lee's  surrender  was  received: 

"  In  a  telegram  dated  Greensboro,  4:30  p.  M.,  the  President  directed  me  to 
leave  the  troops  under  Lieutenant-General  Hardee's  command,  and  report  to 
him  there. 

"Taking  the  first  train,  about  midnight,  I  reached  Greensboro  about  eight 
o'clock  in  the  morning  on  the  12th,  and  was  General  Beanregard's  guest. 
His  quarters  were  a  burden  car,  near,  and  in  sight  of  those  of  the  President. 
The  General  and  myself  were  summoned  to  the  President's  office  in  an  hour 
or  two,  and  found  Messrs.  Benjamin,  Mai  lory,  and  Reagan  with  him.  We  had 
supposed  that  we  were  to  be  questioned  concerning  the  military  resources  of 
our  department,  in  connection  with  the  question  of  continuing  or  terminating 
the  Avar. 

"But  the  President's  object  seemed  to  be  to  give,  not  to  obtain  information; 
for,  addressing  the  party,  he  said  that  in  two  or  three  weeks  he  would  have  a 
large  army  in  the  field  by  bringing  back  into  the  ranks  those  who  had 
abandoned  them  in  less  desperate  circumstances,  and  by  calling  out  the 
enrolled  men  whom  the  conscript  bureau,  with  its  forces,  had  been  unable  to 
bring  into  the  army.  It  was  remarked,  by  the  military  officers,  that  men 
who  had  left  the  army  when  our  cause  was  not  desperate,  and  those  who, 
under  the  same  circumstances,  could  not  be  forced  into  it,  would  scarcely,  in 
the  present  desperate  condition  of  our  affairs,  enter  the  service  upon  mere 
invitation.  Neither  opinions  nor  information  was  asked,  and  the  conference 
terminated.  Before  leaving  the  room,  we  learned  that  Major-General  Breck- 
inridge's  arrival  was  expected  in  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  and  it  was  not 


224  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

doubted  that  he  would  bring  certain  intelligence  of  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Virginia. 

"  General  Breckinridge  came  as  expected,  and  confirmed  the  report  of  the 
surrender  of  the  army  in  Virginia.  General  Beauregard  and  myself,  con 
versing  together  after  the  intelligence  of  the  great  disaster,  reviewed  the  con 
dition  of  our  affairs,  and  carefully  compared  the  resources  of  the  belligerents, 
and  agreed  in  the  opinion  that  the  Southern  Confederacy  was  overthrown. 
In  conversation  with  General  Breckinridge  afterward,  I  repeated  this,  and 
said  that  the  only  power  of  government  left  in  the  President's  hands  was 
that  of  terminating  the  war,  and  that  this  power  should  be  exercised  without 
more  delay.  I  also  expressed  my  readiness  to  suggest  to  the  President  the 
absolute  necessity  of  such  action,  should  an  opportunity  to  do  so  be  given  me. 
General  Breckenridge  promised  to  make  me  this  opportunity. 

"  Mr.  Mallory  came  to  converse  with  me  on  the  subject,  and  showed  great 
anxiety  that  negotiations  to  end  the  war  should  be  commenced,  and  urged 
that  I  was  the  person  who  should  suggest  the  measure  to  the  President. 
I,  on  the  contrary,  thought  that  such  a  suggestion  would  come  more  prop 
erly  from  one  of  his  '  constitutional  advisers,'  but  told  Mr.  Mallory  of  my 
conversation  with  General  Breckinridge. 

"That  gentleman  fulfilled  his  engagement  promptly ;  and  General  Beau- 
regard  and  myself  were  summoned  to  the  President's  office  an  hour  or  two 
after  the  meeting  of  hia  Cabinet  there  next  morning.  Being  desired  by 
the  President  to  do  it,  we  compared  the  military  forces  of  the  two  parties 
to  the  war :  ours,  an  army  of  about  twenty  thousand  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  five  thousand  mounted  troops;  those  of  the  United  States,  three  armies 
that  could  be  combined  against  ours,  which  was  insignificant  compared  with 
either — Grant's,  of  a  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  men ;  Sherman's,  of  a 
hundred  and  ten  thousand  at  least;  and  Canby's,  of  sixty  thousand — odds 
of  seventeen  or  eighteen  to  one,  which  in  a  few  weeks  could  be  more  than 
doubled. 

"  I  represented  that,  under  such  circumstances,  it  would  be  the  greatest 
of  human  crimes  for  us  to  attempt  to  continue  the  war;  for,  having  neither 
money  nor  credit,  nor  arms  but  those  in  the  hands  of  our  soldiers,  nor 
ammunition  but  that  in  their  cartridge  boxes,  nor  shops  for  repairing  arms 
or  fixing  ammunition,  the  effect  of  our  keeping  the  field  would  be  not  to 
harm  the  enemy,  but  to  complete  the  devastation  of  our  country  and  ruin  of 
its  people.  I,  therefore,  urged  that  the  President  should  exercise  at  once  the 
only  function  of  government  still  in  his  possession,  and  open  negotiations  for 
peace. 

"The  members  of  the  Cabinet  present  were  then  desired  by  the  President 
to  express  their  opinions  on  the  important  question.  General  Breckinridge, 
Mr.  Mallory,  and  Mr.  Reagan,  thought  that  the  war  was  decided  against  us ; 
and  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  make  peace.  Mr.  Benjamin  expressed 
the  contrary  opinion.  The  latter  made  a  speech  for  war,  much  like  that  of 
Sempronius  in  Addison's  play.  The  President  replied  to  our  suggestion  as 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  225 

if  somewhat  annoyed  by  it.  He  said  that  it  was  idle  to  suggest  that  he 
should  attempt  to  negotiate,  when  it  was  certain,  from  the  attempt  previ 
ously  made,  that  his  authority  to  treat  would  not  be  recognized,  nor  any 
terms  that  he  might  offer  considered  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  I  reminded  him  that  it  had  not  been  unusual,  in  such  cases,  for 
military  commanders  to  initiate  negotiations  upon  which  treaties  of  peace 
were  founded;  and  proposed  that  he  should  allow  me  to  address  General 
Sherman  on  the  subject.  After  a  few  words  in  opposition  to  that  idea,  Mr. 
Davis  reverted  to  the  first  suggestion,  that  he  should  offer  terms  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States — which  he  had  put  aside;  and  sketched  a 
letter  appropriate  to  be  sent  by  me  to  General  Sherman,  proposing  a  meeting 
to  arrange  the  terms  of  an  armistice  to  enable  the  civil  authorities  to  agree 
upon  terms  of  peace.  That  this  course  might  be  adopted  at  once,  I  proposed 
that  he  should  dictate  the  letter  then  to  Mr.  Mallory,  who  was  a  good 
penman,  and  that  I  should  sign  and  send  it  to  the  Federal  commander  im 
mediately.  The  letter,  prepared  in  that  way,  was  sent  by  me  with  all  dis 
patch  to  Lieuten ant-General  Hampton,  near  Hillsboro,  to  be  forwarded  by 
him  to  General  Sherman.  It  was  delivered  to  the  latter  next  day,  the  14th, 
and  was  in  these  terms : 

"  'The  results  of  the  recent  campaign  in  Virginia  have  changed  the  rela 
tive  military  condition  of  the  belligerents.  I  am,  therefore,  induced  to 
address  you,  in  this  form,  the  inquiry  whether,  in  order  to  stop  the  further 
effusion  of  blood  and  devastation  of  property,  you  are  willing  to  make  a 
temporary  suspension  of  active  operations,  and  to  communicate  to  Lieu 
tenant  General  Grant,  commanding  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  the 
request  that  he  will  take  like  action  in  regard  to  other  armies — the  object 
being  to  permit  the  civil  authorities  to  enter  into  the  needful  arrangements 
to  terminate  the  existing  war.'  " 

After  mentioning  the  means  taken  to  secure  a  meeting,  the 
Narrative  continues  with  an  account  of  the  interview,  which 
General  Sherman  thus  indorses: 

"General  Johnston's  account  of  our  interview,  in  his  Narrative  (page 
402,  et  seq.),  is  quite  accurate  and  correct,  only  I  do  not  recall  his  naming 
the  capitulation  of  Loeben  to  which  he  refers." 

Johnston's  statement,  thus  referred  to  and  indorsed,  is  as 
follows : 

"When  General  Sherman  understood  what  seemed  to  have  escaped  him  in 
reading  my  letter,  that  my  object  was  to  make  such  an  armistice  as  would 
give  opportunity  for  negotiation  between  the  'civil  authorities'  of  the  two 
countries,  he  said  that  such  negotiations  were  impossible,  because  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  did  not  acknowledge  the  existence  of  a  Southern 
15 


226  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

Confederacy ;  nor,  consequently,  its  civil  authorities  as  such.  Therefore,  he 
could  not  receive,  for  transmission,  any  proposition  addressed  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States  by  those  claiming  to  be  the  civil  authorities  of  a 
Southern  Confederacy.  He  added,  in  a  manner  that  carried  conviction  of 
sincerity,  expressions  of  a  wish  to  divert  from  the  South  such  devastation  as 
the  continuance  of  the  war  would  make  inevitable;  and,  as  a  means  of 
accomplishing  that  object,  so  far  as  the  armies  we  commanded  were  con 
cerned,  he  offered  me  such  terms  as  those  given  to  General  Lee. 

"  I  replied  that  our  relative  positions  were  too  different  from  those  of  the 
armies  in  Virginia  to  justify  me  in  such  a  capitulation,  but  suggested  that 
we  might  do  more  than  he  proposed ;  that,  instead  of  a  partial  suspension  of 
hostilities,  we  might,  as  other  generals  had  done,  arrange  the  terms  of  a 
permanent  peace,  and  among  other  precedents  reminded  him  of  the  prelimi 
naries  of  Loeben,  and  the  terms  in  which  Napoleon,  then  victorious,  pro 
posed  negotiation  to  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  the  sentiment  he  expressed, 
that  the  civic  crown  earned  by  preserving  the  life  of  one  citizen,  confers 
truer  glory  than  the  highest  achievement  merely  military.  General  Sherman 
replied,  with  heightened  color,  that  he  appreciated  such  a  sentiment,  and 
that  to  put  an  end  to  further  devastatfon  and  bloodshed,  and  restore  the 
Union,  and  with  it  the  prosperity  of  the  country,  were  to  him  objects  of 
ambition. 

"We  then  entered  into  a  discussion  of  the  terms  that  might  be  given 
to  the  Southern  States,  on  their  submission  to  the  authority  of  the  United 
States.  General  Sherman  seemed  to  regard  the  resolutions  of  Congress 
and  the  declarations  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  as  conclusive 
that  the  restoration  of  the  Union  was  the  object  of  the  war,  and  to  believe 
that  the  soldiers  of  the  United  States  had  been  fighting  for  that  object. 
A  long  official  conversation  with  Mr.  Lincoln,  on  Southern  affairs,  a  very 
short  time  before,  had  convinced  him  that  the  President  then  adhered  to 
that  view. 

"  In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  we  agreed  upon  the  terms  expressed  in  the 
memorandum  drawn  up  on  the  18th,  except  that  General  Sherman  did  not 
consent  to  include  Mr.  Davis  and  the  officers  of  his  Cabinet  in  an  otherwise 
general  amnesty.  This  consideration  was  mine  of  course.  General  Sherman 
did  not  desire  the  arrest  of  these  gentlemen.  He  was  too  acute  not  to  foresee 
the  embarrassment  their  capture  would  cause ;  therefore,  he  wished  them  to 
escape.  Much  of  the  afternoon  was  consumed  in  endeavors  to  dispose  of  this 
part  of  the  question  in  a  manner  that  would  be  satisfactory  both  to  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Southern  people,  as  well  as  to  the 
Confederate  President ;  but  at  sunset  no  conclusion  had  been  reached,  and 
the  conference  was  suspended,  to  be  resumed  at  10  o'clock  next  morning. 
Thinking  it  probable  that  the  confidential  relations  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
with  Mr.  Davis  might  enable  him  to  remove  the  only  obstacle  to  an  adjust 
ment,  I  requested  him  by  telegraph  to  join  me  as  soon  as  possible. 

"General   Breckinridge    and   Mr.  Reagan   came   to  General   Hampton's 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  227 

quarters  together  an  hour  or  two  before  daybreak.  After  they  had  received 
from  me  as  full  an  account  of  the  discussion  of  the  day  before  as  my  memory 
enabled  me  to  give,  and  had  learned  the  terms  agreed  upon,  and  the  difficulty 
in  the  way  of  full  agreement,  Mr.  Reagan  proposed  to  reduce  them  to  writing 
to  facilitate  reconsideration.  In  doing  so,  he  included  the  article  for  amnesty 
without  exceptions,  the  only  one  not  fully  agreed  to.  This  paper  being 
unfinished  when  General  Breckinridge  and  myself  set  out  to  the  place  of 
meeting,  was  to  be  sent  to  me  there. 

When  we  met,  I  proposed  to  General  Sherman  that  General  Breckinridge 
should  be  admitted  to  our  discussion,  as  his  personal  relations  with  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  Confederacy  might  enable  him  to  remove  the  obstacle  to  agree 
ment  that  we  had  encountered  the  day  before.  He  assented,  and  that 
gentleman  joined  us. 

"  We  had  conversed  on  the  subject  discussed  the  day  before,  perhaps  a  half 
hour,  when  the  memorandum  written  by  Mr.  Reagan  was  brought.  I  read 
this  paper  to  General  Sherman,  as  a  basis  for  terms  of  peace,  pointing  out  to 
him  that  it  contained  nothing  which  he  had  not  already  accepted,  but  the 
language  that  included  the  President  and  Cabinet  in  the  terms  of  amnesty. 
After  [listening  to  General  Breckinridge,  who  addressed  him  six  or  eight 
minutes  in  advocacy  of  these  conditions  of  peace,  General  Sherman  wrote 
very  rapidly  the  memorandum  that  follows,  with  the  paper  presented  by  me 
before  him.  He  wrote  so  rapidly  that  I  thought  at  the  time  that  he  must 
have  come  to  the  place  prepared  to  agree  to  amnesty,  with  no  exceptions. 
His  paper  differed  from  mine  only  in  being  fuller." 

General  Sherman  gives  the  following  account  of  his  consul 
tations  with  his  principal  officers  after  his  first  interview  with 
Johnston  in  regard  to  the  character  of  terms  that  should  be 
offered : 

"During  the  evening  of  the  17th  and  morning  of  the  18th,  I  saw  nearly 
all  the  general  officers  of  the  army  (Schofield,  Slocum,  Howard,  Logan, 
Blair),  and  we  talked  over  the  matter  of  the  conference  at  Bennett's  house 
of  the  day  before,  and  without  exception,  all  advised  me  to  agree  to  some 
terms,  for  they  all  dreaded  the  long  and  harassing  march  in  pursuit  of  a 
dissolving  and  fleeing  army;  a  march  that  might  carry  us  back  again  over 
the  thousand  miles  that  we  had  just  accomplished.  We  all  knew  that  if  we 
could  bring  Johnston's  army  to  bay,  we  could  destroy  it  in  an  hour,  but  that 
was  simply  impossible  in  the  country  in  which  we  found  ourselves.  We  dis 
cussed  all  the  probabilities,  among  which  was,  whether,  if  Johnston  made  a 
point  of  it,  I  should  assent  to  the  escape  from  the  country  of  Jeff.  Davis  and 
his  fugitive  Cabinet;  and  some  one  of  my  general  officers,  either  Logan  or 
Blair,  insisted  that  if  asked  for,  we  should  even  provide  a  vessel  to  carry 
them  to  Nassau  from  Charleston." 


228  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

In  Craven's  Prison  Life  of  Jeff.  Davis,  the  author  gives 
this  version  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  surrender  of 
Johnston,  which  contains  also  an  allusion  to  the  proposition 
for  Davis7  escape,  mentioned  in  the  Memoirs.  Mr.  Craven 
says: 

"  At  Lexington  he  (Davis)  received  a  dispatch  from  Johnston  requesting 
that  the  Secretary  of  War,  (General  Breckinridge)  should  repair  to  his  head 
quarters  near  Raleigh — General  Sherman  having  submitted  a  proposition  for 
laying  down  arms  which  was  too  comprehensive  in  its  scope  for  any  mere 
military  commander  to  decide  upon.  Breckinridge  and  Postmaster-General 
Reagan  immediately  started  for  Johnston's  camp,  where  Sherman  submitted 
the  terms  of  surrender  on  which  an  armistice  was  declared ;  the  same  terms 
subsequently  disapproved  by  the  authorities  at  Washington. 

"  One  of  the  features  of  the  proposition  submitted  by  General  Sherman 
was  a  declaration  of  amnesty  to  all  persons,  both  civil  and  military.  Notice 
being  called  to  the  fact  particularly,  General  Sherman  said:  'I  mean  just 
that,'  and  gave  as  his  reason  that  it  was  the  only  way  to  have  perfect  peace. 
He  had  previously  offered  to  furnish  a  vessel  to  take  away  such  persons  as 
Mr.  Davis  might  select,  to  be  freighted  with  whatever  personal  property  they 
might  want  to  take  with  them,  and  to  go  wherever  it  pleased. 

"  General  Johnston  told  Sherman  that  it  was  more  than  useless  to  carry 
such  a  proposition  as  the  last  to  him  (Davis).  Breckinridge  also  informed 
General  Sherman  that  his  proposition  contemplated  the  adjustment  of 
certain  matters  which  even  Mr.  Davis  was  not  empowered  to  control. 
The  terms  were  accepted,  however,  with  the  understanding  that  they  should 
be  liberally  construed  on  both  sides,  and  fulfilled  in  good  faith;  General 
Breckinridge  adding  that  certain  parts  of  the  terms  would  require  to  be 
submitted  to  the  various  State  Governments  of  the  Confederacy  for  rati 
fication." 

These  statements  of  General  Sherman  and  Mr.  Davis  cor 
respond  with  those  made  by  General  Johnston. 

By  comparing  the  accounts  of  Generals  Sherman  and  John 
ston,  it  will  appear  that  the  former  officer  says  he  read  the 
draft  of  terms  drawn  up  by  Mr.  Reagan,  the  Confederate 
Postmaster-General,  but  found  them  so  general  and  verbose 
as  not  to  be  admissible.  Johnston's  account  (indorsed  as 
accurate  by  Sherman)  states  that  the  latter  wrote  his  memo 
randum  with  Reagan's  paper  before  him,  and  that  it  differed 
from  Reagan's  only  in  being  fuller. 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  229 

A  copy  of  this  draft  was  afterward  sent  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  by  General  Sherman,  indorsed  in  his  own  hand  as  fol 
lows:  "Copy  of  a  project  sent  by  General  Johnston,  being 
the  production  of  Mr.  Reagan,  P.  M.  General  of  the  Con 
federates." 

The  original  of  this  draft  was  soon  after  captured  by  a 
Union  officer,  and  below  is  an  exact  copy  of  it  and  of  the 
attached  note  transmitting  it  to  General  Johnston  during  the 
interview: 

"As  the  avowed  motive  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  for  the 
prosecution  of  the  existing  war  with  the  Confederate  States  is  to  secure  a 
reunion  of  all  the  States  under  one  common  government,  and  as  wisdom  and 
sound  policy  alike  require  that  a  common  government  should  rest  on  the 
consent  and  be  supported  by  the  affections  of  all  the  people  who  compose  it, 
now,  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  it  be  practicable  to  put  an  end  to  the 
existing  war  and  to  the  consequent  destruction  of  life  and  property,  having 
in  view  the  correspondence  and  conversation  which  has  recently  taken  place 
between  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman  and  myself,  I  propose  the  following 
points  as  a  basis  of  pacification: 

"1.  The  disbanding  of  the  military  forces  of  the  Confederacy;  and 

"  2.  The  recognition  of  the  Constitution  and  authority  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  on  the  following  conditions : 

"  3.  The  preservation  and  continuance  of  the  existing  State  Governments. 

"4.  The  preservation  to  the  people  of  all  the  political  rights,  and  rights  of 
person  and  property,  secured  to  them  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
and  of  their  several  States. 

"5.  Freedom  from  future  persecutions  or  penalties  for  their  participation 
in  the  present  war. 

"6.  Agreement  to  a  general  suspension  of  hostilities  pending  these  nego 
tiations." 

The  above  draft  of  terms  was  accompanied  by  the  follow 
ing  note: 

General  Johnston  will  see  that  the  accompanying  memorandum  omits  all 
reference  to  details,  and  to  the  necessary  action  of  the  States,  and  the  prelim 
inary  reference  of  the  proposition  to  General  Grant  for  his  consent  to  the 
suspension  of  hostilities,  and  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  for  its 
action.  He  will  also  see  that  I  have  modified  the  first  article,  according  to 
his  suggestion,  by  omitting  the  reference  to  the  consent  of  the  President  of 
the  Confederate  States,  and  to  his  employing  his  good  offices  to  secure  the 


230  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

acquiescence  of  the  several  States  to  this  scheme  of  adjustment  and  pacifica 
tion.     This  may  be  done  at  a  proper  subsequent  time. 
April  17, 1865.  JOHN  H.  REAGAN. 

By  comparing  the  above  draft  with  the  one  written  by 
General  Sherman  with  Reagan's  before  him,  it  will  be  seen  that 
Johnston  is  correct  in  asserting  that  Sherman's  paper  differed 
from  his  only  in  being  fuller,  and  that  Sherman's  principal 
additions  were  the  provisions  restoring  the  courts,  and  the 
submission  of  questions  pertaining  to  divided  States  to  the 
Supreme  Court: 

Memorandum,  or  basis  of  agreement,  made  this  18th  day  of  April,  A.  D.  1865,  near 
Durham's  Station,  in  the  State  of  North  Carolina,  by  and  between  General  Joseph 
E.  Johnston,  Commanding  the  Confedei'ate  Army,  and  Mayor-General  W.  T.  Sher 
man,  Commanding  the  Army  of  the  United  States  in  North  Carolina,  both  present. 

I.  (See  6,  Reagan's  draft.)     The  contending  armies  now  in  the  field  to 
maintain  the  status  quo  until  notice  is  given  by  the  Commanding  General  of 
any  one  to  his  opponent,  and  reasonable  time,  say  forty-eight  hours,  allowed. 

II.  (See  1,  Reagan.)     The  Confederate  armies  now  in  existence  to  be  dis 
banded  and  conducted  to  their  several  State  capitals,  there  to  deposit  their 
arms  and  public  property  in  the  State  arsenal,  and  each  officer  and  man  to 
execute  and  file  an  agreement  to  cease  from  acts  of  war,  and  to  abide  the 
action  of  the  State  and  Federal  authorities.     The  number  of  arms  and  muni 
tions  of  war  to  be  reported  to  the  Chief  of  Ordnance  at  Washington  City, 
subject  to  the  future  action  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the 
meantime  to  be  used  solely  to  maintain  peace  and  order  within  the  borders  of 
the  States  respectively. 

III.  (See  3,  Reagan.)     The  recognition  by  the  Executive  of  the  United 
States  of  the  several  State  Governments  on  their  officers  and  Legislatures 
taking  the  oaths  prescribed  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
where  conflicting  State  Governnents  have  resulted  from  the  war,  the  legiti 
macy  of  all  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 

IV.  The  reestablishment  of  all  Federal  courts  in  the  several  States,  with 
powers  as  defined  by  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  Congress. 

V.  (See  4,  Reagan.)     The  people  and  inhabitants  of  all  States  to  be  guar 
anteed,  so  far  as  the  Executive  can,  their  political  rights  and  franchises,  as  well 
as  their  rights  of  person  and  property,  as  defined  by  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  States  respectively. 

VI.  (See  5,  Reagan.)     The  Executive  authority  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  not  to  disturb  any  of  the  people  by  reason  of  the  late  war,  so 
long  as  they  live  in  peace  and  quiet,  abstain  from  acts  of  armed  hostility,  and 
obey  the  laws  in  existence  at  the  place  of  their  residence. 


FAC-SIMILE 


[Reduced] 


O  F    T  H 


ORIGINAL      DRAFT 


O  F 


SHERMAN'S  TERMS   WITH  JOHNSTON 


AS  DRAWN   BY  THE 


REBEL  POST-MASTER  GENERAL 


JOHN  H.  REAGAN. 


hjL^^L^+^4    ~tt&^L>      ^SLO^^lfJ^-c^ 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  231 

VII.  In  general  terms  the  war  to  cease,  a  general  amnesty,  so  far  as  the 
Executive  of  the  United  States  can  command,  on  condition  of  the  disband- 
ment  of  the  Confederate  armies,  the  distribution  of  the  arms,  and  the 
resumption  of  peaceful  pursuits  by  the  officers  and  men  hitherto  composing 
said  armies. 

Not  being  fully  empowered  by  our  respective  principals  to  fulfill  these 
terms,  we  individually  and  officially  pledge  ourselves  to  promptly  obtain 
the  necessary  authority,  and  to  carry  out  the  above  programme. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 
Major-  General  Commanding  Army  of  the  United  States  in  North  Carolina. 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 
General  Commanding  Confederate  States  Army  in  North  Carolina. 

Both  the  Confederate  and  National  Cabinets  held  a  consul 
tation  over  Sherman's  terms  on  the  same  day,  the  former  at 
Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  and  the  latter  at  Washington.  All 
the  members  of  President  Davis*  Cabinet  advised  him  to 
accept  the  terms;  all  the  Cabinet  officers  at  Washington 
advised  that  they  be  rejected. 

General  Johnston  thus  relates  what  occurred  at  his  head 
quarters  upon  the  receipt  of  information  that  the  terms  had 
been  rejected  at  Washington  : 

"  In  the  afternoon  of  the  24th,  the  President  of  the  Confederacy,  then  in 
Charlotte,  communicated  to  me,  by  telegraph,  his  approval  of  the  terms  of 
the  Convention  of  the  17th  and  18th,  and,  within  an  hour,  a  special  messen 
ger  from  General  Hampton  brought  me  two  dispatches  from  General  Sherman. 
In  one  of  them  he  informed  me  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
rejected  the  terms  of  peace  agreed  upon  by  us;  and  in  the  other  he  gave 
notice  of  the  termination  of  the  armistice  in  forty-eight  hours  from  noon 
that  day. 

"The  substance  of  these  dispatches  was  immediately  communicated  to  the 
Administration  by  telegraph  (at  6  P.  M.),  instructions  asked  for,  and  the 
disbanding  of  the  army  suggested,  to  prevent  further  invasion  and  devasta 
tion  of  the  country  by  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  The  reply,  dated 
eleven  o'clock  P.M.,  was  received  early  in  the  morning  of  the  25th;  it  sug 
gested  that  the  infantry  might  be  disbanded,  with  instructions  to  meet  at 
some  appointed  place,  and  directed  me  to  bring  off  the  cavalry,  and  all  other 
soldiers  who  could  be  mounted  by  taking  serviceable  beasts  from  the  trains, 
and  a  few  light  field  pieces.  I  objected,  immediately,  that  this  order  provided 
for  the  performance  of  but  one  of  the  three  great  duties  then  devolving  upon 
us — that  of  securing  the  safety  of  the  high  civil  officers  of  the  Confederate 
Government;  but  neglected  the  other  two — the  safety  of  the  people  and  that 


232  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

of  the  army.  I  also  advised  the  immediate  flight  of  the  high  civil  function 
aries  under  proper  escort. 

"The  belief  that  impelled  me  to  urge  the  civil  authorities  of  the  Confederacy 
to  make  peace,  that  it  would  be  a  great  crime  to  prolong  the  war,  prompted 
me  to  disobey  these  instructions — the  last  that  I  received  from  the  Confederate 
Government. 

"They  would  have  given  the  President  an  escort  too  heavy  for  flight,  and 
not  strong  enough  to  force  a  way  for  him  ;  and  would  have  spread  ruin  over 
all  the  South,  by  leading  the  three  great  invading  armies  in  pursuit.  In  that 
belief,  I  determined  to  do  all  in  my  power  to  bring  about  a  termination  of 
hostilities.  I  therefore  proposed  to  General  Sherman  another  armistice  and 
conference  for  that  purpose,  suggesting  as  a  basis,  the  clause  of  the  recent 
convention  relating  to  the  army.  This  was  reported  to  the  Confederate 
Government  at  once.  General  Sherman's  dispatch,  expressing  his  agreement 
to  a  conference,  was  received  soon  after  sunrise  on  the  26th ;  and  I  set  out  for 
the  former  place  of  meeting,  as  soon  as  practicable,  after  announcing  to  the 
Administration  that  I  was  about  to  do  so. 

"We  met  at  noon  in  Mr.  Bennett's  house  as  before.  I  found  General 
Sherman,  as  he  appeared  in  our  previous  conversation,,  anxious  to  prevent 
further  bloodshed,  so  we  agreed  without  difficulty  upon  terms  putting  an 
end  to  the  war  within  the  limits  of  our  commands  which  happened  to  be 
co-extensive — terms  which  we  expected  to  produce  a  general  pacification." 

As  will  be  remembered,  Mr.  Stanton  caused  to  be  made 
public  the  following  "among  others/7  as  the  grounds  upon 
which  the  original  terms  were  rejected : 

"First — It  was  an  exercise  of  authority  not  vested  in  General  Sherman, 
and  on  its  face  shows  that  both  he  and  Johnston  knew  that  General  Sherman 
had  no  authority  to  enter  into  any  such  arrangement. 

"Second — It  was  an  acknowledgment  of  the  rebel  Government. 

/'Third — It  is  understood  to  reestablish  rebel  State  Governments  that  had 
been  overthrown  at  the  sacrifice  of  many  thousands  of  loyal  lives  and  immense 
treasure,  and  placed  arms  and  munitions  of  war  in  the  hands  of  rebels  at 
their  respective  capitals,  which  might  be  used  as  soon  as  the  armies  of  the 
United  States  were  disbanded,  and  used  to  conquer  and  subdue  loyal  States. 

"  Fourth — By  the  restoration  of  the  rebel  authority  in  their  respective 
States,  they  would  be  enabled  to  reestablish  slavery. 

"Fifth — It  might  furnish  a  ground  of  responsibility  by  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  to  pay  the  rebel  debt,  and  certainly  subjects  loyal  citizens  of  the 
rebel  States  to  debts  contracted  by  rebels  in  the  name  of  the  States. 

"Sixth — It  put  in  dispute  the  existence  of  loyal  State  Governments,  and 
the  new  State  of  West  Virginia,  which  had  been  recognized  by  every  depart 
ment  of  the  United  States  Government. 

"Seventh — It  practically   abolished   the   confiscation   laws,  and  relieved 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  233 

rebels  of  every  degree  who  had  slaughtered  our  people,  from  all  pains  and 
penalties  for  their  crimes. 

"Eighth — It  gave  terms  that  had  been  deliberately,  repeatedly,  and 
solemnly  rejected  by  President  Lincoln,  and  better  terms  than  the  rebels 
had  ever  asked  in  their  most  prosperous  condition. 

"  Ninth — It  formed  no  basis  of  true  and  lasting  peace,  but  relieved  the 
rebels  from  the  pressure  of  our  victories,  and  left  them  in  condition  to  renew 
their  effort  to  overthrow  the  United  States  Goverment,  and  subdue  the  loyal 
States,  whenever  their  strength  was  recruited,  and  any  opportunity  should 
offer." 

While  waiting  to  hear  from  Washington  in  regard  to  the 
fate  of  his  terms,  General  Sherman,  in  the  course  of  a  letter 
transmitting  some  orders  to  General  J.  H.  Wilson,  then 
operating  Avith  cavalry  in  Georgia,  thus  expressed  his  ideas 
concerning  slavery  to  General  Johnston  : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  April  21.      j 

General  J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Commanding  Confederate  Army. 

GENERAL:  *  *  *  *  I  shall  look  for  Major  Hitchcock  back 
from  Washington  on  Wednesday,  and  shall  promptly  notify  you  of  the 
result.  By  the  action  of  General  Weitzel  in  relation  to  the  Virginia  Legis 
lature,  I  feel  certain  we  will  have  no  trouble  on  the  score  of  recognizing 
existing  State  Governments.  It  may  be  the  lawyers  will  want  us  to  define 
more  minutely  what  is  meant  by  the  guarantee  of  rights  of  person  and 
property.  It  may  be  construed  into  a  compact  for  us  to  undo  the  past  as  to 
the  rights  of  slaves,  and  ''leases  of  plantations"  on  the  Mississippi,  of 
"vacant  and  abandoned"  plantations.  I  wish  you  would  talk  to  the  best 
men  you  have  on  these  points,  and,  if  possible,  let  us  in  our  final  convention 
make  these  points  so  clear  as  to  leave  no  room  for  angry  controversy. 

I  believe,  if  the  South  would  simply  and  publicly  declare  what  we  all 
feel,  that  slavery  is  dead,  that  you  would  inaugurate  an  era  of  peace  and 
prosperity  that  would  soon  efface  the  ravages  of  the  past  four  years  of  war. 
Negroes  would  remain  in  the  South,  and  afford  you  abundance  of  cheap 
labor,  which  otherwise  will  be  driven  away;  and  it  will  save  the  country  the 
senseless  discussions  which  have  kept  us  all  in  hot  water  for  fifty  years. 

Although,  strictly  speaking,  this  is  no  subject  of  a  military  convention, 
yet  I  am  honestly  convinced  that  our  simple  declaration  of  a  result  will  be 
accepted  as  good  as  law  every  where.  Of  course,  I  have  not  a  single  word 
from  Washington  on  this  or  any  other  point  of  our  agreement,  but  I  know 
the  effect  of  such  a  step  by  us  will  be  universally  accepted. 
I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General  U.  S.  A. 


234  THE  TERMS  WITH   JOHNSTON. 

Through  the  unheralded  arrival  of  General  Grant  at  Raleigh, 
General  Sherman  was  made  acquainted  with  the  primary  dis 
approval  of  his  terms  by  the  former,  and  their  subsequent 
rejection  by  the  Cabinet.  He  was  also  instructed  to  give  im 
mediate  notice  of  the  termination  of  the  truce  at  the  close  of 
the  forty-eight  hours  required  by  its  provision.  Such  notice 
was  sent  forward  early  on  the  24th  of  April,  and  on  the  same 
day  General  Sherman  notified  General  Johnston  that  he  was 
instructed  not  to  attempt  civil  negotiations,  and  further,  that 
he  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  Confederate  army  simply 
upon  the  terms  extended  to  Lee. 

To  these  notes  General  Johnston  sent  the  following  replies : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  TENNESSEE,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  April  25,  1865.      j 

Major- General  SHERMAN,  United  States  Army. 

Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  is  received.  I  propose  a  modification  of  the 
terms  you  offer,  such  terms  for  the  army  as  you  wrote  on  the  18th,  they  also 
modified  according  to  changes  of  circumstances,  and  a  further  armistice  to 
arrange  details,  and  a  meeting  for  that  purpose. 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  Genial. 

IN  THE  FIELD,  April  26, 1865. 
Major- General  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Commanding   United  States  Forces. 

GENERAL,  :  I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  dispatch  summoning  this 
army  to  surrender  on  the  terms  accepted  by  General  Lee  at  Appomattox 
Court  House.  I  propose,  instead  of  such  a  surrender,  terms  based  on  those 
drawn  up  by  you  on  the  18th  for  the  disbandment  of  this  army,  and  a  further 
armistice  and  conference  to  arrange  these  terms. 

The  disbandment  of  General  Lee's  army  has  afflicted  this  country  with 
bands  having  no  means  of  subsistence  but  robbery,  a  knowledge  of  which 
would,  I  am  sure,  induce  you  to  agree  to  other  terms. 

Most  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  E.  JOHNSTON,  General. 

At  a  subsequent  meeting,  and  after  a  protracted  discussion, 
final  terms  of  surrender,  drawn  up  by  General  Schofield,  not 
by  General  Sherman,  were  agreed  upon,  approved  by  General 
Grant,  and  forwarded  to  Washington. 

Then  arrived  the  Northern  papers  containing  Mr.  Stanton's 
bulletins  in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  first  terms,  the 
action  thereon  by  the  Cabinet,  and  the  orders  given  by  General 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  235 

Halleck,  who  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  James,  to  push  on,  cut  off  Johnston's  retreat,  and  pay  no 
attention  to  orders  from  Sherman.  These  awoke  that  storm  of 
abuse  which  the  latter  poured  out  upon  Mr.  Stanton  and 
General  Halleck. 

For  his  criticisms  upon  the  latter,  General  Grant  so  far 
reprimanded  him,  as  to  formally  suggest  the  modification  of 
the  report  in  which  he  reflected  upon  that  officer.  The  letter 
upon  this  subject  was  as  follows : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES.  ) 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  25,  1865.      j 

Major- General  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Comd'g  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

GENERAL  :  General  Grant  directs  me  to  call  your  attention  to  the  part  of 
your  report  in  which  the  necessity  of  maintaining  your  truce,  even  at  the 
expense  of  many  lives,  is  spoken  of.  The  General  thinks  that,  in  making  a 
truce,  the  commander  of  an  army  can  control  only  his  own  army,  and  that 
the  hostile  general  must  make  his  own  arrangements  with  other  armies 
acting  against  him. 

Whilst  independent  generals,  acting  against  a  common  foe,  would  naturally 
act  in  concert,  the  General  deems  that  each  must  be  the  judge  of  his  own 
duty,  and  responsible  for  its  execution. 

If  you  should  wish,  the  report  will  be  returned  for  any  change  you  deem 
best.  Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  S.  BOWERS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

The  part  of  the  report  thus  alluded  to  was  as  follows: 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  CITY  POINT,  VA.,  May  9,  1865.      j 

GENERAL  :  *  *  *  *  It  now  becomes  my  duty  to  paint,  in  justly 
severe  characters,  the  still  more  offensive  and  dangerous  matter  of  General 
Halleck's  dispatch  of  April  26th,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  embodied  in  his  to 
General  Dix  of  April  27th. 

General  Halleck  had  been  chief  of  staff  of  the  army  at  Washington,  in 
which  capacity  he  must  have  received  my  official  letter  of  April  18th,  wherein 
I  wrote  clearly  that  if  Johnston's  army  about  Greensboro  were  "  pushed  "  it 
would  "  disperse,"  an  event  I  wished  to  prevent.  About  that  time  he  seems 
to  have  been  sent  from  Washington  to  Eichmond  to  command  the  new  Mili 
tary  Division  of  the  James,  in  assuming  charge  of  which,  on  the  22d,  he 
defines  the  limits  of  his  authority  to  be  the  "  Department  of  Virginia,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  such  part  of  North  Carolina  as  may  not  be  occu 
pied  by  the  command  of  Major-General  Sherman."  (See  his  General  Orders 
No.  1.) 


236  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

Four  days  later,  April  26th,  he  reports  to  the  Secretary  that  he  has 
ordered  Generals  Mead,  Sheridan,  and  Wright  to  invade  that  part  of  North 
Carolina  which  was  occupied  by  my  command,  and  pay  "  no  regard  to  any 
truce  or  orders  of  "  mine.  They  were  ordered  to  "  push  forward,  regardless 
of  any  orders  save  those  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  and  cut  off  Johnston's 
retreat."  He  knew  at  the  time  he  penned  that  dispatch  and  made  those 
orders  that  Johnston  was  not  retreating,  but  was  halted  under  a  forty -eight 
hours'  truce  with  me,  and  was  laboring  to  surrender  his  command  and 
prevent  its  dispersion  into  guerrilla  bands,  and  that  I  had  on  the  spot  a 
magnificent  army  at  my  command,  amply  sufficient  for  all  purposes  required 
by  the  occasion. 

The  plan  of  cutting  off  a  retreat  from  the  direction  of  Burksville  and  Dan 
ville  is  hardly  worthy  one  of  his  military  education  and  genius.  When  he 
contemplated  an  act  so  questionable  as  the  violation  of  a  " truce"  made  by 
competent  authority  within  his  sphere  of  command,  he  should  have  gone 
himself,  and  not  have  sent  subordinates,  for  he  knew  I  was  bound  in  honor 
to  defend  and  maintain  my  own  truce  and  pledge  of  faith,  even  at  the  cost  of 
many  lives. 

When  an  officer  pledges  the  faith  of  his  Government,  he  is  bound  to  defend 
it,,  and  he  is  no  soldier  who  would  violate  it  knowingly. 

As  to  Davis  and  his  stolen  treasure,  did  General  Halleck,  as  chief  of  staff 
or  commanding  officer  of  the  neighboring  military  division,  notify  me  of  the 
facts  contained  in  his  dispatch  to  the  Secretary?  No  he  did  not.  If  the 
Secretary  of  War  wanted  Davis  caught,  why  not  order  it,  instead  of,  by 
publishing  in  the  newspapers,  putting  him  on  his  guard  to  hide  away  and 
escape?  No  orders  or  instructions  to  catch  Davis  or  his  stolen  treasure  ever 
came  to  me ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  I  was  led  to  believe  that  the  Secretary  of 
War  rather  preferred  he  should  effect  an  escape  from  the  country,  if  made 
"  unknown  "  to  him.  But  even  on  this  point,  I  inclose  a  copy  of  my  letter  to 
Admiral  Dahlgren,  at  Charleston,  sent  him  by  a  fleet  steamer  from  Wilmington 
on  the  25th  of  April,  two  days  before  the  bankers  of  Richmond  had  imparted 
to  General  Halleck  the  important  secret  as  to  Davis'  movements,  designed, 
doubtless,  to  stimulate  his  troops  to  march  their  legs  off  to  catch  their 
treasure  for  their  own  use. 

I  know,  now,  that  Admiral  Dahlgren  did  receive  my  letter  on  the  26th,  and 
had  acted  on  it  before  General  Halleck  had  even  thought  of  the  matter ;  but  I 
don't  believe  a  word  of  the  treasure  story ;  it  is  absurd  on  its  face,  and  General 
Halleck  or  anybody  has  my  full  permission  to  chase  Jeff.  Davis  and  Cabinet, 
with  their  stolen  treasure,  through  any  part  of  the  country  occupied  by  niy 
command. 

The  last  and  most  obnoxious  feature  of  General  Halleck's  dispatch  is 
wherein  he  goes  out  of  his  way,  and  advises  that  my  subordinates,  Generals 
Thomas,  Stoneman,  and  Wilson,  should  be  instructed  not  to  obey  "Sher 
man's  "  commands. 

This  is  too  much,  and  I  turn  from  the  subject  with  feelings  too  strong  for 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  237 

words,  and  merely  record  my  belief  that  so  much  mischief  was  never  before 
embraced  in  so  small  a  space  as  in  the  newspaper  paragraph  headed  "  Sher 
man's  Truce  Disregarded,"  authenticated  as  "  official,"  by  Mr.  Secretary  Stan- 
ton,  and  published  in  the  New  York  papers  of  April  28th.  *  *  *  * 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-General  commanding. 

General  Sherman,  however,  declined  to  make  the  change 
suggested  by  General  Grant,  and  gave  his  reasons  at  length : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  26,  1865.      j 

Colonel  T.  S.  BOWERS,  Assistant  Adjutant- General,  Washington,  D.  C. 

COLONEL:  I  had  the  honor  to  receive  your  letter  of  May  25th  last  evening, 
and  hasten  to  answer.  I  wish  to  precede  it  by  renewed  assurance  of  my  con 
fidence  and  respect  for  the  President  and  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  and  that 
in  all  matters  I  will  be  most  willing  to  shape  my  official  and  private  conduct 
to  suit  their  wishes.  The  past  is  beyond  my  control,  and  the  matters  em 
braced  in  the  operations  to  which  you  refer  are  finished.  It  is  but  just  the 
reasons  that  actuated  me,  right  or  wrong,  should  stand  of  record,  but  in  all 
future  cases,  should  any  arise,  I  will  respect  the  decision  of  General  Grant, 
though  I  think  it  wrong.  *  *  *  * 

In  discussing  this  matter,  I  would  like  to  refer  to  many  writers  on  military 
law,  but  am  willing  to  take  Halleck  as  the  text  (see  his  Chapter  No.  27).  In 
the  very  first  article  he  prefaces  that  "  Good  Faith "  should  always  be  ob 
served  between  enemies  in  war,  because  when  our  faith  has  been  pledged  to 
him,  as  far  as  the  promise  extends  he  ceases  to  be  an  enemy.  He  then  defines 
the  meaning  of  compacts  and  conventions,  and  says  they  are  made  some 
times  for  a  general  or  a  partial  suspension  of  hostilities,  for  the  surrender  of 
an  army,  etc.  They  may  be  special,  limited  to  particular  places,  or  to 
particular  forces,  but  of  course  can  only  bind  the  armies  subject  to  the 
general  who  makes  the  truce,  and  co-extensive  only  with  the  extent  of  his 
command. 

This  is  all  I  ever  claimed,  and  clearly  covers  the  whole  case.  All  of  North 
Carolina  was  in  my  immediate  command,  with  General  Schofield  its  depart 
ment  commander,  and  his  army  present  with  me.  I  never  asked  the  truce  to 
have  effect  beyond  my  own  territorial  command.  General  Halleck  himself, 
in  his  Orders  No.  1,  defines  his  own  limits  clearly  enough,  viz.:  "Such  part  of 
North  Carolina  as  was  not  occupied  by  the  command  of  Major-General 
Schofield."  He  could  not  pursue  and  cut  off  Johnston's  retreat  toward 
Saulsbury  and  Charlotte  without  invading  my  command,  and  so  patent  was 
his  purpose  to  defy  and  violate  my  truce  that  Mr.  Stanton's  publication  of  the 
fact,  not  even  yet  recalled,  modified,  or  explained,  was  headed:  "Sherman's 
Truce  Disregarded,"  that  the  whole  world  drew  but  one  inference.  It  admits 
of  no  other.  I  never  claimed  that  the  truce  bound  Generals  Halleck  and 
Canby  within  the  sphere  of  their  respective  commands  as  defined  by  them- 


238  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

selves.  It  was  a  partial  truce  of  very  short  duration,  clearly  within  my  limits 
and  rights,  justified  by  events,  and,  as  in  the  case  of  prisoners  in  my  custody, 
or  the  violation  of  a  safeguard  given  by  me  in  my  own  territorial  limits,  I 
was  bound  to  maintain  "Good  Faith." 

I  prefer  not  to  change  my  report ;  but  again  repeat  that  in  all  future  cases 
I  am  willing  to  be  governed  by  the  interpretation  of  General  Grant,  although 
I  again  invite  his  attention  to  the  limits  of  my  command  and  those  of  Gen 
eral  Halleck  at  the  time,  and  the  pointed  phraseology  of  General  Halleck's 
dispatch  to  Mr.  Stanton,  wherein  he  reports  that  he  had  ordered  his  generals 
to  pay  no  heed  to  my  orders  within  the  clearly  defined  area  of  my  own  com 
mand.  I  am,  etc., 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major- General  commanding. 

The  movements  of  General  Halleck,  of  which  General 
Sherman  thus  pointedly  complained,  were  made  in  pursuance 
of  the  following  order  from  General  Grant : 

FORTRESS  MONROE,  April  22,  1865. 
Major-General  HALLECK,  Richmond,  Va. 

The  truce  entered  into  by  Sherman  will  be  ended  as  soon  as  I  can  reach 
Raleigh.  Move  Sheridan  with  his  cavalry  toward  Greensboro,  North  Caro 
lina,  as  soon  as  possible.  I  think  it  will  be  well  to  send  one  corps  of  infantry 
also,  the  whole  under  Sheridan.  The  infantry  need  not  go  further  than  Dan 
ville,  unless  they  receive  orders  hereafter  to  do  so. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  I/ieutenant-  General. 

General  Sherman's  report  and  the  subsequent  correspond 
ence  in  relation  to  it  between  himself  and  General  Grant, 
having  been  brought  to  the  attention  of  General  Halleck,  the 
latter  thus  reviewed  the  whole  subject : 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  JAMES,  ) 
RICHMOND,  VA.,  June  7,  1865.      j 
Hon.  E  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War. 

SIR  :  I  have  just  received  the  Army  and  Navy  Gazette  of  May  30th,  con 
taining  an  official  publication  of  Major-General  Sherman's  letters  of  May 
9th  and  26th,  with  other  papers  on  the  same  subject,  parts  of  which  had  been 
previously  published  in  the  newspapers.  In  these  letters  and  papers  General 
Sherman  has  made  statements  and  reflections  on  my  official  conduct,  which 
are  incorrect  and  entirely  unjustified  by  the  facts  of  the  case. 

1st.  He  charges  that  I  encroached  upon  his  military  command,  by  directing 
a  portion  of  rny  troops  to  march  upon  Greensboro  in  North  Carolina. 

By  direction  of  the  President,  I  was,  on  the  19th  of  April  last,  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  James,  which  included  "such 


THE    TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  239 

parts  of  North  Carolina  as  were  not  occupied  by  the  command  of  Major- 
General  Sherman."  At  the  time  my  troops  were  ordered  to  Greensboro, 
General  Sherman's  troops  did  not  occupy  that  part  of  North  Carolina;  it 
was  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  consequently  within  my  command,  as  defined 
by  General  Orders,  No.  71,  of  the  War  Department. 

But  whether  or  not  Greensboro,  or  any  part  of  North  Carolina,  was  in  my 
command,  General  Sherman's  remarks  are  equally  without  justification.  On 
the  22d  of  April  Lieutenant-General  Grant  notified  me  that  Sherman's 
arrangements  had  been  disapproved  and  orders  given  to  resume  hostilities, 
and  directed  me  to  move  my  troops  on  Danville  and  Greensboro,  precisely  as 
I  did  move  them,  there  to  await  his  further  orders.  My  instructions  to  Gen 
erals  Meade,  Sheridan,  and  Wright  were  just  such  instructions  as  General 
Grant  had  directed  me  to  give.  The  offense,  or  whatever  he  may  please  to 
call  it,  if  any  there  was,  of  marching  my  troops  within  territory  claimed 
by  General  Sherman,  was  not  mine,  but  General  Grant's,  and  all  the  abuse 
which  he  has  directed  upon  me  for  that  act  must  fall  upon  the  General-in- 
Chief. 

2d.  General  Sherman  charges  that  by  marching  my  troops  into  North 
Carolina  I  violated  his  truce,  which  he  was  bound  to  enforce  even  at  the  cost 
of  many  lives  by  a  collision  of  our  respective  armies. 

General  Sherman  had  never  sent  me  his  truce ;  I  had  never  seen  it  and 
did  not  know  its  terms  or  conditions.  I  only  knew  that  his  truce  or 
"  arrangement,"  whatever  it  was,  had  been  disapproved  and  set  aside  by  the 
President,  and  General  Grant  in  ordering  the  movement  of  my  troops  simply 
notified  me  of  this  fact  and  of  the  renewal  of  hostilities.  Even  if  Sherman's 
truce  had  been  binding  on  me,  which  it  was  not,  I  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
clause  relating  to  forty -eight  hours'  notice. 

It  is  strange  that  he  should  seek  to  bind  me  by  conditions  of  the  existence  of 
which  I  was  ignorant,  and  he  had  taken  no  measures  to  inform  me.  But 
even  had  I  known  them  I  could  not  have  acted  otherwise  than  I  did.  I 
simply  carried  out  the  orders  of  my  superior  officer,  who  had  seen  the  truce 
and  knew  its  terms.  If  General  Sherman  was,  under  the  circumstances, 
justified  in  stopping  the  movements  of  my  troops,  even  by  destroying  the 
commands  of  General  Sheridan  and  General  Wright,  the  responsbility  of  this 
sacrifice  of  human  life  must  have  rested  either  upon  General  Sherman  or 
upon  General  Grant,  for  I  simply  obeyed  the  orders  of  the  latter  in  regard  to 
these  movements. 

General  Sherman  reflects  on  me  for  not  going  in  person  to  violate,  as  he  is 
pleased  to  call  it,  a  truce  which  he  "was  bound  in  honor  to  defend  and  main 
tain,"  "even  at  the  cost  of  many  lives,"  and  upon  the  marching  powers  of  the 
troops  which  I  sent  into  North  Carolina.  In  reply  to  this  I  can  only  say 
that  I  was  not  ordered  to  go  with  these  troops,  but  to  send  them  under  their 
commanders  to  certain  points,  there  to  await  further  orders  from  Lieutenant- 
General  Grant,  precisely  as  I  directed.  The  troops  were  mostly  selected  by  Gen 
eral  Grant,  not  by  me,  and  as  he  had  commanded  them  for  a  year  he  probably 


240  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

knew  something  of  their  capacity  for  marching,  and  whether  or  not  they 
would  march  their  legs  off  "to  catch  the  treasure  for  their  own  use." 

3.  Again,  General  Sherman  complains  that  my  orders  of  April  26th  to 
push  forward  against  Johnston's  army  were  given  at  the  very  time  I  knew 
that  that  army  was  surrendering  to  him. 

In  making  this  statement  he  forgets  time  and  circumstances.  He  must 
have  known  that  I  did  not  have,  and  could  not  possibly  have  had  at  that 
time,  any  official  information  of  any  new  arrangements  between  him  and 
Johnston  for  the  surrender  of  the  latter's  army.  Neither  General  Sherman 
nor  any  one  else  could  have  sent  me  such  official  information  otherwise  than 
by  sea,  which  would  have  required  several  days.  I  only  knew  from  General 
Grant  that  Sherman's  "arrangements"  had  been  disapproved,  that  orders  had 
been  given  to  resume  hostilities,  and  that  I  was  directed  by  him  to  push  for 
ward  my  troops  to  Greensboro,  where  they  would  receive  further  orders. 
All  other  information  from  North  Carolina  came  from  rebel  sources. 

4th.  The  burthen  of  General  Sherman's  complaint  on  this  subject  is,  that  I 
ordered  Generals  Sheridan  and  Wright  to  push  forward  their  troops  as 
directed  by  General  Grant,  "regardless  of  any  orders  from  any  one  except 
General  Grant." 

This  was  simply  carrying  out  the  spirit  of  my  instructions  from  General 
Grant.  He  had  notified  me  that  orders  had  been  given  to  resume  hostilities, 
and  had  directed  me  to  send  certain  troops  to  Greensboro  to  await  his  further 
orders.  As  these  troops  approached  the  boundaries  of  North  Carolina,  John 
ston,  Beauregard,  and  other  rebel  officers  tried,  on  the  alleged  grounds  of 
arrangements  with  Sherman,  to  stop  the  movement  ordered  by  General  Grant 
When  informed  of  this,  I  directed  my  officers  to  execute  the  commands  which 
General  Grant  had  given  to  me,  regardless  of  orders  from  any  one  except 
Grant  himself.  I  respectfully  submit  that  I  could  not  have  done  less  without 
neglecting  my  duty. 

5th.  General  Sherman  sneers  at  my  sending  troops  from  the  direction  of 
Burkesville  and  Danville  against  Davis  in  North  Carolina  as  "hardly  worthy 
of"  my  "military  education  and  gejiius."  However  ridiculous  General 
Sherman  may  consider  these  movements,  they  were  made  precisely  as  General 
Grant  had  directed  them. 

6th.  He  complains  that  I  did  not  notify  him  in  regard  to  Davis  and  his 
stolen  treasure.  For  the  reason  that  I  had  no  communication  open  to  him. 
My  most  direct  way  of  communicating  with  him  was  through  the  Depart 
ment  at  Washington,  and  I  sent  all  information  to  the  Department  as  soon 
as  it  was  received. 

However  "  absurd"  General  Sherman  may  have  considered  the  information, 
it  was  given  by  some  of  the  most  respectable  and  reliable  business  men  in 
Richmond,  through  a  gentleman  whose  character  and  position  would  prevent 
me  from  pronouncing  his  statements  "  absurd,"  and  of  saying,  without  exam 
ination,  "  I  don't  believe  a  word  of  the  treasure  story." 

7th.  In  order  to  sustain  his  position  that  the  movements  of  my  troops 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  241 

ordered  by  General  Grant  were  in  violation  of  his  truce,  which  I  was  bound  to 
observe,  even  without  knowing  its  terms,  and  that  he  would  have  been  justified 
to  resent,  "even  at  the  the  cost  of  many  lives,"  General  Sherman  refers  to  a 
chapter  of  International  Law.  His  reference  is  most  pointedly  against  his 
positions  and  doctrines,  and  the  case  given  in  illustration  in  paragraph  4  was  one 
of  which  General  Sherman  was  personally  cognizant.  In  that  case  a  subordi 
nate  commander  refused  to  be  bound  by  a  truce  of  his  superior  commanding 
another  department.  General  Sherman  was  not  even  my  superior.  I  con 
tend  that  all  my  orders  were  justified  by  the  laws  of  war  and  military  usage, 
even  if  they  had  not  been  directed  by  superior  authority. 

8th.  General  Sherman  says  that  General  Grant  "reached  the  Chesapeake 
in  time  to  countermand  General  Hal  leek's  orders  and  prevent  his  violating 
my  truce."  This  is  not  true.  General  Grant  neither  disapproved  nor 
countermanded  any  orders  of  mine,  nor  was  there  at  that  time  any  truce.  It 
had  ceased  by  General  Grant's  orders  to  resume  hostilities  and  the  subsequent 
surrender  of  Johnston's  army  of  which  he  then  notified  me,  and  recalled 
a  part  of  the  troops  which  he  had  directed  me  to  send  to  Danville  and 
Greensboro. 

9th.  There  is  but  one  other  point  in  General  Sherman's  official  complaint 
that  I  deem  it  necessary  to  notice.  I  refer  to  the  suggestion  made  to  you  in 
regard  to  orders  to  Generals  Thomas  and  Wilson  for  preventing  the  escape 
of  Davis  and  his  Cabinet.  Although  these  officers  were  under  the  nominal 
command  of  General  Sherman,  yet  after  he  left  Atlanta,  they  received  their 
instructions  and  orders  from  yourself  and  General  Grant  direct,  not  through 
General  Sherman. 

This  is  recognized  and  provided  for  by  the  regulations  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  and  has  been  practised  for  years.  I  have  transmitted  hundreds  of 
orders  in  this  way,  and  General  Sherman  was  cognizant  of  the  fact.  The 
movements  of  Generals  Thomas,  Stoneman,  Wilson,  A.  J.  Smith,  etc.,  while 
within  General  Sherman's  general  command,  have  been  directed  in  this 
way  for  more  than  six  months.  In  suggesting  that  orders  be  sent  to  these 
officers  directly  and  not  through  General  Sherman,  I  suggested  no  departure 
from  well  established  official  channels.  But  even  if  I  had,  the  responsibility 
of  adopting  that  course  must  rest  upon  the  authority  who  sent  the  orders. 

If  his  complaint  is  directed  against  the  form  of  the  suggestions,  I  can  only 
say  that  I  was  innocent  of  any  intended  offense.  My  telegram  was  hurriedly 
written,  intended  for  yourself,  not  the  public,  and  had  reference  to  the  state 
of  facts  as  reported  to  me.  It  was  reported  that  orders  purporting  to  come 
from  General  Sherman  had  been  received  through  rebel  lines  for  General 
Wilson  to  withdraw  from  Macon,  release  his  prisoners,  and  that  all  hostilities 
should  cease.  These  orders  threw  open  the  doors  for  the  escape  of  Davis  and 
his  party.  This  I  knew  was  contrary  to  the  wishes  and  orders  of  the  Gov 
ernment;  but  I  had  no  means  of  knowing  whether  or  not  Sherman  had  been 
BO  informed.  I  at  the  time  had  no  communication  with  him  or  with  General 
Grant,  and  I  was  not  aware  that  either  could  communicate  with  our  officers 

16 


242  THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON. 

in  the  West,  except  through  rebel  authorities,  who,  of  course,  could  not  be 
relied  on.  I  repeat  that  my  suggestions  had  reference  only  to  the  facts  and 
wishes  of  the  Government  as  known  to  me  at  the  time,  and  was  intended  in 
no  respect  to  reflect  upon,  or  be  disrespectful  to  General  Sherman.  If  I  had 
been  able  to  communicate  with  General  Sherman,  or  had  known  at  the  time 
the  condition  of  affairs  in  North  Carolina,  there  would  have  been  no  necessity 
or  occasion  for  any  suggestion  to  you,  and  most  probably  none  would  have 
been  made. 

With  these  remarks,  I  respectfully  submit  that  General  Sherman's  report, 
so  far  as  he  refers  to  me,  is  unjust,  unkind,  and  contrary  to  military  usage, 
and  that  his  statements  are  contrary  to  the  real  facts  of  the  case.  I  beg 
leave  further  to  remark  that  I  have,  in  no  way,  shape,  or  manner,  criticised 
or  reflected  upon  General  Sherman's  course  in  North  Carolina,  or  upon  his 
truce,  or  as  General  Grant  styles  it  "arrangement"  with  Johnston  and 
Breckinridge,  but  have  simply  acted  upon  the  orders,  instructions,  and 
expressed  wishes  of  my  superiors  as  communicated  to  me,  and  as  I  under 
stand  them.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General 

The  same  officer  who  captured  the  original  of  Mr.  Reagan's 
draft  of  the  rejected  terms,  also  secured  the  written  opinions 
of  the  different  members  of  Mr.  Davis'  Cabinet,  rendered  in 
accordance  with  his  request,  made  at  the  session  of  his  Cabinet 
held  on  the  21st  of  April,  at  Charlotte,  K  C.  All  reviewed 
the  situation  at  length. 

A  few  extracts  from  these  opinions  will  serve  to  show  that 
the  rebel  Cabinet  held  substantially  the  same  views  of  the 
scope  of  Sherman's  terms  as,  according  to  Mr.  Stanton,  were 
entertained  at  Washington. 

Mr.  Reagan  wrote: 

*  *  #  *  "The  agreement  under  consideration  secures  to  our 
people,  if  ratified  by  both  parties,  the  uninterrupted  continuance  of  the 
existing  State  Governments;  the  guarantees  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  and 
of  the  Constitutions  of  their  respective  States ;  the  guarantee  of  their  political 
rights,  and  of  their  rights  of  person,  and  property,  and  immunity  from  future 
prosecutions,  and  penalties  for  their  participation  in  the  existing  war,  on  the 
condition  that  we  accept  the  Constitution  and  Government  of  the  United 
States,  and  disband  our  armies  by  marching  the  troops  to  their  respective 
States,  and  depositing  their  arms  in  the  State  arsenals,  subject  to  the  future 
control  of  that  Government,  but  with  a  verbal  understanding  that  they  are 
only  to  be  used  for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  order  in  the  respective 


THE  TERMS  WITH  JOHNSTON.  243 

States.  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  the  agreement  contains  no  direct 
reference  to  the  question  of  slavery;  requires  no  concessions  from  us  in 
regard  to  it,  and  leaves  it  subject  to  the  Constitution  and  Laws  of  the  United 
States  and  of  the  several  States  just  as  it  was  before  the  war." 

Mr.  Benjamin,  Secretary  of  State,  summed  up  the  terms  as 
follows : 

"  The  Military  Convention  made  between  General  Johnston  and  General 
Sherman  is,  in  substance,  an  agreement  that  if  the  Confederate  States  will 
cease  to  wage  war  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  separate  government,  the 
United  States  will  receive  the  several  States  back  into  the  Union,  with  their 
State  Governments  unimpaired,  with  all  their  Constitutional  rights  recognized, 
with  protection  for  the  persons  and  property  of  the  people,  and  with  a  general 
amnesty." 

Mr.  George  Davis,  Attorney-General,  wrote: 

"Taken  as  a  whole,  the  convention  amounts  to  this,  that  the  States  of  the 
Confederacy  shall  reenter  the  old  Union  upon  the  same  footing  on  which  they 
stood  before  seceding  from  it." 

In  the  light  of  these  opinions,  how  unjust  does  General 
Sherman's  attack  upon  the  memory  of  Secretary  Stanton 
appear ! 

General  Sherman  relates  that  at  the  first  meeting  with  John 
ston,  after  the  rejection  of  these  terms,  the  latter,  "  without 
hesitation  agreed  to,  and  we  executed"  the  final  terms.  But 
even  these  were  drawn  up  by  General  Schofield,  and  this 
officer,  during  the  subsequent  absence  of  General  Sherman, 
also  made  supplementary  terms  with  Johnston,  which  were 
found  to  be  necessary  to  complete  the  details  of  the  surrender. 

From  all  of  which  it  appears  that  the  records  tell  a  very 
different  story  of  the  negotiations  with  General  Johnston  from 
that  contained  in  the  Memoirs. 


CHAPTER     XVIII. 

OPINIONS  OF   JEFF.  DAVIS*  CABINET  OFFICEBS  ON   SHERMAN'S 

TERMS. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN,  in  his  Memoirs,  returns  with  increased, 
violence  to  his  old  attack  upon  Secretary  Stan  ton,  and  attempts 
to  hold  him  chiefly  responsible  for  a  course  in  regard  to  the 
Sherman- Johnston  terms,  which  at  the  time  was  approved  by 
the  President,  General  Grant,  General  Halleck,  every  member 
of  the  Cabinet,  and  by  the  loyal  North. 

He  attempts  to  convey  the  impression  that  Mr.  Stanton 
exceeded  his  authority  in  the  matter,  by  the  statement  that 
President  Johnson,  and  nearly  all  the  members  of  the  Cabinet 
assured  him,  after  his  arrival  in  Washington,  that  they  knew 
nothing  of  Mr.  Stanton's  publications  setting  forth  the  nature 
of  his  terms  and  the  reasons  of  the  Cabinet  for  rejecting  them. 
This  is  an  attempt  to  escape  upon  a  technicality.  The  Presi 
dent,  and  every  member  of  the  Cabinet,  had  united  in  rejecting 
the  terms  on  the  grounds  which  Mr.  Stanton  made  known. 
It  is  doubtless  true  that  none  of  them,  except  Mr.  Stanton, 
knew  that  these  reasons  were  to  be  made  public  in  the  shape 
they  were  till  they  saw  them  in  the  newspapers.  And,  as  the 
Secretary  of  War  "  oifered  no  word  of  explanation  or  apology," 
General  Sherman  concluded  to  insult  him  in  public,  which  he 
seems  to  think  he  afterward  did,  by  refusing  to  take  Mr. 
Stanton's  hand,  or  as  he  expresses  it,  speaking  of  his  own 
behavior  on  the  stand  at  the  great  review,  "I  shook  hands 
with  the  President,  General  Grant,  and  each  member  of  the 
Cabinet.  As  I  approached  Mr.  Stanton,  he  offered  me  his 
(244) 


JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.       245 

hand,  but  I  declined  it  publicly,  and  the  fact  was  univer 
sally  noticed  " — but  how  decidedly  to  the  discredit  of  General 
Sherman  he  does  not  relate  in  his  new  capacity  of  historian. 

His  main  complaint  is  directed  at  the  reasons  assigned  by 
Mr.  Stanton  for  the  rejection  of  his  terms.  He  contends  that 
personally  he  "cared  very  little  whether  they  were  approved, 
modified,  or  disapproved  in  toto,"  only  he  "  wanted  instruc 
tions;"  and  yet  in  a  letter  to  Halleck,  quoted  in  the  Memoirs, 
and  written  the  day  these  terms  were  agreed  upon,  is  this 
appeal : 

"Please  give  all  orders  necessary  according  to  the  views  the  Executive  may 
take,  and  influence  him,  if  possible,  not  to  vary  the  terms  at  all,  for  I  have 
considered  every  thing,  and  believe  that  the  Confederate  armies  once  dis 
persed,  we  can  adjust  all  else  fairly  and  well." 

It  is  now  known,  from  documents  which  might  have  slept 
but  for  General  Sherman's  revival  of  this  matter,  that  the 
members  of  Jeff.  Davis'  Cabinet  construed  the  Sherman- 
Johnston  terms  exactly  as  Mr.  Stanton  and  the  other  members 
of  Lincoln's  Cabinet  did. 

It  has  already  been  made  to  appear  that  Mr.  Reagan,  the 
Confederate  Postmaster-General ;  Mr.  Breckinridge,  Secretary 
of  War;  Wade  Hampton,  and  General  Johnston  held  a  con 
sultation  at  the  headquarters  of  the  latter,  late  at  night,  after 
the  first  conference  with  General  Sherman.  Up  to  that  time 
no  draft  of  "terms"  had  been  prepared  by  either  side,  and 
Mr.  Reagan  thereupon  drew  up  outlines,  based  upon  John 
ston's  conversations  with  Sherman,  and  this  paper  was  the 
next  day  handed  to  the  latter,  and,  with  it  before  him,  he 
wrote  the  memorandum,  which  was  afterward  signed.  This 
was  agreed  to,  and  did  not  differ  in  its  most  important  points 
from  the  draft  prepared  by  Mr.  Reagan. 

The  latter,  therefore,  was  well  qualified  to  inform  Mr.  Davis 
of  the  character  of  these  terms;  and  a  few  days  later,  when 
they  had  been  under  consideration  in  the  rebel  Cabinet,  he, 
in  common  with  his  associate  members,  at  the  request  of  Mr. 


246       JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

Davis,  gave  a  written  opinion  upon  the  terms  and  the  question 
of  accepting  them. 

This  paper,  which  is  now  both  interesting  and  pertinent  to 
the  questions  General  Sherman  has  raised,  is  as  follows : 

Views  of  Postmaster-General  Reagan: 

To  the  President.  CHARLOTTE,  N.  C.,  April  22,  1865. 

SIR — In  obedience  to  your  request  for  the  opinions  in  writing  of  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Cabinet  on  the  questions :  first,  as  to  whether  you  should  assent 
to  the  preliminary  agreement  of  the  18th  inst.,  between  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  of  the  Confederate  army,  and  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  of 
the  army  of  the  United  States,  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities  and  the  adjust 
ment  of  the  difficulties  between  the  two  countries ;  and,  if  so,  second,  the 
proper  mode  of  executing  this  agreement  on  our  part,  I  have  to  say  that, 
painful  as  the  necessity  is,  in  view  of  the  relative  condition  of  the  armies 
and  resources  of  the  belligerents,  I  must  advise  the  acceptance  of  the  terms 
of  the  agreement. 

General  Lee,  the  General-in-Chief  of  our  armies,  has  been  compelled  to 
surrender  our  principal  army,  heretofore  employed  in  the  defense  of  our 
capital,  with  the  loss  of  a  very  large  part  of  our  ordnance,  arms,  munitions 
of  war,  and  military  stores  of  all  kinds,  with  what  remained  of  our  naval 
establishment.  The  officers  of  the  civil  government  have  been  compelled  to 
abandon  the  capital,  carrying  with  them  the  archives,  and  thus  to  close,  for 
the  time  being  at  least,  the  regular  operations  of  its  several  departments, 
with  no  place  now  open  to  us  at  which  we  can  reestablish  and  put  these 
departments  in  operation,  with  any  prospect  of  permanency  or  security  for 
the  transaction  of  the  public  business  and  the  carrying  on  of  the  Govern 
ment.  The  army  under  the  command  of  General  Johnston  has  been  reduced 

to  fourteen  or  fifteen infantry  and  artillery  and cavalry,  and  this 

force  is,  from  demoralization  and  despondency,  melting  away  rapidly  by  the 
troops  abandoning  the  army  and  returning  to  their  homes  singly  and  in 
numbers  large  and  small;  it  being  the  opinion  of  Generals  Johnston  and 
Beauregard  that  with  the  men  and  means  at  their  command  they  can  oppose 
no  serious  obstacle  to  the  advance  of  General  Sherman's  army.  General 
Johnston  is  of  opinion  that  the  enemy's  forces  now  in  the  field  exceed  ours 
in  numbers  by  probably  ten  to  one.  Our  forces  in  the  South,  though  still 
holding  the  fortifications  at  Mobile,  have  been  unable  to  prevent  the  fall  of 
Selma  and  Montgomery  in  Alabama,  and  of  Columbus  and  Macon  in 
Georgia,  with  their  magazines,  workshops,  and  stores  of  supplies. 

The  army  west  of  the  Mississippi  is  unavailable  for  the  arrest  of  the  vic 
torious  career  of  the  enemy  east  of  that  river,  and  is  inadequate  for  the 
defense  of  the  country  west  of  it.  The  country  is  worn  down  by  a  brilliant 
and  heroic,  but  exhausting  and  bloody  struggle  of  four  years.  Our  ports  are 


JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.        247 

closed  so  as  to  exclude  the  hope  of  procuring  arms  and  supplies  from  abroad; 
and  we  are  unable  to  arm  our  people  if  they  were  willing  to  continue  the 
struggle.  The  supplies  of  quartermaster  and  commissary  stores  in  the 
country  are  very  limited  in  amount,  and  our  railroads  are  so  broken  and 
destroyed  as  to  prevent,  to  a  great  extent,  the  transportation  and  accumula 
tion  of  those  remaining.  Our  currency  has  lost  its  purchasing  power,  and 
there  is  no  other  means  of  supplying  the  treasury;  and  the  people  are  hostile 
to  impressments  and  endeavor  to  conceal  such  supplies  as  are  needed  for  the 
army  from  the  officers  charged  with  their  collection.  Our  armies,  in  case  of 
a  prolongation  of  the  struggle,  will  continue  to  melt  away  as  they  retreat 
through  the  country.  There  is  danger,  and  I  think  I  might  say  certainty, 
based  on  the  information  we  have,  that  a  portion,  and  probably  all  of  the 
States  will  make  separate  terms  with  the  enemy  as  they  are  overrun,  with  the 
chance  that  the  terms  so  obtained  will  be  less  favorable  to  them  than  those 
contained  in  the  agreement  under  consideration.  And  the  despair  of  our 
people  will  prevent  a  much  longer  continuance  of  serious  resistance,  unless 
they  shall  be  hereafter  urged  to  it  by  unendurable  oppressions. 

The  agreement  under  consideration  secures  to  our  people,  if  ratified  by 
both  parties,  the  uninterrupted  continuance  of  the  existing  State  Govern 
ments  ;  the  guarantees  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  and  of  the  Constitutions 
of  their  respective  States;  the  guarantee  of  their  political  rights  and  of  their 
rights  of  person  and  property,  and  immunity  from  future  prosecutions  and 
penalties  for  their  participation  in  the  existing  war,  on  the  condition  that  we 
accept  the  Constitution  and  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  disband 
our  armies  by  marching  the  troops  to  their  respective  States,  and  depositing 
their  arms  in  the  State  arsenals,  subject  to  the  future  control  of  that  Govern 
ment,  but  with  a  verbal  understanding  that  they  are  only  to  be  used  for  the 
preservation  of  peace  and  order  in  the  respective  States.  It  is  also  to  be 
observed  that  the  agreement  contains  no  direct  reference  to  the  question  of 
slavery,  requires  no  concessions  from  us  in  regard  to  it,  and  leaves  it  subject 
to  the  Constitution  and  Laws  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  several  States 
just  as  it  was  before  the  war. 

With  these  facts  before  us,  and  under  the  belief  that  we  can  not  now  rea 
sonably  hope  for  the  achievement  of  our  independence,  which  should  be  dearer 
than  life  if  it  were  possibly  attainable,  and  under  the  belief  that  a  continu 
ance  of  the  struggle,  with  its  sacrifices  of  life  and  property,  and  its  accumu 
lation  of  sufferings,  without  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success,  would  be  both 
unwise  and  criminal,  I  advise  that  you  assent  to  the  agreement  as  the  best 
you  can  now  do  for  the  people  who  have  clothed  you  with  the  high  trust  of 
your  position. 

In  advising  this  course  I  do  not  conceal  from  myself,  nor  would  I  withhold 
from  your  Excellency,  the  danger  of  trusting  the  people  who  drove  us  to  war 
by  their  unconstitutional  and  unjust  aggressions,  and  who  will  now  add  the 
consciousness  of  power  to  their  love  of  dominion  and  greed  of  gain. 

It  is  right  also  for  me  to  say  that  much  as  we  have  been  exhausted  in  men 


248       JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

and  resources,  I  am  of  opinion  that  if  our  people  could  be  induced  to  con 
tinue  the  contest  with  the  spirit  which  animated  them  during  the  first  years 
of  the  war,  our  independence  might  yet  be  within  our  reach.  But  I  see  no 
reason  to  hope  for  that  now. 

On  the  second  question,  as  to  the  proper  mode  of  executing  the  agreement, 
I  have  to  say  that  whatever  you  may  do  looking  to  the  termination  of  the 
contest  by  an  amicable  arrangement  which  may  embrace  the  extinction  of 
the  Government  of  the  Confederate  States,  must  be  done  without  special 
authority  to  be  found  in  the  Constitution.  And  yet,  I  am  of  opinion  that, 
charged  as  you  are  with  the  duty  of  looking  to  the  general  welfare  of  the 
people,  and  without  time  or  opportunity,  under  the  peculiarity  and  necessities 
of  the  case,  to  submit  the  whole  question  to  the  States  for  their  deliberation 
and  action  without  danger  of  losing  material  advantages  provided  for  in  the 
agreement;  and,  as  I  believe  that  you,  representing  the  military  power  and 
authority  of  all  the  States,  can  obtain  better  terms  for  them  than  it  is  probable 
they  could  obtain  each  for  itself;  and,  as  it  is  in  your  power,  if  the  Federal 
authorities  accept  this  agreement,  to  terminate  the  ravages  of  war  sooner  than 
it  can  be  done  by  the  several  States,  while  the  enemy  is  still  unconscious  of 
the  full  extent  of  our  weakness,  you  should,  in  case  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  terms  of  this  agreement  by  the  authorities  of  the  United  States,  accept 
them  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  take  steps  for  the  disbanding 
of  the  Confederate  armies  on  the  terms  agreed  on.  As  you  have  no  power  to 
change  the  government  of  the  country,  or  to  transfer  the  allegiance  of  the 
people,  I  would  advise  that  you  submit  to  the  several  States,  through  their 
governors,  the  question  as  to  whether  they  will,  in  the  exercise  of  their  own 
sovereignty,  accept,  each  for  itself,  the  terms  proposed. 

To  this  it  may  be  said,  that  after  the  disbanding  of  our  armies  and  the  aban 
donment  of  the  contest  by  the  Confederate  Government,  they  would  have 
no  alternative  but  to  accept  the  terms  proposed  or  an  unequal  and  hopeless 
war,  and  that  it  would  be  needless  for  them  to  go  through  the  forms  and  incur 
the  trouble  and  expense  of  assembling  a  convention  for  the  purpose.  To  such 
an  objection,  if  urged,  it  may  be  answered  that  we  entered  into  the  contest  to 
maintain  and  vindicate  the  doctrine  of  State  rights  and  State  sovereignty,  and 
the  right  of  self-government,  and  that  we  can  only  be  faithful  to  the  Consti 
tution  of  the  United  States,  and  true  to  the  principles  in  support  of  which  we 
have  expended  so  much  blood  and  treasure,  by  the  employment  of  the  same 
agencies  to  return  into  the  old  Union  which  we  employed  in  separating  from  it 
and  in  forming  our  present  Government;  and  that  if  this  should  be  an  unwel 
come  and  enforced  action  by  the  States,  it  would  not  be  more  so  on  the  part 
of  the  States  than  on  the  part  of  the  President,  if  he  were  to  undertake  to 
execute  the  whole  agreement,  and  while  they  would  have  authority  for  acting 
he  would  have  none. 

This  plan  would  at  least  conform  to  the  theory  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  and  would,  in  future,  be  an  additional  precedent,  to  which  the 
friends  of  State  rights  could  point  in  opposing  the  doctrine  of  the  consolida- 


JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.        249 

tion  of  powers  in  the  central  government.  And  if  the  future  shall  disclose  a 
disposition  (of  which  I  fear  the  chance  is  remote)  on  the  part  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States  to  return  to  the  spirit  and  meaning  of  the  Constitution, 
then  this  action  on  the  part  of  the  States  might  prove  to  be  of  great  value  to 
the  friends  of  constitutional  liberty  and  good  government. 

In  addition  to  the  terms  of  agreement,  an  additional  provision  should  be 
asked  for,  which  will  probably  be  allowed  without  objection,  stipulating  for 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Federal  forces  from  the  several  States  of  the  Confederacy, 
except  a  sufficient  number  to  garrison  the  permanent  fortifications  and  take 
care  of  the  public  property  until  the  States  can  call  their  conventions  and 
take  action  on  the  proposed  terms. 

In  addition  to  the  necessity  for  this  course,  in  order  to  make  their  action  as 
free  and  voluntary  as  other  circumstances  will  allow,  it  would  aid  in  softening 
the  bitter  memories  which  must  necessarily  follow  such  a  contest  as  that  in 
which  we  are  engaged. 

Nothing  is  said  in  the  agreement  about  the  public  debt  and  the  disposition 
of  our  public  property  beyond  the  turning  over  of  the  arms  to  the  State 
arsenals. 

In  the  final  adjustment  we  should  endeavor  to  secure  provisions  for  the 
auditing  of  the  debt  of  the  Confederacy,  and  for  its  payment  in  common  with 
the  war  debt  of  the  United  States. 

We  may  ask  this  on  the  ground  that  we  did  not  seek  this  war,  but  only 
sought  peaceful  separation  to  secure  our  people  and  States  from  the  effects  of 
unconstitutional  encroachments  by  the  other  States,  and  because,  on  the  princi 
ples  of  equity,  allowing  that  both  parties  had  acted  in  good  faith,  and  gone  to 
war  on  a  misunderstanding  which  admitted  of  no  other  solution,  and  now  agree 
to  a  reconciliation,  and  to  a  burial  of  the  past,  it  would  be  unjust  to  compel 
our  people  to  assist  in  the  payment  of  the  war  debt  of  the  United  States,  and 
for  them  to  refuse  to  allow  such  of  the  revenues  as  we  might  contribute  to  be 
applied  to  the  payment  of  our  creditors.  If  it  should  be  said  that  this  is  a 
liberality  never  extended  by  the  conqueror  to  the  conquered,  the  answer  is 
that  if  the  object  of  the  pacification  is  to  restore  the  Union  in  good  faith  and 
to  reconcile  the  people  to  each  other,  to  restore  confidence  and  faith,  and 
prosperity,  and  homogenity,  then  it  is  of  the  first  importance  that  the  terms 
of  reconciliation  should  be  based  on  entire  equity,  and  that  no  just  ground  of 
grief  or  complaint  should  be  left  to  either  party.  And  to  both  parties,  look 
ing  not  only  to  the  present  but  to  the  interest  of  future  generations,  the 
amount  of  money  which  would  be  involved,  though  large,  would  be  as  nothing 
when  compared  with  a  reconciliation  entirely  equitable,  which  should  leave 
no  sting  to  honor,  and  no  sense  of  wrong  to  rankle  in  the  memories  of  the 
people,  and  lay  the  foundation  for  new  difficulties  and  for  future  wars.  It  is 
to  this  feature,  it  seems  to  me,  the  greatest  attention  should  be  given  by  both 
sides.  It  will  be  of  the  highest  importance  to  all,  for  the  present  as  well  as 
for  the  future,  that  the  frankness,  sincerity,  and  justice  of  both  parties  shall 
be  as  conspicuous  in  the  adjustment  of  past  difficulties,  as  their  courage  and 


250       JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

endurance  have  been  during  the  war,  if  we  would  make  peace  on  a  basis 
which  would  be  satisfactory  and  might  be  rendered  perpetual 

In  any  event  provisions  should  be  made  which  will  authorize  the  Con 
federate  authorities  to  sell  the  public  property  remaining  on  hand,  and  to 
apply  the  proceeds,  as  far  as  they  will  go,  to  the  payment  of  our  public 
liabilities,  or  for  such  other  disposition  as  may  be  found  advisable. 

But  if  the  terms  of  this  agreement  should  be  rejected,  or  so  modified  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  as  to  refuse  a  recognition  of  the  right  of 
local  self-government  and  our  political  rights,  and  rights  of  persons  and 
property,  or  as  to  refuse  amnesty  for  past  participation  in  this  war,  then  it 
will  be  our  duty  to  continue  the  struggle  as  best  we  can,  however  unequal  it 
may  be;  as  it  would  be  better  and  more  honorable  to  waste  our  lives  and 
substance  in  such  a  contest  than  to  yield  both  to  the  mercy  of  a  remorseless 
conqueror. 

I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  Excellency's  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  H.  REAGAN,  Postmaster-General. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Mr.  Reagan,  whose  opportunities  for 
being  well  informed  were  excellent,  looked  u,pon  the  Sherman 
terms  as  "  preliminary,"  and  held,  as  Mr.  Stanton  said  our 
Cabinet  did,  that  subsequently  a  claim  might  be  made  that 
the  North  should  help  pay  the  rebel  war  debt. 

The  views  of  the  other  members  of  the  Davis  Cabinet,  sub 
mitted  in  writing  at  the  same  time,  were  as  follows : 

Views  of  Mr.  Benjamin,  Secretary  of  State: 

CHARLOTTE,  N.  C.,  22d  April,  1865. 
To  the  President. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  this  paper  as  the  advice  in  writing  which 
you  requested  from  the  heads  of  the  departments  of  the  Government. 

The  military  convention  made  between  General  Johnston  and  General 
Sherman  is,  in  substance,  an  agreement  that  if  the  Confederate  States  will 
cease  to  wage  war  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a  separate  government,  the 
United  States  will  receive  the  several  States  back  into  the  Union  with  their 
State  Governments  unimpaired,  with  all  their  constitutional  rights  recognized, 
with  protection  for  the  persons  and  property  of  the  people,  and  with  a  general 
amnesty. 

The  question  is  whether,  in  view  of  the  military  condition  of  the  belliger 
ents,  the  Confederate  States  can  hope  for  any  better  result  by  continuing  the 
war ;  whether  there  is  any  reason  to  believe  that  they  can  establish  their 
independence  and  final  separation  from  the  United  States. 

To  reach  a  conclusion  it  is  requisite  to  consider  our  present  condition  and 
the  prospect  of  a  change  for  the  better. 


JEFF.  PAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.        251 

The  General-in-Chief  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy  has  capitulated, 
and  his  army,  the  largest  and  finest  within  our  country,  is  irretrievably  lost. 

The  soldiers  have  been  dispersed  and  remain  at  home  as  paroled  prisoners. 

The  artillery,  arms,  and  munitions  of  war  are  lost,  and  no  help  can  be 
expected  from  Virginia,  which  is  at  the  mercy  of  the  conqueror. 

The  army  next  in  numbers  and  efficiency  is  known  as  the  Army  of  Ten 
nessee,  and  is  commanded  by  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard. 

Its  rolls  call  for  more  than  seventy  thousand  men.  Its  last  returns  show  a 
total  present  for  duty,  of  all  arms,  of  less  than  twenty  thousand  men.  This 
number  is  daily  diminishing  by  desertions  and  casualties.  In  a  recent  con 
ference  with  the  Cabinet  at  Greensboro  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard 
expressed  the  unqualified  opinion  that  it  was  not  in  their  power  to  resist 
Sherman's  advance,  and  that  as  fast  as  their  army  retreated,  the  soldiers  of 
the  several  States  on  the  line  of  retreat  would  abandon  the  army  and  go 
home. 

We  also  hear  on  all  sides,  and  from  citizens  well  acquainted  with  public 
opinion,  that  the  State  of  North  Carolina  will  not  consent  to  continue  the 
struggle  after  our  armies  shall  have  withdrawn  further  south,  and  this  with 
drawal  is  inevitable  if  hostilities  are  resumed. 

This  action  of  North  Carolina  would  render  it  impossible  for  Virginia  to 
maintain  her  position  in  the  Confederacy,  even  if  her  people  were  unanimous 
in  their  desire  to  continue  the  contest. 

In  the  more  southern  States  we  have  no  army  except  the  forces  now 
defending  Mobile  and  the  cavalry  under  General  Forrest.  The  enemy  are  so 
far  superior  in  numbers  that  they  have  occupied  within  the  last  few  weeks 
Selma,  Montgomery,  Columbus,  and  Macon,  and  could  continue  their  career 
of  devastation  through  Georgia  and  Alabama  without  our  being  able  to  pre 
vent  it  by  any  forces  now  at  our  disposal. 

It  is  believed  that  we  could  not  at  the  present  moment  gather  together  an 
army  of  thirty  thousand  men  by  a  concentration  of  all  our  forces  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River. 

Our  sea-coast  is  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  we  can  not  obtain  arms 
and  munitions  from  abroad  except  in  very  small  quantities  and  by  precarious 
and  uncertain  means  of  transportation. 

We  have  lost  possession  in  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  of  our  chief 
resources  for  the  supply  of  powder  and  lead. 

We  can  obtain  no  aid  from  the  Trans-Mississippi  Department,  from  which 
we  are  cut  off  by  the  fleets  of  gun-boats  that  patrol  the  river. 

We  have  not  a  supply  of  arms  sufficient  for  putting  into  the  field  even  ten 
thousand  additional  men,  if  the  men  themselves  were  forthcoming. 

The  Confederacy  is,  in  a  word,  unable  to  continue  the  war  by  armies  in  the 
field,  and  the  struggle  can  no  longer  be  maintained  in  any  other  manner  than 
by  a  guerrilla  or  partisan  warfare.  Such  a  warfare  is  not,  in  my  opinion, 
desirable,  nor  does  it  promise  any  useful  result.  It  would  entail  far  more 
suffering  on  our  own  people  than  it  would  cause  damage  to  the  enemy ;  and 


252       JEFF.  DAVIS1  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

the  people  have  been  such  heavy  sufferers  by  the  calamities  of  the  war  for  the 
last  four  years  that  it  is  at  least  questionable  whether  they  would  be  willing 
to  engage  in  such  a  contest,  unless  forced  to  endure  its  horrors  in  preference 
to  dishonor  and  degradation. 

The  terms  of  the  convention  imply  no  dishonor,  impose  no  degradation, 
exact  only  what  the  victor  always  requires — the  relinquishment  by  his  foe  of 
the  object  for  which  the  struggle  was  commenced. 

Seeing  no  reasonable  hope  of  our  ability  to  conquer  our  independence, 
admitting  the  undeniable  fact  that  we  have  been  vanquished  in  the  war,  it  is 
my  opinion  that  these  terms  should  be  accepted,  being  as  favorable  as  any 
that  we,  as  the  defeated  belligerents,  have  reason  to  expect  or  can  hope  to 
secure. 

It  is  further  my  opinion  that  the  President  owes  it  to  the  States  and  to  the 
people  to  obtain  for  them,  by  a  general  pacification,  rights  and  advantages 
which  they  would,  in  all  probability,  be  unable  to  secure  by  the  separate 
action  of  the  different  States.  It  is  natural  that  the  enemy  should  be  willing 
to  accord  more  liberal  conditions  for  the  purpose  of  closing  the  war  at  once 
than  would  be  granted  if  each  State  should  continue  the  contest  till  separate 
terms  could  be  made  for  itself. 

The  President  is  the  chief  political  executive  of  the  Confederacy,  as  well  as 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  its  armies.  In  the  former  capacity  he  is  power 
less  to  act  in  making  peace  on  any  other  basis  than  that  of  independence.  In 
the  latter  capacity  he  can  ratify  the  military  convention  under  consideration, 
and  execute  its  provisions  relative  to  the  disbandment  of  the  army  and  the 
distribution  of  the  arms.  He  can  end  hostilities. 

The  States  alone  can  act  in  dissolving  the  Confederacy  and  returning  to  the 
Union,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  convention. 

I  think  that  if  this  convention  be  ratified  by  the  United  States,  the  Presi 
dent  should,  by  proclamation,  inform  the  States  and  the  people  of  the  Con 
federacy  of  the  facts  above  recited ;  should  ratify  the  convention  so  far  as  he 
has  authority  to  act  as  Commander-in-Chief,  and  should  execute  the  military 
provisions;  should  declare  his  inability,  with  the  means  remaining  at  his 
disposal,  to  defend  the  Confederacy  or  maintain  its  independence,  and  should 
resign  a  trust  which  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  fulfill. 

He  should  further  invite  the  several  States  to  take  into  immediate  consid 
eration  the  terms  of  this  convention,  with  a  view  to  their  adoption  and 
execution  as  being  the  best  and  most  favorable  that  they  could  hope  to  obtain 
by  a  continuance  of  the  struggle. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  P.  BENJA-MIN,  Secretary  of  State. 

Views  of  Mr.  Mallory,  Secretary  of  the  Navy : 

CHARLOTTE,  N.  C.,  24th  April,  1865. 
MB.  PRESIDENT:  In  compliance  with  your  suggestion  I  have  the  honor 


JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.       253 

briefly  to  present  the  following  views  upon  the  propositions  discussed  in  Cab 
inet  council  yesterday. 

These  propositions,  agreed  upon  and  signed  by  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
and  W.  T.  Sherman,  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  providing  for  the  immediate 
cessation  of  hostilities,  the  disbandment  of  our  armies,  and  the  return  of  our 
soldiers  to  the  peaceful  walks  of  life ;  the  restoration  of  the  several  States  of 
our  Confederacy  to  the  old  Union,  with  the  integrity  of  their  State  Govern 
ments  preserved;  the  security  of  their  "people  and  inhabitants"  in  their 
rights  of  person  and  property  under  the  Constitution  and  the  Laws  of  the 
United  States,  equally  with  the  people  of  any  other  State,  guaranteed, 
and  a  general  amnesty  for  and  on  account  of  any  participation  in  the 
present  war. 

The  very  grave  responsibility  devolved  upon  you  by  these  propositions  is 
at  once  apparent.  To  enter  at  all  upon  their  discussion  is  to  admit  that 
independence,  the  great  object  of  our  struggle,  is  hopeless.  I  believe  and 
admit  this  to  be  the  case,  and  therefore  do  I  advise  you  to  accept  these  propo 
sitions  so  far  as  you  have  the  power  to  do  so ;  and  my  conviction  is  that  nine- 
tenths  of  the  people  of  every  State  of  the  Confederacy  would  so  advise  if 
opportunity  were  presented  them.  They  are  weary  of  the  war  and  desire 
peace.  If  they  could  be  rallied  and  brought  to  the  field,  a  united  and 
determined  people  might  even  yet  achieve  independence ;  but  many  circum 
stances  admonish  us  that  we  can  not  count  upon  their  cordial  and  united 
action. 

The  vast  army  of  deserters  and  absentees  from  our  military  service  during 
the  past  twelve  months,  the  unwillingness  of  the  people  to  enter  the  armies, 
the  impracticability  of  recruiting  them,  the  present  utter  demoralization  of 
our  troops  consequent  upon  the  destruction  of  the  Army  of  Virginia,  the 
rapid  decrease  by  desertion  of  General  Johnston's  army,  which  as  it  retreats 
south,  if  retreat  it  can,  will  retain  in  its  ranks  but  few  soldiers  beyond  the 
by-paths  and  cross-roads  which  lead  to  their  homes,  together  with  the  recent 
successes  of  the  enemy,  the  fall  of  Selma,  Montgomery,  Columbus,  and 
Macon,  his  forces  in  the  field  and  his  vast  resources,  all  dictate  the  admission 
I  have  made. 

I  do  not  believe  that  by  any  possibility  we  could  organize,  arm,  and  equip, 
and  bring  into  the  field  this  side  of  the  Mississippi  fifteen  thousand  men 
within  the  next  sixty  days,  and  I  am  convinced  that  both  General  Beaure- 
gard  and  General  Johnston  are  utterly  hopeless  of  continuing  the  contest.  A 
guerrilla  warfare  might  "be  carried  on  in  certain  portions  of  our  country  for 
a  time,  perhaps  for  years,  but  while  such  a  warfare  would  be  more  disastrous 
to  our  own  people  than  it  could  possibly  be  to  the  enemy,  it  would  exercise 
little  or  no  influence  upon  his  military  operations,  or  upon  his  hold  upon 
the  country.  Conducted  upon  our  own  soil  our  own  people  would  chiefly  feel 
its  evils,  and  would  afford  it  neither  countenance  nor  support.  Guerrilla 
warfare  never  has  been  and  never  can  be  carried  on  by  and  between  peoples 
of  a  common  origin,  language,  and  institutions. 


254       JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

Our  sea-board  and  our  ports  being  in  the  enemy's  hands  we  can  not  rely 
upon  supplies  of  arms  and  other  munitions  of  war  from  abroad,  and  our 
means  of  producing  them  at  home,  already  limited,  are  daily  decreasing. 
The  loss  of  Selma  and  of  Columbus,  where  much  valuable  machinery  for  the 
construction  of  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  was  collected,  must  materially 
circumscribe  our  ability  in  this  respect. 

Our  currency  is  nearly  worthless,  and  will  become  utterly  so  with  further 
military  disasters,  and  there  is  no  hope  that  we  can  improve  it. 

The  arms  of  the  United  States  have  rendered  the  great  object  of  our  strug 
gle  hopeless,  have  conquered  a  reconstruction  of  the  Union,  and  it  becomes 
your  duty  to  secure  to  the  people,  as  far  as  practicable,  life,  liberty,  and 
property. 

The  propositions  signed  by  the  opposing  generals  are  more  favorable  to 
these  great  objects  than  could  justly  have  been  anticipated. 

Upon  you,  with  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of  the  condition  of  our 
country,  the  character  and  sentiments  of  our  people,  and  of  our  means  and 
resources,  than  is  possessed  by  others,  is  devolved  the  responsibility  of 
promptly  accepting  or  of  promptly  rejecting  them.  I  advise  their  acceptance ; 
and  that,  having  notified  General  Johnston  of  your  having  done  so,  you 
promptly  issue,  so  soon  as  you  shall  learn  the  acceptance  thereof  by  the 
authorities  of  the  United  States,  a  proclamation  to  the  people  of  the  Confed 
erate  States,  setting  forth  clearly  the  condition  of  the  country,  your  inability 
to  resist  the  enemy's  overwhelming  numbers,  or  to  protect  the  country  from 
his  devastating  and  desolating  march,  the  propositions  submitted  to  you,  and 
the  reasons  which,  in  your  judgment,  render  their  acceptance  by  the  States 
and  the  people  wise  and  expedient.  You  can  not,  under  the  Constitution, 
dissolve  the  Confederacy  and  remit  the  States  composing  it  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States. 

But  the  Confederacy  is  conquered.  Its  days  are  numbered.  Virginia  is 
lost  to  it,  and  North  Carolina  must  soon  follow,  and  State  after  State,  under 
the  hostile  tread  of  the  enemy,  must  reenter  the  old  Union.  The  occasion,  the 
emergency,  the  dire  necessities  and  misfortunes  of  the  country,  the  vast  inter 
ests  at  stake,  were  never  contemplated  by  those  who  framed  the  Constitution. 
They  are  all  outside  of  it,  and  in  the  dissolution  of  the  Confederacy  and  the 
wreck  of  all  their  hopes,  the  States  and  the  people  will  turn  to  you,  whose 
antecedents  and  whose  present  position  and  powers  constitute  you,  more  than 
any  other  living  man,  the  guardian  of  their  honor  and  their  interests,  and 
will  expect  you  not  to  stand  upon  constitutional  limitations,  but  to  assume 
and  exercise  all  powers  which  to  you  may  seem  necessary  and  proper  to 
shield  them  from  useless  war,  and  to  save  from  the  wreck  of  the  country  all 
that  may  be  practicable  of  honor,  life,  and  property. 

If  time  were  allowed  for  the  observance  of  constitutional  forms  I  would 
advise  the  submission  of  these  propositions  to  the  executives  of  the  several 
States  to  the  end  that,  through  the  usual  legislative  and  conventional  action, 
the  wills  of  the  people  of  the  States  respectively  might  be  known.  But  in 


JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.        255 

the  present  condition  of  the  country  such  delay  as  this  course  would  involve 
would  be  the  death-blow  to  all  hopes  founded  upon  them. 

The  pacification  of  the  country  should  be  as  speedy  as  practicable,  to  the 
end  that  the  authorities  of  the  States  may  enter  upon  the  establishment  and 
maintenance  of  law  and  order.  Negotiations  for  this  purpose  can  more 
appropriately  follow  upon  the  overwhelming  disaster  of  General  Lee  than  at 
a  future  time.  The  wreck  of  our  hopes  results  immediately  from  it. 

I  omit  all  reference  to  the  details  which  must  be  provided  for  by  the  con 
tending  parties  to  this  agreement  for  future  consideration. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  R.  MALLORY,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Views  of  Attorney-General  Davis  : 

CHARLOTTE,  N.  C.,  22d  April,  1865. 
To  the  President. 

SIR  :  The  questions  submitted  by  you  to  the  members  of  your  Cabinet  for 
their  opinions  are : 

1.  Whether  the  convention  agreed  upon  on  the  18th  inst,  by  and  between 
General  Johnston,  commanding  the  Confederate  forces,  and  Major-General 
Sherman,  commanding  the  forces  of  the  United  States,  in  North  Carolina, 
should  be  ratified  by  you. 

2.  If  so,  in  what  way  should  it  be  done. 

The  terms  of  that  convention  are  substantially  as  follows : 

That  the  armies  of  the  Confederate  States  shall  be  disbanded  and  their 
arms  surrendered. 

That  the  several  State  Governments  shall  be  recognized  by  the  Executive 
of  the  United  States,  upon  their  officers  and  legislatures  taking  the  oaths 
prescribed  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  where  there  are  con 
flicting  State  Governments  the  question  to  be  referred  to  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court. 

That  all  political  rights  and  franchises,  and  all  rights  of  person  and  prop 
erty,  shall  be  respected  and  guaranteed. 

That  a  general  amnesty  be  granted,  and  no  citizen  be  molested  in  person 
or  property  for  any  acts  done  in  aid  of  the  Confederate  States  in  the  prosecu 
tion  of  the  war. 

Taken  as  a  whole  the  convention  amounts  to  this,  that  the  States  of  the 
Confederacy  shall  reenter  the  old  Union  upon  the  same  footing  on  which  they 
stood  before  seceding  from  it. 

These  States  having,  in  their  several  conventions,  solemnly  asserted  their 
sovereignty  and  right  of  self-government,  and  having  established  for  them 
selves,  and  maintained  through  four  years  of  bloody  war  a  government  of 
their  own  choosing,  no  loyal  citizen  can  consent  to  its  abandonment  and 


256       JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

destruction  as  long  as  there  remains  a  reasonable  hope  of  successful  resistance 
to  the  arms  of  the  United  States. 

The  question,  therefore,  whether  the  terms  of  the  military  convention 
should  be  accepted  will  depend  upon  whether  the  Confederate  States  are  in  a 
condition  further  to  prosecute  the  war  with  a  reasonable  hope  of  success,  and 
this  question  will  be  answered  by  a  brief  review  of  our  military  situation. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  for  four  years  the  pride  and  boast  of  the 
Confederacy,  under  the  lead  of  the  General-in-Chief,  whose  name  we  have 
been  accustomed  to  associate  with  victory,  after  having  been  defeated  and 
reduced  to  a  mere  remnant  by  straggling  and  desertion,  has  capitulated  to 
the  enemy.  All  who  were  not  embraced  in  the  capitulation  have  thrown 
away  their  arms  and  disbanded  beyond  any  hope  of  reorganization. 

Our  only  other  army  east  of  the  Mississippi,  the  Army  of  Tennessee,  con 
tains  now  about  thirteen  thousand  effective  men,  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and 
is  daily  melting  away  by  desertion.  It  is  confronted  by  one  of  the  best  armies 
of  the  United  States,  fifty  thousand  strong.  Manifestly  it  can  not  fight,  and 
if  it  retreats,  the  chances  are  more  than  equal  that,  like  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  it  will  dissolve,  and  the  remnant  be  forced  to  capitulate.  If  it 
should  retreat  successfully,  and  offer  itself  as  a  nucleus  for  reorganization,  it 
can  not  be  recruited.  Volunteering  is  long  since  at  an  end,  and  conscription 
has  exhausted  all  its  force.  East  of  the  Mississippi,  scattered  through  all  the 
States,  we  have  now  about  forty  thousand  organized  troops.  To  oppose  these 
the  enemy  have  more  than  two  hundred  thousand.  Persevering  efforts  for 
many  months  past  have  failed  to  overcome  the  obstacle  to  the  removal  of 
troops  from  the  west  to  the  east  of  the  Mississippi.  We  can,  therefore,  look 
for  no  accession  of  strength  from  that  quarter.  If  a  returning  sense  of  duty 
and  patriotism  should  bring  back  the  stragglers  and  deserters  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  form  a  respectable  army,  we  have  not  the  means  of  arming  them. 
Our  supply  of  arms  is  very  nearly  exhausted,  our  means  of  manufacturing 
substantially  at  an  end,  and  the  blockade  of  our  ports  prevents  their  intro 
duction  from  abroad,  except  in  small  quantities,  and  at  remote  points.  In 
view  of  these  facts  our  two  generals  highest  in  command  in  the  field  have 
expressed  in  decided  terms  our  inability  longer  to  continue  the  struggle. 
Observation  has  satisfied  me  that  the  States  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina 
are  finally  lost  to  our  cause.  The  people  of  the  latter  are  utterly  weary  of 
the  war,  broken  and  despairing  in  spirit,  and  eager  to  accept  terms  far  less 
liberal  than  the  convention  proposes.  In  the  absence  of  a  general  arrange 
ment  they  will  certainly  make  terms  for  themselves.  Abandoned  by  our 
armies,  the  people  of  Virgina  will  follow  their  example,  and  it  will  be  im 
possible  to  arrest  the  process  of  disintegration  thus  begun. 

This  melancholy  array  of  facts  leaves  open  but  one  conclusion.  I  am 
unhesitatingly  of  the  opinion  that  the  convention  ought  to  be  ratified. 

As  to  the  proper  mode  of  ratification,  greater  doubt  may  be  reasonably  enter 
tained.  The  Confederate  Government  is  but  the  agent  of  the  States,  and  as 
its  chief  executive  you  can  rot,  according  to  our  governmental  theory,  bind 


JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS.       257 

the  States  to  a  government  which  they  have  not  adopted  for  themselves. 
Nor  can  you  rightfully,  without  their  consent,  dissolve  the  government  which 
they  have  established.  But  there  are  circumstances  so  desperate  as  to  over 
ride  all  constitutional  theories,  and  such  are  those  which  are  pressing  upon 
us  now.  The  Government  of  the  Confederate  States  is  no  longer  potent  for 
good.  Exhausted  by  war  in  all  its  resources  to  such  a  degree  that  it  can  no 
longer  offer  a  respectable  show  of  resistance  to  its  enemies,  it  is  already 
virtually  destroyed.  And  the  chief  duty  left  for  you  to  peform  is  to  provide 
as  far  as  possible  for  the  speedy  delivery  of  the  people  from  the  horrors  of  war 
and  anarchy. 

I  therefore  respectfully  advise  that  upon  the  ratification  of  the  convention 
by  the  Executive  of  the  United  States,  you  issue  your  proclamation,  plainly 
setting  forth  the  circumstances  which  have  induced  you  to  assent  to  the  terms 
proposed,  disbanding  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy,  resigning  your  office  as 
chief  magistrate,  and  recommending  to  the  people  of  the  States  that  they 
assemble  in  convention  and  carry  into  effect  the  terms  agreed  on. 

GEORGE  DAVIS. 

Views  of  Mr.  Breckin ridge,  Secretary  of  War: 

CHARLOTTE,  N.  C.,  April  23,  1865. 
To  His  Excellency  the  President. 

SIR:  In  obedience  to  your  request  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  my  advice  as 
to  the  course  you  should  take  upon  the  memorandum  or  basis  of  agreement 
made  on  the  18th  inst.  by  and  between  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  of  the  Con 
federate  States  Army,  and  Major-General  W.  T.  Sherman,  of  the  United  States 
Army,  provided  that  paper  shall  receive  the  approval  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States. 

The  principal  army  of  the  Confederacy  was  recently  lost  in  Virginia. 
Considerable  bodies  of  troops  not  attached  to  that  army  have  either  dis 
banded  or  marched  toward  their  homes,  accompanied  by  many  of  their 
officers.  Five  days  ago  the  effective  force,  in  infantry  and  artillery,  of  General 
Johnston's  army  was  but  fourteen  thousand  seven  hundred  and  seventy  men, 
and  it  continues  to  diminish.  That  officer  thinks  it  wholly  impossible  for 
him  to  make  any  head  against  the  overwhelming  forces  of  the  enemy.  Our 
ports  are  closed,  and  the  sources  of  foreign  supply  lost  to  us.  The  enemy 
occupy  all  or  the  greater  part  of  Missouri,  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Virginia, 
and  North  Carolina,  and  move  almost  at  will  through  the  other  States  to  the 
east  of  the  Mississippi. 

They  have  recently  taken  Selma,  Montgomery,  Columbus,  Macon,  and 
other  important  towns,  depriving  us  of  large  depots  of  supplies  and  of  muni 
tions  of  war.  Of  the  small  force  still  at  command,  many  are  unarmed,  and 
the  Ordnance  Department  can  not  furnish  five  thousand  stand  of  small  arms. 

I  do  not  think  it  would  be  possible  to  assemble,  equip,  and  maintain  an 
army  of  thirty  thousand  men  at  any  point  east  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
17 


258        JEFF.  DAVIS'  CABINET  ON  SHERMAN'S  TERMS. 

The  contest,  if  continued  after  this  paper  is  rejected,  will  be  likely  to  lose 
entirely  the  dignity  of  regular  warfare,  many  of  the  States  will  make  such 
terms  as  they  may,  in  others  separate  and  ineffective  hostilities  may  be  prose 
cuted,  while  the  war,  wherever  waged,  will  probably  degenerate  into  that 
irregular  and  secondary  stage  out  of  which  greater  evils  will  flow  to  the  South 
than  to  the  enemy. 

For  these  and  for  other  reasons  which  need  not  now  be  stated,  I  think  we 
can  no  longer  contend  with  a  reasonable  hope  of  success. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  time  has  arrived  when,  in  a  large  and  clear  view  of 
the  situation,  prompt  steps  should  be  taken  to  put  an  end  to  the  war. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  agreement  of  the  18th  inst.  contains  certain  stipula 
tions  which  you  can  not  perform. 

This  is  true,  and  it  was  well  understood  by  General  Sherman  that 
only  a  part  could  be  executed  by  the  Confederate  authorities.  In  any 
view  of  the  case  grave  responsibilities  must  be  met  and  assumed.  If  the 
necessity  for  peace  be  conceded,  corresponding  action  must  be  taken.  The 
mode  of  negotiation  which  we  deem  regular  and  would  prefer  is  imprac 
ticable. 

The  situation  is  anomalous  and  can  not  be  solved  upon  principles  of  theo 
retical  exactitude. 

In  my  opinion  you  are  the  only  person  who  can  meet  the  present 
necessities. 

I  respectfully  advise : 

1.  That  you  execute,  so  far  as  you  can,  the  second  article  in  the  agreement 
of  the  18th  inst. 

2.  That  you  recommend  to  the  several  States  the  acceptance  of  those  parts 
of  the  agreement  upon  which  they  alone  can  act. 

3.  Having  maintained,  with  faithful  and  intrepid  purpose,  the  cause  of  the 
Confederate  States  while  the  means  of  organized  resistance  remained,  that 
you  return  to  the  States  and  the  people  the  trust  which  you  are  no  longer  able 
to  defend. 

Whatever  course  you  pursue  opinions  will  be  divided.  Permit  me  to  give 
mine.  Should  these  or  similar  views  accord  with  your  own,  I  think  the 
better  judgment  will  be  that  you  can  have  no  higher  title  to  the  gratitude  of 
your  countrymen  and  the  respect  of  mankind  than  will  spring  from  the  wis 
dom  to  see  the  path  of  duty  at  this  time,  and  the  courage  to  follow  it,  regardless 
alike  of  praise  or  blame. 

Respectfully  and  truly  your  friend, 

JOHN  C.  BRECKINEIDGE,  Secretary  of  War. 

General  Sherman  deserves  thanks  for  bringing  to  light  the 
above  interesting  and  valuable  historical  papers. 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

SNEERS  AT  THE    STAFF — THE   CONTROVERSY  WITH   THE  WAR 
DEPARTMENT  OVER  THE  CONTROL  OF  THE  STAFF  CORPS. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN,  in  his  last  chapter  discusses  at  consid 
erable  length  the  same  issues  which  he  raised  with  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  the  statute  law,  when  he  assumed  the  duties  of 
general  and  promulgated  an  order  assigning  all  officials  in  the 
War  Department,  except  the  Secretary  himself,  and  possibly 
his  chief  clerk,  to  duty  on  his  staff.  In  his  treatment  of  this 
question  he  indulges  in  many  undignified  sneers  at  staff  officers. 
For  example : 

"The  subordinates  of  these  staff-corps  and  departments  are  selected  and 
chosen  from  the  army  itself,  or  fresh  from  West  Point,  and  too  commonly 
construe  themselves  into  the  tlite,  as  made  of  better  clay  than  the  common 
soldier.  Thus  they  separate  themselves  more  and  more  from  their  comrades 
of  the  line,  and  in  process  of  time  realize  the  condition  of  that  old  officer  of 
artillery,  who  thought  the  army  would  be  a  delightful  place  for  a  gentleman 

if  it  were  not  for  the  d d  soldier;  or,  better  still,  the  conclusion  of  the 

young  lord  in  'Henry  IV.,'  who  told  Harry  Percy  (Hotspur)  that  'but  for 
these  vile  guns  he  would  himself  have  been  a  soldier.'  This  is  all  wrong ; 
utterly  at  variance  with  our  democratic  form  of  government  and  of  universal 
experience;  and  now  that  the  French,  from  whom  we  had  copied  the  system, 
have  utterly  'prescribed'  it,  I  hope  that  our  Congress  will  follow  suit." 

General  Sherman's  own  military  history,  however,  will 
show  that  it  was  not  until  he  attained  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general  that  his  antipathy  to  staff  duty  began.  But  from  that 
time  forward  it  has  been  marked.  Even  the  large  body  of 
staff  officers  in  his  own  army,  who,  on  the  Atlanta  campaign, 
had  been  continuously  on  duty  and  most  of  the  time  under 

(259) 


260  SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF. 

fire  from  May  till  September,  did  not  escape  being  made  to 
feel  this  prejudice. 

While  the  army  was  moving  from  Atlanta  on  Hood,  who 
had  passed  to  its  rear,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Warner,  inspector- 
general  on  the  staff,  was  appointed  by  the  Governor  of  Ohio 
to  the  command  of  one  of  the  new  regiments  from  that  State. 
Whereupon  General  Sherman  issued  the  following  order: 

[Special  Field  Orders  No.  98.] 

HEADQUARTERS  MILITARY  DIVISION  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
IN  THE  FIELD,  SUMMERVILLE,  GA.,  October  19,  1864.      J 

1st.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Willard  Warner,  acting  Inspector-General  on  the 
staff  of  this  military  division,  having  been  appointed  colonel  of  the  One- 
Hundred  and  Eightieth  Ohio,  is  hereby  relieved  from  duty  at  these  headquar 
ters,  and  will  proceed  to  Nashville  and  assume  command  of  his  new  regiment. 

2d.  The  General  commanding  thanks  Colonel  Warner  for  his  most  zealous 
and  intelligent  service  during  the  past  campaign,  compliments  him  on  his 
good  sense  in  preferring  service  with  troops  to  staff'  duty,  and  predicts  for  him 
the  highest  success  in  his  professional  career. 

By  order  of  Major- General  W.  T.  SHERMAN. 

Colonel  Warner  was  an  able  and  gallant  officer.  As  lieu 
tenant-colonel  of  an  Ohio  regiment,  he  was  detailed  for  duty 
on  the  staff  of  General  Sherman,  and  afterward,  upon  being 
appointed  to  a  colonelcy,  he  naturally  desired  to  assume  com 
mand  of  his  regiment.  Certainly  there  were  very  few,  if  any, 
of  the  hundreds  of  staff  officers  serving  with  General  Sher 
man  who  would  not  gladly  have  exchanged  places  with 
Colonel  Warner.  They  were  for  the  most  part,  men  who 
had  volunteered  for  the  war  without  stopping  to  bargain  for 
place  or  power,  and  accepted  their  staff  positions  and  obeyed 
the  orders  detailing  them  for  such  duty  as  they  would  have 
obeyed  any  other  military  orders  they  might  have  received. 
It  was  a  fact  universally  recognized  that  promotion  came 
chiefly  from  the  line,  and  none  of  them,  with  the  same  oppor 
tunity,  would  have  failed  to  follow  Colonel  Warner's  example. 

In  the  nature  of  things  it  was  impossible  for  many  of  them 
to  receive  such  promotion  in  the  line  as  would  justify  them  in 
asking  to  be  relieved  from  staff  duty,  and  under  the  circum- 


SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF.  261 

stances,  General  Sherman's  order  was  to  these  officers  both  a 
cruel  wrong  and  a  gratuitous  insult. 

But  if  General  Sherman  in  writing  his  final  chapter  had 
remembered  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  opening  of  his  book,  he 
might  have  tempered  his  language  in  regard  to  staff  service. 

The  Memoirs  begin  with  the  information  that  in  the  Spring  of 
1846  he  was  first-lieutenant  in  the  Third  Artillery,  and  present 
with  his  company  at  Fort  Moultrie,  South  Carolina.  In  April 
of  the  same  year  he  was  detailed  for  recruiting  service.  In 
June  he  was  ordered  to  California  with  Company  F  of  his  regi 
ment,  and  assigned  to  staff  duty  as  quartermaster  and  commis 
sary.  In  March,  1847,  he  returned  to  company  duty.  The 
next  month  (April)  he  was  assigned  as  aid-de-camp  to  Gen 
eral  Kearney.  In  May  General  Kearney  left  California,  and 
Lieutenant  Sherman  became  acting  assistant  adjutant-general 
on  the  staff  of  Colonel  R.  B.  Mason.  In  February,  1849, 
he  was  relieved  from  this  service  and  assigned  in  the  same 
capacity  to  the  staff  of  General  Persifer  F.  Smith.  While 
thus  acting  his  duties  were  changed  to  those  of  aid-de-camp 
on  the  same  staff,  in  which  capacity  he  continued  to  act  until 
September,  1850,  when  he  rejoined  his  company  in  St.  Louis 
with  the  assurance  that  he  would  soon  receive  a  regular  staff 
appointment.  This  promise  was  soon  after  fulfilled,  and  on 
the  27th  of  the  same  month  he  was  appointed  captain  and 
commissary  of  subsistence  in  the  regular  army.  This  position, 
he  hold  until  his  resignation  some  three  years  after,  Sep 
tember  6th,  1853,  having  thus  completed  an  almost  unbroken 
record  of  seven  years7  service  as  an  officer  of  the  staff. 

And  when,  after  the  hesitation  about  reentering  the  army 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  which  he  details  at  length,  he 
finally  decided  to  take  part  in  the  struggle,  he  applied  for 
staff  duty  again,  as  is  plain  from  the  close  of  the  letter  in 
which  he  tendered  his  services.  "Should  they  be  needed," 
he  writes  May  8,  1861,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  "the  records 
of  the  War  Department  will  enable  you  to  designate  the  sta 
tion  in  which  I  can  render  the  most  service."  As  these 


262  SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF. 

records  for  seven  preceding  years  of  his  former  army  duty 
pertained  mainly  to  varied  staff  service,  the  intent  of  the 
application  is  manifest. 

However,  he  was  made  colonel  of  the  Thirteenth  Infantry, 
and  this  was  his  "  new  regiment."  But,  instead  of  following 
Colonel  Warner's  example,  who  went  from  inspector  on  the 
staff  to  the  command  of  a  regiment,  he  reversed  it,  and  with 
his  colonel's  commission  in  his  pocket  passed  to  duty  as 
inspector  on  the  staff  of  General  Scott,  and  this  duty  con 
tinued  until  he  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  a  brigade 
some  weeks  later.  From  this  time  forward  he  "had  the  good 
sense  to  prefer  service  with  troops  to  staff  duty." 

In  this  last  chapter  General  Sherman  argues  that  military 
correspondence  with  higher  officials  should  pass  through  the 
hands  of  the  intermediate  generals,  in  order  that  they  may 
never  be  ignorant  of  any  thing  that  concerns  their  command. 
This  has  always  been  considered  sound  doctrine  in  the  army, 
and  yet  General  Sherman's  records  show  that  he  constantly 
corresponded  directly  with  General  Halleck,  on  matters  inti 
mately  affecting  the  whole  army,  without  sending  the  letters 
through  his  own  superiors.  Now  he  Avrites  :  "  I  don't  believe 
in  a  chief-of-staff  at  all."  But  up  to  the  18th  of  April,  1865, 
he  sustained  most  intimate,  cordial,  and  confidential  relations 
with  General  Halleck  as  chief-of-staff,  and  on  that  date,  as 
has  been  seen,  wrote,  asking  him  to  influence  the  President, 
"  if  possible,  not  to  vary  the  first  terms  made  with  Johnston  at 
all."  So  close  were  these  relations  as  to  suggest  the  idea  that 
his  present  non-belief  in  a  chief-of-staff  dates  from  a  few  days 
later,  when,  in  addressing  General  Grant  after  his  terms  had 
been  rejected,  he  wrote : 

"It  now  becomes  my  duty  to  paint  in  justly  severe  characters  the  still  more 
offensive  and  dangerous  matter  of  General  Halleck's  dispatch  of  April  26th 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  embodied  in  his  to  General  Dix  of  April  27th." 

Out  of  the  circumstances  attending  the  rejection  of  the 
Johnston-Reagan  terms,  grew  the  controversy  with  the  Secre- 


SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF.  263 

tary  of  War  over  the  relative  rights  and  powers  of  this  officer 
and  those  of  the  General  of  the  Army,  which  subject  is  dis 
cussed  at  some  length  in  the  Memoirs. 

Ever  since  Secretary  Stanton's  fearless  performance  of  duty 
in  connection  with  the  political  features  of  Johnston's  surren 
der,  General  Sherman  has  maintained  that  this  officer  was  a 
mere  clerk,  and  in  his  last  chapter  he  contends  that  the  Gen 
eral  of  the  Army  should  have  command  of  all  the  heads  of 
staff-corps,  and  that  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  should 
command  the  army  through  the  general.  What  he  leaves 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  is  thus  described  :  "  Of  course,  the 
Secretary  would,  as  now,  distribute  the  funds  according  to 
the  appropriation  bills,  and  reserve  to  himself  the  absolute 
control  and  supervision  of  the  larger  arsenals  and  depots  of 
supply." 

And  while  he  declares  that  the  law  or  its  judicial  interpre 
tation  is  against  the  right  for  which  he  contends,  the  removal 
of  army  headquarters  to  St.  Louis  resulted  in  great  degree 
from  the  fact  that  when  he  became  general  he  could  not 
bring  himself  to  conform  to  this  law.  The  history  of  this 
controversy  is  pertinent  to  his  present  discussion  of  the  organ 
ization  and  control  of  the  staff-corps. 

One  of  his  first  official  acts,  when  made  General  of  the 
Army,  was  to  issue  an  order  reducing  the  Secretary  of  War  to 
the  position  which  he  had  frequently  before  with  great  em 
phasis  assigned  him,  namely,  that  of  a  mere  clerk. 

The  preliminary  order  to  effect  this  he  obtained  from  the 
President.  It  was  as  follows : 

[General  Orders  No.  11.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,      ) 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  WASHINGTON,  March  8,  1869. j 

The  following  orders  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  are  published 
for  the  information  and  government  of  all  concerned: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,      ) 
WASHINGTON  CITY,  March  5,  1869.  j 

By  direction  of  the  President  General  William  T.  Sherman  will  assume 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 


264  SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF. 

The  Chiefs  of  Staff  Corps,  Departments,  and  Bureaus  will  report  to  and  act 
under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  General  commanding  the  Army. 

All  official  business,  which  by  law  or  regulations  requires  the  action  of 
the  President  or  the  Secretary  of  War,  will  be  submitted  by  the  General  of 
the  Army  to  the  Secretary  of  War;  and,  in  general,  all  orders  from  the  Pres 
ident  or  Secretary  of  War  to  any  portion  of  the  army,  line,  or  staff,  will  be 
transmitted  through  the  General  of  the  Army. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Secretary  of  War. 

By  command  of  the  General  of  the  Army. 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

General  Schofield,  who  expected  to  retire  in  a  few  days, 
did  not  care  to  make  issue  upon  it,  and  contented  himself 
with  pointing  out  that  it  violated  or  contravened  some 
twenty-six  express  provisions  of  statute  law,  or  regulations 
having  the  force  of  law.  Based  upon  the  above  order  Gen 
eral  Sherman  issued  the  following: 

[General  Orders  No.  12.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,      ) 
ADJUTANT-GENERAI/S  OFFICE,WASHJNGTON,  March  8, 1869.  J 

By  direction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  undersigned  hereby 
assumes  command  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States.  His  general  staff 
will  be : 

Brevet  Major-General  E.  D.  Townsend,  Adjutant-General. 

Brevet  Major-General  E.  B.  Marcy,  Inspector-General. 

Brevet  Major-General  M.  C.  Meigs,  Quartermaster-General. 

Brevet  Major-General  A.  B.  Eaton,  Commissary-General  Subsistence. 

Brevet  Major-General  J.  K.  Barnes,  Surgeon-General. 

Brevet  Major-General  B.  W.  Brice,  Pay  master- General. 

Brevet  Major-General  Joseph  Holt,  Judge  Advocate-General. 

Brevet  Major-General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  Chief  of  Engineers. 

Brevet  Major-General  A.  B.  Dyer,  Chief  of  Ordnance. 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  A.  J.  Myer,  Chief  Signal  Officer. 

His  personal  staff,  Aids-de-Camp  with  the  rank  of  Colonel  from  this  date, 
will  be : 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  C.  McCoy,  Second  Lieutenant,  Second  In 
fantry. 

Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  L.  M.  Dayton,  Captain,  Seventh  Cavalry. 
Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  C.  Audenried,  Captain,  Sixth  Cavalry. 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  C.  B.  Comstock,  Major,  Corps  of  Engineers. 
Brevet  Brigadier-General  Horace  Porter,  Major,  Ordnance  Department. 


SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF.  265 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  F.  T.  Dent,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  Thirty-third 
Infantry. 

II.  Generals  commanding  military  departments,  in  addition  to  the  duties 
heretofore  required  of  them,  will  give  their  special  atttention  to  the  econom 
ical  administration  of  all  brandies  of  the  service  within  their  command, 
whether  of  the  line  or  staff',  and  to  this  end  will   exercise  supervision   and 
command   of   every   part  t>f    the    army   within    their   limits   not   specially 
excepted. 

III.  The  military  academy,  general  depots  of  supply,  arsenals  of  con 
struction,  permanent  forts  in  process  of  construction  or  extensive  repairs, 
general  recruiting  depots,  and  officers  employed  on  duties  not  military,  are 
excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  foregoing  paragraph. 

IV.  All  orders  and  general  instructions  to  the  troops,  or  to  staff  officers 
serving  in  military  departments,  must  go  from  the  headquarters  of  the  army 
through  the  Adjutant-General's  office,  and  through  the  Generals  commanding 
the  military  divisions  and  departments  in  which  the  officers  are  serving;  but 
ordinary  correspondence  relating  to  the  details  of  execution  may  be  carried 
on  between  the  parties  concerned  and  the  heads  of  the  staff  department  or 
corps  charged  with  their  execution.  -yy   T.  SHERMAN,  General. 

On  the  13th  of  March  General  Rawlins  assumed  the  duties 
of  Secretary  of  War,  and  among  his  first  acts  he  called  the 
attention  of  the  President  to  the  various  violations  of  law  in 
volved  in  Sherman's  order  These  were  too  plain  to  admit 
either  of  doubt  or  extended  discussion,  and  the  following 
order  was  issued  by  direction  of  the  President,  revoking  those 
printed  above: 

[General  Orders  No.  28.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,      ) 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S   OFFICE,  WASHINGTON,  March  27,1869.) 

The  following  orders,  received  from  the  War  Department,  are  published 

for  the  government  of  all  concerned : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,      j 
WASHINGTON  CITY,  March  26,  1869.  } 

By  direction  of  the  President,  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated  War 
Department,  March  5,  1869,  and  published  in  General  Orders  £so.  11,  Head 
quarters  of  the  Army,  Adjutant-General's  office,  dated  March  8,  1869,  except 
so  much  as  directs  General  W.  T.  Sherman  to  "  assume  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  United  States,"  is  hereby  rescinded. 

All  official  business  which,  by  law  or  regulations,  requires  the  action  of  the 
President  or  Secretary  of  War,  will  be  submitted  by  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  Corps, 
Departments,  and  Bureaus,  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

All  orders  and  instructions  relating  to  military  operations,  issued  by  the 


266  SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF. 

President  or  Secretary  of  "War,  will  be  issued  through  the  General  of  the 
Army.  JOHN  A.  RAWLINS,  Secretary  of  War. 

By  command  of  General  SHERMAN. 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

The  violations  of  law  in  General  Sherman's  Order  No.  12, 
can  be  readily  made  to  appear.  The  act  of  July  25,  1866, 
reviving  the  grade  of  General,  authorized  him,  "under  the 
direction  and  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President,  to  com 
mand  the  .armies  of  the  United  States."  The  same  act  author 
ized  him  to  select  "for  service  upon  his  staff  such  number  of 
aids,  not  exceeding  six,  as  he  may  judge  proper,"  and  the  act 
of  July  28,  three  days  later,  provided  that  "there  shall  be  one 
General  *  *  entitled  to  the  same  staff  officers, 

in  number  and  grade,  as  now  provided  by  law."  The  law 
provided  only  six;  Sherman's  order  assigned  sixteen — an 
excess  of  ten;  and  more  than  this,  each  of  the  ten  was,  by  law, 
directly  under  the  Secretary  of  War. 

But  before  following  this  branch  of  the  subject  to  its 
conclusion,  it  will  be  well  to  present  in  brief  some  of  the 
decisions  upon  the  relations  of  the  President  as  commander- 
in-chief  under  the  Constitution,  and  those  of  the  Secretary  of 
"War  to  the  army : 

"By  the  Constitution  the  President  is  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States.  The  departments  of  war  and  of  the 
navy  are  the  channels  through  which  his  orders  proceed  to  them  respectively, 
and  the  secretaries  of  these  departments  are  the  organs  by  which  he  makes 
his  will  known  to  them.  The  orders  issued  by  those  officers  are,  in  the  con 
templation  of  the  law,  not  their  orders,  but  the  orders  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States.— [1  Opinions,  380. 

By  the  act  of  August  7,  1789,  establishing  the  War  Depart 
ment,  the  duties  of  the  Secretary  of  War  are  thus  denned: 

"There  shall  be  an  Executive  Department,  to  be  denominated  the  Depart 
ment  of  War,  and  there  shall  be  a  principal  officer  therein  to  be  called  the 
Secretary  for  the  Department  of  War,  who  shall  perform  and  execute  such 
duties  as  shall  from  time  to  time  be  enjoined  on  or  intrusted  to  him  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  agreeable  to  the  Constitution  relative  to  mili 
tary  commissions,  or  to  the  land  or  naval  forces,  ships  or  warlike  stores  of  the 


SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF.  267 

United  States,  or  to  such  other  matters  respecting  military  or  naval  affairs  as 
the  President  of  the  United  States  shall  assign  to  the  said  department." 

Subsequently,  upon  the  establishment  of  a  Navy  Depart 
ment,  the  supervision  of  naval  affairs  was  withdrawn  from  the 
War  Department. 

"The  Secretary  of  War  is  'The  regularly  constituted  organ  of  the  Presi 
dent  for  the  administration  of  the  military  establishment  of  the  nation,  and 
rules  and  orders  publicly  promulgated  through  him  must  be  received  as  the 
acts  of  the  Executive,  and  as  such  be  binding  upon  all  within  the  sphere  of 
his  legal  and  constitutional  authority.' — [U.  S.  vs.  Eliason,  16  Peters,  291. 

"  The  War  Department  has  a  staff  officer,  the  Adjutant-General,  through 
whom  the  Secretary,  in  behalf  of  the  President,  that  is,  the  President,  speaks 
when  he  sees  fit,  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  army." — [7  Opinions,  473. 

And  yet  General  Sherman,  in  the  first  line  of  his  assign 
ments,  boldly  invaded  the  official  household  of  the  President, 
his  military  superior,  and  ordered  the  chief  staff  officer  there 
to  report  to  him  at  the  headquarters  of  the  army.  This  did 
not  differ,  in  any  material  respect,  from  what  General  Sheridan 
or  any  other  general  officer  would  be  guilty  of  in  issuing  an 
order  directing  staff  officers  to  report  to  him,  who,  by  express 
provision  of  law,  had  been  placed  under  the  General  of  the 
Army. 

The  Quartermaster  and  Commissary  Departments  are  placed 
by  law  directly  under  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  yet  General 
Sherman  attached  them  both  to  his  staff,  and  assumed  that 
they  were  under  his  direction.  The  law  regulating  their 
duties  reads  as  follows : 

"In  addition  to  their  duties  in  the  field,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Quarter 
master-General,  his  deputies,  and  assistant  deputies,  when  thereto  directed  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  to  purchase  military  stores,  camp  equipage,  and  other 
articles  requisite  for  the  troops,  and  generally  to  procure  and  provide  means  of 
transport  for  the  army,  its  stores,  artillery,  and  camp  equipage. — [Act  March 
28,  1812. 

"Supplies  for  the  army,  unless  in  particular  and  urgent  cases  the  Secretary 
of  War  should  otherwise  direct,  shall  be  purchased  by  contract,  to  be  made 
by  the  Commissary-General  *  *  *  *  under  such  regulations  as 
the  Secretary  of  War  may  direct."— [April  14,  1818. 


268  SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF. 

These  officers  are  also  severally  directed  by  law  to  make 
their  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  And  none  of  these 
acts  were  changed  when  the  grade  of  General  was  revived. 

By  another  section  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  Quartermaster- 
General,  "  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,"  to 
receive  and  distribute  all  clothing  and  camp  and  garrison 
equipage,  and,  "  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  "War," 
to  enforce  a  system  of  accountability  for  the  same. 

In  the  same  manner  the  Surgeon-General  by  law  performs 
his  duties  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and, 
in  short,  the  whole  general  staff  is,  by  law,  governed  by  regu 
lations  which  the  Secretary  of  War  is,  by  direct  statute  pro 
vision,  obliged  to  make. 

By  the  law  creating  it,  the  Bureau  of  Military  Justice  was 
"attached  to  and  made  a  part  of  the  War  Department." 

Paragraph  1,063  of  Revised  Army  Regulations,  which  were 
enacted  by  Congress  into  law,  reads  as  follows : 

"The  Signal  Officer  shall  have  charge,  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  of  all  signal  duty,  and  of  all  books,  papers,  and  apparatus  connected 
therewith." 

The  following  extracts  from  regulations,  taken  from  many 
similar  provisions,  show  clearly  that  Congress  placed  the  gen 
eral  staff  under  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  these  regulations 
have  been  recognized  by  Congress  since  the  office  of  General 
was  established  : 

"Paragraph  1,010.  The  Chief  of  such  Military  Bureau  in  the  War 
Department  shall,  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  regulate,  as 
far  as  practicable,  the  employment  of  hired  persons  required  by  the  adminis 
trative  service  of  his  department. 

"  Paragraph  1,043.  Chiefs  of  the  Disbursing  Department  shall,  under  the 
direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  designate  where  principal  contracts  shall 
be  made,  etc." 

Paragraph  1,197  makes  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  necessary  to  rules  which  the  Surgeon-General  may  pre 
scribe  for  supplying  hospitals. 


SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF.  269 

By  various  paragraphs  of  regulations  the  Paymaster-General 
is  directed  to  report  to  the  Adjutant-General,  the  legal  staff 
officer  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"  Paragraph  1,360.  The  Chief  Engineer,  with  the  approbation  of  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  will  regulate  and  determine  the  number,  quality,  form,  and 
dimensions  of  the  necessary  vehicles,  pontoons,  tools,  etc." 

By  paragraphs  1,377,  1,378,  1,379,  all  the  operations  of 
the  Ordnance  Department  are  placed  under  the  Secretary 
of  War. 

The  officers  of  the  Engineer  Corps  are  placed  under  the 
sole  direction  of  the  President. 

These  various  citations  are  quite  sufficient  to  prove  that  the 
theory  of  Congress  in  all  its  legislation  relating  to  army 
organization  has  been,  that  the  President  is  Commander-in- 
Chief,  while  the  Secretary  of  War  is  his  representative  at  the 
head  of  the  army,  and  his  organ  of  communication  with  it; 
that  the  Adjutant-General  is  the  staff  officer  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  that  is,  of  the  President;  and  that  the  chiefs  of  the 
various  staff  corps  form  the  general  staff  of  the  President,  and 
are  in  consequence  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Thus  it  will  be  readily  seen  that  Sherman's  order  contra 
vened,  or  directly  violated  the  laws  and  regulations  which 
have  the  full  force  of  law,  for  the  government  of  the  army. 
After  that  order  was  revoked,  and  his  attention  had  been  thus 
pointedly  called  to  the  law,  every  subsequent  protest  against 
it  was  unsoldierly,  and  in  short,  insubordination.  The  same 
conduct  in  any  officer  of  less  rank  would  not  have  been 
allowed  to  go  unpunished.  If  the  general  of  an  army  con 
stantly  frets  over  the  restraints  of  the  regulations,  what 
attention  can  he  rightfully  expect  to  be  paid  them  by  the 
army  at  large? 

Although  at  the  time  his  order  was  revoked,  he  was 
made  fully  acquainted  with  the  law,  a  few  months  later  he 
was  found  not  only  violating  it,  but  reporting  and  defending 
his  disregard  both  of  orders  and  the  law.  The  facts  upon 


270  SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF. 

which  this  statement  is  based  will  be  found  in  his  annual 
report  for  1869. 

General  Rawlins  died  September  6,  following  the  issuing 
of  General  Order,  No.  28,  given  above.  General  Sherman 
was  assigned  temporarily  to  the  desk  of  the  Secretary  of 
War.  The  following  paragraph  of  the  President's  order,  as 
given  above,  was  still  in  force : 

'By  direction  of  the  President,  *  *  *  *  all  official  business 
which,  by  law  or  regulations,  requires  the  action  of  the  President  or  the  Sec 
retary  of  War,  will  be  submitted  by  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  Corps,  Departments, 
and  Bureaus  to  the  Secretary  of  War." 

No  order  revoking  this  had  been  issued  by  the  President. 
General  Sherman  was  also  aware  that  this  order  had  been 
framed  solely  to  control  his  official  acts.  It  was  not  an  order 
that  he  would  for  a  moment  forget.  And  yet,  while  speaking 
in  his  annual  report  of  these  same  Chiefs  of  Staff  Corps,  Depart 
ments,  and  Bureaus,  General  Sherman  said: 

"The  heads  of  these  departments  reside  in  Washington,  and  submit 
annually  a  written  report  of  their  operations  for  the  past  year.  It  so  hap 
pened  that  I  was  Secretary  of  War  during  the  month  of  October,  when  by 
law  these  reports  were  made  in  order  to  reach  the  Public  Printer  by  the  first 
of  November,  and  I  required  all  the  annual  reports  to  be  addressed,  like  all 
other  military  reports,  to  the  Adjutant-General  for  the  perusal  of  the  General 
of  the  Army,  who  could  make  use  of  such  information  as  they  contained, 
and  then  lay  them  before  the  Secretary  of  War.  This  is,  in  my  judgment,  the 
course  that  should  always  be  pursued — though  a  different  one  has  heretofore 
prevailed — for  otherwise  we  would  have  the  absurdity  of  a  general  com 
manding  an  army  with  his  chief  staff  officer  reporting  to  somebody  else." 

A  little  further  on  in  the  same  paper  he  called  attention  to 
a  report  made  by  the  Military  Committee  of  the  House,  upon 
which,  however,  the  House  had  taken  no  action,  much  less 
Congress,  in  which  the  Committee  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  staif  corps  should  be  as  directly  under  the  control  of  the 
general  and  the  department  commanders  as  the  officers  of  the 
line.  He  then  added:  "I  heartily  concur  in  these  views,  and, 
so  far  as  my  authority  goes,  will  carry  them  out."  And  this 


SNEERS  AT  THE  STAFF.  271 

in  a  formal  report,  after  he  had  been  expressly  ordered  by  the 
President  not  to  carry  out  these  identical  views. 

Throughout  this  controversy  of  General  Sherman's  own 
raising  and  pressing,  there  was  no  attempt  by  the  War  Depart 
ment  to  assume  unlawful  authority  over  the  General  of  the 
Army,  nor  had  there  been  any  other  limitations  placed  upon 
his  power  than  the  law  imposes.  The  case  was  simply  this : 
The  Secretary  of  War  had  been  guided  by  the  law  as  it  exists. 
General  Sherman  had  constantly  protested  against  the  law  in 
the  case,  and,  so  far  as  he  could,  ignored  it.  The  whole  trouble 
on  his  side  was  this:  He  had  not  been  regarded  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief,  and  had  not  been  allowed  to  command  the 
army  as  such.  Instead  of  exercising  his  authority  under  the 
law  and  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  his  commission — 
that  is,  "under  the  direction  and  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
President,  to  command  the  armies  of  the  United  States" — he 
insisted  upon  being  allowed  to  exercise  that  authority  as  if 
both  law  and  commission  read,  "  under  the  direction  and 
according  to  the  pleasure  of  W.  T.  Sherman." 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


CHAPTER    XX. 

CONCLUSION — THE   CASE  AGAINST  THE  MEMOIRS  SUMMED  UP. 

IN  closing  this  review,  based  throughout  upon  facts  dis 
closed  by  the  official  files,  the  case  against  the  author  of  the 
Memoirs  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

Ten  years  after  the  close  of  the  war,  when  the  open,  and  all 
the  secret  official  records,  collected  and  arranged  for  ready 
reference,  were  at  his  service,  he  has  published  to  the  world  a 
story  of  his  campaigns,  crowded  with  inaccuracies,  and  stained 
with  injustice  done  associate  commanders  and  cooperating 
armies. 

The  kindly  years  which,  for  most  who  followed  the  flag, 
have  eifaced  whatever  jealousies  and  misunderstandings  arose 
in  the  field,  leaving  prominent  in  memory  only  the  central 
and  enduring  fact  of  common  service  in  a  worthy  cause,  seem 
to  have  exerted  no  such  influence  upon  him,  but  rather  acted 
as  mordants  to  fix  all  unpleasant  things  indelibly  upon  his 
pages.  By  following  the  statements  of  his  book,  and  com 
paring  them  with  the  records  of  the  same  events,  made  at  the 
time  of  their  occurrence,  and  often  by  his  own  hand,  many 
grave  diiferences  have  been  established. 

Where  the  Memoirs  give  the  credit  of  the  move  on  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson  to  Halleck,  the  records  show  that  it 
belongs  to  Grant.  Where  General  Sherman  argues  against 
the  idea  of  a  surprise  at  Shiloh,  the  records  prove  it  to  have 
been  complete,  and  due  mainly  to  his  own  blindness  and 
neglect.  Where  he  seeks  to  detract  from  the  service  rendered 
there  by  Buell  and  his  army,  the  records  set  that  service  in 
(272) 


CONCLUSION.  273 

clear  light.  While  he  intimates  that  Rosecrans  acted  dis 
creditably  at  luka  and  Corinth,  and  that  Grant  was  deeply 
offended  over  some  failure  or  blunder  not  clearly  defined,  the 
reports  of  the  latter  are  found  to  commend  Rosecrans  strongly 
for  these  brilliant  battles.  Where  he  now  visits  severe  cen 
sure,  in  connection  with  his  failure  at  Chick asaw  Bayou,  his 
own  report  of  the  action,  written  at  the  time,  commends  the 
very  officers,  thus  unjustly  arraigned,  for  having  done  the 
heaviest  fighting,  and  accomplished  all  that  was  possible. 
Where  he  assails  General  Sooy  Smith  for  causing  the  partial 
failure  of  his  Meridian  expedition,  his  own  orders,  then  issued, 
claimed  complete  success;  and  while  he  now  declares  he  never 
had  any  intention  of  going  to  Mobile,  the  letters  of  General 
Grant  (who  ordered  his  movement)  to  Halleck  and  Thomas, 
informed  these  officers  that  in  certain  contingencies  Sherman 
was  to  push  for  Mobile.  He  describes  Rosecrans'  flanking 
movement  to  capture  Chattanooga  as  a  march  from  that  city 
to  attack  the  enemy;  and  the  battle  which  secured  this  strong 
hold,  as  a  defeat  before  it,  and  its  occupation  after  the  battle 
as  a  retreat  into  it.  He  describes  the  terrible  condition  of 
affairs  in  Chattanooga,  following  the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
and  seeks  to  create  the  impression  that  Rosecrans  alone  was  in 
fault,  when  the  records  show  that  Burnside  failed  him  on  one 
flank  and  Sherman  on  the  other — this  too  after  the  pressing 
necessities  of  the  case  had  been  repeatedly  represented  to  them 
both — and  that  finally  Burnside  never  came,  and  Sherman 
himself  was  seven  weeks  behind  the  time  set  for  his  arrival  at 
Chattanooga,  exhibiting  no  special  activity  in  his  advance 
until  after  Rosecrans  was  removed,  when  suddenly,  under 
Grant's  request  to  come  on,  the  energy  of  his  movement  sur 
passed  praise.  While  he  states  that  Grant  was  afraid  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  could  not  be  drawn  out  of  its 
trenches  to  attack  Bragg,  and  wanted  Sherman's  men  to  come 
up  and  coax  them  into  fighting  by  the  power  of  their  example, 
the  records  show  that  Grant  had  confidence  enough  in 
Thomas'  army  to  order  it — before  Sherman  was  within  sup- 
18 


274  CONCLUSION. 

porting  distance  even — to  do  what  the  latter  afterward  failed 
to  perform;  and  further,  that  when  General  Thomas  insisted 
upon  giving  orders  for  an  attack  without  waiting  for  Sherman, 
who  was  still  delayed  with  the  greater  part  of  his  troops, 
Grant  assented,  and  Thomas  actually  accomplished  that  part 
of  the  battle  assigned  for  the  first  day,  before  Sherman  arrived; 
and  lastly,  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  stormed  and 
carried  the  whole  line  of  Missionary  Ridge  hours  before 
Sherman  even  received  the  news  of  the  great  success,  he 
alone,  of  the  three  army  commanders,  having  failed,  though 
after  splendid  fighting,  to  carry  the  point  assigned  to  him. 
While  he  contends  that  the  failure  to  bring  Johnston  to  bat 
tle  at  Resaca,  was  due  to  the  timidity  of  General  McPherson, 
the  records  show  that  this  officer  acted  exactly  in  accord 
ance  with  Sherman's  own  orders;  and  while  the  latter  claims 
that  from  the  outset  of  the  movement,  it  was  his  intention 
merely  to  feign  through  Buzzard  Roost  on  Dalton,  and  press 
the  bulk  of  the  army  through  Snake  Creek  Gap  on  Johnston's 
rear,  the  records  show  that  for  three  days  he  "  assaulted 
precipices"  in  front  of  Dalton,  with  Thomas7  and  Schofield's 
armies,  before  he  allowed  McPherson  to  make  more  than  a 
diverson  on  Johnston's  rear,  so  that  the  latter,  being  warned 
in  time,  withdrew  safely.  At  Kenesaw  he  assaulted  impreg 
nable  works  to  teach  his  veterans  that  flanking  was  not  the 
only  means  of  attacking  an  enemy,  and  failed  at  a  cost  of  two 
thousand  men,  claiming  now  that  Thomas,  McPherson,  and 
Schofield  agreed  with  him  that  the  assault  was  necessary,  when 
the  records  clearly  reveal  Thomas'  stern  dissatisfaction,  and  a 
bold  extension  to  the  right  by  Schofield,  which  plainly  indicates 
that  the  latter  looked  for  success  in  the  direction  from  which  it 
finally  came,  through  their  old  and  sure  method  of  flanking. 
He  describes  the  battle  before  Atlanta,  where  McPherson 
fell,  in  such  a  manner  that  no  reader  would  dream  of  its  being 
a  great  surprise,  and  well  nigh  serious  disaster;  but  the 
records  disclose  an  army,  plunged  by  the  flank  against  an 
enemy  in  position  behind  heavy  works,  on  the  supposition 


CONCLUSION.  275 

that  Atlanta  was  evacuated,  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  at 
tacked  by  the  enemy  upon  its  left  and  rear,  before  it  had 
ceased  to  exult  over  the  announcement  from  Sherman  that  the 
enemy  had  abandoned  Atlanta,  and  his  order  for  a  vigorous 
pursuit.  While  he  claims  that  he  originated  the  March  to  the 
Sea,  and  had  it  in  his  "mind's  eye"  by  the  21st  of  September, 
the  records  prove  that  Grant  had  planned  the  campaign  through 
to  Mobile  in  the  previous  January,  notified  Halleck  of  it  on 
the  loth  of  that  month,  Thomas  on  the  19th,  and  that  in 
February  Thomas  was  arranging  the  details  of  the  move  as 
far  as  Atlanta.  The  records  show  further,  that  on  the  10th 
of  September  Grant  suggested  a  move  from  Atlanta  on 
Augusta  or  Savannah,  instead  of  Mobile,  since  the  control  of 
the  latter  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Union  forces. 

Concerning  Savannah,  the  records  reveal  an  escape  of  Hardee 
with  ten  thousand,  from  Sherman's  sixty  thousand,  without 
disclosing  even  a  plausible  excuse.  Here  the  Memoirs  show 
Sherman  looking  back  to  Nashville,  from  whence  alone, 
through  defeat  of  Hood,  could  come  a  success  that  should 
vindicate  his  March  to  the  Sea,  and  finding  fault  with  Thomas, 
who,  though  crippled  in  all  ways  by  Sherman,  was  through 
superhuman  efforts  there,  saving  him  from  the  jeers  of  the 
Nation. 

In  treating  of  Savannah,  he  also  attacks  Mr.  Stanton  for 
carelessness  in  connection  with  the  captured  cotton,  and 
transactions  relating  thereto,  while  the  records  show  not  only 
that  he  had  absolutely  no  foundation  for  his  charges,  but  that 
in  most  respects  the  exact  opposite  of  what  he  wrote  was  true. 
After  a  magnificent  and  really  wonderful  march  through  the 
Carolinas,  with  every  warning,  as  the  Memoirs  relate,  that  the 
enemy  was  rapidly  concentrating  in  his  front,  the  records  show 
that  he  neglected  all  precautions,  and  marched  the  two  wings 
of  his  army,  neither  moving  in  close  order,  so  far  apart  that 
when  the  head  of  the  left  wing  was  attacked  at  10  o'clock  one 
forenoon,  by  the  whole  rebel  army,  estimated  by  himself  to 
have  been  from  thirty-seven  to  forty  thousand,  the  advance 


276  CONCLUSION. 

of  his  right  wing,  marching  to  the  sound  of  battle,  to  support 
the  left,  did  not  arrive  till  the  next  morning,  while  the  bulk 
of  this  wing  did  not  reach  the  field  till  the  following  after 
noon  ;  and  then,  when  his  whole  force  was  in  front  of  and  on 
the  flank  of  the  enemy,  the  latter  escaped.  Such  is  the  record 
history  of  Bentonville,  the  last  battle  of  his  army. 

What  shall  be  said  of  the  political  negotiations  which 
followed  ?  What  need  be  said  further  than  the  records 
show,  that,  beginning  with  a  proposition  to  receive  the  sur 
render  of  Johnston's  forces  upon  the  same  terms  Grant  had 
extended  to  Lee,  he  ended  by  surrendering  to  Johnston  upon 
terms  drawn  up  by  a  member  of  the  rebel  Cabinet? 


HOME  USE 


ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 


ALL  BUUiva  rei«  i   BU  «•  . 

LwcU  end  Rech.rges  m.y  be  mode  4  days  prior  ,o  ,he  due  d.,e 


Book,  may  be  Renewed  by  colling     642-3405 


^ — — — — •"•" " — ""^"^^"^ 

AgTAMPED  BELOW 


FORM  NO.  DD6 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


LD  2lA-50m-3  '62 
(C7097»10)476B 


General  Library     . 
University  of  California 
Berkeley 


CDS13t,a?3D 


